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1 Introduction 
German health care, like most health care systems in the Western world, has under-
gone profound changes over the last four decades (Giaimo & Manow, 1999). Start-
ing with financial reforms in the late 1970s, German policymakers have introduced 
increasingly radical changes in health care legislation over the last years (Lungen & 
Lapsley, 2003). Among the primary goals of these reforms were the containment of 
costs in the face of an aging society (Altenstetter & Busse, 2005: 132f.) and the se-
curing of high medical quality through increased market competition between 
health care providers (Neubauer & Pfister, 2008: 157).  
While Germany’s health care sector seems to be in a constant state of flux, change 
in this field does not come easily. Especially when politically or economically mo-
tivated changes collide with health care professionals’ ideas on desirable goals and 
appropriate modes of restructuration, change becomes a challenging endeavor 
(Ackroyd, Kirkpatrick, & Walker, 2007; Degeling, Maxwell, Kennedy, & Coyle, 
2003). The complexity of change in health care can be attributed to the unique role 
that professionals obtain in this sector. Like few other (service) sectors, health care 
is dominated by the normative control of professionals (Elston, 1991; Freeman & 
Moran, 2000; Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & Caronna, 2000). Professionals are members 
of autonomous occupations with exclusive authority over advanced knowledge 
(MacDonald, 1995: 1) who experience public recognition as they execute services 
of high societal value (Burkart, 2006; Parsons, 1937). As such, they have substan-
tial political leverage and significantly shape the process and outcome of changes in 
socially important sectors like health care (Elston, 1991; Kurunmäki, 1999). Exam-
ples of how professionals influenced changes in German health care include lobby-
ing activities of the German Medical Association against new modes of hospital 
funding (Bundesärztekammer, 2014) and petitions against the commercial provi-
sion of physician-assisted suicide (Bundesärztekammer, 2012). 
While these examples show how medical professionals attempted to secure the sta-
tus-quo, professionals do not only serve as a conservative force in health care 
(Kuhlmann, 2006: 25f.). They also initiate change in both their own standards of 
practice (e.g. Dent, 2002; Kitchener & Mertz, 2012) and the boundary conditions of 
their work (Leicht & Fennell, 1997; Suddaby & Viale, 2011). By promoting or re-
sisting changes in the diverse contexts of their practice, professionals influence the 
functionality of essential societal sectors like health care and law (Castel & 
Friedberg, 2010; Kilpatrick, Lavoie-Tremblay, Ritchie, Lamothe, & Doran, 2012; 
Salhani & Coulter, 2009; Waring & Bishop, 2010). Hence, it is crucial to under-
stand when, why, and how professionals engage in the change of their institutional 
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environment, that is, the entirety of regulatory, normative and cultural-cognitive 
contexts in which they are embedded (cf. Scott et al., 2000: 48ff.).  
As one of the most influential theories in organization research (Greenwood, Oli-
ver, Sahlin, & Suddaby, 2008: 30f.), neo-institutional theory
1
 has already started to 
examine how professionals alter the rules, norms, or interpretive schemes of their 
institutional environment (Battilana, 2011; Kitchener & Mertz, 2012; Muzio, 
Brock, & Suddaby, 2013; Scott, 2008b; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005; Suddaby & 
Viale, 2011). Mostly under the labels of ‘institutional change’ (Muzio et al., 2013; 
Scott et al., 2000) and ‘institutional work’ (Currie, Lockett, Finn, Martin, & 
Waring, 2012; Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Singh & Jayanti, 2013; Suddaby & Viale, 
2011), research has provided valuable insights on professionals’ role in the dynam-
ics of their institutional environment. Scholars have shown, for example, how pro-
fessional associations draw on discursive means to change dominant conceptions of 
appropriate organizational structure (Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002), how 
professionalization efforts of former occupations inform public legislation 
(Kitchener & Mertz, 2012), and how professionals maintain their status by resisting 
new modes of service provision (Currie et al., 2012). While institutional change has 
been one of the central themes in institutional research for over two decades now 
(Scott, 2010a) and professionals are commonly identified as central element in in-
stitutional dynamics (cf. Scott et al., 2000; Singh & Jayanti, 2013; Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005), scholars have only recently begun to explicitly theorize the re-
lationship between professionals and institutional change (Muzio et al., 2013; 
Suddaby & Viale, 2011). Given the various contexts in which professionals operate 
and the multiplicity of roles they obtain, ranging from political actors with consid-
erable societal leverage to salaried employees in large corporations, our understand-
ing of when, why and how professionals affect institutional change is still far from 
clear. 
To address this research gap, this dissertation aims to expand our understanding of 
the relationship between professionals and institutional dynamics in health care. In 
the following sections, I will further elaborate on health care as empirical setting of 
this thesis and will identify the theoretical gaps in research on professionals’ role in 
institutional change and stability. Further, I will give an overview of the specific 
goals as well as the structure of this thesis.  
                                                 
1 Here and in the following, the terms „institutional” and „institutionalism“ will be used in reference to neo-
institutional theory in organization research (Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin, & Suddaby, 2008), unless indicated 
otherwise. 
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1.1 Institutional Change in Health Care and the Role of 
Professionals  
Nothing appears to be as constant as change in the health care systems of the devel-
oped world (Kuhlmann & Annandale, 2012). This phenomenon is often attributed 
to current demographic developments taking place in most Western societies 
(Nicholas & Smith, 2006: 480). Highly industrialized countries like Germany face 
an aging population and a corresponding increase in age-related illnesses against 
the background of a rapid expansion of innovative treatment options (Pammolli, 
Riccaboni, & Magazzini, 2012). With the goal to provide high-quality health care 
while keeping costs at bay, policymakers and managers are united in their efforts to 
achieve effective and efficient change in the structures of health care (Perleth, 
Jakubowski, & Busse, 2001). However, change in health care is far from being a 
linear process, but instead follows complex dynamics (Grol, Baker, & Moss, 2002: 
7; Hinings et al., 2003; Parkin, 2009). The complexity of change in health care 
mainly stems from the normative aspects inherent to the provision of medical ser-
vices which may literally boil down to life-or-death decisions (Martin & Singer, 
2003). Even though increasing shortage of financial resources forces economic per-
spectives upon health care, scholars point out that “health care systems are primari-
ly driven by values not by economic forces” (Light, 1997: 110; see also Kuhlmann, 
2006: 40). Hence, to understand the dynamics of change in health care, we must 
direct our focus to those who provide the moral values to this field, that is, profes-
sionals (cf. Hafferty & Light, 1995; Kuhlmann, 2006, 2008; Wolinsky, 1988). A 
prime example of how professionals infuse a field with values is the long-standing 
dominance of the professional ethics of medicine in health care (cf. Currie et al., 
2012). Primarily based on the Hippocratic Oath as the first formalized professional 
code of conduct (Miles, 2005), medical ethics represent the normative basis of 
health care as a societal and economic sector (cf. Freidson, 1985). While scholars 
and practitioners observe that the medical profession has lost part of its normative 
power due to the rise of managerialism in health care (Relman, 2007; Scott et al., 
2000), the provision of health care is still virtually inseparable from the work of 
highly trained health care professionals (e.g. Noordegraaf & Van der Meulen, 2008; 
Sanders & Harrison, 2008; Watkins, 2005). This work extends to the provision of 
services on the practice level but also to the design of the organizational and the 
wider institutional environments in which professionals’ services are embedded 
(Muzio et al., 2013; Scott, 2008b; Suddaby & Viale, 2011). Any change in health 
care is thus also a change in and/or through the health care professions (cf. Ferlie, 
Fitzgerald, Wood, & Hawkins, 2005). Accordingly, it is impossible to grasp the 
origins and processes of change and stability in health care without drawing specif-
ic attention to the role of professionals in these dynamics.  
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The notion of professionals as forces of change and stability in different areas of 
organizational life has found its way into organization research with the develop-
ment of neo-institutional theory. In line with the explanatory focus of early neo-
institutional research, professionals have initially been depicted as source of norma-
tive pressures causing stability and structural homogeneity within organizational 
fields (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), defined as a “community of organizations that 
partakes of a common meaning system and whose participants interact more fre-
quently and fatefully with one another than with actors outside of the field” (Scott, 
2008a: 86). Despite the notion that  professionals are “primary types of actors shap-
ing institutional environments” (Scott, 1987: 493, emphasis added by author), pro-
fessionalization has long been theorized as mechanism of convergent organizational 
change in line with the status-quo of the institutional environment (D'Aunno, 
Sutton, & Price, 1991; Dacin, 1997). 
Yet, institutional theory has changed and so has the conceptualization of profes-
sionals. Within the last two decades, the focus of institutional theory has shifted 
from explaining the convergence of structures and the reproduction of practices in 
different organizational settings (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008; Guler, Guillén, & 
Macpherson, 2002; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009) towards the dynamics of institutions 
themselves (Hargrave & van de Ven, 2006; Holm, 1995; Leblebici, Salancik, 
Copay, & King, 1991; Sherer & Lee, 2002). With this rising interest in the origins 
and processes of institutional change (Battilana, 2006; Battilana, Leca, & 
Boxenbaum, 2009; Beckert, 1999; Maguire & Hardy, 2009), institutional research 
has also renewed and broadened its interest in the study of professions and profes-
sionals (Muzio et al., 2013). Specifically, the link between professionals’ institu-
tional work, i.e. the creation, maintenance and disruption of institutional arrange-
ments and practices (Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2011; Lawrence, Leca, & Zilber, 
2013; Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009a), and institutional change has been the 
object of extensive scientific scrutiny (e.g., Currie et al., 2012; Micelotta & 
Washington, 2013; Reay, Golden-Biddle, & Germann, 2006). Conceptually, pro-
fessionals have developed from the enforcers of normative beliefs on appropriate 
organizational structure and conduct (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) to what Scott 
(2008b) terms the “lords of the dance”. According to him, professionals are “the 
most influential, contemporary crafters of institutions” (Scott, 2008b: 223). This 
appraisal of professionals as most powerful actors in organizational fields is sup-
ported by a substantial amount of empirical research that, both implicitly and ex-
plicitly, identifies professionals as institutional agents who, more or less successful-
ly, initiate (Goodrick & Reay, 2010), direct (Greenwood et al., 2002), or hamper 
(Dunn & Jones, 2010; Micelotta & Washington, 2013) field-level change. 
However, the notion of professionals as “lords of the dance” (Scott, 2008b) and the 
focus of research on their proactive and purposeful exertion of agency in processes 
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of institutional change (Kitchener & Mertz, 2012) appears to fall short of the reali-
ties of many professionals. While undoubtedly central actors in many organization-
al fields and of crucial importance to broader society, members of the traditional 
professions (e.g. health care professionals) have to witness how their formerly high 
status is withering away (Noordegraaf, 2007; Noordegraaf & Van der Meulen, 
2008). In most western countries, societal and technological changes start to un-
dermine professionals’ authority and autonomy (Elston, 1991; Kurunmäki, 1999), 
and market logics gradually begin to erode the logic of professionalism (Kitchener, 
2002; Scott et al., 2000). Leicht and Fennell (2008: 431) summarize these devel-
opments as follows:  
“[T]he classic autonomous, peer-oriented professional practice is under pressure 
from institutional constituents interested in lower costs, more accountability, and 
ethical transparency at the same historical moment that technological changes put 
pressure on traditional, institutionalized methods for delivering professional ser-
vices. The combination of new places, new people, new technologies and new cli-
ents has pushed professionals in new and uncharted directions.” 
In addition to an increasing number of social expectations that challenge the exer-
tion of ideal-type professionalism, these expectations may also vary over different 
contexts, thereby enabling and constraining professionals’ agency in idiosyncratic 
ways. For example, medical managers in large hospitals are expected to also pro-
mote efficient processes in their organization (Doolin, 2001; Iedema, Degeling, 
Braithwaite, & White, 2004; Kuhlmann et al., 2013) while legal professionals in 
multinational law firms may have to integrate several diverging ideas on appropri-
ate legal practice in their routines (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013). Hence, it is im-
portant to study professionals’ involvement in institutional dynamics against the 
background of the different contexts of their work.  
While research on institutional change still tends to focus on drastic changes 
brought forth by public struggles between different constituents of a field (Suddaby 
& Greenwood, 2005; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010; Zilber, 2007), we have to 
acknowledge that professionalization and the enactment of professionalism is not 
only a political process at the field-level – it is far from that (Kellogg, 2009; 
Kellogg, Breen, Ferzoco, Zinner, & Ashley, 2006; Kitchener, 2000). Today, many 
professionals work as employees of large organizations that are under managerial 
rather than professional control (Leicht & Fennell, 1997). Within organizations, 
professionals frequently experience tension between the autonomous organization 
of their work, a core characteristic of professionalism (Freidson, 1984), and the bu-
reaucratic standards associated with the hierarchical organization of work (Engel, 
1970; Marcus, 1985). This tension may increase professionals’ reflexivity and may 
motivate them to exert agency (cf. Battilana et al., 2009). Accordingly, much of 
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professionals’ involvement in institutional change is taking place within the bound-
aries of organizations as they seek to defend their professional autonomy (Dent, 
2003) and struggle to balance different logics encapsulated in their roles as manag-
ers, employees, and members of a profession (Doolin, 2001). These processes of 
institutional change are usually less dramatic than the political quarrels on the level 
of organizational fields (Kellogg, 2009; Singh & Jayanti, 2013), and commonly the 
product of what scholars describe as everyday institutional work that is “nearly in-
visible and often mundane” (Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009b: 1). Despite the 
fact that many studies restrict their research focus to macro-level processes of insti-
tutional change, initiated by political actors such as professional associations and 
legislative bodies (Galvin, 2002; Greenwood et al., 2002; Lounsbury, 2002; 
Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005), field-level change often originates from incremen-
tal, sometimes even unintentional, institutional work on the routine-level 
(Jarzabkowski, Matthiesen, & Van de Ven, 2009; Lounsbury, 2008). Smets, 
Morris, and Greenwood (2012: 893) describe this kind of institutional work as “sit-
uated improvising” rather than strategic action (see also: Jarzabkowski et al., 2009; 
Lounsbury, 2008). 
Against the background of the diverse setting in which professionals operate, the 
increasing constraints on professional work, and recent findings on practice-driven 
processes of institutional work, we find two major shortcomings in extant literature 
on professionals’ role in institutional change: 
First, much of extant literature focuses to the highly visible instances of institutional 
change on the field-level, initiated by elite actors and implemented through often 
dramatic processes of political action (Greenwood et al., 2002; Kitchener & Mertz, 
2012). While the need to direct more attention to the microfoundations of institu-
tional change has been frequently emphasized (Lawrence et al., 2013; Powell & 
Colyvas, 2008), institutional research has been slow in adopting a micro-
perspective on institutional change as constant, incremental, and ubiquitous phe-
nomenon. In particular, institutional research has only begun to theorize and empir-
ically explore the less visible instances of professionals’ institutional work efforts 
within the boundaries of their organizations and their daily routines (Reay et al., 
2013; Waldorff, Reay, & Goodrick, 2013). Further, the different levels on which 
institutional change may occur have so far mostly been studied in isolation (for 
exceptions see: Purdy & Gray, 2009; Seo & Creed, 2002; Smets et al., 2012). 
Hence, we still know little about how professionals enable institutional change and 
stability on the micro-level and how multilevel institutional dynamics interrelate 
through professionals’ involvement.  
Second, while comprehensive case studies have provided us with valuable insights 
on how and why professionals shape institutional change, most research empha-
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sized professionals’ central status within a field and conceptualizes them as power-
ful agents who successfully initiate and direct the implementation of new institu-
tional arrangements and practices (Battilana, 2006; Scott, 2008b, 2010b). In doing 
so, research on professionals’ role in institutional change is facing similar pitfalls as 
the concept of ‘institutional entrepreneurship’ (Battilana et al., 2009). Initially de-
veloped to explain how “new institutions arise when organized actors with suffi-
cient resources see in them an opportunity to realize interests that they value high-
ly” (DiMaggio, 1988: 14), the conceptualization of the ‘institutional entrepreneur’ 
has been criticized for depicting actors as “hypermuscular supermen, single handed 
in their efforts to resist institutional pressure, transform organizational fields and 
alter institutional logics” (Suddaby, 2010: 15). While professionals do hold exclu-
sive authority over specific fields of expertise and still enjoy higher status than most 
members of other white-collar-occupations (Leicht & Fennell, 1997; Reed, 1996), 
theories of increasing de-professionalization and proletarization of the professions 
(Barnett, Barnett, & Kearns, 1998; Wolinsky, 1988) shed a critical light on profes-
sionals as guiding and mostly unrestricted forces in institutional change. According-
ly, research needs to take into account that while the professions constitute a source 
of institutional pressure (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), professionals’ reflexivity, 
power, and agency are also limited through their embeddedness in diverse political, 
social and work contexts (Leicht & Fennell, 2001: 96ff.). 
Overall, it seems fair to state that institutional research is only at the beginning of 
understanding how professionals and institutional dynamics are intertwined, that is, 
when and why professionals engage in institutional change, how they exert institu-
tional work and how their institutional work efforts are enabled and constrained by 
the multiple contexts in which they operate. Given the relative lack of studies that 
provide a balanced view on the diverse antecedents and processes of professionals’ 
institutional work against the background of professionals’ embeddedness in politi-
cal systems, organizational hierarchies and everyday routines, it is not surprising 
that scholars still find that “the precise role of professionals and professional ser-
vices firms in processes of institutional change remains under-theorized and under-
examined“ (Muzio et al., 2013: 700). It is the goal of this thesis to add to the resolu-
tion of this theoretical puzzle by integrating and extending theoretical and empirical 
findings on professionals’ institutional work.   
1.2 Goal and Structure of Thesis  
With an empirical focus on the health care sector, this dissertation addresses the 
questions on when, how and why professionals influence institutional change and 
stability. Specifically, this dissertation focuses on the institutional work efforts of 
different groups of health care professionals, namely physicians and nurses, within 
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German health care. Given the significant regulatory dynamics that German health 
care experienced during the last decades, this setting provides a particularly favora-
ble background for the study on when, why, and how professionals seek to create, 
maintain and disrupt institutions. 
Elaborating on how professionals interact with the different contexts in which they 
are embedded, this thesis aims to provide a holistic picture of professionals’ en-
gagement in institutional dynamics. In particular, this thesis contributes to the 
growing literature on the micro-processes of professionals’ institutional work with-
in the diverse contexts in which these actors operate.  
This dissertation is divided into seven main parts. It starts with an introductory 
overview of the empirical setting of this thesis that will illustrate its practical rele-
vance. In chapter two, I will first explain the structure of German health care with 
a special focus on the institutions and actors that constitute this field (Chapter 2.1). 
Second, I will trace the most important regulatory changes between 1977, the year 
of the first comprehensive financial reform in modern German health care, and to-
day. I will then briefly outline to which extent these changes in the regulatory envi-
ronment of this sector entailed processes of institutional change in the normative 
and cognitive foundations of health care (Chapter 2.2).  
Following this brief synopsis on institutional change in German health care, I will 
lay the conceptual foundations of this thesis. Chapter three contains four main 
sections, which, in sum, will provide a general understanding of how professionals 
and institutional dynamics are intertwined. Starting with a basic definition of pro-
fessions and professionals, I will first elaborate on how the conceptualization of 
professionals moved from a trait-based approach (Greenwood, 1957) to an interac-
tionist explanation on what constitutes a profession (Freidson, 1988a) (Chapter 3.1). 
While I will draw on the sociology of the professions as the probably most influen-
tial theoretical perspective on the nature of professionalism (Elliott, 1972; 
MacDonald, 1995), the focus of this chapter lies on an institutional perspective on 
the professions as socially constructed entities (Torres, 1991) as well as on profes-
sionals as agents in the institutionalization of the professions (Larson, 1979). The 
following section is dedicated to an overview of the different levels on which pro-
fessionals operate (Chapter 3.2). I will illustrate how professionals act as political 
force on the field-level, how they fulfil managerial and employee roles within the 
hierarchical structures of organizations, and how they execute their craft as partici-
pants in routines. I will proceed with a brief discussion on why professionals need 
to be studied as carriers of multiple logics (i.e. distinct patterns “of material practic-
es, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules” (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999: 804)) and 
how professionals can be viewed as institutional workers who shape their profes-
sion as well as adjacent institutions (Chapter 3.3). I will end chapter three by devel-
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oping an integrated model on how professionals exert institutional work on and 
across the different levels of their practice (Chapter 3.4). Specifically, I will elabo-
rate on how professionals’ institutional work can generally be conceptualized as 
‘boundary work’, implying that professionals’ change and maintain institutional 
arrangements by selectively in- and excluding specific institutional logics into their 
profession, their organizational roles, and their daily routines.  
Chapters four, five, and six comprise the main parts of this thesis, including three 
self-contained empirical studies. Each chapter discusses in more detail selected as-
pects of professionals’ institutional work in German health care on the field-, the 
organization-, or the routine-level. Specifically, I will provide new insights on how 
professionals exert institutional work as political actors on the field-level (Chapter 
4.3), as recipients of planned changes within their organizations (Chapter 5.3), and 
as participants in organizational routines (Chapter 6.3). While each study represents 
a distinct research effort, they are united in their goal to provide a more fine-grained 
understanding of the ‘whens’, ‘whys’, and ‘hows’ of professionals’ institutional 
work.  
In chapter four, I will address institutional change on the field-level (i.e. the level 
on which collective actors interact and recognize each other as part of a distinct 
social community (Scott, 2008a: 86)). The chapter begins with a descriptive analy-
sis on how selected field-level changes in German health care within the last decade 
have influenced and were influenced by professionals (Chapter 4.1). This section 
will provide the empirical context for the qualitative study in the further course of 
this chapter. The focus of chapter 4.1 will be on the dynamics between external 
shocks (e.g. an aging population), regulatory changes, and the professional projects 
(Larson, 1979) of different health care professions. The next section of chapter four 
contains the theoretical perspective on the interaction between professionals and 
field-level changes (Chapter 4.2). Drawing on a comprehensive literature review, I 
will provide an in-depth discussion of the antecedents and processes of profession-
als’ involvement in changes within organizational fields. During the course of this 
review of extant conceptual and empirical research, I will identify gaps in the litera-
ture on professionals’ role in field-level-change. The last section of chapter four 
contains a qualitative study on how federal, physician and nursing representatives 
make use of vocabulary structures to promote or inhibit institutional change (Chap-
ter 4.3)
2
. It contributes to extant research by providing a more-fine-grained view on 
the use of discursive means as tools in disruptive and maintaining institutional 
work. Specifically, this study identifies three distinct patterns of vocabulary con-
struction as means of institutional work and shows how existing power relations 
                                                 
2 Earlier versions of this study have been presented at the EGOS Colloquium 2013 in Montreal, Canada and 
the 1st First Austrian Young Scholars Workshop in Management 2013 in Linz, Austria. 
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within a field are reinforced when high-status actors gain interpretive control of a 
debate’s key phrases.  
Chapter five will deal with institutional change on the organization-level. I will 
first provide a descriptive overview on major changes within the structures and pro-
cesses of German health care organizations (Chapter 5.1). The main focus of this 
section will be on changes in hospitals as these organizations host several profes-
sional groups and regularly become an arena of professional politics (Iedema et al., 
2004; Mesler, 1991; Mueller, Sillince, Harvey, & Howorth, 2004; Oborn, 2008; 
Porter, 1991). I will elaborate on how regulatory changes informed the provision of 
health care in hospitals. Specifically, I will discuss in more detail how hospitals 
increased their use of industrial management concepts and how the division of labor 
between different health care professionals changed. In the second section of this 
chapter, I will provide the theoretical background for the empirical study that fol-
lows. I will discuss findings on professionals’ institutional work within the bounda-
ries of their organizations and identify shortcomings within this literature (Chapter 
5.2). In the last section of chapter five, I will present an empirical study based on 
the configurative method of fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA)
3
. 
The study addresses the question of when and why nursing professionals are open 
to changes in institutionalized practices. One contribution of this study lies in the 
analysis of ‘reactive institutional work’ within organizations in the sense of profes-
sionals’ openness to change. Overall, I find three configurations of boundary condi-
tions that foster nursing professionals to be open to changes in their working prac-
tices. The results suggest that configurations of boundary conditions only foster 
nursing professionals’ openness towards changes in institutional practices when 
they provide professionals with both pragmatic and normative legitimization ac-
counts. This study furthers our understanding of professionals’ reaction to planned 
institutional change by elaborating on how characteristics of change projects must 
interact with organizational boundary conditions to foster perceptions of usefulness 
and appropriateness at the same time. 
Chapter six addresses the routine-level of institutional change and stability in 
German health care. In the first section of this chapter, I will describe how recent 
developments in German health care affected the treatment routines within hospi-
tals (Chapter 6.1). A key focus of this section will be on the growing standardiza-
tion tendencies within health care routines. While these developments promise both 
large efficiency gains and improved quality of care, they also restrict professionals’ 
autonomy (Timmermans & Berg, 2003). As autonomous conduct is a key aspect of 
professionalism, these routine-level developments do not only challenge profes-
                                                 
3 Earlier versions of this study have been presented at the EGOS Colloquium 2014 in Rotterdam, Netherlands 
and the Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management 2014 in Philadelphia, PA. 
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sionals’ working structure but also their role identities (Doolin, 2002; Marcus, 
1985).  In the second section of chapter six, I will discuss insights from extant re-
search on professionals’ institutional work within this micro-sphere of organiza-
tional life (Chapter 6.2). Due to a relative negligence of organizational routines as 
level of analysis in research on institutional agency, this section will draw on insti-
tutional and routine research to provide theoretical insights on how professionals 
exert agency within routines as “effortful accomplishments” (Pentland & Rueter, 
1994: 488). In analogy to the previous chapters 4.2 and 5.2, I will elaborate on how 
current literature needs to be extended to gain a fuller understanding of profession-
als’ institutional work on the routine-level. The final section of chapter six contains 
another fsQCA study
4  
(Chapter 6.3). This study explores when and why written 
organizational rules are persistently enacted by professionals within medical treat-
ment routines. In doing so, this study sheds light on the dynamics of mundane insti-
tutional work that occurs alongside professionals’ daily work (cf. Lawrence et al., 
2013) while accounting for the embeddedness of routines in organizational and 
wider institutional environments. Overall, the study reveals three multilevel config-
urations of institutional, organizational, and task conditions fostering persistent rule 
enactment.  This study contributes to extant literature by emphasizing how contex-
tual embeddednesss affects professionals’ routines – an aspect which is oftentimes 
missed by practice-minded routine researchers (Parmigiani & Howard-Grenville, 
2011). This study suggests that theories of organizational routines need to be broad-
ened to include the interplay of multilevel dynamics to explain persistence of writ-
ten rules in organizational routines. Hence, it proposes a “routines-in-situations per-
spective” to explain routine dynamics and rule persistence in professional settings. 
I will end this dissertation with chapter seven which includes an in-depth discus-
sion on how the findings of this work connect to extant research on the role of pro-
fessionals in institutional dynamics, and how they add to our current knowledge in 
this field. Figure 1 gives a brief overview on the structure and the main contents of 
this thesis.   
                                                 
4 This study was jointly conducted with Hendrik Wilhelm. Earlier versions have been presented at the EGOS 
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2 Setting: Changing German Health Care  
According to the World Health Organization (2000), German health care is among 
the most-efficient health care systems in the world.
5
 However, more recent rankings 
shed a more critical light on Germany’s health care system. In the 2010 health care 
system ranking of the Commonwealth Fund, Germany only ranks 4
th
 on overall 
health care system performance among seven Western countries (Mahon & Fox, 
2010).
6
 While the German health care sector performs well regarding timeliness of 





respectively (idb.).  
Put under cost pressures due to demographic challenges like an aging and increas-
ingly morbid society (Arnold, Litsch, & Schellschmidt, 2001; Nicholas & Smith, 
2006), it has not gone unnoticed by policymakers that the performance of Germa-
ny’s health care sector leaves room for improvement. In attempts to secure the effi-
cient provision of health care, policymakers have introduced several financial and 
structural reforms during the last four decades (Kamke, 1998). Yet, not all of these 
reforms generated the desired outcomes (Döhler, 1995) and several attempts of re-
structuring health care evoked fierce struggles between legislators, statutory health 
insurance funds, and service providers, including hospitals and, not least, health 
care professionals (Höppner & Kuhlmey, 2009; Kuhlmann, 2006; Kuhlmann & 
Allsop, 2008).   
The reason for the contested nature of changes in this sector can be found in the 
unique history of German health care that brought forth a corporatist governance 
structure (von Winter, 2014; Wendt, Rothgang, & Helmert, 2005). This corporatist 
structure leaves considerable discretion over the operational design of health care to 
decentralized governance bodies such as the Federal Joint Committee (Ge-
meinsamer Bundesausschuss: G-BA). While self-regulation within a profession is 
not uncommon in Western health care systems (Lameire, Joffe, & Wiedemann, 
1999), the governance structures of German health care are exceptionally deeply 
intertwined with professional interests (Kuhlmann & Allsop, 2008). For example, 
the National Associations of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians and Dentists are 
two of the four member associations in the G-BA, a central federal body in German 
                                                 
5 Germany obtains the 25th rank among 191 member states of the United Nations. The efficiency ranking is 
based on a weighted index comprised of the following indicators: health, health inequality, level of respon-
siveness, distribution of responsiveness, and fairness in financing (Tandon, Murray, Lauer, & Evans, 2001).  
6 Performance evaluation is based on patient and physician surveys and includes the following areas: Quality 
(including Effective Care, Safe Care, Coordinated Care, and Patient-Centered Care), Access to Care (includ-
ing Cost-Related Problems of Access and Timeliness of Care), Efficiency, Equity and Ability to Lead Long, 
Healthy, and Productive Lives. The countries included in this ranking are (listed according to their ranking 
position): The Netherlands, the U.K, Australia, Germany, Canada, and the United States.  
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health care, responsible for translating abstract legal frameworks into specific reso-
lutions and directives to regulate the provision of health care (G-BA, 2014e). Be-
sides the multiple interdependencies between professional governance and the ad-
ministration of the health care system as a whole, Germany is further characterized 
by an extensive social security system that has long separated health care from the 
logics of the free market. Accordingly, policymakers faced the challenge of enforc-
ing reforms against the interest of powerful stakeholders and a historically grown 
detachment from market logics.  
The goal of this chapter is to provide an overview of the origins and the structures 
of German health care and to give insights into the latest structural changes of this 
highly important sector. This empirical background provides an important founda-
tion to the studies in chapters 4.3, 5.3, and 6.3 as any changes in such highly institu-
tionalized fields as health care need to be assessed against the background of their 
contextual embeddedness. In the first section, I will elaborate on the historical ori-
gins of German health care and illustrate how its current corporatist structure came 
into existence. Further, I will give a short overview on the most important stake-
holders in the political processes that shape German health care. In the second sec-
tion, I will explain the most important health care reforms that have been intro-
duced since the end of 1970s and have induced a paradigm change from a state-
protected social sector to a (partly) liberalized health care market. I will further il-
lustrate how these changes altered the structures of the field and how they affected 
the relative position of different stakeholders such as insurances and health care 
professionals.  
2.1 German Health Care: Institutional Foundations and 
Present State   
Germany’s current health system dates back to Otto von Bismarck, Germany’s first 
chancellor, who established mandatory health care insurance in 1883 (Kamke, 
1998). With statutory health care, one of the most central characteristics of German 
health care evolved: statutory health insurance funds (SHI-funds). In opposite to 
purely market-based health care systems, German health care is based on the prin-
ciple of solidarity. The SHI funds had initially been developed to provide lower-
class workers with access to adequate health care but were successively opened for 
all citizens (Bärnighausen & Sauerborn, 2002). The idea behind this system was to 
secure health care for all individuals in the German state, regardless of their health 
risk.  
In the early years after their inception, SHI-funds made individual contracts with 
selected physicians, effectively excluding a considerable number of physicians 
from providing medical services to SHI-fund-members who represented about 18 
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percent of the German population by 1911 (Simon, 2013: 34). Yet, the treatment of 
insured patients was an attractive option for physicians to secure and expand their 
income as most people without insurance were not able to afford health care, which 
generated a considerable income uncertainty for physicians (Simon, 2013: 36). Es-
pecially after SHI-funds had been opened for larger parts of society, including more 
wealthy classes of employees like clerical workers, the number of doctors with own 
offices increased rapidly, roughly doubling between 1885 and 1919.Yet, SHI-funds 
still had the privilege of including and excluding physicians from providing medi-
cal care covered by the insurance. In a reaction to the licensing monopoly of the 
SHI-funds, physicians founded the ‘Hartmannbund’ in 1900 with the goal to substi-
tute individual contracts between SHI funds and physicians for collective agree-
ments. The ensuing struggles between the Hartmannbund and the SHI-funds culmi-
nated in 1905 with the “Leipzig doctors’ strike” (Kunstmann, Butzlaff, & Böcken, 
2002). By 1913 and under the protectorate of the German government, the SHI-
funds and the Hartmannbund reached agreement in the form of the “Berlin Conven-
tion” that created the structural basis for Germany’s current health care system 
which strongly relies on self-administration. The Berlin convention granted the 
Hartmannbund co-decision rights in the selection and appointment of SHI-approved 
doctors. Further, the closure of individual contracts required the consent of the con-
tract committee that represented physicians and SHI-administrators equally (Simon, 
2013: 36). However, the peace between the SHI-funds and the Hartmannbund was 
only temporal. After the end of the Berlin convention in 1923, doctors and SHI-
funds were unable to come to a new agreement. Eventually, the government of the 
Weimar Republic intervened by integrating the main contents of the Berlin conven-
tion into federal law and further expanding the system of joint self-government 
(Simon, 2013: 37). Between 1923 and 1932, several changes in the structure of 
German health care were introduced which have – in their basic structure – sur-
vived until today. First, the government founded the ‘Committee for Physicians and 
Health Insurance Funds of the German Empire’ (Reichsausschuss für Ärzte und 
Krankenkassen), a joint body of physicians and statutory health insurance funds 
which was entrusted with the development of guidelines for the admission of phy-
sicians (Simon, 2013: 38). Further, arbitration courts with equal representation were 
established to settle potential disputes between physicians and insurances. By 1932, 
individual contracts between the SHI funds and physicians had been replaced with 
collective contracts between the SHI funds and the Association of Statutory Health 
Insurance Physicians which took the position of the Hartmannbund. Apart from an 
interruption during the Third Reich, German health care remained mostly self-
governed through a collaboration of service providers (i.e. physicians) and SHI 
funds.  
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Today, the structure of German health care still clearly reflects its origins: While 
governmental bodies on the macro-level provide the general jurisdictional frame, 
German health care is still characterized by a strong self-administration on the me-
so-level that translates abstract laws into concrete resolutions and guidelines. The 
following overview over the main decision-making bodies (BMG, 2014b) will give 
a more detailed picture on how politics, professionals, and health care funds are 
intertwined within German health care (see Figure 2.1).  
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On the macro-level, the federal ministry of health (Bundesministerium für Gesund-
heit: BMG) represents the central authority of German health care
7
. It drafts bills, 
ordinances and administrative regulations  that directly or indirectly support its core 
task “of safeguarding and further developing the effectiveness of the statutory 
health insurance” (BMG, 2014a). A key responsibility of the federal ministry of 
health is the supervision of subordinate federal agencies like the Robert-Koch-
Institute (which is responsible for the identification, prevention and control of infec-
tious diseases) or the Federal Institute for Drugs and Medical Devices (which au-
thorizes, registers, and controls the risk of drugs and other medical products). Every 
two years, the BMG commissions the Advisory Council on the Assessment of De-
velopments in the Health Care System (SVR) to issue a report on current develop-
ments in health care, including themes such as structural and demographic chal-
lenges (SVR, 1994) or the development of the health care professions (SVR, 2007). 
These reports are mostly used to develop and refine legislative initiatives that are 
introduced to the Bundestag which – under cooperation of the Bundesrat – decides 
whether the proposed bills will be passed.  
Yet, despite its central position within the German health care system, the BMG 
only provides the general regulative environment, the ‘legislative boundaries’ for 
the federal bodies on the meso-level which more directly regulate and supervise the 
provision of health care. Even the BMG (2014b) itself points out that a great part of 
health care regulation is being delegated to the meso-level, summarizing its func-
tion as follows: “The state provides the framework. The partners of the self-
government design the provision of health care”.  
Since 2004, the Federal Joint Committee (G-BA) has become the most important 
federal body to translate and implement government regulation. It is the highest 
board of the joint self-government of service providers and SHI-funds and its deci-
sions – while subordinate to federal law – are legally binding. The tasks of the G-
BA include defining which medical services are to be reimbursed by statutory 
health insurances as well as managing and securing quality within ambulatory and 
in-patient care through the definition of legally binding guidelines, structures, and 
processes (G-BA, 2014e). The G-BA is comprised of a decision-making body and 
nine subcommitees
8
 that deal with specific topics such as quality management. The 
decision-making body consists of 13 members that represent the central profession-
al, hospital and SHI-bodies in German health care. The National Association of 
Statutory Health Insurance Funds (GKV-SV) – as the relatively most powerful ac-
tors within this body – is being represented by five members. The National Asso-
                                                 
7 As Germany is a federal republic, health care legislation is enforced by the regional ministries of health in 
each federal state. Yet, they do not possess any legislative power. 
8 As per July 2014. 
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ciation of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians (KBV) and the German Hospital 
Federation (DKG) are each represented by two members while the National Asso-
ciation of Statutory Health Insurance Dentists provides one member. Owing to its 
federal mandate, the G-BA is managed by a neutral chairman and includes two ad-
ditional neutral members. Patient associations are not directly represented within 
the G-BA but have consultation rights and may make motions. The consultation 
processes of the G-BA further include official statements of third parties, which, 
depending on the regulation in question, may be other health care occupations, 
pharmaceutical companies, or scientific institutes.  
While the G-BA is a federal body, its structure illustrates well that German health 
care is strongly influenced by the interests of (statutory health care) insurances and 
health care professionals who do not only shape health care policy through lobby-
ing attempts but have become an integral part of the regulatory bodies. This system 
comes with specific advantages and challenges. On the one hand, the state is widely 
relieved from the strenuous task of providing guidelines specific enough to be ap-
plicable and relevant to health care routines on the operational level (Simon, 2013: 
119). Further, as professionals are regular members of the G-BA, the practical fea-
sibility of new guidelines is considered early in the process.  
On the other hand, the G-BA has also been criticized for delaying the access to 
medical innovation due to its focus on cost containment. Generally, much of the 
criticism the G-BA has to face is directed towards its attempts to minimize health 
care expenditures. This is because cost-containment measures are most likely to 
affect the quantity and quality of services provided to patients as well as the work-
ing conditions of health care professionals and the potential revenue of pharmaceu-
tical companies. For example, politicians blamed the G-BA for hindering the mar-
ket launch of urgently needed drugs due to its opinionated consultation processes 
(Mißlbeck, 2011). Besides, patient associations have attacked the G-BA for jeop-
ardizing public health due to inappropriate drug assessment (Hohle, 2013) and 
overly simplistic needs- and demand-based planning of ambulatory care (VdK, 
2014).   
Especially the health care professions have not only criticized the decision-making 
processes of the G-BA but also its very structure. The German Nursing Council 
(DPR), for example, demands the inclusion of nursing representatives into the joint 
self-government beyond occasional consultation (DPR, 2014c). Physicians, who are 
already represented within the G-BA by two members of the KBV, are particularly 
critical of the relative majority of the SHI-funds within the G-BA. According to 
Flintrop and Gerst (2010), the five SHI-representatives are more likely to reach 
consensus while delegates of the KBV and the DKG, as a less homogenous group, 
are often unable to build a coherent unity against the cost-conscious SHI-
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representatives. Further, physicians questioned the legitimacy of the G-BA with 
regard to the regulation of professional work, claiming that decisions like the redi-
vision of tasks between physicians and other health care professions (§ 63 c SGB 
V) clearly falls into the responsibilities of professional associations (Flintrop & 
Gerst, 2010: 172).  
Hence, while the G-BA is the central federal body on the meso-level of German 
health care, it is by far not the only influential collective actor as the health care 
professions have high stakes in the economic and structural boundary conditions of 
their work. Overall, several hundred professional associations represent the interests 
of their members in German health care (Preusker, 2011). Among the most im-
portant are the German Medical Association (Bundesärztekammer: BÄK) and the 
German Nursing Council (Deutscher Pflegerat: DPR) which represent the medical 
and the nursing profession as the two major groups of the health care workforce.  
The BÄK was founded as early as 1947 and comprises the 17 State Chambers of 
Physicians. Physicians are compulsory members in one of these Chambers as they 
are the bodies of professional self-administration and, as such, provide the code of 
medical ethics and oversee both professional training and practice. In contrast to the 
KBV, the BÄK does not only represent SHI-accredited physicians but all practicing 
members of the medical profession. Further, it is not primarily concerned with 
questions of reimbursement and not legally obligated to secure the nation-wide 
availability of medical services. The BÄK itself defines one of its main tasks as 
“safeguarding the professional interests of the medical profession” (BÄK, 2014b). 
Accordingly, the BÄK is often fiercely involved in political struggles whenever 
they perceive the interests of the medical profession to be threatened. Examples 
include debates with SHI-funds regarding the extent of doctors shortage in rural 
areas (Haverkamp, 2014), public demands to prohibit organizations that offer medi-
cally-assisted suicide (BÄK, 2014a), and opposition against governmental plans to 
grant SHI-funds the permission to recommend specific hospitals to their members 
(BÄK, 2012). The BÄK regularly publishes its positions on current political and 
medical topics in reports and resolutions and is frequently involved in the consulta-
tion processes of the G-BA. Hence, while the BÄK itself is not part of the Federal 
Joint Committee, it plays an important role in the political arenas of German health 
care, both through direct interaction with the BMG as lobbyist and as advisory par-
ticipant in the G-BA’s decision-making processes. 9 
                                                 
9 Further, the BÄK is also represented as advisory participant in the G-BA’s subcommittee on quality man-
agement in healthcare (BÄK, 2013) 
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The counterpart of the BÄK on the side of the largest group of health care profes-
sionals, the nurses
10
, is the German Nursing Council (DPR) which was founded in 
1998. The DPR, like the BÄK, serves as umbrella association for currently 16 
member associations, which, in contrast to the BÄK, are not regional sub-
associations but distinct nursing organizations with slightly different thematic foci 
and specific stakeholder groups (e.g. catholic nurses). According to the DPR, it has 
been founded to “present the positions of nursing associations consistently, coordi-
nate their political work, and speak with a single voice in the interest of profession-
al nurses in Germany” (DPR, 2014a). Compared to the BÄK, the DPR is still far 
less central to the field of German health care
11
 which may be owed to both, the 
subordinate role of the nursing profession in health care (Dent, 2002) and the rela-
tively young age of this association. Yet, the DPR is gaining influence in health 
care, currently providing one advisory participant to the G-BA’s subcommittee on 
quality management (G-BA, 2012a). As of 2014, the DPR has been heard in 91 
decisions of the G-BA. While this is still considerably less than the BÄK, which 
has been heard 468 times, current developments like an intensifying nurses’ short-
age strengthen the DPR’s position in politics and in the public.12  
Overall, the meso-level is probably the most important political sphere in German 
health care for several reasons. Due to the corporatist structure of German health 
care, specific regulations that most directly affect the structure and contents of this 
sector are developed on this level, thus making it the most dynamic arena of lobby-
ing attempts from professional associations and SHI-funds. Further, SHI-funds, 
hospitals, and physicians are all represented within the G-BA, making three of the 
most important stakeholder groups in health care not only lobbying ‘outsiders’ but 
decision-making ‘insiders’ of health care policy.  
The micro-level of German health care is constituted by the provision of medical 
services by physicians, specialist doctors, and hospitals to individual patients under 
the restrictions of the regulative environment designed by the macro- and meso-
level actors (Gerlinger & Noweski, 2012). The provision of medical services to 
German citizens, over 90 percent of whom are members of SHI funds (BMG, 2013) 
                                                 
10 In 2011, there were 826.00 nurses in Germany, 342.000 physicians, and 61.000 pharmacists (Destatis, 
2011). 
11 The DPR is only participating in eight external healthcare committees (DPR, 2014d) while the BÄK reports 
being active in as much as 23 external committees (BÄK, 2013). Further, the BÄK works closely with the 
KBV within the Agency for Quality in Medicine (ÄZQ, 2014), thereby raising its chances to gain influence 
within the G-BA as both organizations pursue the common goal of representing (SHI-accredited) physicians’ 
interests.  
12 For example, the petition „I want care!“ that was initiated by the DPR in 2013 with the goal to achieve 
comprehensive reforms in the professional education and integration of nurses in federal bodies has been 
supported by over 40.000 citizens (as per 11.07.2014) (Westfellerhaus, Wagner, & Lemke, 2013).  
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due to mandatory health insurance and restrictive preconditions for private insur-
ance, follows several main principles.  
The first principle guiding the provision of health care in Germany is rooted in the 
Basic Law (Grundgesetz) which determines that the German state must provide 
social services to its citizens (Art.  20, Abs. 1; Art. 28 Abs. 1). This includes that the 
state ensures all German citizens access to adequate health care (Döring & Paul, 
2010). Due to the state’s legal obligation to provide all citizens, regardless of their 
income situation or health status, with equal access to health care, German health 
care is further designed according to the principle of solidarity. In this context, soli-
darity implies that the medical services received are independent from the payments 
of the respective insurant. In Germany, insurance premiums are paid by employees 
and employers to equal parts. The basis for calculating the premium is the respec-
tive income of each insurant but independent from demographic variables such as 
age, gender, or overall health status. The SHI-funds effectively redistributes insur-
ance premiums between the rich and the poor as well as between the healthy and 
the ill by reimbursing the medical treatments of all insurants equally. For SHI-
members, the direct contact with service providers such as general practitioners and 
medical specialists is cost-free (principle of benefits in kind) (Simon, 2013: 111). 
Further, each SHI-member receives medical treatment according to his or her indi-
vidual needs as the provision of health care must generally be aligned with the pop-
ulations’ medical needs and may not be determined by economic performance indi-
cators (Bäcker, Naegele, Bispinck, Hofemann, & Neubauer, 2010: 230). This prin-
ciple of meeting need is supported by the federal government’s legal obligation to 
guarantee treatment by securing the nationwide availability of in-patient and out-
patient facilities (Döring & Paul, 2010).  
While the German health care system has – as so called “Bismarck-System” – set 
an example for health care systems in Europe as well as in Japan, the ambition to 
provide all citizens with equal access to health care does not come without cost 
(Lameire et al., 1999). Given the general reimbursement policy, a common problem 
of health care systems with compulsory insurance and solidarity-based financing is 
the overuse of medical services by the population (Freeman & Moran, 2000: 39). In 
addition, Germany’s expansion of public welfare between the 1960s and the 1970s 
was owed to overly optimistic prognoses on the future economic development of 
the country (Simon, 2013: 52). While the oil price crisis in the 1970s slowed down 
economic growth, health care expenditures have constantly increased.
13
 
Accordingly, policy makers had to reconsider both the financing and the structure 
of health care to be able to meet their normative goal of securing high quality health 
                                                 
13 Between 1970 and 2013, healthcare expenditures have risen from 6.0 percent to 11.3 percent of the German 
gross domestic product (OECD, 2014).  
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care to the German population. The results were extensive reforms that started in 
the 1970s and have continued until the latest restructuration laws in 2013. How 
these reforms have informed the mode of health care provision as well as the work-
ing conditions and relative positions of health care professionals will be elaborated 
on the following section.  
2.2 Structural and Economic Changes in German Health 
Care between 1977 and 2014 
As briefly touched upon in the last chapter, German health care has undoubtedly 
undergone significant changes over the past decades. As most Western health care 
systems, Germany had to deal with a plethora of demographic and economic 
changes since the 1970s that made a continuous restructuration of the health care 
sector inevitable. With an aging population and an extensive system of social secu-
rity that was once considered one of the great achievements of post-war Germany 
(Simon, 2013), long-term financing of health care became a major concern for 
German politicians (Altenstetter & Busse, 2005). Starting with the 1977 reform on 
hospital financing (KVKG), German policymakers began to re-evaluate the finan-
cial capacity of SHI-members and allowed insurances to increase the share of man-
datory deductibles. Further, drugs and medical treatments were increasingly evalu-
ated against the background of their cost effectiveness. Until the 1990s, health care 
reforms in Germany did not alter the incentive or organizational structures in health 
care. When the cost-containment initiatives of the 1970s and 1980s failed because 
they had only selectively restricted reimbursement rates and had focused on mini-
mizing the expenditures for specific services, politicians started to introduce struc-
tural changes to health care to promote an increase in the overall efficiency of the 





                                                 
14 Sources: AOK (2014), own depiction and additions.   
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Table 2.1: Major Health Care Reforms in Germany between 1977 and 2014 









 Reduction of reimbursable medical services  
 Introduction of the ‘Concerted Action in Health Care’: Service provides,  
federal,  professional, and consumer associations had to develop cost con-
tainments initiatives in health care 
 Introduction  of an earnings-based spending policy among SHI-funds; 







 Inclusion of hospitals into extant cost containment measures 
 Development of self-governance structures between hospitals and health 
insurance funds 
 SHI-funds granted a say in defining hospital per diem charges 
 Introduction of financial incentives to reduce hospital beds 




turing Act  
(KHNG) 
 Introduction of the possibility to finance rationalization investments 
through hospital per diem charges 
 Transfer of public financing of hospital to federal states; enlargement of 
federal states’ authorities in hospital planning  
 Reduction of federal states’ influence on the definition of  hospital per 
diem charges; transfer of the negotiation of per diem charges to hospitals 






 Introduction of flexible budgeting for hospitals with the possibility of 
making profit and losses; costs of inpatient-care still covered by predefine 




Need Planning Act 
(GVKBP) 
 Introduction of restrictions in the admission of SHI-physicians 
 Self-governance bodies of physicians and SHI-funds enabled to suggest 




form Act (GRG) 
 Introduction of fixed charges for drugs 
 Strengthening of SHI-funds’ participation rights in cost effectiveness 
auditing of physicians and hospitals 
 Strengthening of self-governance bodies’  rights to  enact guidelines for 
quality assurance 
 Introduction of a financial compensation scheme between SHI-funds of 
the same kind (e.g. insurance funds for craftsmen or salaried employees) 
 Enabling of contracts between regional SHI-fund-associations, SHI-
physician-associations, and hospital-associations to improve cooperation 




ture Act (GSG) 
 Increase of mandatory deductibles for insurants  
 Introduction of collective drug budgets in ambulatory care 
 Budgeting of compensation in stationary care including the abolition of the 
principle of net cost coverage; replacement of hospital per diem charges by 
service-oriented lump-sum reimbursement rates 
 Integration of ambulatory and stationary care through ambulatory surgery 
 Introduction of a general risk-structure compensation scheme among SHI-
funds in 1994 






 Budgeting of compensation in stationary care 
 Introduction of hospital compensation through case-based lump-sum 
reimbursement rates and mandatory deductibles 
✔  
1997 
First and Second 
Health Insurance 
Restructuring Act 
(1. & 2. NOG) 
 Extraordinary rights of contract termination in case of rising SHI-fund 
premiums 
 Increase of mandatory deductibles (restricted for chronically-ill patients); 
reduction of reimbursement rates for dental prostheses; introduction of 
drug spending benchmarks within medical specialist groups 
 Introduction of cost-sharing and premium  reimbursement as competitive 








 Reduction of mandatory deductibles for chronically-ill patients  
for drugs and medical aids 
 Budgeting of selected sectors (e.g. ambulatory care, pharmaceuticals, 
stationary care) 
 Abolition of insurants’ choice between reimbursement and benefit in kind 
✔  
2000 




 Implementation of integrated care structures between ambulatory and 
stationary care; possibility of selective contracts with SHI-funds  
 Introduction of general practitioner-centered care  
 Expansion of ambulatory care options in hospitals 
 Stepwise introduction of diagnosis-related reimbursement rates for hospi-
tal treatment  
 Increased cost-effectiveness auditing of medical treatment  
 Self-governance bodies of physicians and SHI-funds enabled to exclude 
ineffective diagnostic and treatment procedures reimbursement  
✔ ✔ 
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Table 2.1: Major Health Care Reforms in Germany between 1977 and 2014 (continued) 









Act (GKV - RSA) 
 Implementations of a morbidity-based risk-structure compensation scheme 






 Implementation lump-sum reimbursement for hospital treatment based on  






 Renaming of the ‚Concerted Action‘ into ‘Advisory Council on the As-
sessment of Developments in the Health Care System’ (SVR) including 
new responsibilities  
 Foundation of the Federal Joint Committee (G-BA) to replace the joint 
self-government of SHI-funds and SHI-physicians  
 Foundation of the Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care 
(IQWiG) 
 Reformation of health care structures, including the promotion of integrat-
ed care, general practitioner-centered care, ambulatory care in hospitals, 
and structured disease-management-programs 
 Liberalization of drug market including mail order sale 
 Liberalization of contract law, allowing SHI-funds to close selective 
contracts with individual health care providers  
 Introduction of evidence-based medicine as benchmark for -reimbursable 
services  
 Introduction of quarterly ‘practice fees’ for insurants 
✔ ✔✔ 
2007 





 Implementation of compulsory health care insurance for all citizens  
 Increase of competition between SHI-funds through permission of selec-
tive contracting with health care providers, individualized service and fee 
options, and mergers between SHI-funds 
 Introduction of a health care fund in 2009 including standardized insurance 
premium rates 
 Foundation of the National Association of Statutory Health Insurance 
Funds to replace the SHI- sub-associations  
✔ ✔ 
2008 
Long Term Care 
Further Develop-
ment Act (PfWG) 
 Improved services for citizens in need of long-term care  and their family 
members  
 Increase of quality assurance measures in long-term-care facilities (e.g. 
mandatory expert standards) 
 Increase of transparency  among long-term-care facilities through publica-
tion of services provided 
 Authorization of task-transfer from physicians to nurses  
✔ (✔) 
2009 




in SHI  (GKV -
GKV-OrgWG) 
 Introduction of the possibility of insolvency of SHI-funds 
 Mandatory provision of general practitioner-centered care programs  
 Additional regulations on the allocation of resources from the central 
health care fund to individual SHI-funds 
 Mandatory tenders for individual contracts between SHI-funds and health 
care providers  
✔ (✔) 
2010 
SHI Financing Act 
(GKV-FinG) 
 Introduction of  fixed absolute sums for mandatory deductibles for chroni-
cally-ill patients  
 Social compensation through reduction of premiums  
 Fixing of  employers’ SHI- share on 7.3 percent 






 Mandatory price negotiations for drugs between SHI-funds and pharma-




Act on Care Struc-
tures in SHI (GKV-
VStG) 
 Alignment of ambulatory care need planning with  regional age and 
morbidity-structure 
 Support of physicians in undersupplied areas 
 ✔ 
2000 




 Implementation of integrated care structures between ambulatory and 
stationary care; possibility of selective contracts with SHI-funds  
 Introduction of general practitioner-centered care  
 Expansion of ambulatory care options in hospitals 
 Stepwise introduction of diagnosis-related reimbursement rates for hospi-
tal treatment  
 Increased cost-effectiveness auditing of medical treatment  
 Self-governance bodies of physicians and SHI-funds enabled to exclude 
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Table 2.1: Major Health Care Reforms in Germany between 1977 and 2014 (continued) 









Act (GKV - RSA) 
 Implementations of a morbidity-based risk-structure compensation scheme 






 Implementation lump-sum reimbursement for hospital treatment based on  






 Renaming of the ‚Concerted Action‘ into ‘Advisory Council on the As-
sessment of Developments in the Health Care System’ (SVR) including 
new responsibilities  
 Foundation of the Federal Joint Committee (G-BA) to replace the joint 
self-government of SHI-funds and SHI-physicians  
 Foundation of the Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care 
(IQWiG) 
 Reformation of health care structures, including the promotion of integrat-
ed care, general practitioner-centered care, ambulatory care in hospitals, 
and structured disease-management-programs 
 Liberalization of drug market including mail order sale 
 Liberalization of contract law, allowing SHI-funds to close selective 
contracts with individual health care providers  
 Introduction of evidence-based medicine as benchmark for -reimbursable 
services  
 Introduction of quarterly ‘practice fees’ for insurants 
✔ ✔✔ 
2007 





 Implementation of compulsory health care insurance for all citizens  
 Increase of competition between SHI-funds through permission of selec-
tive contracting with health care providers, individual-lized service and fee 
options, and mergers between SHI-funds 
 Introduction of a health care fund in 2009 including standardized insurance 
premium rates 
 Foundation of the National Association of Statutory Health Insurance 
Funds to replace the SHI- sub-associations  
✔ ✔ 
2008 
Long Term Care 
Further Develop-
ment Act (PfWG) 
 Improved services for citizens in need of long-term care  and their family 
members  
 Increase of quality assurance measures in long-term-care facilities (e.g. 
mandatory expert standards) 
 Increase of transparency  among long-term-care facilities through publica-
tion of services provided 








in SHI  (GKV -
GKV-OrgWG) 
 Introduction of the possibility of insolvency of SHI-funds 
 Mandatory provision of general practitioner-centered care programs  
 Additional regulations on the allocation of resources from the central 
health care fund to individual SHI-funds 
 Mandatory tenders for individual contracts between SHI-funds and health 
care providers  
✔ (✔) 
2010 
SHI Financing Act 
(GKV-FinG) 
 Introduction of  fixed absolute sums for mandatory deductibles for chroni-
cally-ill patients   
 Social compensation through reduction of premiums  
 Fixing of  employers’ SHI- share on 7.3 percent 






 Mandatory price negotiations for drugs between SHI-funds and pharma-




Act on Care Struc-
tures in Statutory 
Health Insurance 
GKV-VStG) 
 Alignment of ambulatory care need planning with  regional age and 
morbidity-structure 





 Implementation of ‘treatment contracts’ between health care providers and 
patients 
 Obligation of physicians to inform patients of treatment errors 
 Obligation of SHI-funds to approve or deny requested treatments within 
three to six weeks 
 Introduction of mandatory critical incident reporting systems and patient-









*Notation: ✔✔ = Significant change, ✔ = Intermediate change, (✔) = Insignificant change 
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The Health Care Structure Act of 1992 initiated a cascade of health care reforms in 
Germany that led to an incremental, however comprehensive, restructuring of Ger-
man health care. The main paradigm changes that the reforms of the 1990s entailed 
were a liberalization of the insurance market as well as the introduction of market-
based incentive structures (Gerlinger, 2010). Forced memberships in specific SHI-
funds based on one’s occupation (such as the ‘Techniker Krankenkasse’ for tech-
nical occupations) were repealed; thus, SHI-fund members could now freely choose 
between different insurance providers. As the competition between SHI-funds in-
creased, the key to their survival in the now liberalized market were low insurance 
rates as these became the main driver of market share (Gerlinger, 2010: 113). Ac-
cordingly, SHI-funds were forced to re-evaluate their receipts and expenditures. At 
the same time, fixed fees for hospitals (as well as budgets for ambulatory physi-
cians) were introduced, which effectively created financial incentives to reduce ra-
ther than expand services. The financial risk of patient treatment was thereby 
moved to individual service providers who had to reduce costs by implementing 
more efficient modes of patient treatment (ibd.). Between 1993 and 1995, fixed fees 
were determined on the level of the individual hospital and budgets were tied to the 
overall income of the SHI-funds. After 1995, budgets became freely negotiable be-
tween hospitals and sickness funds. While the introduction of fixed-fees entailed a 
rising cost-consciousness and more efficient service provision on the hospital side, 
it also led to ‘cherry picking’, i.e. hospitals focusing on patient groups with profita-
ble case fees. However, by 1995, less than one quarter of all hospital services was 
reimbursed on the basis of fixed fees (Wörz & Busse, 2005).  
In 2000, policymakers decided to introduce a new system of fixed fees that was 
based on international examples and should include almost all cases in stationary 
care. In the context of the Hospital Financing Act of 2000, state actors ordered the 
corporatist organizations of the self-government (at this time the Associations of 
SHI-funds, the Association of Private Health Insurance, and the German Hospital 
Federation) to agree on an international DRG-based reimbursement system to be 
implemented in Germany. Eventually, the Australian AR-DRGs (Australian Re-
fined Diagnosis Related Groups) were used as a reference frame for developing the 
G-DRG system. Within the G-DRG system, each hospital case is being assigned to 
one of multiple, clinically defined groups which reflect comparable treatment costs 
(Schreyögg, Tiemann, & Busse, 2006). Until 2003, hospitals could participate in 
DRG-based reimbursement on a voluntary basis; in 2004, cases were already coded 
into DRG-groups but hospitals still received individually negotiated budgets. Be-
tween 2005 and 2008, DRG rates were incrementally adapted from hospital-
specific to base-rates for each federal state. By 2014, these were aligned with a na-
tionwide DRG base rate. The introduction of the G-DRG system was probably one 
of the most influential cornerstones of the recent cost-containment policy in Ger-
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man health care and led to a restructuration of the hospital landscape. While a fre-
quently-quoted copious “hospital dying” could eventually not be observed (Fleßa, 
2014; Lüthy & Buchmann, 2009; Meurer, 2011), the number of hospitals in Ger-
many has decreased notably from 2.242 hospitals in the year 2000 to 2.017 hospi-
tals in 2012. Additionally, the share of publicly-owned and non-profit hospitals de-
creased from 78.3 percent to 65.4 percent while the share of privately-owned hospi-
tals steeply increased from 21.7 percent to 34.6 percent (Statista, 2014). 
In addition to the ubiquitous cost-containment initiatives, service providers faced 
increasing pressures from the SHI-funds with regard to service agreements. In the 
years after 1995, the importance of collective contracts between SHI-funds and the 
Associations of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians further declined; by 2007 the 
Statutory Health Insurance Competition Strengthening Act (GKV-WSG) allowed 
SHI-funds to close contracts with individual service providers such as hospitals or 
groups of physicians in ambulatory care. Through this development, SHI-funds 
gained considerable influence in health care as the Associations of Statutory Health 
Insurance Physicians lost their former contractual monopoly and were no longer 
able to dictate the conditions of health care provision to the Associations of Statuto-
ry Health Insurance Funds (Gerlinger, 2002: 114). As Gerlinger (2002: 114) puts it, 
insurance funds have moved from “payer to player”, redefining the power relations 
between them and physician associations to their advantage.  
With the introduction of competitive elements into SHI-fund regulation and the 
liberalization of service agreements, the foundations for a structural modernization 
of health care had been laid. Insurance funds’ interests became coherent with poli-
cymakers’ intent to create more efficient structures of service provision while phy-
sician associations have become restricted in their ability to effectively counter 
SHI-funds’ strive for cost-containment. A paradox feature of Germany’s health care 
reforms over the last years is an increase in both market liberalization and state in-
tervention (Gerlinger, 2010: 124). In the course of the 2007 health care reform, pol-
icymakers introduced a state-regulated universal health care fund. Since 2009 in-
surants and employers have been paying their insurance premiums directly into this 
central health care fund. Individual SHI-funds are each allocated a specific share of 
this fund according to the number and health structure of their members. Addition-
ally, insurance premiums have been set at a fixed rate for all SHI-funds, eventually 
bringing price-competition between insurance providers to an end (Bäcker et al., 
2010: 227f. ).  
While the partial liberalization of the health care market held significant potential to 
raise efficiency in the provision of health care through selective contracting and 
increased competition between insurances, it also harbored the dangers of insuffi-
cient care and reduced quality of care as means of cost-containment (Gerlinger, 
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2010: 126). Accordingly, state interventions were primarily aimed at securing and 
enhancing the quality of medical care. Due to the state’s legal mission to secure 
adequate health care to all citizens, it took extensive measures to control the quality 
of health care. Among these was a dense regulatory framework regarding quality 
management in hospitals, which included mandatory quality reports (§ 137 Section 
3, No. 4 SGB V), the implementation of internal quality management systems, and 
the participation in external initiatives of quality control (§ 135a, SGB V). Addi-
tionally, new organizations like the Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health 
Care (IQWiG) were founded to provide independent assessments of the medical 
quality of drugs, diagnostic tests and treatments, and clinical guidelines and pro-
grams (§ 139a, SGB V; IQWIG, 2014). Given that the reforms of the early 2000s 
mark an era in which the state extended its direct control of the modes of health 
care provision while shifting the negotiation of service agreements from the meso- 
to the micro-level, researchers have concluded that corporatism is eroding in Ger-
man health care (Bandelow, 2004; Noweski, 2004). While it is true that the auton-
omy of the self-government has declined due to increasingly restrictive federal 
guidelines and the provision of health care is no longer exclusively negotiated be-
tween the two ‘big players’ (i.e. the Association of Statutory Health Insurance Phy-
sicians and the Association of Statutory Health Insurance Funds), it seems exagger-
ated to speak of a “downfall” of the corporatist system (von Winter, 2014: 171).  
Still, the meso-level of German health care has been characterized by a notable 
transformation. The G-BA (see chapter 2.1), which was established in 2004, re-
placed the Association of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians and the Associa-
tion of Statutory Health Insurance Funds as central corporatist bodies on the meso-
level. While including representatives of both associations, the G-BA is not sup-
posed to function as an arena for the negotiation of collective agreements between 
SHI-funds and service providers. Within the new structure of self-government on 
the meso-level, the G-BA’s main task lies in enabling the liberalization and market-
ization of health care by creating the regulatory framework for micro-level-
competition. By providing legally binding guidelines for the provision of health 
care on the micro-level, the G-BA’s competences go far beyond those of the SHI-
fund- and SHI-physician-associations. Accordingly, German health care is still very 
much structured as corporatist governance system (von Winter, 2014). However, 
the G-BA operates under strict federal supervision, weakening the role of classic, 
autonomous self-governance. In addition, the introduction of the G-BA led to a plu-
ralization of interests; beside physicians and SHI-funds, hospital representatives are 
now regularly involved in the G-BA’s decision-making processes while the inter-
ests of patients and other stakeholder groups are considered in official hearings. 
While the interests represented on the meso-level have become more fragmented 
and reaching agreement has become more difficult, the inclusion of several stake-
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holders in the consultation- and decision-making-processes of the G-BA provides 
the new corporatist system with the necessary expertise to reliably assess the cost-
benefit ratio of medical services and structures in health care (von Winter, 2014: 
204). Also, through the representation of multiple interests, the G-BA obtains a 
higher legitimacy than the former corporatist system. This characteristic of the G-
BA is of particular importance against the background of its regulatory role which 
comprises the exclusion of specific drugs and treatments from SHI-reimbursement 
catalogues (Gerlinger, 2010; Gerlinger & Noweski, 2012).  
Overall, despite far-reaching reforms, German health care still reflects its historical 
roots, relying strongly on corporatist governance and aiming at the provision of 
comprehensive medical care to all citizens. Yet, economic and demographic chang-
es forced policymakers to reconsider the modes of health care provision. As a re-
sult, central contracting between physician- and SHI-fund-associations has been 
replaced by more market-based modes of individual contracting between SHI-funds 
and service providers. The expansion of fixed-fee reimbursement in ambulatory and 
stationary care additionally shifted the focus from service expansion to rationing 
and economization. As the introduction of free market elements bore the risk of 
creating misincentives with regard to service quality, policymakers countered this 
threat by extending state-regulation, effectively creating a “state-domesticated 
competitive corporatism” (Gerlinger, 2010: 130).  
These structural changes in health care naturally informed the relative position of 
health care professions in the political processes that shape this field. Despite in-
creased liberalization and marketization, physicians remained the dominant stake-
holders in German health care. As Altenstetter and Busse (2005: 138) emphasize, 
“the influence and authority of medical professionals as knowledge bearers and 
technological craftsmen have not declined, although physicians are subject to in-
creasingly restrictive conditions. Neither has the medical profession lost the ability 
to police itself according to the rules, codes, and norms developed by corporatist 
medicine” (Altenstetter & Busse, 2005: 138). Physicians successfully claimed cen-
tral positions in the newly established bodies of the meso-level-corporatist system. 
For example, both executive managers of the IQWIG are medical doctors 
(Kuhlmann, 2006: 65) and currently even one of the neutral members of the G-BA 
is a physician (G-BA, 2014c). In spite of physicians’ major voice in decisions on 
appropriate structures, treatments, and quality indicators at the micro-level of health 
care, the acknowledgment of their expertise does not translate into market power in 
the same way as it did before the structural reforms that had been implemented be-
tween 2004 and 2007. As noted above, the Association of Statutory Health Insur-
ance Physicians has lost its state-secured contracting monopoly. Further, while the 
traditionally high societal status of physicians has not suffered under recent re-
forms, their authority in questions of health care structuration has become fragile. 
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When the state started to introduce additional regulation to secure quality in health 
care, it also overstepped the boundaries of professional self-government. Specifical-
ly, the Health Modernization Act of 2004 included the regulation of medical con-
tinuing training (§ 95d and §137 Section 1 No. 2 SGB V). While the German Med-
ical Association remained in charge of defining the contents of continuing educa-
tion, legislators now determined that hospital and ambulatory physicians had to 
complete a certain quantity of additional training during a five-year-period. As a 
result, physicians may still obtain high degrees of autonomy in determining medical 
education and providing the benchmarks for quality management in medicine but 
their role as dominant, mostly autonomous collective actor in health care is no 
longer axiomatic.  
The changes recently brought upon German health care, have, on the other side, 
opened up opportunities for the non-medical health care occupations. The multi-
interest-structures of the G-BA attracted lobbying attempts of formerly marginal-
ized stakeholder groups, most of all health care professions that have hitherto been 
subordinate to the medical profession (e.g. nurses, surgery receptionists, and para-
medics) (Gerlinger, 2009; von Winter, 2014). Additionally, demographic changes 
like an aging and increasingly multimorbid population in combination with a nota-
ble doctors shortage lead to a re-evaluation of task divisions between health care 
occupations (Bergmann, 2009). A legislative reform in 2008 (the Long-Term Care 
Further Development Act) generally allowed the autonomous provision of medical 
treatment by nurses and other non-medical occupations within pilot programs, 
thereby strengthening their relative position in health care. These developments are 
further catalyzed by SHI-funds’ constant strive for cost reduction. Trying to imple-
ment efficient service structures that allow high-quality medicine under restricted 
budgets, hospitals have increasingly adopted new modes of work division and are 
steadily expanding the task spheres of non-medical occupations (Gerst & Hibbeler, 
2010). Hence, while in 2006, Kuhlmann (2006: 93) asserted that the “hegemony of 
the medical profession […] is accompanied by a weak position and a lack of quali-
fication of other health occupation”, recent regulatory changes forecast a more dy-
namic professional landscape that both shapes and is shaped by the restrictive regu-
latory framework of German health care.  
The role of health care professionals in the institutional changes that have been 
characterizing German health care over the last decade will be further elaborated in 
the course of this thesis. The subsequent chapter will first provide an overview of 
how professionals generally relate to institutional dynamics; offering insights on 
what constitutes a ‘profession’ (section 3.1.), how professionals interact with the 
different contexts in which they are embedded (section 3.2), and how they affect 
and are in turn affected by processes of institutional change (section 3.3 and 3.4). 
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3 Theory:  Professionals’ Role in Institutional 
Dynamics   
“The professions dominate our world. They heal our bodies, measure our profits, 
save our souls.” Abbott (1988: 1) 
Professions are important to society. They provide standardized and accepted rules 
on who is allowed to exert medical treatment, they regulate the quality and quantity 
of knowledge-intensive services like accounting, and they guarantee the effective-
ness of courts (Freidson, 1988a; MacDonald, 1995). As the preceding chapter has 
shown, (German) health care is strongly influenced by professionals – not only 
through their daily work as physicians and nurses but also through their co-decision 
rights in central bodies of the self-government. Professionals’ relevance in socially 
important areas like law and health care has been well reflected in sociological lit-
erature (e.g. Barber, 1963; Brown, 1973; Carr-Saunders & Wilson, 1933) while 
organizational scholars have shown little interest in the idiosyncrasies of profes-
sions for a long time. The study of professions and professionals has, however, re-
cently aroused the interest of organizational scholars as a fast-growing area in insti-
tutional research.
15
 While the professions have always been an omnipresent subject 
in institutional theory (Leicht & Fennell, 2008), professions and professionals have 
only recently moved to the center stage of institutional research as scholars have 
become increasingly interested in institutional change (e.g. Currie et al., 2012; 
Greenwood et al., 2002). As the institutionalization, the deinstitutionalization, and 
the change of professions are often particularly illustrative examples of institutional 
change processes (Kitchener & Mertz, 2012; McCann, Granter, Hyde, & Hassard, 
2013), institutional research has renewed its interest in explaining the characteris-
tics and peculiarities of professions and professionals (Leicht & Fennell, 2008) and 
their relation to institutional dynamics (Muzio et al., 2013; Scott, 2008; Suddaby & 
Viale, 2011). Yet, institutional perspectives on the professions are still surprisingly 
disconnected from the sociology of the professions. This relative isolation of the 
sociology of the professions and the study of professionals in organizational institu-
tionalism has indeed been criticized (Muzio et al., 2013; Suddaby & Viale, 2011), 
but has yet to be addressed in conceptual and empirical research.  
It is the goal of this chapter to provide an answer to the question on how profes-
sionals and institutional dynamics interrelate. To do so, I will integrate literature 
from the sociology of the professions and institutional research. I will begin this 
                                                 
15 This rising interest in professions within organization research is well-reflected by special issues explicitly 
connecting institutional research and the sociology of the professions (Muzio et al., 2013) and has already 
culminated in the launch of the ‘Journal of Professions and Organizations’ at the beginning of 2014 (Brock, 
Leblebici, & Muzio, 2014).  
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chapter with a section on the conceptual evolution of professions and professionals, 
including the defining features of a profession and the social role of professionals 
(chapter 3.1). In chapter 3.2, I will provide an overview on the different contexts in 
which professional work takes places. Specifically, I will elaborate on how fields, 
organizations, and routines enable and constrain professionals’ ability to exert 
agency. Following the explanation on what professions are and how professionals 
are embedded in different social contexts, I will provide a more in-depth theoretical 
analysis on the mechanisms that lead to professionals’ constant and effective in-
volvement in institutional change and stability (chapter 3.3). I will close this chapter 
with an integrated model on how professsionals shape institutional dynamics on 
and through different levels of their work (chapter 3.4). This model will provide a 
general understanding of the multifacetedness and context-specificity of profes-
sionals’ role in institutional change and stability whereas chapters four to six will 
offer more in-depth analyses of selected aspects of professionals’ institutional work 
on the field-, the organization-, and the routine-level.  
3.1 Professions and Professionals  
Professions have been defined in various ways. According to the Oxford dictionary 
(2014), a profession is “a paid occupation, especially one that involves prolonged 
training and a formal qualification” or, in the sense of a collective actor, “a body of 
people engaged in a particular profession”. A more specific definition is provided 
by Burkart (2006: 470f.) in the encyclopedia of social theory. He defines profes-
sions as follows: 
“Professions are occupational categories whose members have degrees of statua-
tory power and autonomy, because they successfully claim to solve better than oth-
ers relevant problems of their clients or of society in general. The expertise of their 
members is validated by advanced university degrees, theoretical knowledge and 
technical skills. Profession is both a status category […] and a category for a cer-
tain type of occupation.” 
Burkart’s (2006) definition reflects two broad traditions of approaching the phe-
nomenon of professions, which I will discuss in the following. Sociologists and 
institutional researchers alike differentiate between a functionalist, or “trait-based”, 
approach and an interactionist, or “conflict-based”, approach to the question on 
what characterizes a profession (MacDonald, 1995; Muzio et al., 2013).  
Undeniably, Burkart’s (2006: 407f.) definition favors the more recent interactionist 
approach by emphasizing the constructed nature of professionals’ status. Yet, it also 
includes key characteristics of a profession like a formal education and scientific 
knowledge which have been the focus of trait-based researchers who sought to 
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identify specific sets of stable traits and functions in which professions’ special role 
in society is founded. While both approaches have their merit, the following sec-
tions will focus on the interactionist approach as it lays the theoretical foundation to 
the conceptualization of professions as source and object of institutional dynamics 
(Scott, 2008b, 2010b) 
The goal of this section is to provide an overview on how research on the profes-
sions evolved conceptually and what makes professionals the powerful actors that 
they are. I will first elaborate on how different conceptualizations of the professions 
within sociological and organizational research relate to institutionalist’ view on 
professions as socially constructed entities (section 3.1.1). Second, I will discuss 
how the professions shape organizational life and how professionals become social 
actors who fulfill important roles in the dynamics of both their profession and the 
different contexts in which their professional practice is embedded (section 3.1.2)  
3.1.1 Historical Perspectives on the Professions: From Functionalist to 
Interactionist Approaches 
The study of professions has a long history in both sociological and organizational 
research. Given that professionals dominate societies’ most important sectors like 
health care and law, it is not surprising that much research has been dedicated to 
explaining what distinguishes professions from regular occupations and how pro-
fessions come into existence (Adams, 2015). The functionalist or ‘trait-based’ ap-
proach dominated the sociology of the professions from its inception in the first half 
of the 1900s to the late 1960s (Carr-Saunders & Wilson, 1933; Parsons, 1937, 
1939). This perspective on professions is mainly concerned with identifying the 
characteristics which define a profession vis-à-vis non-professional occupations 
(Greenwood, 1957). Scholars who take a the trait-perspective on the professions 
mostly subscribe to the idea that professions are inherently stable entities with dis-
tinctive qualities (Parsons, 1939; Torres, 1991) such as “prolonged specialized 
training in a body of abstract knowledge” and client- rather than self-orientation 
(Goode, 1961: 308). Beginning with the works of Carr-Saunders and Wilson 
(1933), professions have been defined as occupations which are organized around a 
formalized body of scientific knowledge and additionally serve as a stabilizing 
force in society which protects a set of higher morals and values – the professional 
ethics – against erosion (e.g. Durkheim, 1957; Durkheim, 2013). While Carr-
Saunders and Wilson (1933: 3) explicitly refrain from drawing “a line between pro-
fessions and other vocations”, they propose that typical professions can be de-
scribed by a specific set of traits. Later research from the trait-based perspective 
even goes so far as to develop lists of “the characteristics of an ideal-type profes-
sion against which actual examples of occupational groups could then be assessed 
as more or less professional” (MacDonald, 1995: 3). The belief in a firm set of uni-
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versal professional traits culminated in the development of occupational categories 
like “semi-professions” (Etzioni, 1969). These imply that the professional nature of 
occupations can be determined through their membership in randomly defined sets 
of structural and value-based criteria (MacDonald, 1995).  
In addition to their focus on stable criteria of professionalism, early works in the 
sociology of the professions are united in their assumption that professionals’ high 
status is a legitimate function of their importance to society. For example, 
Durkheim (2013: 15) presents professional ethics as remedy to what he terms the 
impending “moral anarchy” associated with economic life in the era of industriali-
zation. Merton (1982: 114) summarizes the normative foundations of professions as 
a “triad of human values” consisting of knowing, doing, and helping. While “know-
ing” and “doing” refer to the possession of scientifically derived knowledge and its 
application to solve socially relevant problems, “helping” describes the overarch-
ing, normative principle that guides professional conduct (Merton, 1982: 115). In 
contrast to most scholars from the functionalist tradition (e.g. Carr-Saunders & 
Wilson, 1964; Etzioni, 1969; Greenwood, 1957), Merton (1982: 118) acknowledg-
es that professionals are not per se of moral superiority and may not always act in 
their clients’ best interest. Yet, he also points out that institutionalized altruism is a 
core feature of the professions that legitimizes their privileged position in society 
(ibd.: 117). Overall, functionalists prefer structural over process explanations of 
what constitutes a profession and conceptualize professionalism as almost natural 
phenomenon that is linked to specific traits and superior ethical standards that only 
few occupations possess.  
The interactionist approach which has been developed at the beginning of the 1970s 
represents a counter movement to functionalists’ search for universal structural 
traits and intrinsic values that justify the professions’ superior status over regular 
occupations (Barber, 1963; Carr-Saunders & Wilson, 1933; Carr-Saunders & 
Wilson, 1964; Goode, 1957, 1961). Accordingly, the main research question shifted 
from ‘what are professions and why are they special?’ to ‘how do professions gain 
and maintain the special status that they are granted?’. The probably most influen-
tial works within the interactionist approach are those of Freidson (1970b, 1970a, 
1988a) and Larsson (1977). Freidson’s (1970) studies on the medical profession 
question functionalists’ assumption that professionals are generally committed to 
moral integrity. By showing that medical professionals, as members of one of the 
most traditional and prestigious professions, are driven by self-interest rather than 
altruistic ideals, he put a sudden end to the idea of the noble professional who fol-
lows a higher calling (Freidson, 1970).  
Freidson’s (1970) conceptualization of the professions is one that puts self-interest 
and the political quest for power at the center of professionals’ doing. The results of 
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his studies on the profession of medicine (Freidson, 1970b, 1970a) can be summa-
rized as follows. First, professions do not occur ‘naturally’ but are the outcome of 
occupations’ purposive actions to achieve dominance over adjacent occupations 
and external regulatory bodies. Second, while professions may legitimize their au-
tonomy claims with their mission to secure the provision of high-quality profes-
sional services, their actual motives are often far less altruistic. According to 
Freidson (1970), professions form in an attempt to gain a market monopoly over 
profitable services. Rather than being community-oriented preservers of socially 
important knowledge and skills, professions strive to artificially create scarcity in 
distinctive areas of the labor market.  By convincing the state (or other elite actors) 
that society will benefit from granting professional bodies the exclusive right to 
autonomously develop, organize and control professional services, professions gain 
market dominance over adjacent occupations. Eventually, and as we can observe in 
e.g. hospitals or law firms, organizations are obligated to hire specifically trained 
individuals to provide professional services. Hence, Freidson (1970b) conceptual-
izes professions as an outcome of specific, knowledge-intensive occupations’ 
struggles to create market exclusiveness. By placing more emphasis on agentic be-
havior as the source of professions than on professions as inherently stable struc-
tures that ‘somehow came into existence’, Freidson’s work laid important founda-
tions to the study of professions as the result of social construction. 
Larson (1977) draws heavily on Freidson’s (1970) idea of professions as socially 
constructed entities that strive for a market monopoly. Yet, she offers a more fine-
grained and more critical analysis of how occupations become professions. Accord-
ing to Larson (1977: xvii) “[p]rofessionalization is […] an attempt to translate one 
order of scare resources – special knowledge and skills – into another – social and 
economic rewards. The “professional project”, as she terms it (Larson, 1977: x), is 
concerned with both, gaining market control and achieving superior social status. In 
opposite to Freidson (1970), Larson argues that professionalizing occupations 
mainly seek status which is based on the idea of the professions’ moral superiority. 
This status, however, does not lead to actual power as the professions themselves 
are only reinforcing a broader class system rooted in the capitalist order (Larson, 
1977).
16
 Larson’s model of professionalism is widely recognized and has advanced 
theory by drawing attention to the political nature of professionalization and the 
interdependencies between professions and wider institutional structures (Suddaby 
& Viale, 2011). However, there are also two major shortcomings in Larson’s ap-
proach to professionalization. First, she implies that professional projects end once 
                                                 
16 Larson’s critical stance towards professional power is also owed to her focus on the profession of engineer-
ing that operates within the hierarchy of bureaucratic organizations. However, she also acknowledges the 
power of the medical profession that is rather in control of than controlled by bureaucracy. Yet, she also pro-
poses medicine to be treated as an exceptional case in the sociology of the professions and not as ideal-typical 
instance of professionalization (Schudson, 1980). 
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an occupation achieves a “monopoly of competence […] and a monopoly of credi-
bility”  (Evetts, 2003: 402; see also: Larson, 1977: 38), thereby restricting profes-
sional dynamics to the path of becoming a profession. Second, she focuses on the 
ideological foundations of professions, eventually depicting them as mostly power-
less entities, subordinated to the bureaucratic systems of capitalism (Schudson, 
1980).  
Abbott (1988) offers a more dynamic and less ideology-focused view on the pro-
fessions and the processes of professionalization. According to him, professions 
constantly engage in struggles to defend jurisdictional boundaries against adjacent 
occupations. He explicitly describes professions as open systems and the competi-
tion for monopoly not as a process that may reach final closure but rather as a con-
stant, interprofessional dynamic. Two aspects of Abbott’s work are particularly 
important to the study of professions and their role in institutional change. First, he 
focuses on the importance of work and the division of knowledge and skill as basis 
for the development of regulatory boundaries between professions. Second, Ab-
bott’s approach to professions differs from earlier conceptualizations as he explicit-
ly takes into account the interdependent nature of professions. In his view, no pro-
fession can be studied independently from adjacent professions. This is because 
professionalism is grounded on an exclusive body of abstract knowledge which 
depends on a profession’s success in competing over (formally regulated) areas of 
expertise. In contrast to previous research, Abbott (1988) does not draw on the con-
cept of dominance of certain occupations within specific fields of practice to ex-
plain professions (cf. Freidson, 1970). In his “system of professions”, we also find 
subordinate professions (e.g. nurses) who would have been denied the status of a 
profession in former research. While he restricts his focus primarily to adjacent pro-
fessions, Abbott’s (1988) work gives rise to the notion that when professions 
change, so do adjacent social structures.  
Larsons (1977) and Abbott (1988) both provide a richer understanding of the pro-
fessions and professionalism than former functional or power-focused explanations 
and resonate well with neo-institutional researchers’ idea of social construction as 
origin of seemingly stable structures like professions (Giddens, 1984; Lefsrud & 
Meyer, 2012; Scott, 2010a). While it is Larson’s merit to carve out the symbolic 
dimensions of professionalization in the sense of gaining status, Abbott’s work 
gives first hints on how professions and institutional change are intertwined. First, 
by pointing out that professions are embedded in complex systems of work divi-
sion, Abbott convincingly argues that professions must not be studied in isolation as 
any change in a profession may affect adjacent occupations and vice versa. Second, 
like any other kind of institution, professions may also be deconstructed and disap-
pear, giving rise to a re-structuration of the field in which they were embedded.  
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In conclusion, the sociology of the professions moved from conceptualizing profes-
sions as stable, naturally given entities to a dynamic view on professions as the re-
sult of social construction within a system of adjacent professions. Within this 
movement, we can observe a shift in focus from the professions as such to the pro-
cess of professionalization and more abstract concepts like professionalism (Evetts, 
2003, 2011; Freidson, 2001; Roberts & Dietrich, 1999; Torres, 1991), describing 
“the affirmation of expertise” (Larson, 1977: 144), or, in more general terms, “the 
idea guiding the culture (values, ethics, ideology)  of the profession and the habitus 
of its members” (Burkart, 2006: 470). However, it might be misleading to consider 
professionalism a concept that is only employed by professionals. Oftentimes, non- 
or semi-professional occupations draw on this idea to legitimize their work as being 
‘professional’ and eventually achieve the status of a full profession. Overall, the 
professions and their core ideas have become institutions on which actors draw – 
either as privileged members of these elite groups to defend and extend their status 
(Currie et al., 2012; Micelotta & Washington, 2013) or as members of occupations 
who attempt to gain status by emphasizing the extent to which professionalism 
shapes their work (Dent, 2002; Kitchener & Mertz, 2012; Neal & Morgan, 2000).  
How professions can be conceptualized as institutions that shape organizational and 
social life will be further elaborated in the next section. As I will show, neo-
institutional theory mimics the history of the sociology of the professions insofar as 
professions have moved from stable ‘external’ structures that cause institutional 
stability to a source of institutional change in the environments in which they are 
embedded.  
3.1.2 Current Perspectives on Professions as Institutions and Professionals 
as Social Actors 
The study of professions notably informed neo-institutional theory that began to 
flourish in the beginning of the 1980s (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Leicht & 
Fennell, 2008). Through neo-institutional research, the professions gained a new 
analytical dimension as both the source (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and, more re-
cently, the object of social pressures (Adler & Kwon, 2013; Scott et al., 2000; 
Thorne, 2002).Within neo-institutional theory, institutions are commonly defined as 
entities that “constitute regulations of actions that are relatively long-lasting and 
make rules of behaviour binding on the basis of values and norms, and sanctions. 
They are seen as forming the habitus of particular groups and as symbolically ex-
pressing a certain order” (Rehberg, 2006: 280f. ).  
Professions are institutions insofar as they provide actors –  in particular members 
of the respective profession – with collective and socially binding rules of appropri-
ate behavior that are reinforced by law and socialization within the professional 
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community (Leicht, 2005: 604; see also: Leicht, 2014). Being a member of a pro-
fession is tightly linked to a specific professional habitus which is most obvious in 
traditional professions like medicine and law. Physicians, for example, are social-
ized into the role of widely autonomous decision-makers within the field of medi-
cine, relying on scientific facts and guiding subordinate professionals like nurses 
(Hall, 2005). Individuals from the same profession have been observed to act and 
speak alike to an extent that scholars like e.g. Stelling and Bucher (1973: 661) have 
“often been tempted to define professional socialization as ‘the decline of idiosyn-
cracy’”. Accordingly, the membership in a profession can be viewed as embed-
dedness in a tightly defined institutional framework that guides and standardizes 
each professional’s behavior in a way that made institutional researchers think of 
these individuals as “almost interchangeable” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 152). 
This standardization through professionalization is the basis for early institutionalist 
conceptions of the professions as source of normative pressure that furthers organi-
zational isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Through education and interac-
tion in professional associations, individuals become strongly socialized into the 
professional norms that shape their behavior within and across organizations. Since 
the prime source of professional socialization lies beyond the sphere of the organi-
zation and its structural and cultural idiosyncrasies, organizations in fields with a 
high level of professionalization become increasingly similar (idb.). How normative 
isomorphism through professionalization unfolds empirically, has been shown by 
Slack and Hinings (1994) in their study on Canadian sport organizations. Through 
an increase in professional staff with a similar educational background, standard-
ized hiring procedures and high internal mobility of the professional staff, the man-
agement of Canadian sport organization began to share common “ideological posi-
tions about the purpose of sport and the most appropriate type of organizational 
design to realize this purpose” (Slack & Hinings, 1994: 820). Similarly, Levitt and 
Nass (1989) find that the organization and content of college textbooks are more 
homogenous in academic fields with high degrees of professionalization as these 
fields have stronger assumptions on what defines the discipline and what is to be 
studied within it. Further, it has been shown that new practices diffuse more rapidly 
through organizations with a rising degree of professionals (Sutton, Dobbin, Meyer, 
& Scott, 1994). 
In sum, early institutional works assigned professionals the role of a stabilizing 
force that leads to homogeneity within organizational fields. As enforcers of com-
mon professional norms who hold similar cognitive orientations, professionals 
shape the structures of their organizations in a similar way. Being more embedded 
in their professional networks than in their respective organization, professionals 
cause convergent change in their organizations according to the templates provided 
by their professional community (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Galaskiewicz, 1985). 
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As neo-institutionalism developed from a theory focused on convergent change in 
organizations and isomorphism in organizational fields to a theoretical framework 
that explained both change and stability in social arrangements, so did the role of 
professions and professionals within neo-institutionalism. While early neo-
institutional research portrayed actors as mostly powerless and often even unaware 
of the stable social forces that shape their behavior, institutionalists had to 
acknowledge that actors, while socially embedded, are more than “cultural dopes” 
(Suddaby, 2010: 15)  and that institutional change is often the result of individual or 
collective agency. Although any actor with sufficient resources and an interest in 
institutional change could become a so called “institutional entrepreneur” 
(DiMaggio, 1988: 14), professionals obtain a special position among institutional 
agents. Due to their embeddedness in their profession, professionals are commonly 
endowed with high societal status (Abbott, 1981: 828) and with symbolic resources 
like perceived rationality (Fournier, 1999: 285) and superior moral integrity 
(Postema, 1983: 37). As highly institutionalized fields are commonly organized 
around one or few dominant professions, professionals may shape whether, when, 
and how fields change. For example, in their study on the transformation of the 
field of professional business services Greenwood et al. (2002) show how profes-
sional associations shape field-level change through theorization. They illustrate 
that changes in the structure of accounting firms and the roles of accountants be-
came institutionalized through their endorsement by two accounting associations. A 
key finding of their study is that professional associations provide normative justifi-
cation to new structures and practices that facilitates diffusion. The endorsement of 
altered organizational forms was closely intertwined with their perceived “profes-
sional appropriateness” (Greenwood et al., 2002: 75). Hence, professionals’ in-
volvement in field-level change cannot be separated from the dynamics within their 
profession, as professions and other field-level institutions are inextricably inter-
twined.  
The intimate relationship between professionalization and field-level change is also 
addressed in DiMaggio’s (1991) seminal article on museum workers’ influence on 
increasing field structuration (i.e. the institutionalization and structuring of fields 
(ibd.: 267)). The professionalization efforts of museum workers were intertwined 
with the legitimization of a new, functional form of museums that included educa-
tional aspects. As museum workers started to seek higher education and expanded 
their intraprofessional communication through professional associations, they 
gained expert status which allowed them to define appropriate organizational forms 
for museums. The progressive form of art museums as educational organization, in 
turn, created the demand for these highly-trained professionals who established the 
art museum as a taken-for-granted element in any larger city (DiMaggio, 1991: 
288). In contrast to the study of Greenwood et al. (2002), DiMaggio (1991) analyz-
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es a case in which professionals initiated change, both in their profession and the 
field. Yet, both studies illustrate that professions cannot be reduced to stable, exter-
nal structures whose (arguably) homogenous members merely support the diffusion 
of given institutional forms and practices. Much rather, professionals may also ac-
tively drive field-level change which often includes a redefinition of their profes-
sional role. The observation that professionals are often prominent actors in the cre-
ation and change of organizational fields leads Scott (2008b: 219) to the conclusion 
that professionals are “lords of the dance”, implying that they are the “most influen-
tial, contemporary crafters of institutions” (ibd: 223). Similarly, Suddaby and Viale 
(2011) argue that the professional project is in itself an endogenous mechanism of 
field-level change. As professionals are deeply embedded in their respective field, 
each attempt of expanding their areas of expertise and their jurisdictional bounda-
ries will affect the structure of the field. As Suddaby and Viale (2011: 426) put it, 
“projects of professionalization reverberate throughout the field and influence, ei-
ther directly or indirectly, the institutionalization project of other entities”.  
In conclusion, professionals are important social actors as they are in the position to 
promote both convergent and divergent change within organizations and fields. Due 
to their embeddedness in a profession, they are a mostly homogenous group with 
regard to their cognitive and normative orientation and support the reproduction of 
dominant templates of organizing. Hence, organizations that are primarily struc-
tured around one or few particular professions converge over time with regard to 
their structure and practices. Yet, professionals are also endowed with the legitima-
cy to promote changes that diverge from the status-quo. They may directly work 
towards changes in the structures and practices of a field or indirectly, though 
changes in their profession. In both cases, professional and field-level dynamics are 
closely intertwined as fields are structured around professions and professions are 
embedded in fields.  
While it is indisputable that professionals are powerful agents who may exert sig-
nificant influence on their institutional environment, current institutional research 
tends to overemphasize their political leverage as it largely focuses on dramatic 
instances of change on the field-level (DiMaggio, 1991; Galvin, 2002; Greenwood 
& Suddaby, 2006; Jespersen, Nielsen, & Sognstrup, 2002; Kitchener, 2002; Malsch 
& Gendron, 2013). The reality of many professionals is far from being a ‘lord of 
the dance’ (Scott, 2008b) as they find themselves embedded in the hierarchical 
structures of large organizations and as participants in carefully synchronized rou-
tines. Accordingly, I will dedicate the next section to a discussion of the different 
levels of professional work and elaborate on how they impact professionals’ capaci-
ty of institutional agency.  
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3.2 The Embedded Nature of Professionals’ Work 
Professionals obtain a high degree of autonomy over their work and are deeply em-
bedded in the social structures provided by their membership in a profession. Yet, 
the work of professionals necessarily takes place in contexts beside their profes-
sional community. We find professionals as political actors, e.g. as presidents of 
their chambers who seek to influence the regulatory environment of their work to 
their favor, or as collective actors (e.g. in the form of large professional service 
firms) that provide templates for legitimate organizational practices and interactions 
between different organizations of a field (Quack, 2007; Scott et al., 2000; 
Suddaby, Cooper, & Greenwood, 2007; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). On the 
field-level, professionals mostly act as representatives of their profession as an in-
stitution, seeking to maintain and extend (regulatory) boundaries and defining and 
redefining legitimate modes of professional training and practice. Professionals, 
however, are also increasingly embedded in the structures of large organizations 
(Adams, 2015; Bloor & Dawson, 1994; Leicht & Fennell, 1997; Suddaby, 
Gendron, & Lam, 2009). While this poses a stark contrast to the ideal-type of the 
autonomous, self-employed professional at the center of early research on the pro-
fessions (Carr-Saunders & Wilson, 1964; Elliott, 1972; Freidson, 1970b, 1970a), 
the proportion of professionals in dependent employment is rising: physicians treat 
their patients within the structures of large hospitals (Dent, 2003, 2005; Doolin, 
2001, 2002; Jespersen et al., 2002) and lawyers work as employees in law firms, 
legal departments of large corporations, and – together with accountants – in multi-
disciplinary partnerships (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Within organizational 
structures, professionals often find themselves in dual roles (e.g. as physicians and 
hospital managers). Given the tensions that often exist between professional and 
organizational role expectations, organizations have increasingly become arenas for 
political action that provide new areas of professional influence while restricting 
classical, autonomous professional practice (Kirkpatrick, Dent, & Jespersen, 2011). 
The most immediate level of professional work is the routine level. Here, profes-
sionals apply their abstract knowledge and enact what is considered typical profes-
sional habitus (cf. Deverell, 2000). While this level of professional work provides a 
context in which ‘professional behavior’ can be directly enacted, routines common-
ly necessitate interprofessional collaboration, implying that ‘professional behavior’ 
is rarely enacted in isolation. Specifically, the successful execution of routines often 
relies on the common effort of different professionals and the support of adminis-
trative and management personnel (Goh, Gao, & Agarwal, 2011; Greenhalgh, 
2008; Hilligoss & Cohen, 2011). 
On each level of their work professionals are confronted with different challenges 
regarding the construction and the enactment of professionalism, facing new norms 
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and values, new roles, and new limits to their practice (Aldridge, 1996; Leicht & 
Fennell, 1997; Leicht, Walter, Sainsaulieu, & Davies, 2009). Conversely, each of 
these levels is also strongly influenced by professionals’ work and offers distinct 
opportunities for agency.  
The goal of this section is threefold. On the one hand, I will provide a general un-
derstanding of how professionals are embedded in different work environments and 
how these affect professionals’ political and practice work. On the other hand, I will 
illustrate how the ‘exertion of professionalism’ takes place on the field-, the organi-
zation-, and the routine-level. Lastly, I will elaborate on how each of these levels 
constrains agency while also providing professionals with distinct opportunities to 
initiate and implement institutional change. As professionals’ role in institutional 
dynamics is necessarily context-dependent, this chapter will provide a general un-
derstanding of why professionals’ involvement in institutional change can take var-
ious forms and why it is often more than a political struggle about regulatory 
boundaries. The first section (3.2.1) will explain how professionals maintain and 
change the institutional foundations of organizational fields; the second section will 
illustrate how professionals adapt to and make use of their new roles within organi-
zations (3.2.2), and the final section (3.2.3) will elaborate on how professionals are 
enabled and constrained within their daily working routines that are characterized 
by complex tasks and interprofessional collaboration.  
3.2.1 Field-level: Professionals as Key Constituents and Political Actors 
Organizational fields are defined as “organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute 
a recognized area of institutional life” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 148). According 
to DiMaggio & Powell (1983: 148), fields include “key suppliers, resource and 
product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce simi-
lar services or products”. In short, fields are comprised of individual and collective 
actors who interact with each other and recognize each other as part of a delineable 
community with shared meaning systems (Scott, 2008a: 86). The aspect of com-
mon meaning systems is particularly emphasized by Greenwood et al. (2002: 59) 
who point out the socially constructed nature of fields. Fields are thus more consti-
tuted by actors’ shared perceptions of common goals, norms on appropriate behav-
ior, and interpretive frames than by clear industry boundaries (Wooten & Hoffman, 
2008: 138).   
Professionals play a key role in establishing, maintaining, and changing organiza-
tional fields as they provide the meaning systems that are essential to a field (Scott, 
2008b). How fields are structured around specific professions can be best observed 
at the examples of health care and law. Especially the field of health care has al-
most exclusively been structured around the medical profession for a long time 
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(Scott et al., 2000). Physicians have established the criteria according to which 
medical services are to be offered, by whom, and how health care organizations like 
hospitals are to be structured (Scott et al., 2000). Essentially, fields often come into 
existence and become identifiable as such through the work of professionals who 
inhabit relevant regulatory bodies and other central organizations of a field and 
spread their principles of appropriate structure and conduct throughout the field (cf. 
Suddaby & Viale, 2011). 
Due to the initial focus of institutional theory on organizational fields as arenas of 
isomorphic processes (Dacin, 1997; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Glynn & Abzug, 
2002; Oliver, 1988), much of institutional research on the professions has – some-
times at the expense of more multi-level perspectives – studied professionals’ role 
in field-level dynamics (e.g. DiMaggio, 1991; Galvin, 2002; Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006; Greenwood et al., 2002; Jespersen et al., 2002). As pointed out in 
section 3.1.2, professionals play a key role in creating isomorphism within organi-
zational fields. But perhaps more importantly, professionals also act as collective 
political actors in fields, shaping them on a regulative, normative and cognitive lev-
el (Scott, 2008b: 225ff.). Professionals’ influence on the legal regulation of organi-
zational fields has already been a central theme in the early works of the sociology 
of the professions. In attempts to establish professional dominance, professionals 
engage in negations with state actors who grant them jurisdictional protection for  
certain areas of expertise and effectively exclude members of other occupations 
from providing the respective services (Freidson, 1970b, 1988a). Further, they de-
termine the modes of professional training – often in collaboration with the state 
that provides professional training in public universities – and hence shape fields by 
creating a homogenous workforce (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). They exert coer-
cive power not only through shaping the jurisdiction of their profession but also by 
enforcing the criteria of lawful professional work. Physicians and lawyers may lose 
their licenses if they fail to comply with the standards provided by their profession-
al associations and organizations may face legal sanctions when allowing non-
professionals to provide professional services (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 152). 
Yet, professionals’ influence on the field is far from being restricted to claiming 
formal jurisdictional ‘sanctuaries’ and forcing their peers and organizations to com-
ply with their federally secured regulatory frameworks.  
The normative influence of professionals on organizational fields is probably the 
most-theorized path of professional agency. Both sociologists and organizational 
institutionalists alike have emphasized the impact of professionals on the norma-
tive-moral foundations of a field (Durkheim, 2013; Leicht, 2014; Leicht & Fennell, 
2008; Postema, 1983; Scott, 2008b). While sociological scholars – particularly in 
the first half of the 20
th
 century – argued that professionals protect the morals and 
values of a society (see section 3.1.1), institutionalists focused more on how profes-
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sionals shape a field’s ideas on appropriate and desirable structures, processes, and 
goals. The first pathway through which professionals determine a field’s normative 
orientation can be described as ‘control from the inside’. As employees and execu-
tives in organizations, professionals apply their guiding moral principles – encoded 
in their training and enforced through peer pressure – to the structures and process-
es within their organization. In doing so, they create field-level isomorphism and 
thereby further reinforce the normative standards of their profession as appropriate 
ways of organizing work (see section 3.1.2). The second pathway of professionals’ 
influence relies more on the political work of professional collectives such as pro-
fessional associations and can be viewed as ‘control from the outside’. Professional 
associations craft the standards and norms (while not legally binding) that profes-
sionals should follow to be considered a respectable member of the profession 
(Nerland & Karseth, 2015). These standards are then diffused through their enact-
ment by professionals inhabiting organizations (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006), but 
also directly serve as guidelines for organizational design (cf. Satow, 1975).  
Beyond designing and diffusing the normative standards that determine how organ-
izations should be designed to be perceived as legitimate member of that field, pro-
fessionals also influence the shared cognitive frameworks within fields. These cog-
nitive frameworks comprise the taken-for-granted ‘truths’ of a field, including the 
automatic reproduction of structural arrangements and practices (cf. DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). According to Scott (2008: 224), professionals “exercise control by 
defining reality”. Professional collectives do so by creating common knowledge 
bases and categories (Loewenstein, 2014; Schildt, Mantere, & Vaara, 2011), along 
which professionals and professional organizations interpret problems and evaluate 
potential solutions (Scott, 2008: 225). The extent to which professionals shape the 
cognitive underpinnings of a field is also reflected in the common language that 
differentiates professionals from clients and other occupations (Loewenstein, 2014; 
Stelling & Bucher, 1973). Through this common technical terminology meaning 
systems are created which help to differentiate ‘insiders’ from ‘outsiders’ of a field.  
Despite the fact that the distinction between a regulative, normative and cognitive 
pillar of institutional environments seems to have a strong appeal to institutional 
researchers, it remains a conceptual one (Scott, 2008a). On the empirical level, pro-
fessionals may create and reconfigure organizational fields through strategies that 
affect all three pillars simultaneously (cf. Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). They may 
legally enforce the boundaries of their expertise that are based on a normative belief 
about what a professional of a certain kind should and should not be doing and 
cause a common understanding of what e.g. a physician or lawyer normally does 
and which structures commonly characterize hospitals or courts.  
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While professionals’ have been identified as key actors in field-level-change 
through several empirical studies (DiMaggio, 1991; Greenwood et al., 2002; Scott 
et al., 2000; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005), institutionalists have only recently be-
gun to theorize the relationship between professionals and institutional change on 
the field-level. Suddaby and Viale (2011) develop a model that provides a compre-
hensive theorization of the linkages between professionalization and institutional 
change. Drawing on the sociology of the professions and institutional theory, they 
elaborate on how professionalization efforts do not only affect the boundaries be-
tween adjacent professions, but at the same time, reconfigure the structure of a 
field. Specifically, Suddaby & Viale (2011: 424) view the professional project as 
endogenous mechanism of institutional change as professionals’ constant effort to 
maintain and extend their spheres of influence necessarily affect other actors and 
structures on the field-level such as the state, their clients, and the organizations in 
which they are employed (ibd.: 426). Drawing on extant research on the role of pro-
fessionals in field-level change, Suddaby & Viale (2011: 426 ff.) identify four con-
secutive mechanisms through which professional projects shape organizational 
fields. First, professionals define a new, uncontested space by expanding their 
spheres of expertise and their jurisdictional boundaries. They do so by either creat-
ing entirely new areas to which their knowledge applies or by appropriating adja-
cent professions’ or institutions’ fields of work. Second, professionals populate 
these new spaces with new actors. They do so by creating and reconfiguring catego-
ries of organizations and occupations. As a result, new individual and organization-
al actors become legitimate providers of professional services. The advent of new 
actors, in turn, restructures a field’s composition. Third, professionals promulgate 
new rule systems that redefine the boundaries of organizational fields. As proposed 
by Abbott (1988), professionals find themselves in constant struggles to defend and 
expand the boundaries of their expertise against adjacent professions and occupa-
tions. Suddaby & Viale (2011) extent this argument by pointing out that profes-
sional jurisdiction necessarily affects a fields’ power structures and boundaries. Ac-
cording to them the “promulgation of new rules by professionals […] serves as an 
extension and objectification of the power of the profession” (ibd.: 433) and be-
comes the “fabric of a field” (ibd.: 433). Lastly, professionals restructure fields by 
managing the reproduction of professional capital. Through their high status, pro-
fessionals possess the power to shape the social order of a field. Their skills in ma-
nipulating a fields’ social order are reinforced through their access to critical posi-
tions within organizations and fields. Professionals primarily use rhetoric and cate-
gorization to present changes as appropriate and create new cognitive frameworks 
through which a field is interpreted. They have been found to be “skilled rhetori-
cians” (ibd.: 435) who use language to “reproduce social, cultural and symbolic 
capital” (ibd.: 435). Categorization, in turn, is the mechanism through which pro-
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fessionals define problems, rules of behavior and classes of actors. Mostly, they 
draw on their high status to define categories in a way that allows them to stabilize 
the social order that provides them with their superior status. In short, Suddaby & 
Viale (2011) illustrate that professionals’ constant efforts to advance their profes-
sional project reverberates through a field as changes in a profession inevitably im-
ply changes in the structure of a field. Yet, they also point out that professionals 
skillfully manipulate a fields’ social order in a way that is conducive to their profes-
sional projects by drawing on their high social status. 
However, the process through which professionals shape fields is neither determin-
istic nor without struggle. Interestingly, Scott (2008: 223), who views professionals 
as the “most influential, contemporary crafters of institutions”, proposes several 
endogenous and exogenous changes that may affect professionals’ potential to exert 
agency in their fields. As endogenous changes, Scott (2008: 229) mentions a greater 
division of labor, increasing mechanization and routinization, and the consolidation 
and formalization of knowledge. A greater division of labor introduces new actors 
to the field, including adjacent occupations such as nurses and chiropractors in the 
case of the medical profession. While Scott (2008: 230) presents these occupations 
as having settled with their parallel or subordinate role, recent empirical studies 
suggest that former semi- and non-professionals pursue their professionalization 
projects more consistently and more aggressively than formerly assumed 
(Carvalho, 2012; Goodrick & Reay, 2010; Kilpatrick et al., 2012; Reay et al., 
2006). Given the increasing mechanization and routinization of their work and the 
formalization of their knowledge, formerly dominant professions such as medicine 
are likely to have their status challenged. First, adjacent occupations may begin to 
perceive themselves sufficiently qualified to exert formerly ‘professional’ services 
as the complexity and opacity of knowledge is reduced. Second, other stakeholders 
within a field such as clients or the state might become less willing to accept pro-
fessionals’ central position in defining the rules of a field as the central component 
of their status – a complex and somewhat esoteric body of knowledge – becomes 
‘demystified’. According to Scott (2008: 230), exogenous changes that affect pro-
fessionals’ agency within fields mainly stem from wider societal changes such as a 
rise in the number, size, and social power of organizations, changes in the nature of 
clients, and changes in the institutional logics of a field. Organizations have become 
increasingly larger over the last years and brought forward new, professionalizing 
occupations liked specialized managers. At the same time, members of established 
professions like lawyers discovered corporate actors as new type of clients, leading 
to stratification within the profession and a restructuration of professional organiza-
tions, which have become increasingly multiprofessional and less differentiated to 
accommodate to the needs of their clients. Again, while Scott (2008) remains silent 
on the effects of this development, a change towards the “managed professional 
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service firm” (ibd.: 231) may weaken professionals’ position within a field as they 
cannot claim dominance over their organizations as easily as they could in mono-
professional partnerships or professional bureaucracies that are structured around 
one or very few professions (see also section 2.3.3). This may affect their field-level 
influence insofar as organizations have been identified as a “primary vehicle” 
through which professionals exert agency in fields (Suddaby & Viale, 2011: 427). 
Losing their dominant influence within their organizations may hence decrease 
their political leverage on the field-level.  
The last and arguably most prevalent change that professionals face today is a 
change in the institutional logics that govern an organizational field (Light, 2010). 
As societal meta-logics that describe generalized, field-independent ideas on how 
work and other instances of human behavior are supposed to the structured, have 
moved from frameworks like ‘bureaucracy’, ‘professionalism’ or ‘public services’ 
to market-focused, neoliberal ideas, so have professional fields (Scott, 2008: 232; 
see also section 3.3.1). As a consequence, professionals’ work becomes increasing-
ly assessed along market-based criteria such as efficiency. With privatization and 
managerial control being omnipresent principles in organizational life, professional-
ism is increasingly being questioned as most rational way to organize fields such as 
health care or law (McNulty & Ferlie, 2004). New classes of legitimate stakehold-
ers (e.g. non-professional executives) and changing rationalization accounts now 
populate even the most traditional professional fields like health care (Harris, 
Brown, Holt, & Perkins, 2014; Ruef & Scott, 1998; Scott, 2004). Accordingly, 
while professionals remain powerful actors in many organizational fields, they have 
to account for these new elements to be able to defend their status (Leicht & 
Fennell, 1997; Leicht & Lyman, 2006; Leicht et al., 2009). Even though it is hard to 
imagine that professionals will ever lose their profound impact on highly institu-
tionalized fields like health care and law, their ‘natural’ legitimacy is being chal-
lenged by alternative ideas of rational work design. The unquestioned dominance of 
professionals has hence become a phenomenon on the decline (Scott, 2004; Scott et 
al., 2000).  
Overall, their strong embeddedness in organizational fields is both the reason that 
professionals may successfully shape fields and the cause of their loss in absolute 
power (e.g. Scott et al., 2000). Professionals are the cornerstones of multiple fields. 
Hence, changes in their jurisdictions, which result from their constant struggles 
with members of adjacent occupations over legally protected areas of expertise, 
inevitably reconfigure the structure of a field, including the distribution of power 
and the design of organizational forms.  Further, professionals, due to their central 
position and the symbolic and material privileges associated with their exclusive 
and complex knowledge and supposedly higher morals, may directly manipulate 
the structures and meaning systems of field to promote their professional project. 
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Yet, current developments such as the rise of meta-logics like the free market as 
ultimately rational mechanism of organizing are at conflict with the traditional 
model of professionalism which promotes exclusiveness and autonomy in service 
provision rather than unrestricted market-transactions in professional services. Pro-
fessionals’ status within a field has hence shifted from a field constituent with 
largely unquestioned dominance to a collective actor among several who compete 
for interpretive authority in a field (McDonald, Cheraghi-Sohi, Bayes, Morriss, & 
Kai, 2013; Reay & Hinings, 2009; Scott, 2004). In the end, while some fields may 
have come into existence through the professionalization of occupational groups 
like physicians and attorneys, professionals are just as much shaped by their field as 
they shape it.  
The conflicts between professionals and countervailing powers that are rooted in 
meta-trends like marketization become particularly obvious within an organization. 
Organizations may be instrumental for professionals’ agency on the field-level 
(Suddaby & Viale, 2011: 427), but within organizations, professionals often strug-
gle to adapt to hierarchical structures and the external control of their work (Leicht 
& Fennell, 1997; Marcus, 1985; Raelin, 1986, 1989; Reed, 1996; Thomas & 
Hewitt, 2011). The following section will hence elaborate on how professionals’ 
agency is constrained but may – through the exploitation of new influence opportu-
nities – also be enabled by their embeddedness in organizations.  
3.2.2 Organization-level: Professionals between being Managed and being 
Managers 
Despite institutionalists’ assumption that professionals effectively shape organiza-
tions by applying their normative, professional standards to organizational struc-
tures and processes, research on professionals exhibits an ambivalent stance to-
wards the relationship between professionals and organizations. A key concern is 
the compatibility of the traditionally autonomous professional work with the hierar-
chical structures of organizations (Hall, 1968; Sorensen & Sorensen, 1974). Organ-
izations are generally defined as “systems of coordinated action among individuals 
and groups whose preferences, information, interests, or knowledge differ” (March 
& Simon, 1993: 2). The coordination of individuals and groups towards a common 
goal usually necessitates the definition of formal rules and procedures that have 
been associated with bureaucratic models of control (Weber, 1978). As external 
control is at conflict with professionals’ assumed intrinsic motivation to provide 
high-quality services, early works on the professions conceptualized bureaucracies 
as explicit antithesis to professionalism. The ideal-type professional was the auton-
omous (medical) practitioner who was subject to informal peer control only (Carr-
Saunders & Wilson, 1933; Parsons, 1939). Securing the normative basis of profes-
sionalism and being a salaried employee in a bureaucratic organization appeared 
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incommensurable (Engel, 1970; Marcus, 1985), and scholars perceived the increas-
ing bureaucratization of professional work as a direct path to deprofessionalization 
(Ritzer & Walczak, 1988).  
Even though much of the debate on how professionals and organizations interact 
circled around the assumption that bureaucracy restricts professional autonomy and 
necessarily leads to an erosion of professional values, scholars began to realize that 
more empirical studies are needed to fully comprehend the relationship between 
bureaucracy and professionalism (Barley & Tolbert, 1991) In her studies on predic-
tors of medical professionals’ perceived autonomy, Engel (1969, 1970) showed that 
a conflict between professional autonomy and bureaucracy may in fact exist. How-
ever, this conflict is not an absolute one and applies only to strong bureaucracies. 
Physicians felt most autonomous in settings with moderate bureaucracy. As Engel 
(170: 19) points out, it is important to acknowledge that bureaucracies are not al-
ways detrimental to professional autonomy but may function as a valuable resource, 
especially when compared to the situation of the former ‘ideal-type’ of the solo 
practitioner:  
“Bureaucracies, especially professional bureaucracies, can serve the needs created 
by these alterations in professional practice by supplying those professionals who 
work within bureaucracies with funds, various kinds of equipment, technical per-
sonnel, and other physical facilities essential for contemporary professional per-
formance, and with a stimulating intellectual climate for interchanging information 
and controlling quality of performance. These organizational characteristics will 
enhance the development and performance of today's professional. Working in iso-
lation, he is less likely to have access to the social and physical features which bu-
reaucracies can provide“(Engel, 1970: 19). 
Similarly, Toren (1975) concludes that while tendencies of deprofessionalization 
are observable among most of the traditional professions, a rise in bureaucracy is 
not among the main causes for this trend. The idea that bureaucracies and profes-
sionalism can be complementary modes of organizing (Montagna, 1968) culminat-
ed in the theorization of the “professional bureaucracy” as a distinct organizational 
form (Mintzberg, 1979, 1980). The professional bureaucracy integrates elements of 
bureaucratic as well as professional control while favoring the professional model. 
Minzberg (1980: 333ff.) defines professional bureaucracies as organizations with 
little central control whose main coordinating mechanism is the standardization of 
skills through professional training. Control is exerted individually and collectively 
by professionals who constitute the operating core of this organization. Middle 
managers and operators of this organizational form, too, are professionals while the 
non-professional staff merely supports professionals’ work by providing the neces-
sary minimum of technical infrastructure. In Mintzberg’s (1980: 334) words, “[f]or 
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the support staff of these organizations, there is no democracy, only the oligarchy of 
the professionals”. Formal modes of coordination that are typically associated with 
bureaucracies are generally restricted to the supporting functions as professional 
work is supposedly too complex to be standardized. In Mintzberg’s model, profes-
sionals are the dominant group within the organizational structure, restricting the 
influence of personnel outside the profession rather than the other way around. Yet, 
an empirical investigation of the control mechanisms in professional bureaucracies 
by Abernethy and Stoelwinder (1990) shows only partial support for Mintzberg’s 
model. Contrary to Mintzberg’s propositions, managing personnel with a profes-
sional background relied on formal tools of control (e.g. standard operating proce-
dures or supervision) at least as much as administrative personnel. However, 
Abernethy and Stoelwinder (1990) do not view their findings as evidence for pro-
fessionals being consumed by bureaucratic modes of control. As they point out, 
formal control mechanisms may be used to reinforce professionalism when they 
origin outside of the organization (e.g. standard operating procedures provided by 
professional associations) or when they allow for professional socialization (e.g. 
supervision by senior professionals as mode of professional training).  
Overall, professionals seem to adapt well to bureaucratic settings when mechanistic 
bureaucracy is restricted to support functions while the operational core of the or-
ganization remains under professional control. As the findings of Abernethy and 
Stoelwinder (1990) suggest, professionals may even utilize formal control mecha-
nisms as instruments to reinforce professional socialization within organizations. 
Hence, within professional bureaucracies, professionals’ agency is not constrained 
but rather broadened as the organizational setting provides them with new sources 
of status and power. Professionals may dictate how non-professional support staff 
should support them but may also, as “supervisory elites” (Leicht & Fennell, 1997: 
217), control their peers through both informal and formal structures.   
However, the professional bureaucracy as organizational form under full profes-
sional control is on the decline. First, the organizational settings in which profes-
sionals work have become more diverse. Professionals work in such different or-
ganizational settings as the legal departments of multinational corporations, phar-
maceutical companies, or not-for-profit organizations (Leicht & Fennell, 1997, 
2001). Here, professionals are salaried employees, managed and controlled by non-
professional administrative staff. Second, also classical professional bureaucracies 
such as large university hospitals or law firms are often under the control of profes-
sional managers rather than managing professionals. While organizational literature 
proclaims the rise of the post-bureaucratic era (Maravelias, 2003; McSweeney, 
2006), these claims must not be confused with a decrease in formal control. Quite 
the opposite appears to be true: Today, professionals find themselves in a situation 
in which peer control is often not the primary mode of controlling and coordinating 
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professional work. Even medical services – commonly theorized to be too complex 
to be evaluated by non-professionals – have increasingly become subject to external 
evaluation (Hafferty & Light, 1995). The reasons that professionals are being held 
accountable by non-professionals can be found in legal and economic pressures 
(see section 3.2.1) that call for more complex organizational forms. Accordingly, 
classic professional bureaucracies that are structured around the normative founda-
tion of a single or few dominant professions have evolved to multi-professional 
organizations under managerial control (Leicht & Fennell, 1997; Leicht et al., 
2009).  
With an increasingly diverse workforce, professional organizations tend to become 
political arenas (cf. Mintzberg, 1985) in which different professionals’ claims of 
expertise often collide. One of the most striking features of modern professional 
organizations is the changing role of management. Formerly depicted as supporting 
staff under the control of professionals (Mintzberg, 1980), management staff are 
now engaging in professionalization efforts themselves (Leicht & Fennell, 1997; 
Noordegraaf, 2007; Noordegraaf & Van der Meulen, 2008). Accordingly, Leicht & 
Fennell (1997: 228) argue that the observable increase in managerial intervention 
within professional organizations is less the result of managers wanting to control 
employees but more a side-effect of their own professional project that includes the 
expansion of managerial autonomy. Within an organization, these efforts effective-
ly result in power struggles between management and professionals as both strive to 
align organizational structures with what each of them consider ‘good professional 
service’. Noordegraaf and Van der Meulen (2008: 1057), who draw on the example 
of medical services, subsume the different approaches of professionals and manag-
ers as follows:  
“Medical specialists emphasize their professional knowledge, skills and service 
orientations to justify professional autonomy, whereas managers try to coordinate 
and standardize medical activities and to enhance professional output.”  
How these diverging goals play out in organizational reality is illustrated by several 
studies (Dent, 2003; Doolin, 2002; Raelin, 1986, 1989; Reasbeck, 2008). For ex-
ample, Waring and Bishop (2010) show that implementing lean management – a 
typical managerial tool to increase efficiency – in a hospital sparked resistance 
among clinicians as managers were not considered to be capable of assessing clini-
cal reality. Physicians further questioned managers’ motives, juxtaposing their own 
concern for patient well-being to managers’ presumed neglect of moral aspects in 
clinical care.  
Professionals’ relationship with the concept of managerialism is, however, not re-
stricted to potential conflicts between professionals on the operative and managers 
on the administrative level of the organization. Given the increasing pressures to-
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wards external accountability and efficient process design within professional or-
ganizations, professionals are pushed towards incorporating managerial conduct 
into their practice (Doolin, 2001; Thorne, 2002). Especially professionals in execu-
tive positions often find themselves in hybrid roles between their professional and 
their managerial responsibilities (Bourdieu, 1977; Iedema et al., 2004; Llewellyn, 
2001; Vera & Hucke, 2009). This dual role has been theorized to put additional 
strain on professionals who may circumvent the enactment of managerial practices, 
e.g. by decoupling their actual conduct from formal requirements (Doolin, 2001). 
Yet, other research suggests that the integration of managerialism into their role 
repertoire may become a new avenue for professionals to exert influence in their 
organizations (Baker & Denis, 2011; Kirkpatrick et al., 2011; Thorne, 2002). In her 
study on the activities of clinical directors, Llewellyn (2001) found that instead of 
being overwhelmed with their additional managerial tasks, some clinical directors 
willingly occupied medical management (as opposed to non-medical management) 
as new area of expertise. Non-medical management, exerted by administrative staff, 
was dismissed as not being able to fully grasp the complexity of clinical work. Ac-
cording to Llewellyn (2001: 593), clinical directors were able to use their role as 
medical managers to become what she calls “two way windows”. In this role, clini-
cal directors could mediate the domains of management and clinical work to gain 
influence in both areas instead of jeopardizing their clinical authority for their man-
agerial role and vice versa.  
That organizational hierarchies offer multiple and more direct paths of influence 
than political struggles on the field-level is particularly attractive for members of 
lower-status professions and professionalizing occupations. Organizational hierar-
chies open up opportunities to attenuate professional hierarchies when subordinate 
professionals claim new areas of expertise (Kilpatrick et al., 2012). How subordi-
nate professionals may utilize their organizational context as political arena has be-
come particularly obvious in health care organizations such as hospitals. Here, most 
health care professions are subordinate to the medical profession and additionally 
often bound to their organizational context (e.g. hospital nurses). Yet, these profes-
sionals have also learned how to defend and expand professional spaces by claim-
ing managerial positions within their organization. For example, in her study on 
how nurses incorporate managerialism into their professional role, Carvalho (2012) 
finds that nurses may utilize managerial roles in an attempt to free themselves from 
physicians’ dominance. Nurses claimed that health care management has been an 
inherent part of nurses’ training for almost a century while medical schools have 
not yet included managerial training in their curriculum  (ibd.: 535). In doing so, 
they created a new avenue for nurses’ professional project, increasing their auton-
omy from medical professionals and claiming new areas of expertise. Consequent-
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ly, Carvalho (2012: 537) concludes that “nurses tried to expand their disciplinary 
boundaries by incorporating managerial roles”. 
Given these findings on how professionals utilize organizational hierarchies to 
promote their professional projects, it is not surprising that Muzio and Kirkpatrick 
(2011: 391) view “organizations as sites for professional development”. Interpro-
fessional relations within organizations obviously reflect professional hierarchies 
on the field-level, but also become additional arenas in which power-relations be-
tween different professions are enforced, weakened, or even turned around (Leicht, 
Fennell, & Witkowski, 1995).  
In sum, organizational hierarchies both enable and constrain professionals’ agency. 
Early research on professionals in organizations emphasized the constraining nature 
of bureaucracy on professional work and implied that the bureaucratic control 
erodes professionalism (Ritzer & Walczak, 1988; Toren, 1975). While profession-
als proved to adapt well to bureaucratic settings (Suddaby & Viale, 2011: 426f.), 
appropriating its structures to enhance their power, organizations do put constraints 
on professional work. Today, constraining effects on professionals’ autonomy with-
in organizations stem less from mechanistic bureaucratic structures but more from 
external demands of efficiency and accountability which put professionals under 
pressure to include managerial practices into their formerly self-controlled work 
(Dent, 2005; Doolin, 2001).  Yet, the organizational hierarchy also offers new ave-
nues for professionals to gain formal power and to expand their expertise, thereby 
reinforcing or gaining dominance. Hence, professionals’ organizational embed-
dedness may limit professional autonomy as much as it provides new spheres of 
influence and resources for agency. 
3.2.3 Routine-Level: The Enactment of Professionalism  
Routines are the most immediate level on which professionalism is enacted (Brown 
& Lewis, 2011). Routines are defined as “repetitive, recognizable patterns of inter-
dependent actions, carried out by multiple actors” (Feldman and Pentland, 2003: 
93). Organizational routines are comprised of ostensive and performative aspects. 
The ostensive aspects of routines include abstract ideas of a routine, a general per-
ception on what to do when e.g. performing a medical operation. The performative 
aspect of routines describes concrete actions, carried out by routine participants at a 
specific time and space (Pentland & Feldman, 2005). The two aspects of routines 
are interdependent as the ostensive aspects of a routine enable routine participants 
to guide, account for, and refer to performances; the performative aspects, in turn, 
enable routine participants to create, maintain, and modify their representations of 
the routine (Feldman & Pentland, 2003: 106ff.). 
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Routines secure an organizations’ survival by allowing for coordination between 
several individuals. They support the regularity of actions and help establish con-
sistent, collective expectations on interdependent activities (Becker, 2004). In short, 
routines are coordination devices that help members of an organization to ‘get the 
job done’. Yet, routines are not mindless repetitions, rigorously standardizing hu-
man behavior. Actors may reflect on their behavior when engaging in organization-
al routines; making them effortful accomplishments (Pentland & Rueter, 1994: 
488). As such, routines do not only enable coordination but help to generate and 
sustain work-related identities. While for most employees “who we are” and “what 
we do” are inextricably intertwined, implying that occupational identity and work 
content are mutually constitutive (Nelson & Irwin, 2014), professionals are particu-
larly reliant on their role within routines when developing their professional identi-
ty. Pratt, Rockmann, and Kaufmann (2006: 236) observe that, in contrast to non-
professional employees, organizational membership is less constitutive of profes-
sionals’ identity. Much rather, professionals are “defined by what they do” (ibd.: 
236) much more than by their relative position within an organization. This im-
portance of the routine-level for the development of professional identity is not sur-
prising as it is within routines that professionals enact a key feature of professional-
ism: the application of complex knowledge to solve socially important problems in 
their clients’ best interest (Carr-Saunders & Wilson, 1933).  
This defining feature of professional conduct relates to both aspects of a routine. 
The ostensive part of a routine is the ‘know that’ while the performative part com-
prises the ‘know how’ (Feldman & Pentland, 2003: 103). In the context of profes-
sional work, the ‘know that’ relates to the routine participants’ idea on what kind of 
knowledge is relevant to e.g. treat a patient with renal insufficiency or to provide 
legal advice in the case of tax evasion, what steps are to be taken (e.g. diagnostic 
procedures), and who is to exert which steps in the routine. The performative as-
pect, or the ‘know how’ relates to the actual, observable enactment of professional 
knowledge in an autonomous way that responds to the idiosyncrasies of the situa-
tion at hand.  
The ostensive aspect of a routine automatically incorporates routine participants’ 
professional identity since the idea on what is supposed to happen during a routine 
is dependent on who is exerting the routine (Feldman, 2000; Feldman & Pentland, 
2003). For example, a nurse will exhibit a different representation of the treatment 
routine for a patient with renal insufficiency than a doctor. The ostensive aspect 
hence does not only provide a general scheme on how to behave to guarantee the 
consistent execution of a routine but also incorporates considerations about the ap-
propriateness of actions against the backgrounds of one’s professional identity 
(Brown & Lewis, 2011). The performative aspects of routines, that have to respond 
to the immediate situation in which professionals find themselves in, often include 
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adaption and improvisation and hence frequently deviate from the ideal-type repre-
sentation of a routine stored in the ostensive aspect (Feldman, 2000; Feldman & 
Pentland, 2003). Yet, the performative aspects – through their function of creating, 
maintaining, and modifying ostensive aspects – relate to the ostensive aspects, 
thereby shaping professional selves. This adaption of professional identities through 
everyday routine performances is well illustrated by Pratt et al. (2006). In their 
study on medical residents, they find that young professionals adapted their identi-
ties in a way that solved tensions between their self-conceptualizations and the 
work they carried out. Especially young surgeons who viewed themselves as ac-
tion-orientated felt that their working routines, which included considerable 
amounts of paperwork, threatened their identity as surgeons and even impeded the 
creation of the professional self of a ‘true’ medical doctor (ibd.: 246). As a result, 
interns engaged in the process of identity customization, including “splinting, 
patching, enriching” (ibd.: 253). Overall, Pratt et al.’s study (2006) shows that per-
formative aspects add to the development of professional selves even when a dis-
tinct professional identity is already stored in the ostensive aspects. In their study, 
residents needed to revise their identity to resolve a perceived mismatch between 
‘who they were’ and ‘what they did’.  
Explicitly employing an organizational routine perspective, Brown and Lewis 
(2011) further add to the observation that there is a close interrelation between rou-
tines and professional identities. Specifically, they find that lawyers carry out iden-
tity work (i.e. the formation, maintenance, reinforcement or change in distinctive 
ideas of the self (Sveningsson & Alvesson, 2003)) by discursively constructing os-
tensive aspects of their time reckoning and billing routine in a way that reflected 
their identity as accountable, disciplined professionals. In practice, the time reckon-
ing and billing routine was, however, appropriated by lawyers through flexible ad-
justment of time records and bills, using “their professional judgement” rather than 
official specifications encoded in the routine (Brown & Lewis, 2011: 883). Interest-
ingly, Brown and Lewis (2011) show how lawyers incorporated the constraining 
effect of routines into their professional selves while at the same time, using their 
professional autonomy to resist organizational routines in order to differentiate 
themselves from non-professional service providers. The authors conclude that os-
tensive aspects of the rigorous time reckoning and billing routine were integrated 
into professional identities in a way that made them a part of the ‘productive law-
yer’ rather than an aspect of external control. The performative deviations, in turn, 
served as a reassurance that lawyers are still, despite of their being controlled, self-
reflexive professionals.  
As these examples demonstrate, routines simultaneously enable and constrain pro-
fessional agency as the duality between structure and agency is an inherent part of 
routine dynamics. Ostensive aspects develop from experience gathered in routine 
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performances; performative aspects are held consistent by their alignment with the 
generalized idea of the routine that is stored in the ostensive aspect (Pentland, 
Feldman, Becker, & Liu, 2012). The constraining effect of organizational routines 
on the work of professionals results from both their coordinative and their symbolic 
function. As coordination devices, routines discipline individual agency through 
shared ostensive aspects which ensure that routine participants have similar percep-
tions on what is to be done by whom and when. To be able to reduce uncertainty in 
a collaborative environment, individual preferences have to be subordinated to 
shared understandings of how the work of all routine participants is interrelated 
(Greenhalgh, 2008). Beside their coordinative function, routines uncover social or-
ders and underlying (power) relations between actors. For example, in his study on 
technological changes in radiology departments, Barley (1986: 87) illustrates this 
everyday enactment of social orders within routines as follows: 
 “The radiologists’ dominance was routinely enacted as x-ray techs and radiolo-
gists […] went about their daily work […]. Most interactions between members of 
the two groups involved a radiologist giving a technologist orders, which the tech-
nologist then carried out.” 
Professionals need to adhere to routines as these are commonly created and shaped 
by other actors of the same profession (Savage & Langlois, 1997). A lack of con-
formity to what is considered appropriate behavior within a professional routine 
(e.g. a surgical operation) may not only jeopardize the coordination between actors 
but may also risk participants’ status as legitimate members of a profession, able to 
address tasks in a manner that is considered adequate against their professional 
background. As noted above, their professional identity is dependent upon exerting 
a routine in a specific way. Meeting the expectations of their peers while participat-
ing in a routine is a key aspect of professionals’ socialization. It reinforces both a 
specific professional identity and the ostensive aspect of a routine in general, lead-
ing to an increasing structuration of routine exertions by stabilizing professionals’ 
(mutually constitutive) perceptions on ‘who they are’ and ‘what they do’.  
Beside of being accountable to their peers, professionals find themselves under in-
creased pressure to accommodate external demands for industry-like standardiza-
tion of their routines to secure a consistent service quality. While professionals have 
formerly been theorized to not standardize their routines (Savage & Langlois, 
1997), rising task-complexity and the pressure towards external accountability have 
significantly reduced the scope of professional agency within routines. As profes-
sional work becomes ever more complex, service provision in professional organi-
zations also becomes more fragmented. For example, the number of medical spe-
cialties and sub-subspecialties is constantly rising (Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981) 
and new specialist occupations like wound managers (Miner, Gibbons, Jeffres, & 
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Brandon, 1995) additionally expand the number of actors involved in health care 
routines. As competences are distributed among several routine participants with 
different professional backgrounds, each of them has to be disciplined and restrict-
ed in his individual autonomy as a lack of coordination between routine participants 
would lead to a breakdown of the routine (cf. Currie & White, 2012; Ferlie et al., 
2005). As Savage (1994: 135f. ) puts it, “an individual practitioner’s decisions are 
constrained by the capabilities of the network as a whole, because their productive 
activities must be implemented within the system”. Artifacts like formal rules or 
technological infrastructure have been considered useful to integrate different spe-
cialties into a consistent organizational routine (DeHart-Davis, 2009; Greenhalgh, 
2008). While it is unlikely that professionals like physicians or lawyers will ever be 
degraded to mere executors of externally defined rules, the reliance on binding 
guidelines on how to proceed when confronted with a specific task puts constraints 
on professional autonomy. This trend towards the standardization of professional 
routines is further reinforced by initiatives to design professional service firms more 
industry-like and by calls for the reduction of outcome variance in sectors like 
health care (Rozich et al., 2004; Timmermans & Almeling, 2009), which are often 
further promoted by lawmakers or external accreditation initiatives (Shaw, 2000).  
Despite their coordinative and social functions that require the limitation of indi-
vidual agency, routines also provide professionals with the opportunity to exert in-
fluence in their organizations. Professionals’ participation in organizational routines 
is conducive of agency mostly through the performative aspects. Naturally, routine 
performances rarely fully conform to their ideal-type representations. Hence, it is 
not uncommon that routine participants have to adjust their routine exertions ac-
cording to unanticipated task demands and idiosyncratic situations. This is particu-
larly true for professionals as actors who work in settings in which they commonly 
encounter high levels of uncertainty and must apply their professional judgment to 
be able to best serve their clients’ interest (Faraj & Xiao, 2006; Savage & Langlois, 
1997). In addition, their high autonomy allows professionals to deviate from ‘ideal-
type’-routines to a greater extent than non-professional actors without having their 
status questioned. Mediated by participants’ learning and evaluation processes, rou-
tine performances may modify ostensive aspects (i.e the ideal-type representation 
the interrelated work processes of several routine participants). Hence, profession-
als’ adaption of routines may also induce changes in their and the roles of other rou-
tine participants. By the selective retention of specific routine performances, profes-
sionals’ actions may maintain or change power relations in an organization by de-
fining and redefining who is to do what and when within a routine (Brown & 
Lewis, 2011: 875). Yet, as routines are collective accomplishments, this kind of 
agency is a distributed one; it is often unintentional and only gradually changes rou-
tines. How routines change as feedback from routine performances is incorporated 
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in the ostensive aspects of a routine is well illustrated by Feldman (2000) in her 
study on the routines of housing services in a university. Feldman (2000: 626) em-
phasizes that “[t]he participants in the routines, for the most part, were professionals 
who exercised discretion in the way they performed their tasks”, thus providing an 
example that – while not situated in the stereotypical context of medical or legal 
work – shows how decision autonomy, as a typical element of professional work, 
informs routine dynamics.  
Among the routines that were changed was the hiring routine for student housing 
staff, which was changed from a very decentralized routine to a centralized and 
well-structured hiring process. While routine participants agreed that the routine 
was supposed to become far more efficient through the changes, the outcomes of 
the new routine were assessed differently. Central administrators valued the chance 
to create a specialist system by training the now uniformly qualified staff. Building 
directors, on the other side, felt that a lack of complementary skills and perspectives 
among the staff might impede their problem solving skills. As the outcome of the 
changed routine was unsatisfactory for the building directors, they began to evade 
the new, centralized routine, thereby again altering the hiring routine according to 
their perceptions on what would create a more favorable outcome (i.e. a less uni-
form staff) (Feldman, 2000: 622).  
As this example shows, changes in routines do heavily depend on how routine per-
formances and their outcomes are evaluated against participants’ normative ideals 
of appropriate process and outcomes. Yet, when routines change, they may also 
alter underlying interpretive schemes (Rerup & Feldman, 2011), enabling the de-
velopment of new normative foundations within an organizations’ working pro-
cesses. This mechanism becomes particularly obvious when formerly subordinate 
or new professional groups improve their status by changing their role within rou-
tine performances. For example, in their study on how nursing practitioners institu-
tionalized their professional role in Canadian health care, Reay et al. (2006: 989) 
find that their everyday-interaction with medical and nursing colleagues was a 
small but important part of successfully integrating the profession of the nursing 
practitioner into the working processes in health care. By proving that colleagues 
benefited from the inclusion of nursing practitioners in their working routines, they 
laid the foundation for their profession to be considered a regular part of the work-
ing routine which eventually fostered the institutionalization of the new profession.   
In sum, organizational routines enable and constrain professionals’ agency in sev-
eral ways. First, as routines function as coordination devices that secure the overall 
functioning of organizations, they constrain individual practitioners by providing 
relatively stable ideas on who needs to do what and when in order to complete a 
task. Second, routines are the most immediate level on which professionals prove 
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their capability of adhering to appropriate professional conduct, thereby constrain-
ing their potential to diverge from existing routines. In addition, recent trends to-
wards standardization in professional organizations restrict professionals’ leeway 
within the exertion of routines. Yet, routines also hold significant potential for 
agency. While the kind of agency, exerted in the everyday work of professionals, is 
rarely as dramatic as the political lobbying attempts on the field-level and often un-
intentional, routine performances necessary include individual and collective agen-
cy. As highly autonomous professionals adapt their routine performances to the 
specific tasks and circumstances they find in their daily work, they create starting 
points for routine change. Through the selective retention of specific elements of 
routine performances, ostensive aspects develop and change, thereby often also 
changing the roles and power relations of routine participants. In short, routines 
help develop and shape professionals’ identity as professionalism is most immedi-
ately enacted in routines; they ‘keep professionals on track’ in a coordinative as 
well as normative sense;  but they also serve as site for agency as professionals are 
particularly autonomous and even expected to apply their knowledge in a very case-
specific way when exerting a routine.   
3.3 The Engagement of Professions with Institutional 
Dynamics 
As discussed in the preceding chapters, professions are a socially constructed cate-
gory of occupations which is linked to a distinctive status. Professions as institution 
are deeply embedded in highly-institutionalized fields like law and health care. 
Hence, change and stability in such fields cannot be explained without taking the 
role of the professions into account. As professions change, so do fields and vice-
versa (Muzio et al., 2013; Suddaby & Viale, 2011).  
However, the professions are abstract entities that do not ‘act’ independently from 
their members. Professionals, in turn, may act as individual or collective institu-
tional actors, within or even through the organizations in which they are embedded. 
As explained in section 3.1.2, professionals may enable convergent and divergent 
changes in their institutional environment. However, the mechanisms by which pro-
fessionals engage in institutional dynamics are complicated, non-deterministic, and 
occur on several, intertwined levels of professionals’ work (Smets et al., 2012). In 
addition, professionals are neither free from organizational constraints nor uncon-
tested in their status and power (Leicht & Fennell, 1997; Leicht & Lyman, 2006). 
Currently, most professionals find themselves in situations in which they have to 
respond to several stakeholders within and beyond their own profession: State in-
terventions in professional fields are expanding, the organizational embeddedness 
of professionals has become the norm rather than the exception, and professionals 
C H A N G I N G  P R O F E S S I O N A L S  
60 
have to adapt their practices to external efficiency demands and their embeddedness 
in multi-professional teams. Yet, their increasingly restrictive work environments 
are not to be confused with a lack of power in shaping institutional norms and struc-
tures. Professionals regularly define and redefine work relations, organizational 
structures, and the cognitive frameworks of a field as they try to advance their pro-
fessional project (Currie et al., 2012; Kirkpatrick et al., 2011; Kitchener & Mertz, 
2012). They do so through deliberate political interventions but also through emer-
gent adaptions in their everyday work, making their involvement in institutional 
dynamics often invisible and sometimes unintentional (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 
2013). As professionals are constantly embedded in several institutional structures, 
e.g. their profession and their organization, they are more likely to experience ten-
sion between different cognitive frameworks and normative ideals. As an effect, 
they regularly engage in institutional dynamics, often to either expand or defend 
their spheres of influence as professionals.  
The goal of this chapter is to elaborate on how professionals become both agents 
and objects in processes that lead to institutional stability and change. This theoreti-
cal analysis of how professionals change and are being changed by institutional 
dynamics serves as important foundation to the following chapters, including the 
empirical studies in chapters 4.3, 5.3 and 6.3 as it provides the reader with a general 
understanding of the complexity and variety of professionals’ agency.  
The first section will employ an institutional-logics perspective to explain how pro-
fessionals incorporate different mindsets and normative orientations into their work, 
thereby spreading multiple logics throughout their institutional environments while 
also constantly mutating the relationships between different logics. The second sec-
tion will provide an overview on how professionals exert agency through ‘institu-
tional work’. The concept of institutional work is particularly suitable to uncover 
how professionals shape institutional dynamics on every level of their work as it 
emphasizes that “institutionalization and institutional change are enacted in the eve-
ryday getting by of individuals and groups who reproduce their roles, rites, and rit-
uals at the same time that they challenge, modify, and disrupt them” (Lawrence et 
al., 2011: 57). Accordingly, the institutional work perspective provides a holistic 
picture of individual and collective institutional agency while avoiding the notion of 
overly powerful, disembedded ‘heroes’(Hardy & Maguire, 2008) .   
3.3.1 Professionals as Carriers of Multiple Institutional Logics  
The ‘institutional logics’-perspective in neo-institutional theory (Thornton, Ocasio, 
& Lounsbury, 2012) provides a particularly suitable theoretical framework to illu-
minate professionals’ role in institutional dynamics within the different contexts of 
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their work as it allows to account for a pluralism of cognitive frameworks and nor-
mative orientations to guide actors’ behavior.  
Institutional logics are defined as “the socially constructed, historical pattern of ma-
terial practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals pro-
duce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide 
meaning to their social reality” (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999: 804). They help actors 
to interpret and structure social situations and to find appropriate behavioral re-
sponses against the background of their professional and organizational role 
(Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011: 318). Logics are 
“locally instantiated and enacted in organizational fields as in other places such as 
markets, industries and organizations” (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008: 119). Further, 
institutional logics do not magically ‘appear’ as guiding principles that diffuse from 
the field-level to the organization- and routine-level, but are constructed through 
interaction, that is, any kind of social interaction on one or more of these levels 
(Friedland, 2013). Actors, as Greenwood et al. (2011: 342) point out, “are ‘carri-
ers’[…] and thus ‘represent’ and give voice to institutional logics”. Through their 
daily work, which is guided by one or multiple logics, actors render institutional 
logics visible and maintain or alter their relevance in specific situations (Smets, 
Morris, & Greenwood, 2012: 892). Human interaction within organizations and 
routines constitutes what McPherson and Sauder (2013: 185) refer to as “ground-
level processes that make logics relevant and consequential”, implying that institu-
tional logics may guide, yet do not exist independently from social interaction. Put 
simply: logics are both behavioral guidelines that inform individual and organiza-
tional action and aggregates of the symbolic implications of social interaction in 
organizations and routines (cf. Giddens, 1984). 
Institutional logics have, however, been used ambiguously in institutional research. 
Hence, I deem it necessary to first elaborate on how the concept of logics will be 
employed in the course of this thesis before going into more detail on how profes-
sionals are carriers of multiple logics. Most scholars agree that the concept of logics 
has been introduced by Friedland and Alford (1991) who argue that contemporary 
Western societies comprise several distinct “institutional orders” (ibd.: 244), each 
of which applies to a specific societal sector. Their conceptualization of institutional 
logics comprises five symbolic systems with distinct notions of meaningful goals 
and appropriate social interaction. These are the logics of capitalism, family, (bu-
reaucratic) state, democracy, and religion (ibd.: 248). Today, scholars commonly 
distinguish between six or seven ideal-type logics along which societies are struc-
tured. Interestingly, it is the logic of professionalism which is most commonly add-
ed to Friedland and Alford’s (1991) original framework (e.g. Thornton & Ocasio, 
2008: 104), owing to the importance of professionalism for the organization of 
work and institutionalists’ particular interest in this central institution of modern 
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societies (Lander, Koene, & Linssen, 2012; Leicht & Fennell, 2008; Malsch & 
Gendron, 2013; Micelotta & Washington, 2013; Muzio et al., 2013; Quack, 2007; 
Scott, 2008b; Suddaby & Viale, 2011). Reviewing several empirical studies on in-
stitutional meaning systems, Thornton (2004: 44-45) provides a condensed frame-
work of six societal sectors that can be distinguished according to their concepts of 
reality (i.e. their logics) that include different goals and behavioral norms. These are 
markets, corporations, professions, states, families, and religions. Aside from addi-
tions like the community logic (Besharov & Smith, 2014: 366), these societal logics 
have become widely accepted as central pillars along which most societies are be-
ing structured (Lounsbury & Boxenbaum, 2013; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; 
Thornton et al., 2012; Zilber, 2013). Societal logics are, however, highly abstract, 
nominal categories to conceptually differentiate general principles of organizing 
that may help to find order in the complex realities of organizational fields.  
While scholars have elaborated on the difference between societal and field-level 
logics on a conceptual level (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008: 104), most empirical 
studies fail to explicitly address the difference between the abstract guiding princi-
ples of societal sectors and the specific frameworks of appropriate structures and 
practices that shape human behavior in organizational fields. A notable exception 
that differentiates between societal logics as ideal-types and empirically identifiable 
logics on the field-level are McPherson and Sauders (2013), who find in their study 
on logic complexity in drug courts, that local manifestations of four societal logics 
simultaneously shape the working processes in the organizational field of drug 
courts (see also chapter 6.2). Specifically, the state logic was specified as a “logic of 
criminal punishment”, the logic of the profession as “logic of rehabilitation”, the 
community logic as “logic of community accountability”, and the corporate logic as 
“logic of efficiency” (ibd.: 173). On the one hand, this distinction illuminates how 
societal logics translate into specific cognitive frames and behavioral norms that 
structure organizational fields. On the other hand, it helps to disentangle the some-
times confusing multiplicity of logics that characterizes empirical research.
17
 Figure 
3.1 provides a schematic overview on how societal logics are empirically instantiat-
ed as field-level logics and how the enactment of logic constellation in organiza-
tions and routines is, in turn, aggregated into field-level logics.  
 
  
                                                 
17 For example, scholars have identified the managerial logic (Scott, 2004) and the logics of efficiency and 
accountability (Adler and Kwon, 2013), the logic of bureaucracy (Freidson, 2001), or the commercial logic 
(Harris et al., 2014) as counterlogics of professional logics. While in the following, I will use the original 
terms of the authors quoted, I urge the reader to keep in mind that field-level logics are local instantiations of 
specific societal logics.  
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The differentiation between abstract, societal logics and field-level logics has im-
portant implications for the study of professionals’ role in institutional dynamics. 
Generally, all professionals can be conceptualized as carriers of the societal logic of 
professionalism (Bledstein, 1985: 5). The logic of professionalism is commonly 
defined as “the creation of a social space that is independent and autonomous from 
both the state and the market” (Suddaby et al., 2009: 410) and as “a ‘social trustee’ 
ideal that links expert knowledge with higher social purpose” (Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005: 44; see also: Brint, 1994). Consequently, the societal logic of 
professionalism describes a general principle of organizing that prefers peer-control 
and normative commitment over formal mechanisms of coordination and legitimiz-
es professionals’ autonomy from outside-control via the complexity and the societal 
importance of their work (Evetts, 2003, 2011; Fournier, 1999). Given that the logic 
of professionalism has been viewed as explicit antithesis to other principles of or-
ganizing like the bureaucratic or the market logic (Freidson, 2001), research on pro-
fessionals and institutional logics has focused much on how professionals defend 
‘their logic’ against other logics that penetrate the respective organizational field 
(Reay & Hinings, 2009; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005; Thornton, Jones, & Kury, 
2005). However, specific ideas of professionalism may vary largely between pro-
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fessions and fields. This applies to the definition of a professions’ area of expert 
knowledge (Schildt et al., 2011) and the contents of their normative belief system, 
including how the ‘higher calling’ of profession is defined in a specific field. For 
example, a lawyer would naturally define the social purpose of his profession dif-
ferently than a doctor while neither of these actors would consider themselves less 
of a professional. Further, scholars have even identified distinct sub-logics within a 
profession such as the logics of science and care as two competing types of medical 
professionalism (Dunn & Jones, 2010; see also chapter 4.2). Consequently, extant 
notions of professionals as carriers and defenders of the (societal) logic of profes-
sionalism are not only overly simplistic but also seem to disregard that different 
professional groups may promote different professional logics (Keshet, Ben‐Arye, 
& Schiff, 2013; Kilpatrick et al., 2012; Kirkpatrick et al., 2011; Kurunmäki, 2004; 
McDonald, Campbell, & Lester, 2009; Timmons & Tanner, 2004), that is, different 
local instantiations of the logic of professionalism.  
While the differentiation between the abstract notion of professionalism and specif-
ic professional logics that are actualized in routines, organizations, and fields re-
mains a conceptual one, it helps to view professionals as contextually embedded 
actors who share some general features but are a more heterogeneous class of actors 
than previous conceptual work on the professions suggests (Freidson, 1989; Scott, 
2008b).  
This general insight is important against the background of most professionals’ cur-
rent working environments (see also sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3) that impede the en-
actment of their professional logic. For example, if the logic of medical profession-
alism was fully enacted in health care “[p]hysicians would practice medicine alone 
or in association with other physicians” (Goodrick & Reay, 2011: 378). This, how-
ever, is rarely the case as physicians are increasingly being employed in large hos-
pital corporations in which they have to fulfill additional organizational roles. This 
ambiguity of roles entails a multitude of logics around which professionals have to 
organize their behavior, thereby inhibiting the application of ‘pure’ professionalism 
(Doolin, 2001; Farrell & Morris, 2003). Further, political changes in most profes-
sional fields foster marketization and competition, leaving even self-employed pro-
fessionals little leeway to fully align their practice with their idealized concept of 
professionalism as a publicly protected principle of service provision exclusively 
guided by the norms provided by professional associations (Goodrick & Reay, 
2011; Harris et al., 2014; Harris & Holt, 2013; McArthur & Moore, 1997; Scott, 
2004). Hence, while professionals are undeniably carriers of their professional logic 
it is by far not the only logic affecting their practice. In contrast to non-professional 
actors who can more easily detach themselves from their occupational background 
to fulfill different organizational roles (cf. Pratt et al., 2006), professionals face a 
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constant state of multiple embeddedness with their professional logic providing the 
‘baseline’ of their cognitive and behavioral repertoires.  
While the existence of multiple logics has been well-accounted for in field-level 
research (Green, Babb, & Alpaslan, 2008; Greenwood, Díaz, Li, & Lorente, 2010; 
Purdy & Gray, 2009; Scott, 2004), the simultaneous influence of several logics on 
professionals, as a group of social actors within the field, has so far received less 
attention. A notable exception is provided by Goodrick and Reay (2011) who draw 
on a historical case study to illustrate that the work of pharmacists was consistently 
guided by a multiplicity of logics. The authors identify five eras between 1852 and 
2011 in which different constellations of logics affected the professional work of 
pharmacists. The professional logic, the corporate logic, the market logic, and the 
state logic all affected pharmacists’ work over time while only one era is character-
ized by the existence of a dominant logic (the market logic). Interestingly, the pro-
fessional logic, while relatively strong since 1945, never achieved absolute domi-
nance in the work of pharmacists. This finding underlines the importance of con-
ceptualizing professionals as carriers of multiple logics who have privileged access 
to the logic of professionalism and commonly utilize this logic as discursive figure 
(Fournier, 1999; Jones & Livne-Tarandach, 2008; Thomas & Hewitt, 2011; 
Turkoski, 1995), but may indeed be primarily guided by another logic. Another 
important finding of Goodrick and Reay (2011) relates to the idea that different 
logics can coexist within a group of social actors through the process of segmenting 
and through cooperative relationships between different logics. Goodrick and Reay 
(2011: 402) describe segmenting as a process through which different aspects of 
professional work are guided by different logics. In their study, they find that e.g. 
pharmacists’ education and accreditation was primarily structured according to the 
professional logic while the corporate logic prevailed in the context of pharmacists’ 
increasing employment in large grocery chains. Cooperative relationships between 
logics, in turn, imply that professionals’ may simultaneously be guided by two or 
more logics within the same aspect of their work. In Goodrick and Reay’s (2011: 
402) study, this was the case when the increasing importance of the market logic, 
including a more aggressive advertisement of pharmaceuticals, led to better-
informed customers that more strongly valued pharmacists’ scientific knowledge, 
thereby strengthening the relevance of the professional logic in pharmacists’ work. 
In sum, professionals are likely to be confronted with an enduring multiplicity of 
logics which they need to incorporate into their political and everyday work. De-
pending on time and context, they may even be primarily guided by non-
professional logics, implying that professionals’ role in institutional dynamics is 
more complex, ambiguous and contingent than them being mere defenders of their 
professional logic against external influences (Currie et al., 2012; Micelotta & 
Washington, 2013; Muzio & Ackroyd, 2005; Noordegraaf, 2007; Relman, 2007). 
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As Muzio et al. (2013: 703) point out, the “coexistence, copenetration, sedimenta-
tion, and hybridization” of  different types of logics within professionals’ work may 
even produce distinct “forms of professionalism”, thereby confirming the idea that 
non-professional logics are not necessarily external to a profession but often be-
come an integral part of professionals’ work. 
How actors and professionals in particular balance the different logics that they car-
ry within their roles as e.g. politicians, practitioners, managers, or employees de-
pends on their relative embeddedness in a logic, which may vary over time. Ac-
counting for the specific role of professional socialization as powerful process of 
familiarizing actors with a professional logic, Pache and Santos (2013) provide a 
comprehensive framework on individuals’ responses to competing institutional 
logics. According to the authors, individuals’ response to competing logics is con-
tingent upon their degree of adherence to different logics. Actors may be novice, 
familiar, or identified with different logics which may result in the ignorance, com-
pliance, defiance, combination, or compartmentalization of these logics (Pache & 
Santos, 2013: 12ff.). Professionals are normally highly identified with their profes-
sional logic as “[p]rofessions act as powerful conduits of logic identification” 
(Pache & Santos, 2013:10) because the norms encoded in professional training pro-
vide them with “ready-to-wear templates about how to behave” (ibd.: 7). Hence, 
professionals can be assumed to always be aware of and willing to comply with the 
demands of their professional logic. Yet, as elaborated above, this does not imply 
that professionals exclusively adhere to the professional logic. As traditionally ‘pro-
fessional’ fields like law and health care become increasingly influenced by market 
and corporate logics, (Brown & Amelung, 1999; Dunn & Jones, 2010; Reay & 
Hinings, 2009; Ruef & Scott, 1998; Scott et al., 2000), professionals become famil-
iarized with new belief systems that may persistently provide additional, sometimes 
conflicting, templates for appropriate behavior. Being familiar or even identified 
with more than one logic induces more complex reactions towards different logics 
than complying with one and resisting another logic. In their model, Pache & San-
tos (2013) identify combination and compartmentalization as two strategies by 
which actors balance two logics. Combination refers to the integration of two or 
more logics within their work. Incompatibilities between these logics may be re-
solved through the combination of selective elements from each logic or through 
the synthesis of both logics into a new set of norms or practices (ibd.: 14). Com-
partmentalization describes the selective adherence to different logics across time 
and context. This strategy corresponds to what Goodrick and Reay (2011) describe 
as ‘segmenting’ (see above) and illustrates particularly well that embeddedness in 
multiple logics may lead to a permanent state of forced agency. As professionals 
commonly find themselves at the interstices of several templates for appropriate 
behavior while unable to fully distance themselves from the professional logic that 
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remains an inherent part of their identity (Chreim, Williams, & Hinings, 2007; 
Fagermoen, 1997; Pratt et al., 2006), they are less likely to take given institutional 
arrangements for granted. This increased reflexivity of actors through multiple em-
beddedness has been identified as a necessary precondition for the exertion of insti-
tutional agency (Battilana, 2006, 2011; Battilana et al., 2009). Further, as profes-
sionals become aware of the multiple social expectations imposed on them, they 
have to strategically balance different templates for legitimate behavior (Llewellyn, 
2001; Witman, Smid, Meurs, & Willems, 2011). Having to choose between several 
sets of norms, values and practices inevitably induces agency which, in turn, fosters 
institutional dynamics (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013). These dynamics occur as 
actors repeatedly comply with one logic while ignoring or resisting another logic or 
as they create new institutional arrangements and practices (such as ‘clinical man-
agement’ (Thorne, 2002)) through the integration of several logics.  
However, it would be misleading to conceptualize professionals as passive carriers 
of multiple logics who exert agency only as a means to resolve tension between the 
different roles they have to fulfill. Having a repertoire of several logics at hand al-
lows professionals to selectively combine elements of different logics in a way that 
helps them promote their interests. As Goodrick and Reay (2011: 405) explain, “ac-
tors attempt to use societal logics as a ‘tool box’ to fit their interests”, making the 
embeddedness in several logics not only a source of tension but also an expansion 
of available legitimization accounts to defend or promote specific roles, practices, 
and structural arrangements.  
Overall, being carriers of multiple logics puts professionals in a special position to 
exert agency within the different contexts of their work as it enhances their reflexiv-
ity and provides them with additional symbolic resources. Hence, it is not surpris-
ing that we find professionals so often as initiators and central agents within institu-
tional dynamics on different levels of their work. A particularly important insight of 
this section is the idea that while professionals are strongly socialized into their pro-
fessional logic, professional work may very well be structured around other logics. 
As an effect, professionals, commonly conceptualized as promoters and defenders 
of their professional project (Suddaby & Viale, 2011), may claim spheres of influ-
ence by drawing on legitimizations accounts that differ from those provided by the 
logic of professionalism. In the following sections, I will further elaborate on how 
professionals make use of their unique status to work towards the creation, mainte-
nance, and change of institutions through both, political and practice work.  
3.3.2 Professionals as Institutional Workers  
As elaborated above, professionals often find themselves in institutionally complex 
situations that necessitate the incorporation of several logics into their work. By 
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actively choosing which norms, practices and ideological foundations should guide 
their daily work, their organizational roles, and their profession as such, profession-
als exert institutional work. Institutional work is generally defined as “the practices 
of individual and collective actors aimed at creating, maintaining, and disrupting 
institutions” (Lawrence et al., 2011: 52). As such, institutional work covers all in-
stances of agency that may affect institutional dynamics, regardless of their actual 
outcomes. Institutional work provides a holistic perspective to professionals’ role in 
institutional dynamics as it explicitly includes the “myriad, day-to-day equivocal 
instances of agency”, that are often “simultaneously radical and conservative, stra-
tegic and emotional, full of compromises, and rife with unintended consequences” 
(ibd.: 52f.).  
Recent institutional research has emphasized that professionals are powerful institu-
tional workers who reconfigure fields as a ‘by-product’ of their constant struggle to 
defend and expand their jurisdictional boundaries (Suddaby & Viale, 2011; see also 
section 3.2.1). While linking processes of professionalization and institutionaliza-
tion within the wider field has provided an important insight into why professionals 
are so often found to be central actors in institutional change processes, this line of 
research exhibits two major ‘blind spots’. First, professionals’ institutional work 
has often been conceptualized as inherently political, carried out at the field-level 
and aimed at securing and extending the jurisdictional boundaries of their profes-
sion (DiMaggio, 1991; Greenwood et al., 2002; Kirkpatrick et al., 2011; Kitchener, 
2002; Kuhlmann, Allsop, & Saks, 2009; Lawrence, 2004; Noordegraaf & Van der 
Meulen, 2008; Quack, 2007; Scott, 2008b). Second, despite sociologists’ rejection 
of the notion that professionals are necessarily dominant actors within a field 
(Abbott, 1988), institutionalists have so far focused on the institutional work of 
high-status professionals (Castel & Friedberg, 2010; Dunn & Jones, 2010; 
Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Greenwood et al., 2002), thereby feeding the idea 
that professionals are basically elite actors who excel in shaping organizational 
fields due to their reputation and power (Kellogg, 2012; Scott, 2008b).  
Accordingly, despite its rising relevance as conceptual explanation for institutional 
change and stability, institutional work as a bottom-up and multifaceted, sometimes 
ambiguous kind of institutional agency, has yet to be fully utilized within the study 
of professionals’ role in institutional dynamics. Bringing a more holistic perspective 
to professionals’ institutional work is particularly relevant as recent empirical stud-
ies highlight that professionals’ role in institutional dynamics is neither limited to 
elite professional nor is professionals’ institutional work necessarily a political or 
even a conscious effort to advance their professional project. For example, Reay et 
al. (2006) provide a case study on how former nurses, as a professional group 
whose status within health care is traditionally subordinate to physicians, success-
fully established the role of the nurse practitioner in the health care system of Al-
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berta, Canada. Their strategies to legitimize their new role transcended the field-
level and unfolded as an interdependent and situated cascade of three micropro-
cesses: the cultivation of opportunities for change, the fitting of a new role into pre-
vailing systems, and the provision of proof of the new role’s value (Reay et al., 
2006: 984ff.). These processes included political action such as the integration of 
the professional group of nurse practitioners into the existing nursing associations 
to secure nurse practitioners’ independence from the medical profession. Yet, espe-
cially the processes of fitting the new role into existing systems and proving its val-
ue took place at the organization- and routine-level. Nursing practitioners institu-
tionalized their role by integrating official job descriptions into the HR systems of 
the local health care organizations; they further used their experience in health care 
to carefully establish trustful relationships with their colleagues from other profes-
sional groups in the context of their daily work (ibd.: 987f.). Eventually, achieving 
these “small wins” (ibd: 990) accumulated into the institutionalization of new ways 
of working in Alberta health care. While the results of this study illustrate well that 
professionals’ institutional work is far more diverse and context-specific than the 
often studied political disputes about field-level structures and practices 
(Greenwood et al., 2002; Suddaby et al., 2007), it covers a case in which members 
of a new professional group carry out institutional work to advance their profes-
sional project. Yet, professionals’ institutional work may also be triggered by non-
political causes such as the mundane attempt to do their everyday work within insti-
tutionally complex settings.  
Integrating institutional logics and institutional work perspectives, Smets and 
Jarzabkowski (2013) illustrate how professionals who are confronted with multiple, 
contradicting logics engage in institutional work to balance these logics in a way 
that allows them to go on with their daily work. Specifically, the authors present a 
case study on German and English lawyers in a multinational law firm who con-
stantly navigate between the logics provided by different national jurisdictions and 
diverging ideas of legal professionalism. They identify four cycles in which lawyers 
managed and resolved the rivalry between different logics through institutional 
work. In cycle one, lawyers strove to separate local and foreign practices by pur-
posely maintaining their usual ways of providing services while dismissing foreign 
practices as irrelevant and strange in the context of their work. However, as this 
intentional separation of practices proved to be unsustainable within collaborative 
work relationships, German and English lawyers had to actively engage in a re-
evaluation and balance of their diverging logics. Thus, in cycle two of their institu-
tional work process, they began to construct the two logics as contradictory, at-
tempting to de-legitimize foreign work practices while trying to present the respec-
tive local practice as ‘the right way’ to complete transactions. These constant strug-
gles about the appropriateness of the respective local practices interfered with the 
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provision of legal services to their international clients, causing inefficiencies and 
delays, and culminating into what Smets and Jarzabkowski (2013: 1299) describe 
as “work-level crisis”. As working processes broke down and client satisfaction 
was increasingly at stake due the perceived incommensurability of the different sets 
of practices, lawyers began to review the sources of conflict and started to experi-
ment with the different practice templates. In this third cycle of institutional work, 
compatibility between the different logics was constructed as lawyers improvised 
around given work problems, thereby generating hybrid practices that reflected el-
ements from both logics. In the last cycle of lawyers’ institutional work, the former-
ly improvised practices were formalized and integrated into official organizational 
structures such as training programs. As an effect, the two different logics of legal 
professionalism were constructed as not only compatible but complementary, 
providing lawyers with practices that were superior to any of the original practices. 
An important insight which Smets and Jarzabkowski (2013) derive from their case 
study is the limited projectivity of institutional agency in the face of an institutional-
ly complex workplace. While being embedded in complex constellations of logics 
triggers actors’ reflexivity and potential to intentionally promote or impede institu-
tional change, their institutional work efforts are not necessarily purposive attempts 
to shape their institutional environment. Smets and Jarzabkowksi (2013: 1304) ar-
gue that actors may lack an elaborate vision of future institutional arrangements and 
engage in institutional work simply because they are “practical people doing practi-
cal work to get a job done”. This idea is especially relevant in the context of profes-
sionals’ institutional work as the political nature of their agency is regularly 
(over)emphasized and their involvement in institutional dynamics often reduced to 
the conscious effort of promoting their professional project (Suddaby & Viale, 
2011).  
Overall, we find that professionals’ institutional work is context-specific and can 
take multiple forms, ranging from highly visible, projective strategies on the politi-
cal level (e.g. Greenwood et al., 2002) to practical improvisations that may uninten-
tionally generate new institutional structures and practices (Reay et al., 2013; Smets 
& Jarzabkowski, 2013; Smets et al., 2012).  
While scholars have only recently begun to explicitly account for professionals’ 
multiple contextual embeddednes when explaining when, why, and how they exert 
institutional work (Adler & Kwon, 2013; Currie et al., 2012; McCann, Granter, 
Hyde, & Hassard, 2013), I would like to point out that professionals’ embeddedness 
in both material and ideological systems is a key to understanding the antecedents 
and processes of their institutional work (see also section 3.3.1). Specifically, I sug-
gest that there are four major aspects to account for when studying when, why, and 
how professionals exert institutional agency.  
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First, professionals’ institutional work always relates to both, their profession and 
their institutional environment as professions are deeply embedded in organization-
al fields. While theoretical models have focused on how professionals’ institutional 
work changes the contents and boundaries of their profession, causing concomitant 
or subsequent change in the organizational field (Suddaby & Viale, 2011), profes-
sionals’ institutional work is not always explicitly aimed at developing their profes-
sion. This is, for example, the case when individuals who happen to be profession-
als promote new working structures within their organization without having an 
explicit political agenda (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013) or when they react to sud-
den changes in their working context (Barley, 1986; Edmondson, Bohmer, & 
Pisano, 2001). Yet, as professionals are representatives and “inhabitants” 
(Delbridge & Edwards, 2013; Hallett & Ventresca, 2006) of their profession as an 
institution in itself, any systematic change in the content or context of their work 
will inevitably affect their profession. We can see this, for example, when profes-
sions develop ‘along the way’ of professionals responding to new practical chal-
lenges (Smets et al., 2012). In short, professionals’ institutional work will always 
directly or indirectly contribute to the change or stability of their profession while 
the development of a profession will, in turn, affect surrounding institutions.  
Second, as noted above, professionals’ embeddedness in multiple institutional 
logics serves as enabler of institutional agency as it induces reflexivity. Profession-
als may, for example, begin to actively re-evaluate institutional arrangements when 
constellations between their professional and other institutional logics shift on the 
field-level (Reay & Hinings, 2009; Scott, 2004) or when the normative values and 
beliefs provided by their profession collide with those provided by their organiza-
tion (Dent, 2003; Doolin, 2001). With a rising number of cognitive and normative 
templates for the structuration of professional work, professionals become more 
likely to envision new and creative institutional arrangements as the taken-for-
grantedness of given structures and practices decreases in the face of feasible alter-
natives (cf. Battilana et al., 2009). Additionally, the existence of multiple logics in 
their work environment is likely to increase professionals’ motivation to engage in 
institutional work. While low-status professionals like nurses or health care techni-
cians are often motivated to take institutional action when they perceive an alterna-
tive constellation of logics to be conducive of raising their status (cf. Carvalho, 
2012), high-status professionals like physicians are frequently found to engage in 
institutional work when changes in the salience of given logics or the emergence of 
new logics threaten their status (Currie et al., 2012; Scott et al., 2000). Hence, as 
inhabitants of their profession, members of organizations and participants in specif-
ic routines, professionals do not only become aware of alternative institutional 
logics on a daily basis but at the same time acquire a set of avenues through which 
they can promote their professional project.  
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Third, professionals may effectively utilize their embeddedness in material envi-
ronments when engaging in institutional work. The probably most prominent ex-
ample of how professionals used their organizational embeddedness to advance 
their professional project is provided by DiMaggio’s (1991) study on museum di-
rectors who reshaped the organizational form of their museums from private collec-
tions to public educational institutions to raise the relevance of their expertise and 
eventually their professional status in the organizational field of art museums (see 
also Suddaby & Viale, 2011). Apart from being “vehicles” (Muzio et al., 2013: 
710) through which professionals can exert institutional work on the field-level, 
organizations often serve as the as the major arena for professionals’ attempts to 
change institutions. While this is particularly true for organization-bound profes-
sions like human-resource managers (Muzio et al., 2013: 710), members of classi-
cal (semi-)professions have been found to initiate institutional change within the 
boundaries of their organization (Dent, 2002). As elaborated in section 3.2.2, organ-
izations are particularly attractive sites for institutional work for professionals who 
lack status at the field-level. As organizations offer an additional avenue to gain 
status and resources through hierarchical position, low status professionals like, for 
example, nurses are more likely to pursue institutional changes at the organizational 
level first (cf. Battilana, 2011). Commonly, these changes comprise the appropria-
tion of new roles and task responsibilities that eventually translate into new regula-
tory structures on the field-level (Dent, 2002; Deverell, 2000; Reay et al., 2006). 
Accordingly, their organizational embeddedness provides professionals with both, a 
vehicle to induce change on the field-level and a distinct site for professional devel-
opment.  
Lastly, professionals’ embeddedness in different ideological systems, i.e. institu-
tional logics, has been identified as a symbolic resource which they can draw on to 
promote their interests (Goodrick & Reay, 2011). While having access to multiple 
logics is not an exclusive feature of professionals and other groups of actors have 
also been shown to generate convincing legitimization accounts by leveraging sev-
eral cognitive and normative frameworks (Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004), 
professionals are uniquely able to frame new institutional arrangements as rational 
or dismiss them as irrational (Green & Li, 2011; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). 
This is because professionals are adept in using discursive means since the devel-
opment and maintenance of a profession depends on the construction of compelling 
arguments as to why a distinct group of actors should hold exclusive control over 
specific areas of knowledge-intensive work (Freidson, 1988a; Suddaby & Viale, 
2011). However, being embedded in a profession can also serve as a powerful re-
source in itself as it grants professionals a discursive advantage: While profession-
als are generally endowed with higher legitimacy due to the public perception that 
they are particularly reasonable individuals with high levels of moral integrity, their 
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privileged access to the logic of professionalism provides them with a distinct rep-
ertoire of discursive means (Richardson, 1985; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). One 
of these discursive means is the concept of professionalism itself which has become 
a synonym for rationality and high service quality to an extent that practices and 
actors may lose legitimacy simply by being depicted as ‘unprofessional’ (Fournier, 
1999; McKinlay, 1972). Further, professionals occupy distinct “spaces of reason” 
(Schildt et al., 2011: 84). Drawing on Putnam’s (1975) idea of a division of linguis-
tic labor, Schildt et al. (2011) argue that society leaves the definition, maintenance 
and control of specific spaces of reason to professionals. Such spaces of reason are 
accepted domains of professional expertise which include, for example, notions on 
how sickness and health are to be defined or what constitutes a ‘gene’. Having au-
thority over spaces of reason endows professionals with power over specific areas 
of social life as their vocabularies and associated meaning systems restrict other 
actors’ capacity to change the cognitive and normative premises of this area. As 
Schildt et al. (2011: 84) point out, “even governments cannot intervene in areas like 
health care or economy unless their actions are rational in the context of accepted 
‘truths’ of medical science or economics”. Loewenstein (2014) further elaborates 
on why professionals’ distinct vocabularies provide means for institutional action 
by pointing towards the coordinative function of words and categories. While non-
professional actors rarely grasp the detailed meaning of such words as ‘heart attack, 
they have a basic understanding of how these words are to be used and what reac-
tions are reasonable when encountering a situation that falls into the category of a 
‘heart attack’ (ibd.: 9f.). Accordingly, non-professionals commonly borrow profes-
sional vocabularies for the purpose of coordinating action. However, as they lack 
the expertise and hence the legitimacy to find labels for examples of real-life-
situations and entities, they rely on professionals to provide classifications for them 
(ibd.: 10). As words play an important role in constructing reality (Berger & 
Luckmann, 2007), their labeling power gives professionals considerable leverage in 
institutional dynamics. Their institutional work efforts are facilitated as other actors 
actively seek professionals’ words to be used as tools for coordination and signals 
of legitimacy (Loewenstein, 2014: 10). In this sense, being embedded in a profes-
sion provides an important symbolic resource for maintaining or changing institu-
tions as it endows individual and collective actors with the power to discursively 
construct categories and the relations between them.  
In sum, being aware of professionals’ multiple embeddedness in material and ideo-
logical systems is crucial to understanding how and why they exert institutional 
work. One the one hand, professionals’ institutional work often has more profound 
effects on organizations and fields than the institutional agency of non-
professionals. As professionals ‘inhabit’ professions (cf.Hallett & Ventresca, 2006), 
their institutional work efforts inevitably affect the institutional foundations of their 
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profession. This happens either directly, through politically motivated institutional 
work to advance their professional project (Larson, 1979), or indirectly by pragmat-
ic institutional work that changes the content and immediate context of profession-
als’ work and eventually the profession itself (Deverell, 2000; McCann et al., 
2013). Professions, in turn, are central institutional pillars of organizational fields. 
Hence, as they change, so do surrounding institutional structures (Suddaby & Viale, 
2011). As a result, professionals’ institutional work always relates to their profes-
sion and the wider institutional environment.  
On the other hand, being embedded in multiple ideological systems, one of which is 
their professional logic, is likely to induce reflexivity, making professionals com-
paratively more prone to actively engage in the change and maintenance of institu-
tions (Delbridge & Edwards, 2013; McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Smets & 
Jarzabkowski, 2013). In addition, having access to multiple logics serves as a “tool 
box”(Goodrick & Reay, 2011:405) when promoting institutional change or stabil-
ity. Within this “tool box”, professionals possess a particularly valuable tool as their 
affiliation with the logic of professionalism endows them with authority over 
“spaces of reason” (Schildt et al., 2011: 84) in which they define vocabularies and 
categories. As other actors commonly draw on professionals’ meaning systems to 
organize reality and even seek professionals to provide words for unlabeled in-
stances of reality (Loewenstein, 2014), professionals are in a particularly favorable 
position to create, maintain and change institutions.  
Compared to the institutional work efforts of non-professionals, professionals’ in-
stitutional work has more impact on the field as it relates to the profession and sur-
rounding structures, is more likely to occur due to increased levels of reflexivity, 
and is more likely to be successful as it rests on a unique configuration of material 
and symbolic resources.   
3.4 Changing Professionals – An Integrated Model  
Despite recent attempts to distinguish professionals’ institutional work along clear 
categories (Lefsrud & Suddaby, 2012; Suddaby & Viale, 2011), the preceding 
chapters should have shown that professionals engage in institutional dynamics in 
multiple ways and on multiple levels of their work. Accordingly, professionals’ 
institutional work is far more diverse than extant models suggest and needs to be 
studied against the background of their material and their ideological embed-
dedness. In particular, while institutionalists’ focus on politically motivated institu-
tional work on the field-level (Scott, 2008b; Suddaby & Viale, 2011) resonates well 
with sociologists’ idea of professional projects as ongoing negotiations about the 
regulatory boundaries of professional work (Abbott, 1988, 1995; Larson, 1979), it 
restricts our understanding of how professionals shape institutional dynamics to 
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highly visible political strategies. Attempts to integrate institutional theory with the 
sociology of the professions have proven to be a useful starting point to gain a fuller 
understanding on when, why, and how professionals become institutional workers 
(Brock et al., 2014; Muzio et al., 2013; Muzio, Kirkpatrick, & Kipping, 2011). 
However, research integrating these perspectives has largely focused on profession-
als’ carefully arranged strategies to gain or maintain status and influence on the 
field-level (Galvin, 2002; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Greenwood et al., 2002; 
Kitchener & Mertz, 2012; Scott et al., 2000; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Fur-
ther, institutionalists commonly emphasize professionals’ high status within a field 
as a main component of their institutional leverage (Greenwood et al., 2002; Scott, 
2008b), implying that dominance within a field is an inherent characteristic of pro-
fessionals – a notion that had already been criticized by Abbott (1988).  
Hence, we lack a comprehensive model on professionals’ institutional work that (1) 
takes into account their multiple embeddedness in different logics, that (2) provides 
an integrated perspective on professionals’ institutional work as a large spectrum of 
strategic and non-strategic efforts to shape their institutional environment on the 
field-, organization-, and routine-level, and that (3) allows for a conceptualization 
of professionals’ institutional work that does not rely on their dominance within the 
field. Accordingly, it is the goal of this chapter to develop an integrated model on 
professionals’ institutional work that broadens our understanding of when, why, 
and how professionals engage in institutional dynamics without losing sight of their 
ideological and material embeddedness or excluding professionals who lack domi-
nance on the field-level.  
In the first section, I will elaborate on the idea of professionals’ institutional work 
as ‘boundary work’. Boundaries and boundary work obtain a prominent role in the 
sociology of the professions with researchers emphasizing that professional projects 
are constant struggles of defending and extending jurisdictional boundaries against 
adjacent professions (Abbott, 1988, 1995). Institutional researchers have also 
acknowledged the vital role of boundary work for the creation of shared concepts of 
reality and the importance of boundaries for institutional change and stability 
(Lawrence, 1999; Lawrence, 2004; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). Given the im-
portance of boundaries for the creation and maintenance of both the professions 
themselves and the institutional contexts in which they are embedded, I argue that 
the notion of boundary work provides a useful lense to study professionals’ diverse 
forms of institutional work. However, as I will further explain in the following, pro-
fessionals’ multiple roles and the increasing complexity of their work contexts 
(Leicht & Fennell, 1997) call for a conceptualization of professionals’ institutional 
work as a form of boundary work that comprises the purposeful and selective inclu-
sion and exclusion of logics to create (or prevent) new institutional structures and 
practices.   
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In the second section, I will develop a conceptual model on professionals’ institu-
tional work as boundary work that takes place in fields, organizations, and routines. 
To do so, I will elaborate on how professionals’ attempts to balance and skillfully 
manipulate the boundaries between institutional logics on the different levels of 
their work become visible as change and stability in the field, their organizations, 
and their routines. Further, I will illuminate the interrelations between the three lev-
els of professionals’ work, thereby drawing attention to the multi-level nature of 
professionals’ institutional work. The resulting model will provide a general con-
ceptual framework on professionals’ role in institutional dynamics and will serve as 
a starting point to the in-depth analyses of chapters 4, 5 and 6 that include self-
contained empirical studies on selected aspects of professionals’ role in the institu-
tional dynamics of German health care.  
3.4.1 Professionals’ Institutional Work as Boundary Work 
Professionals exert institutional work in various ways, depending on the level on 
which they promote institutional change or stability (Smets et al., 2012) and the 
logics available to them at a given time (Goodrick & Reay, 2011). Despite the great 
variety of professionals’ institutional work, ranging from the collective political 
agency of professional associations (Greenwood et al., 2002) to the everyday en-
actment of professionalism in the face of task pressures (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 
2013), I argue that any instance of professionals’ institutional work represents a 
form of  ‘boundary work’ (Fournier, 2000; Gieryn, 1983). 
In sociological and organizational research, a boundary most generally refers to “a 
distinction that establishes categories of objects, people, or activities” (Zietsma & 
Lawrence, 2010: 191). Accordingly, boundary work describes the creation of cate-
gories and relations between those categories. These categorization processes typi-
cally involve the explicit or implicit definition and juxtaposition of ideologies and 
material objects to establish a sense of sameness or difference (Gieryn, 1983). In 
short, boundary work is about the demarcation of ‘insiders’ from ‘outsiders’ to give 
order to a specific area of social life.  
The concept of boundary work is intimately intertwined with the existence and the 
development of the professions and has been identified as an integral part of any 
professional project (Abbott, 1988, 1995; Larson, 1979). Professionals draw 
boundaries when they negotiate their regulatory spheres (Abbott, 1988; Cooper & 
Robson, 2006; Suddaby et al., 2007), they draw boundaries when they choose their 
professional group as relevant peer group within organizations (Ferlie et al., 2005), 
and they draw boundaries when they defend task spheres against members of adja-
cent occupational groups in the context of organizational routines (Apesoa-Varano, 
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2013; Hall, 2005; Mitchell, Parker, & Giles, 2011; Salhani & Coulter, 2009; 
Snelgrove & Hughes, 2000).  
While the boundary work of professionals has primarily been studied as their politi-
cal endeavors to achieve and protect a monopoly over specific services through le-
gal regulation (Abbott, 1988, 1995) and the demarcation of task spheres in their 
workplace (Allen, 1997; Apesoa-Varano, 2013; Brown, Crawford, & 
Darongkamas, 2000; Chreim, 2012; Denis, Lamothe, Langley, & Valette, 1999), 
professionals create and enact boundaries in more complex and ambiguous ways 
than defining ‘who gets to do what’. Fournier (2000) provides an overview on the 
different kinds of boundary work that professionals exert. She suggests that profes-
sionals’ boundary work should be studied as both the constitution of a professional 
field and the appropriation of this field through what she calls the “labour of divi-
sion” (ibd.: 72). This labour of division comprises the construction of boundaries 
between different professional groups, the construction of boundaries between the 
professional and the client, as well as the construction of boundaries between the 
profession and the market. Fournier’s (2000) tentative framework on the different 
kinds of professionals’ boundary work offers an important insight that may help to 
advance both the sociology of the profession and research on professionals’ institu-
tional work.  Her conceptualization of boundary work does not only relate to the 
turf battles between different professional groups (see Abbott, 1988) but also in-
cludes the demarcation of professionalism from non-professionalism. More specifi-
cally, Fournier (2000: 77) points out that “professions have sought to situate them-
selves outside the commercial logic of the market”, implying that the boundaries 
professionals seek to establish are often between symbolic systems rather than 
groups of social actors per se.  
Further elaborating on the general idea of professionals’ boundary work as the defi-
nition of ‘insider’- and ‘outsider’-logics rather than the demarcation of boundaries 
between actors, I argue that whenever professionals seek to change, maintain, or 
disrupt institutions, they automatically engage in boundary work between different 
institutional logics. This is because any shift in the institutions surrounding profes-
sionals – from everyday practices to the profession itself – entails the restructuring 
of boundaries between professionalism and (elements of) other logics which pro-
fessionals are exposed to (cf. Goodrick & Reay, 2011). The notion that profession-
als’ institutional work can generally be conceptualized as an instance of boundary 
work provides a valuable conceptual extension to both the sociology of the profes-
sions and institutional theory as it offers an integrated view on the political and 
pragmatic processes through which professionals shape social life while accounting 
for their own embeddedness in complex constellations of logics (Dunn & Jones, 
2010; Freidson, 2001; Goodrick & Reay, 2011).  
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Specifically, I argue that institutional work generally comprises the implicit or ex-
plicit management of relations between logics since shifts in institutional structures 
and practices are achieved through the inclusion and exclusion of logics as guiding 
principles and meaning systems for fields, organizations, and individual actors 
(Scott, 2004; Scott et al., 2000; Thornton et al., 2005; Waldorff et al., 2013). For 
professionals, this management of logics is necessarily boundary work as their mul-
tiple embeddedness in their professional logic and additional institutional logics, 
such as the market or the state logic (Freidson, 2001), require them to purposefully 
integrate and separate logics when creating, maintaining, or disrupting institutions 
on different levels of their work. This includes the definition of a logic’s scope of 
application as well as the selective combination of logics within their profession 
(Goodrick & Reay, 2011) and the structures and practices of their work environ-
ment (Dunn & Jones, 2010; Galvin, 2002; McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Smets & 
Jarzabkowski, 2013). A prominent example of how professionals purposely shift 
the boundaries between formerly separate logics can currently be found in most 
Western health care systems, where medical and nursing professionals dynamically 
include or reject typical elements of the managerial logic to advance their profes-
sional projects (Carvalho, 2012; Kirkpatrick et al., 2011). 
While early work in the sociology of the professions and research on professionals’ 
involvement in institutional change suggests that professionals’ institutional work is 
mostly an ideal-typical creation and defense of a sphere in which the dominance of 
their professional logic is unquestioned (Freidson, 1970b; Scott et al., 2000), the 
increasing hybridization of professionals’ working contexts calls for a different per-
spective on professionals’ institutional agency. As multiple and conflicting logics 
enter professional fields like health care (Scott, 2004), professionals’ institutional 
work has shifted from the ‘classic’ forms of boundary work between idealized con-
ceptions of professionalism versus the market or the state logic (Freidson, 2001), or 
the reinforcement of regulatory boundaries that separate different professional 
groups (Abbott, 1988) to a more complex and contingent construction and decon-
struction of boundaries between norms, beliefs, and value systems (i.e. logics). That 
said, we can observe how professionals change institutions through boundary work 
between different logics on a daily basis, e.g. by integrating different logics to cre-
ate hybrid practices (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013; see also section 3.3.2) or by 
purposefully excluding new field-level logics from their professional role (cf. 
Doolin, 2001). Even the professions themselves – as the main object of profession-
als’ institutional work – are often based on constellations of several broader societal 
logics, which professionals enact, mutate, or reject over time, thereby disrupting, 
maintaining, or changing their profession (Goodrick & Reay, 2011). 
The notion of professionals as boundary workers who mediate and catalyze rather 
than initiate institutional change through the skillful combination of existing logics 
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resonates well with recent notions of professionals “as ‘behind the scenes’ ringmas-
ters, rather than ‘center stage’ musclemen” (Lefsrud & Suddaby, 2012: 322).  
While professionals have been shown to create new institutional structures, espe-
cially when first establishing or promoting their professional status (Dent, 2002; 
Goode, 1961), professionals rarely introduce new logics to a field but rather func-
tion as mediators who spread, translate, and manipulate constellations of logics in 
their roles as political actors (Kuhlmann, 2008), members of organizations (Doolin, 
2001; Iedema et al., 2004), and routine participants (Deverell, 2000; Reay et al., 
2013; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013). Hence, depicting professionals’ institutional 
work as boundary work between given institutional logics helps account for their 
embeddedness in multiple systems of reason while not underrating their important 
role as institutional agents.  
While boundary work as a form of institutional work can essentially be reduced to 
the inclusion and exclusion of logics as principles according to which institutional 
structures and practices are to be designed, professionals’ boundary work (like any 
form of institutional work) may take various forms, leading to the replacement of 
one dominant logic by another (Scott et al., 2000) as well as the co-existence of 
several logics in fields (Dunn & Jones, 2010), organizations (Bode & Maerker, 
2014; Castel & Friedberg, 2010), and routines (McPherson & Sauder, 2013). How 
professionals exert boundary work within the different contexts in which they oper-
ate will be the subject of the following section. Specifically, I will elaborate on how 
the context in which professionals exert boundary work determines whether the 
purposeful application, integration, and separation of logics become visible as pro-
fessional project, role enactment, or routine dynamics.  
3.4.2 Professionals’ Boundary Work in Context – An Integrated Model  
As elaborated above, I define professionals’ institutional work as a specific kind of 
boundary work. This boundary work relates to the integration and separation of 
available institutional logics to shape institutions like the professions, organizational 
structures, or working practices and the demarcation of spaces in which particular 
constellations of logics should be applied.  
While I argue that any kind of professionals’ institutional work can be conceptual-
ized as boundary work, the integration, separation and application of logics constel-
lations is highly context-dependent. As Zilber (2013: 89) points out, the study of 
institutional work generally requires contextualization as actors are enabled and con-
strained by the environment in which they operate (see also section 3.2):  
“To appreciate the creativity actors use in constructing their positions and re-
sources (again as part of their institutional work), we need to think of actors, ac-
tions, and the institutional contexts within which institutional work is carried out. An 
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institutional context determines ‘what types of actors can exist as well as what they 
can do’ (Hwang & Colyvas, 2011, p. 64), but actors may also construct this con-
text.”  
On the one hand, the contexts in which professionals’ institutional work takes place 
– including fields, organizations, and routines – determine the potential objects of 
their boundary work, that is, the kind of institution created, maintained, or disrupted 
through the purposeful integration and separation of logics as design principles. 
While, for example, changes in professional jurisdiction may have their origin in 
incremental routine changes (cf. Smets et al., 2012) and routines may be altered in 
response to the institutionalization of new professions in the field (Currie et al., 
2012; Kroezen, Mistiaen, van Dijk, Groenewegen, & Francke, 2014; Reay et al., 
2006), each level of professionals’ work comprises a distinct set of institutions 
(Dopson, Fitzgerald, & Ferlie, 2008). Accordingly, while institutional dynamics can 
originate on every level of professionals’ work, context-specific institutions like or-
ganizational roles or habitualized ways of working are most accessible for institu-
tional work efforts at the location of their primary enactment (cf. Dopfer, Foster, & 
Potts, 2004; Jarzabkowski, 2004; van Dijk, Berends, Jelinek, Romme, & 
Weggeman, 2011). On the other hand, contextual embeddedness determines the 
constellations of logics which professionals have to respond to and, at the same time, 
the set of logics that is utilizable as ‘tool box’ for the exertion of institutional agency 
(Goodrick & Reay, 2011:405; see also section 3.3.2). For example, their organiza-
tional embeddedness might detach professionals from some of the logics that char-
acterize the field as a whole while it may simultaneously increase the relative sali-
ence of other logics (cf. Pache & Santos, 2013). This is because organizations and 
organizational routines – while nested in the logic systems of fields – are not ideal 
representations of field-level structures (cf. Durand, Szostak, Jourdan, & Thornton, 
2013). Here, owners and managers function as ‘gateways’ that determine which 
logics become most salient in their organization (Beckert, 1999) as they set up the 
structures and goals that reflect which core assumptions and norms should guide 
organizational members.  
While classic neo-institutionalism would predict otherwise, suggesting that organi-
zations within a field become increasingly similar in their strive for legitimacy 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), a controlled deviance from the logic constellations 
within a field may create strategic advantages and hence become a reason for organ-
izational decision-makers to create an organizational environment that – while reso-
nating with the legitimacy expectation of a field – does not perfectly reproduce the 
logics that constitute the field as a whole (Durand et al., 2013). Further, as profes-
sional organizations become increasingly multi-professional due to the integration of 
additional professional groups and the professionalization of former occupations, the 
representation of specific professional logics may be skewed when compared to the 
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field-level. This trend is observable especially in health care where medical domi-
nance is weakened as professional groups who are subordinate in the field-level hi-
erarchy (e.g. nurse practitioners or technicians) have increased their leverage as phy-
sicians are highly reliant on their services to complete their daily work (Barley, 
1986; Kilpatrick et al., 2012; Timmons & Tanner, 2004). Accordingly, organizations 
within professional fields may combine specific professional, market, state, bureau-
cratic, and other logics in idiosyncratic ways (Zietsma, Greenwood, & Langley, 
2014). They may sponsor a constellation of logics that favors market over profes-
sional logics (like e.g. privately-owned hospitals) or may even selectively exclude 
logics that characterize the field (cf. Besharov & Smith, 2014; Waldorff, 2013; 
Waldorff et al., 2013). Further, logics themselves become altered through translation 
processes as the abstract frameworks on the field-level are enacted as concrete roles 
and practices, expressed in specific codes of conduct, and reflected by organizational 
structures. Through these processes of structuration logics are naturally altered and 
adapted (Czarniawska, 1997). Hence, every organization needs to be understood as 
an institutional context of its own; it is embedded in and (partly) reflects the field but 
never represents an ideal reproduction of the field-level as political arena. While this 
should not imply that organizations do not provide a space for political action, this 
space is biased and often fuzzy with regard to the logics involved, more immediately 
linked to concrete work demands, and rarely allowing professionals to act exclusive-
ly as representatives of their professional logics as they have to additionally fulfil 
their respective organizational roles (see also section 3.3.1).  
The same holds true for the routine-level, on which logics are represented in the os-
tensive aspects of professionals as routine participants, guiding their “attention to 
alternative schemas for perceiving, interpreting, evaluating, and responding to envi-
ronmental situations” and providing them with “a set of rules and conventions […] 
for deciding which problems get attended to, which solutions get considered, and 
which solutions get linked to which situations” (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008: 114). On 
the routine-level, logics are rarely enacted as ideal-types due to the demands and 
restrictions that actors face when engaging in routine performances to address con-
crete tasks. Still, routines are embedded both in fields and – more immediately – in 
their organizational context and the ideological and material foundations that these 
contexts provide (Weber & Glynn, 2006: 1650).  
Routines are embedded in a field through the professional background of their par-
ticipants. For example, the multi-professional routines that are characteristic for the 
provision of health care will be structured according to what physicians, nurses, and 
other health care professionals consider appropriate, thereby uniting aspects of sev-
eral professional logics (Greenhalgh, 2008). In addition, the organizational context 
provides routine participants with organizational roles that may position routines 
within an even more complex constellation of logics, as actors’ organizational roles 
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and professional roles are often diverging, sometimes even conflicting (Doolin, 
2001; Llewellyn, 2001; Thorne, 2002). Beside the ideological background of routine 
participants that places routines at the intersection of multiple logics, routines are 
heavily reliant on their material embeddedness in organizational structures. Exem-
plary structures that inform actors’ ostensive aspects and shape routine performances 
are artifacts such as IT-systems and formal rules (Becker, 2004). While fulfilling the 
function of coordinative mechanisms, they also convey specific logics according to 
which routines should be carried out and thus transport organizational worldviews to 
the most immediate locus of professional action. Dense frameworks of formal rules 
that are accompanied by elaborate control and sanctioning mechanisms are, for ex-
ample, indicative of a dominant bureaucratic logic that is supposed to be enacted 
within an organization’s routines. Consequently, the routine-level comprises a mul-
tiplicity of logics which actors (have to) include and separate in their daily struggles 
to address the tasks at hand. On the routine-level, logics become fuzzy as they can-
not be enacted in the sense of ideal-types. Much rather, the organizational routine 
provides a context in which professional backgrounds, organizational roles, and 
structural artifacts congeal and provide a seemingly endless repertoire of potential 
logic combinations that can be used to guide actors’ performances. Therefore, 
changes in the relative salience of logics are more common and occur more rapidly 
than on the organizational or the field-level. This is because, while routines provide 
a context in which professionals prove their capability to put their professional logic 
into action (see section 3.2.3), routines are exerted to address tasks, that is, specific 
tasks within specific circumstances that may necessitate routine participants to act 
more ‘professional’, more ‘bureaucratic’, or more ‘market-oriented’ to achieve a 
favorable outcome in a given routine iteration (cf. Harris et al., 2014). However, and 
in explicit contrast to the field-level, routine participants rarely consciously set out to 
enact or reject an ‘institutional logic’ but integrate their concepts of appropriate con-
duct – which are strongly informed by the logics characterizing the field- and the 
organizational level – in a way that helps them to ‘get things done’ (Smets & 
Jarzabkowski, 2013). As such, the routine-level is arguably the most relevant level 
for the kind of agency that researchers have described as “more immediate ongoing, 
messy institutional work at the stage in which no one knows – neither the actors nor 
the researcher – whether these actions would result in maintaining, creating, or 
changing the institutional order” (Zilber, 2013: 88).  
So, while the routine-, the organization-, and the field-level are nested systems, they 
provide distinct contexts for professionals’ boundary work as (i) the relative salience 
of specific institutional logics may vary between these levels and (ii) each level pro-
vides specific enabling and constraining conditions that shape how logics are repre-
sented and to which extent they can be used to exert agency. Accordingly, profes-
sionals exert boundary work differently on the different levels of their institutional 
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environment. A key characteristic along which the boundary work differs is the ex-
tent to which the resulting institutional dynamics have a political or pragmatic quali-
ty. While neither of these levels is purely political or practice-driven and profession-
als may shape institutional dynamics on each of these levels simultaneously, the 
conceptual separation of the field, the organization and the routine as arena of insti-
tutional agency is helpful to understand the contextuality of professionals’ boundary 
work.  
Boundary Work on the Field-Level 
On the field-level, professionals typically exert agency as collective actors, mostly 
occupied with shaping, defending and extending the sphere of their professional log-
ic as an ideal-type. As the resulting political struggles with other field constituents 
are often normative and concerned with the basic principles on how a field or a pro-
fession within a field should be designed, concrete tasks and organizational chal-
lenges may be used as discursive figures but are rarely the prime concern of  politi-
cal stakeholders when engaging in institutional work. On this level, professionals 
and other important stakeholders within a field, shape and enact institutional logics 
in the ideal-typical way in which most institutional researchers use the concept 
(Dunn & Jones, 2010; Hinings, Greenwood, Reay, & Suddaby, 2004). Field-level-
actors often fulfill the roles of representatives and advocates of ‘pure’ logics like 
their professional logic, the state logic, or the market logic (Freidson, 2001). They 
try to in- and exclude logics as guiding principles of a field with a deep awareness 
and specific normative ideas on what defines professionalism, the state, or the mar-
ket (or other logics), and – while not always successful in weakening a competing 
logic (i.e. positioning this logic at the periphery or outside of the field boundaries) – 
create well-observable, distinct boundaries between each of these logics (Lounsbury, 
2007; McDonald et al., 2013; Pouthier, Steele, & Ocasio, 2013; Scott, 2004). Pro-
fessionals’ boundary work on the field-level commonly becomes visible as their 
professional project. A professional project can be viewed as an attempt to extend 
and secure the boundaries in which a specific professional logic is seen as appropri-
ate principle of organizing work (Larson, 1979). This is usually achieved by defin-
ing specific task spaces, translating these into legitimate areas of professional control 
and securing them against adjacent professions and other actors through jurisdiction 
(Abbott, 1988).  
How professionals promote and secure their status within a field by establishing and 
reinforcing the boundaries between the professional, the market, and the state logic 
while expanding the scope of application of their professional logic has already been 
illustrated by classic sociological works on professionalization (Abbott, 1988; 
Freidson, 1970b; Larson, 1979). Also, recent studies on professionals’ institutional 
work illustrate that the field-level often becomes an arena in which professionals 
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defend the boundaries between their professional logic and other logics (Muzio & 
Ackroyd, 2005). Especially the exclusion of market logics from professional work 
has emerged as a recurring theme in the study of professionals’ institutional work, 
since marketization and rationalization have become societal megatrends that in-
creasingly affect professional fields (Aldridge, 1996; Bode, 2015; Giaimo & 
Manow, 1999; Leicht & Lyman, 2006; Relman, 2007). 
However, while professionals commonly act as defenders of their professional logic 
within the political struggles on the field-level that eventually determine the status 
and power of the different field constituents, recent studies show that professionals 
may also exert boundary work in the sense of a selective inclusion of new logics into 
their profession (Blomgren, 2003; Kurunmäki, 2004). This is the case when new 
logics provide professionals with complimentary legitimization accounts for the ad-
vancement of their professional logic and thereby become instrumental to the pro-
motion of their professional project. Kirkpatrick et al. (2011) provide a particularly 
illustrative case study on how both the nursing and the medical profession sought to 
integrate the managerial logic into their profession in order to defend and advance 
their claims of dominance in the Danish hospital field. While Danish legislators in-
troduced management reforms, they left the design of managerial structures widely 
unspecified, aiming at a “model of inspiration” (ibd: 496) rather than hard reforms. 
This approach allowed for local adaptions in the decentralized Danish hospital sector 
and resulted in a re-evaluation of the status relation between doctors and nurses. 
Physicians, who traditionally enjoyed a higher status in the professional hierarchy, 
sought to defend their privileged position and buffer their clinical work from being 
controlled by non-medical managers. Nurses, on the other side, perceived a potential 
involvement in hospital management as an opportunity to emancipate from their 
subordinate status as assistant profession to medicine by occupying key positions 
within the organizational hierarchy (i.e. taking over managerial roles). They em-
braced the newly introduced managerial logic as inherent part of their profession, 
claiming that even basic nursing education included far more administrative 
knowledge than most physicians could acquire through additional training (ibd.: 
496). While eventually physicians succeeded in further expanding their dominance 
in the field of health care by promoting a shared management model led by a physi-
cian, the managerial turn in the Danish hospital field also supported the professional-
ization of nurses who were able to defend their right to participate in hospital man-
agement. Thus, both nurses and physicians profited from including the managerial 
logic into their profession. As Kirkpatrick et al. (2011) point out, this selective inclu-
sion of the managerial logic into health care professions is a rather rare occurrence 
as physicians and nurses usually try to distance themselves from any economically 
motivated action. Yet, their case study shows that professional associations “articu-
late new ‘institutional logics’ to support (or legitimate) their claims” (ibd.: 500), 
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thereby underlining that even on the highly political field-level, professionals’ 
boundary work can be more complex and differentiated than a mere exclusion of 
non-professional logics from their profession.  
Boundary Work on the Organization-Level 
Compared to the field-level, the relationships between logics become more blurry on 
the organization-level as professionals need to fulfill the roles of executives, middle-
managers, employees, and – last but not least – members of their profession (see 
section 3.2.2) against the background of given organizational goals and structures. 
Within the boundaries of an organization, professionals have to respond to both, 
their role in the organizational hierarchy and their professional role as e.g. nurses, 
physicians, or lawyers. Fulfilling these multiple roles requires professionals to bal-
ance diverse sets of logics on which different role concepts rest (Doolin, 2001, 2002; 
Kirkpatrick et al., 2011; Thorne, 2002). Hence, boundary work in the sense of a se-
lective and contingent in- and exclusion of institutional logics is an inherent part of 
role enactment (cf. Chreim, 2012; Chreim, Langley, Comeau-Vallée, Huq, & Reay, 
2013; Iedema et al., 2004) even though actors may not necessarily be aware of the 
underlying ideological frameworks they represent by fulfilling their organizational 
roles in a specific way. This is because, within organizations, technological and 
market requirements may urge actors to enact their roles in a way that allows them 
to efficiently respond to the organizational challenges within their area of responsi-
bility, thereby often superseding normative and political considerations (McCann et 
al., 2013). Nevertheless, in the process of enacting their organizational and profes-
sional roles, professionals – consciously or unconsciously – also enact or reject spe-
cific constellations of logics, thereby working towards institutional stability or 
change.  
Chief physicians, for example, have to balance their professional role as member 
and representative of the medical profession and their organizational role as execu-
tive (Witman et al., 2011). To enact this dual role “as both caregivers and adminis-
trators, [they] must balance two competing logics” (Arman, Liff, & Wikström, 2014: 
283). Depending on the technological and institutional context provided by their 
organizational embeddedness, they may decide to orientate their role more towards 
managerialism or professionalism, thereby strengthening or weakening the influence 
of each of these logics in their organization. However, and in contrast to designing 
their profession on the field-level, professionals do not have unlimited discretion 
over how they integrate different logics into their organizational roles (Kitchener, 
2000). In their study on how different logics were balanced in psychiatric care units, 
Arman et al. (2014) find that psychologists refused to include managerial elements 
into their role but were eventually forced to align their work with efficiency consid-
erations rather than the idea of holistic care that was essential to their professional 
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logic. The result of this permanent role conflict was a hierarchization of logics 
through which both the professional and the managerial logic prevailed within the 
psychiatric care units. However, the managerial logic dominated psychiatrists’ or-
ganizational role despite their continuous and aggressive attempts to primarily enact 
their professional logic. Further research suggests that intra-organizational dynamics 
such as individual career prospects may lead professionals to balance logics differ-
ently when enacting their organizational role than they do as collective, political ac-
tors on the field. A study by Vera and Hucke (2009), for example, shows that physi-
cians’ attitude towards managerial skills correlates with their career success in hos-
pitals. Specially, given that modern hospitals are increasingly reliant on employees 
who willingly internalize result-orientation and a focus on efficiency, assistant phy-
sicians with a positive attitude towards managerial skills were more likely to be 
promoted. This finding further strengthens the assumption that professionals may 
draw different boundaries between logics on the organizational level than on the 
field-level as their contextual embeddedness determines not only the relative sali-
ence of logics, but also provides distinct incentives and sanctions for enacting spe-
cific logic combinations.  
In addition to the – more or less successful – in- and exclusion of logics from their 
given organizational roles, professionals exert boundary work on the organization-
level when they acquire new roles and infuse these roles with new constellations of 
logics. The organizational hierarchy is often conducive to professionals’ pursuit of 
status and influence as it provides an additional system of super- and subordination 
(see section 3.2.2). Especially in health care, professionals try to occupy executive 
roles in an attempt to increase the relevance of their professional logic within their 
organization (Carvalho, 2012) and to hamper the expansion of managerial logics to 
the operational core of professional organizations (Kirkpatrick et al., 2011; Waring 
& Currie, 2009). Examples include physicians who defend medical dominance in 
hospitals by what Thorne (2002: 23) describes as acquiring the “tools and techniques 
of [their] oppressors”, that is, the assimilation of managerial roles. While first reluc-
tantly taking over managerial roles that have been imposed on them, clinical direc-
tors began to utilize their new organizational role as an avenue to promote medical 
professionalism as dominant logic within their organizations. Here, medical profes-
sionals purposefully engaged in fuzzying the boundaries between managerial and 
professional logics, securing their power by including the managerial logic into 
medicine while infusing management with the logic of medical professionalism. 
Similarly, Doolin (2001) provides a case study on clinical leaders in a New Zealand 
hospital who, in their role as frontline managers, marginalized the managerial logic 
in favor of their professional logic, thereby undercutting organizational change initi-
atives.  
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In sum, professionals’ boundary work on the organization-level exhibits some simi-
larities to their boundary work on the field-level as – due to their strong embed-
dedness in their profession – professionals often seek to defend and extend the spac-
es in which their professional logics prevail. Yet, given the multiple roles that pro-
fessionals have to fulfill as organizational members, professionals’ agency within 
organizations often lacks the ideal-typical, political nature that characterizes their 
institutional work on the field-level. While the redefinition of organizational roles 
through the selective in- and exclusion of logics may be utile in promoting profes-
sional projects on the field-level, e.g. by providing additional rationales for altered 
jurisdictional boundaries, organizational embeddedness forces professionals to ad-
dress challenges that lie beyond the mere protection of professionalism. As manag-
ers, professionals become responsible for securing organizational survival; as em-
ployees, they have to obey organizational control mechanisms and respond to organ-
izational incentives such as career prospects. Accordingly, within organizations, pro-
fessionals exert institutional work by interpreting and enacting their organizational 
roles along the lines of several logics, some of which are forced upon them by their 
organizational membership. 
Boundary Work on the Routine-Level 
On the routine-level, professionals often exert boundary work between logics in iter-
ative, adaptive processes that occur along the everyday accomplishment of their 
work (McPherson & Sauder, 2013). As routines are embedded in the logic constella-
tions of a field and an organization, routine participants’ ostensive aspects include 
these logics as cognitive and normative orientations that guide professionals’ per-
formances. How logic constellations on the field are integrated into professionals’ 
everyday routines is illustrated by Harris and Holt (2013) who provide a qualitative 
case study on how dentists enact business-like health care, commercialism, and 
medical professionalism as three logics guiding the field of dentistry in the UK. The 
authors find that dentists are fully aware of the complex logic constellations in 
which their practice is embedded. Still, instead of aligning their work with only one 
logic while rejecting the others, dentists’ routine performances are guided by ele-
ments of several logics, creating a dynamic that provides the grounds for subtle, 
adaptive institutional change on the routine-level. As Harris and Holt (2013: 68) 
emphasize, professionals integrate and balance field-level logics in their routine “not 
merely in an ‘uneasy truce’ of one bloc set against another […] but are interweaving 
threads running throughout their everyday activity”.  Accordingly, routine scholars’ 
observation that routines are effortful accomplishments rather than mindless repeti-
tion (Feldman, 2000; Pentland & Rueter, 1994) extents to professionals’ mindful in- 
and exclusion of logic elements into their work as they design routines that generate 
favorable outcomes while reflecting what they consider appropriate professional 
conduct.  
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However, institutional dynamics on the routine level do not only occur when profes-
sionals mindfully integrate different logics but also when they intentionally reject 
new logics as guiding principles for their routine performances. Given their high 
autonomy in executing their work, this may result in the effective decoupling of ac-
tual routine performances from normative prescriptions on the field-level and from 
organizational structures if professionals disagree with the respective value-systems. 
Specifically, professionals’ strong bond with their respective professional logic may 
affect the dynamics through which routines evolve and new practices become insti-
tutionalized. As professional identity is developed and enacted in working routines 
(see section 3.2.3), professionals may actively work towards the exclusion of market 
or corporate logics from their working routines because they consider the corre-
sponding principles of work organization as inappropriate. This selective enactment 
of available logics may cause a decoupling of actual routine performances from rou-
tine prescriptions, which results in long-term institutional change or maintenance. 
As Novotná (2014) shows in her study on the implementation of integrated treat-
ment programs for mental health and additions in a hospital in Ontario, professionals 
may even increase their workload to prevent a managerial logic from dominating 
their routine performances. She finds that clinicians who strove “to remain faithful 
to their professional standards of care” (ibd: 271) deliberately worked overtime and 
offered uncompensated therapy sessions within their treatment routines to provide 
their patients with what they considered good professional service.  
While institutional dynamics on the routine-level often result from professionals 
responding to immediate task requirements (Harris et al., 2014), performances are 
always interpreted against the logic constellations encoded in the ostensive aspects. 
Hence, learning from routine performances, while often a pragmatic process and 
rarely evaluated against wider political implications, does not occur in a normative 
vacuum. On the other side, learning from performances typically induces modifica-
tions in routine participants’ ostensive aspects and – as illustrated by Smets and 
Jarzabkowski (2013) (see section 3.3.2) – may result in the mindful integration of 
several logics into the ostensive aspects of routine participants when they prove to 
produce more efficient working processes or more favorable outcomes.  
In sum, professionals’ institutional work on the routine-level is fuzzy and results 
from an interplay between logic constellations stored in the ostensive aspect of a 
routine and routine performances that may necessitate improvisation, induce practi-
cal learning, and eventually cause modifications in professionals’ abstract, norma-
tive ideas on appropriate performances. Thus, while professionals in- and exclude 
logics to achieve change or stability in their routines through the mindful adaptation 
of their ostensive aspects, new logic constellations may ‘creep up’ on their routines 
as they repeatedly adapt their performances to unforeseen task and context condi-
tions or when the outcome of their performance remains below their aspiration lev-
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els (cf. Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Levitt & March, 1988: 324; Lounsbury & 
Crumley, 2007; Rerup & Feldman, 2011). 
While this thesis will provide separate analyses of professionals’ institutional work 
on the field-, the organization-, and the routine-level to account for the idiosyncra-
sies of each level that shape when, why, and how professionals engage in institu-
tional agency, it is important to acknowledge that the field, the organization, and the 
routine are mutually intertwined. Thus, institutional work on each of these levels 
needs to be viewed as a potential precursor of institutional dynamics on the levels 
above and below. Just as institutional pressures diffuse from the field-level to affect 
organizational structures and routines (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Tolbert & 
Zucker, 1983), norms and practices develop and become institutionalized ‘on the 
ground’, that is, through human interaction within routines (Lounsbury & 
Boxenbaum, 2013; Zilber, 2013). New practices are infused with meaning through 
processes of theorization (Reay et al., 2013), are being integrated into the structures 
and roles that characterize organizations (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013), and eventu-
ally become aggregated into delimitable institutional logics as abstract categories 
that define fields (Smets et al., 2012). Figure 3.2 provides an integrated overview of 
how the different levels on which professionals engage in institutional work are in-
tertwined and summarizes the different kinds of ‘boundary work’ between logics 
that professionals exert on each level.  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Professionals’ Institutional Work as Boundary Work in Context 
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4 Professionals and Field-Level Change 
Professionals’ institutional work has been theorized to be a key mechanism of insti-
tutional dynamics on the level of the organizational field (Muzio et al., 2013; 
Suddaby & Viale, 2011), which is defined as a “community of organizations that 
partakes of a common meaning system and whose participants interact more fre-
quently and fatefully with one another than with actors outside of the field” (Scott, 
2008a: 86). Accordingly, on the field-level, professionals act as collective agents, 
either through the organizations in which they are employed or through their pro-
fessional associations (Greenwood et al., 2002; Lounsbury, 2002; Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005). As elaborated above, professionals’ impact on the structures, 
practices, and hierarchies of a field generally stems from their interest in advancing 
their professional project and can be conceptualized as boundary work between 
different institutional logics which are integrated, mutated, or dismissed through 
political strategies and tactics. It is the field-level on which the professions are de-
fined and the general relationship between professions and other actors are negoti-
ated (Freidson, 1988a; Muzio et al., 2013). The organizational field provides a 
common institutional environment in which organizations interact and strive for 
legitimacy by adopting and adapting to the norms, standards, and values promoted 
in the field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Hence, institutional dynamics on the field-
level have a profound impact on organizations and individuals as, through diffusion 
processes, they affect organizational goals and structures and eventually the rou-
tines that lie at the core of any organization. Accordingly, the role of professionals’ 
in institutional change and stability on the field-level has received much scholarly 
attention (DiMaggio, 1991; Dunn & Jones, 2010; Greenwood et al., 2002; Malsch 
& Gendron, 2013; Micelotta & Washington, 2013; Muzio & Ackroyd, 2005; Muzio 
et al., 2013). However, while professionals’ grand political strategies to promote or 
prevent field-level change have been the subject of extensive scientific scrutiny, 
less attention has been brought to how contextual conditions enable and constrain 
professionals’ agency. In particular, professionals are generally considered high-
status actors within a field and agents who shape rather than being shaped by the 
norms, values, and cognitive frames of the field (Muzio et al., 2013; Muzio et al., 
2011; Suddaby & Viale, 2011). Further, field-level dynamics are often reduced to 
the highly visible struggles between proponents and opponents of change that are 
based on competing normative arguments (Pieterse, Caniëls, & Homan, 2012; 
Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Thus, literature on professionals’ institutional work 
on the field-level is still scant in fine-grained and contextualized views on when, 
why, and how professionals alter the logic constellations that define organizational 
fields.  
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This chapter sets out to expand our understanding on when, why, and how profes-
sionals exert institutional work on the field-level by focusing on how their contex-
tual embeddedness enables and constrains professionals’ attempts to promote spe-
cific constellations of logics in a field. Specifically, the goal of this chapter is to 
broaden theoretical perspectives on professionals’ institutional work by elaborating 
on how professionals’ relative status affects their use of institutional strategies 
while providing an empirical insight on how professionals’ institutional work 
shaped the German health care system. In the first section, I will elaborate on the 
changes that characterized the field of German health care over the last decade and 
foreshadow how these changes affected and were informed by different groups of 
health care professionals. In doing so, I will provide empirical background infor-
mation to the study presented in the third section. The second section comprises a 
concise literature review that will illustrate when, why, and how professionals gen-
erally engage in institutional dynamics on the field-level. Specifically, I will pro-
vide an integrated overview of empirical findings on the antecedents that cause pro-
fessionals to defend or redefine the boundaries between different institutional logics 
in their profession and in the field and the processes through which they eventually 
disrupt, create, and maintain institutions. Further, I will discuss the shortcomings in 
extant literature that I seek to address with the empirical study presented in the third 
section. The final and main part of this chapter includes a case study on how pro-
fessional and state actors employed vocabulary construction as a means to either 
protect or decrease medical dominance in German health care. This study expands 
literature by shedding light on how low-status professionals like nurses reinforce 
existing power relations in a field through the utilization of high-status-actors’ vo-
cabulary spaces.  
4.1 Setting: Marketization and International Models of 
Professionalization in German Health Care 
The changes that German health care faced over the last decades are typical for 
Western health care systems (Freeman & Moran, 2000; Lameire et al., 1999, see 
also chapter 2). Against the background of demographic and technological chal-
lenges and the proliferation of economic rationalization in all areas of public ser-
vice, the logic constellations that guide the field of German health care have drasti-
cally shifted and brought forth a state of institutional complexity in which neither of 
the available logics is dominant. Bode (2015: 2ff.) argues that this state of “institu-
tional ambiguity” is rooted in the simultaneous expansion of community and mar-
ket logics, specifically, human rights universalism and micro-economic rationaliza-
tion, and affects public services all over the world. In Germany, human rights uni-
versalism is well-reflected in the long-standing tradition to provide all citizens with 
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equal access to high quality health care, mostly through the implementation and 
expansion of mandatory health care insurance (see section 2.1). Micro-economic 
rationalization, or the advent of the market-logic within German health care, is in 
turn, a relatively current change which is best illustrated by the introduction of pro-
spective payment schemes for patient care in the beginning of the 2000s (budgeting 
in ambulatory care and the G-DRG-system in inpatient care) that increased cost-
pressures for providers and simultaneously challenged the logic constellations ac-
cording to which health services should be provided (Schmid, Cacace, Götze, & 
Rothgang, 2010). 
The logic of medical professionalism has long been dominating the provision of 
health care in Germany (Kuhlmann, 2006) and while the medical profession has 
remained a central social actor in German health care, occupying key positions in 
the corporatist governance system (see section 2.2), the introduction of the market 
logic to the field threatened key aspects of medical professionalism. While in retro-
spective payment systems, individual practitioners had full autonomy over provid-
ing their patients with what they considered to be adequate medical services, pro-
spective reimbursement rates limited this aspect of professional autonomy 
(Neubauer & Pfister, 2008). Even though physicians’ autonomous provision of 
medical services as such was not challenged, the above-mentioned cost contain-
ment initiatives restricted their potential to exclusively align their work with profes-
sional ethics (Weiss, 2011). Accordingly, the conflict between ‘medical ethics’ and 
‘business ethics’ became a key concern in the discourse between federal actors and 
medical associations (Offermanns, 2007). Representatives of the medical profession 
publicly warned that economic considerations are likely to encroach on autono-
mous medical practice, thereby jeopardizing professional values and patient well-
being (Stiefelhagen, 2002) and the German Medical Council published guidelines 
on how medical professionals are supposed to resist economic pressures and secure 
their professional integrity (BÄK, 2007). Similarly, the simultaneous expansion of 
the state logic, reflected in federally prescribed quality indicators and the founding 
of public institutes of quality control (§ 139a, SGB V; IQWIG, 2014), evoked re-
sistance among the medical profession which sought to defend peer control and 
public trust in their expertise as appropriate means of control in the field of health 
care. In particular, recently planned pay-for-performance schemes that link reim-
bursement rates to medical outcome quality have faced stark opposition from the 
medical profession who rejected output-oriented, quantifiable quality measures and 
the resulting open price-competition (Bode, 2014). Having medical services evalu-
ated by external parties – in this case federal institutes – has been described as 
“quality paternalism and incapacitation of the treating physician” that exploits phy-
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sicians and “robs them of their identity” (Armstrong, 2013)18. Accordingly, while 
the introduction of the market logic and the expansion of the state logic have been 
accepted by the medical profession as the ‘state of things’ in German health care, 
the protection of medical work against the intrusion of non-professional logics re-
mains a dominant theme in the political work of the medical profession. The agen-
das of the German Medical Assembly during the last decade bear witness that eco-
nomic pressures and external restrictions of medical practice became a key concern 
of professional politics, covering topics such as the “De-bureaucratization of medi-
cal practice” (107th German Medical Assembly, 2004, Bremen) and “The medical 
profession – a free profession today and in the future” (112th German Medical As-
sembly, 2009, Mainz).  
However, the general increase in economic pressures together with demographic 
challenges did not only cause institutional complexity through the co-existence of 
the market logic, the state logic, and the logic of medical professionalism (cf. 
Freidson, 2001) but also induced a fierce competition between representatives of 
different professional logics. While in Germany the dominant role of medical pro-
fessionalism is still widely in place, the shifting focus from medically appropriate to 
economically efficient modes of service provision gave formerly subordinate pro-
fessions the opportunity to expand the influence of their professional logic in the 
field. In particular, the nursing profession strived to enhance their role in German 
health care from an auxiliary profession, almost instrumental to the enactment of 
medical dominance, to an equally important professional actor (Klakow-Franck, 
2010; Ulsenheimer, 2009). Nurses’ professional project included both an expansion 
of their task spheres within bottom-up initiatives (Bachstein, 2005; Spickhoff & 
Seibl, 2008; Zimmermann, 2011) and lobbying attempts towards a regulatory re-
definition of nursing tasks, including the autonomous provision of formerly medical 
tasks (Schramm & Hollitzer, 2012; Schramm, 2007) as well as the legal accredita-
tion of a formal code of conduct for the nursing profession (Höfert, 2008). Further 
motivated by nurses’ professional projects in other European countries 
(Groenewegen, 2008; Sheer & Wong, 2008; Spitzer & Perrenoud, 2006), German 
nurses sought to integrate their professional logic into the political sphere of Ger-
man health care by establishing professional bodies (DPR, 2014a), increasing ho-
mogeneity and organization within the profession (RbP, 2013), and lobbying for the 
inclusion of nursing as self-governed profession into the corporatist system on the 
meso-level (DPR, 2014c; Fleischmann, 2009; Heynemeyer, 2012). While scholars 
pointed out that German nurses’ professional project had only limited success and 
that the professionalization of nursing is still far less advanced when compared to 
other European countries (Kuhlmann et al., 2009), nurses’ attempts to gain status 
                                                 
18 Translated from German by the author.  
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induced considerable inter-professional struggles about task spheres and regulatory 




The situation found in German health care can be described as relatively typical, 
both with regard to field-level dynamics in modern professional fields and when 
compared to changes in other Western health care systems (Blomgren, 2003; Dent, 
2005; Jespersen et al., 2002; Leicht et al., 2009). As will be further elaborated be-
low, professionals’ institutional work in the field-level is often induced by direct 
environmental pressures (e.g. cost pressures and multimorbid patients) and wider 
societal changes, in this case the rationalization movement in public services, which 
create opportunities and threats for professional projects. In German health care, the 
status of the medical profession was threatened by both, the replacement of profes-
sionalism by market logics and nurses’ claims to be recognized as equal profession, 
including their appropriation of formerly medical tasks (Di Luzio, 2008; Spitzer & 
Perrenoud, 2006). For nurses and other non-medical health care professions, the 
marketization and economic rationalization of German health care opened a win-
dow of opportunity to promote their professional projects as (i) the dominance of 
medical professionalism was no longer taken-for-granted and (ii) the newly arisen 
institutional complexity provided additional legitimization accounts (e.g. appeals to 
economic efficiency) that could be leveraged to institutionalize new roles, struc-
tures, and practices (cf. Lounsbury & Boxenbaum, 2013).  
How nursing professionals promoted their professional project and how their con-
textual embeddedness enabled and constrained their effort to expand the influence 
of nursing professionalism in the field of health care will be discussed in further 
detail in chapter 4.3. Specifically, this chapter provides an empirical case study on 
how nurses, physicians, and federal actors employed vocabulary construction as 
means to promote or prevent change in the logic constellations guiding German 
health care. Before giving this more detailed account on how nurses and physicians 
sought to moderate change in German health care, I will provide a concise literature 
review on when, why, and how professionals generally engage in institutional work 
on the field-level. Accordingly, the following chapter includes an overview of ante-
cedents and processes of professionals’ involvement in field-level change and sta-
bility.  
  
                                                 
19 A more detailed account of these inter-professional struggles will be provided in chapter 4.3. 
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4.2 Theory: Professionals’ Role in Field-Level Change 
As elaborated in previous chapters of this thesis (see section 3.2. and 3.4), the or-
ganizational field is the most political context of professionals’ work. Here, profes-
sionals act as collective agents – e.g. in the form of professional associations – 
changing their profession and other field-level institutions (e.g. ideas on appropriate 
organizational forms) through often well-observable political strategies. To fully 
understand and appreciate the diverse roles that professions and professionals play 
in the institutional dynamics of an organizational field, it is important to consider 
when, why, and how professionals engage in the reconfiguration and conservation 
of logic constellations to disrupt, create, and maintain field-level institutions. 
Hence, in the following chapter, I will discuss and integrate empirical findings on 




Early neo-institutionalism emphasizes that actors are embedded in taken-for-
granted belief systems that allow for an automatic reproduction of existing institu-
tions but make the active, reflective, and purposeful creation, maintenance, and dis-
ruption of institutions an exception (Zucker, 1977, 1987). While current research 
has loosened the strict assumptions of early neo-institutionalism, embracing the 
idea that institutional dynamics are often the result of actors’ reflective engagement 
with their social context (Lawrence et al., 2013; Lawrence et al., 2009a), this does 
not imply that actors continuously or mechanically become active proponents or 
opponents of institutional change.  
As discussed earlier, professionals are often particularly involved in episodes of 
institutional upheaval on the field-level (see section 3.3) and their professional pro-
ject has been conceptualized as inherently dynamic process (Abbott, 1988) and thus 
as endogenous mechanism of field-level change (Suddaby & Viale, 2011). Howev-
er, active and purposeful engagement in institutional dynamics (as opposed to the 
habitual reproduction of institutions) commonly presupposes an increase in actors’ 
reflexivity and motivation (Battilana et al., 2009; Heugens & Lander, 2009; 
                                                 
20 The literature reviews in this and  section 5.1 are based on neo-institutional research on pro-
fessions, professionals, and institutional change between the years 1977, the time of the earli-
est “neo-institutional” publications (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1977), and 2014. Specifi-
cally, I searched the database Web of Science for empirical and theoretical articles in peer-
reviewed journals that contained one of the following keyword phrases in their full text: “pro-
fession*” AND “institutional change”; “profession*” AND “institutional entrepreneurship”; 
“profession*” AND “institutional work”; “profession*” AND “institutional logics”. In total, 
the searches generated 203 articles. In a second step, I excluded any publication that (i) was 
not a conceptual or empirical research paper (e.g. call for papers or book reviews), (ii) did not 
refer to the term “institutional” in the sense of organizational institutionalism (e.g. institutional 
economics), and (iii) only mentioned the search terms in passing. The references of the re-
maining papers were then searched for recurring citations which were also considered for the 
following review that focuses on selected, particularly illustrative and relevant studies. 
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Lawrence et al., 2009a) that is induced or amplified by contextual conditions like 
wider social developments (DiMaggio, 1988; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Garud, 
Hardy, & Maguire, 2007). Hence, in the next section I will first elaborate on when 
and why professionals are more likely to work towards change or stability in the 
logic constellations that guide their profession and the field before discussing the 
processes through which they eventually generate institutional change and stability.  
Antecedents: When and Why Professionals engage in Field-level Change 
The antecedents of any actors’ institutional work can generally be divided into the 
ability to reflect upon formerly taken-for-granted institutional arrangements and the 
motivation to become actively involved in defending existing or promoting new 
institutions. As professionals are permanently confronted with their embeddedness 
in a profession which becomes an integral part of their identity (Doolin, 2002; 
Mitchell et al., 2011; Ogilvie, 2012; Pratt et al., 2006), they are likely to evaluate 
institutional arrangements on the field-level from both their professional and their 
organizations’ perspective (e.g. the hospital or law firm in which they practice), 
thus obtaining higher degrees of reflexivity than non-professionals who can fully 
subscribe themselves to one logic system.  
To actually engage in institutional change by combining institutional logics into 
new constellations to guide an organizational field, professionals, however, do not 
only need to become aware of alternative logic constellations but also motivated to 
exert agency (cf. Battilana et al., 2009). Both reflexivity about their institutional 
context and motivation to promote or hinder change in this context are commonly 
triggered when a field provides new opportunities or threats for a professional pro-
ject.  
Threats to a professional project may arise when environmental jolts like techno-
logical developments (Currie, 2012), changes in the roles and preferences of clients 
(Wolinsky, 1988), or shifts in wider societal logics (Adler, Kwon, & Heckscher, 
2008) question the appropriateness of given institutional structures and practices. 
Often, it is representatives of the dominant profession who engage in institutional 
work when they perceive their high status being threatened. Such threats come into 
existence, e.g. when the status of a specific profession is being challenged by adja-
cent professions (Allen, 1997; Kitchener & Mertz, 2012) or when the appropriate-
ness of professionalism as organizing principle is being questioned (Scott, 2004; 
Scott et al., 2000).   
Especially traditional professions like medicine, law, or accounting have commonly 
been conceptualized as being ‘under threat’ by either adjacent professions who seek 
to encroach on their jurisdictional monopoly or new templates of organizing pro-
moted by state actors or corporations (Relman, 2007; Thornton et al., 2005). What 
professional collectives (e.g. professional associations) perceive as threat to their 
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professional project may range from carefully orchestrated domination strategies of 
other field-level actors (Ackroyd et al., 2007; Jespersen et al., 2002; Kirkpatrick et 
al., 2011; Malsch & Gendron, 2013) to such mundane material entities as buildings 
that may challenge institutional orders through their symbolic meanings (Jones, 
Boxenbaum, & Anthony, 2013; Jones & Massa, 2013). Yet, threats that induce 
agency among professionals share their potential to destabilize the logic constella-
tions on which professionals’ power rests and hence frequently result in mainte-
nance work (Micelotta & Washington, 2013; Savage & Robertson, 1999).  
An illustrative example on how external shocks shifted the relative salience of 
logics in a field and thereby threatened the position of a profession can be found in 
the ENRON scandal that culminated in increasing financial and political pressures 
in the field of accounting and evoked harsh public criticism towards the accounting 
profession, challenging the appropriateness of accounting professionalism as organ-
izing principle. Several studies have investigated how the aftermaths of this shock 
lead to a reconfiguration of the field, including the effects on the accounting and the 
legal profession as two central professions to provide professional business services 
(Covaleski, Dirsmith, & Rittenberg, 2003; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; 
Greenwood et al., 2002; Suddaby et al., 2007). In particular, accounting profession-
alism was publicly questioned as it clearly failed to live up to the moral superiority 
that justified autonomous conduct, leading to maintenance work by professionals 
who sought to buffer professional autonomy from increasing state regulation 
(Covaleski et al., 2003: 349).  
Yet, threats to a profession cannot be broken down to an archetypical process of 
shocks followed by external actors challenging the appropriateness of a profes-
sion’s position in a field or the rationality of their conduct. As the works of Dunn 
and Jones (2010) and Ramirez (2013) illustrate, environmental jolts and subtle 
shifts in the wider social environment may cause a ‘threat from the inside’ when 
they produce or accentuate heterogeneity within the profession (see also: 
Lounsbury, 2007; Townley, 2002). 
Dunn and Jones (2010) provide a comprehensive study on how different societal, 
political, and demographic developments interacted to create a tension between the 
science and the care logics as guiding principles of medical education. They find 
that external stakeholders as well as subgroups within the profession had different 
ideas on how future physicians are to be trained. These different stances towards 
medical education induced a contest between the proponents and opponents of each 
logic and threatened the consistency of medical education and socialization. The 
authors illustrate that agency among professionals in the form of in- or excluding 
the care logic as legitimate guiding principle of medical education was initiated and 
catalyzed by a variety of contextual conditions. First, health care reforms, an expan-
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sion in public health, and an increase in community-based schools to counter doc-
tors shortage between the 1960s and the 1970s led to a stronger emphasis of the 
care logic in medical education. This caused an increase in women entering the 
medical profession and, in turn, further strengthened the relevance of the care logic 
in medicine. The tension between the two available logics was further exacerbated 
as public health, through jurisdictional competition with professional bodies, in-
creasingly became a “threat to the medical profession” (Dunn & Jones, 2010: 123). 
Second, specialization in the medical profession both between scientifically-
oriented physicians and physicians with a focus on patient care as well as between 
different clinical subspecialties led to heterogeneous stances towards the prolifera-
tion of the care logic. This further reinforced perceived incompatibilities between 
the science and the care logic in medical education. As the two camps within the 
medical profession also competed for public funding of their respective medical 
schools, a ‘peaceful co-existence’ of two logics seemed impossible within the field 
and hence fostered institutional work efforts on both sides. However, while the 
competition between logics created a powerful motivator for medical professionals 
to engage in institutional work to exclude either the science or the care logic from 
medical education, both logics persisted in an “uneasy tension” (idb: 139).  
Dunn and Jones (2010) illustrate two important points that help understand when 
and why professionals engage in field-level change. First, their study underlines 
that ‘threats’ from the outside of a profession are usually triggered by an interplay 
between several political and societal developments that cause shifts in the institu-
tional order and introduce new field-level stakeholders that challenge professionals’ 
regulatory monopoly. Second, and perhaps more importantly, their study sheds a 
critical light on the assumption that professions are homogenous entities, showing 
that internal stratification can amplify external threats and cause tension in the pro-
fession itself. In contrast to neo-institutionalists’ conceptualization of professionals 
as source of field-level isomorphism and the underlying assumption that profes-
sionals are “almost interchangeable” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 152; see also sec-
tion 3.2.1), Dunn and Jones (2010) show that internal stratification and different 
normative beliefs within professional subgroups may not only occur as temporal 
incoherence but also persist over time and become a strong motivator for institu-
tional action. While external pressures have been shown to be important drivers of 
professionals’ institutional work, it is tensions between professional subgroups that 
pose a threat to the internal consistency and hence to the political power of a pro-
fession in the field. As the study of Dunn and Jones (2010) demonstrates, profes-
sionals’ exert institutional work is thus boundary work (see section 3.4.2) in the 
sense of both, excluding ‘outsider’ logics (e.g. the state logic) from the profession 
and balancing different logics within the profession.  
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How tensions within the profession may motivate institutional work is further illus-
trated by Ramirez (2013) whose study focuses on how threats to the cohesion of the 
British accounting profession came into existence when professional subgroups 
experienced unfair hierarchies within the profession. Specifically, he discusses how 
wider institutional changes challenge the “orders of worth” (Ramirez, 2013: 845) 
within a profession and thereby motivate institutional work. For the British ac-
counting profession, such a change occurred through the proliferation of monitoring 
instruments which reflected the corporate logic that dominated large accounting 
firms. Professionals from small accounting firms felt treated unfairly as their inter-
nal processes more strongly relied on professional peer-control and autonomy and 
lacked the formalization that was typical for large accounting firms. To prevent 
internal stratification of the profession and avert the “risk of imploding” (ibd: 836), 
the ICAEW – as largest British accounting body –  began to redefine monitoring 
practices for small accounting firms to reflect their sense of self-control and their 
idea of appropriate professional conduct. By re-integrating the professional logic 
into the newly introduced control mechanisms which reflected a general “accounta-
bility turn” (ibd: 851) in professional fields, the ICAEW was able to maintain a 
sense of community within the profession. Overall, Ramirez’ (2013) study further 
demonstrates that professions may erode from the inside and that the institutional 
work of collective professional actors like professional associations to secure a pro-
fessions’ dominance within the field may originate from perceived inequality with-
in the profession itself.   
In sum, the perception that the profession is being ‘under threat’ is a strong motiva-
tor for professional collectives to engage in institutional work on the field-level. 
Interestingly, threats, especially to the dominant professions of a field, may origi-
nate from the inside of a profession when different subgroups of a profession fol-
low different agendas. These different agendas may translate into fierce intraprofes-
sional struggles when external changes provide additional incentives to work to-
wards the in- or exclusion of specific logics within the profession (see Dunn & 
Jones, 2010). Yet, as the power of a professional collective within a field strongly 
relies on their ability to defend their status against external parties (Ackroyd et al., 
2007; Child & Fulk, 1982), internal homogeneity is a political resource. Hence, 
professional associations may exert institutional work to reverse unfavorable logic 
shifts and repair internal inconsistencies to reduce, as Ramirez (2013: 836) so elo-
quently put it, their “risk of imploding”. 
However, while internal coherence is crucial for a profession to become and remain 
an institution within an organizational field, sociologists and institutionalists alike 
have emphasized that professional collectives shape fields when they compete over 
jurisdictional boundaries and corresponding task spheres (Abbott, 1988; Allen, 
1997; Fournier, 2000; Martin, Currie, & Finn, 2009; Suddaby & Viale, 2011). 
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Threats to the profession thus occur and induce agency – mostly among the domi-
nant profession of  field – when members of low-status professions and profession-
alizing occupations claim new areas of expertise and propose new logic constella-
tions that may destabilize another professions’ status (Nancarrow & Borthwick, 
2005; Snelgrove & Hughes, 2000).  
Hence, threats to the status of a profession often arise when members of another 
profession perceive the opportunity to increase their status within a field. While 
often two sides of the same coin, perceived threats and opportunities to a profession 
are distinct stimuli for institutional agency among professional collectives. The op-
portunity to increase their status may motivate both high- and low-status profes-
sions to actively manipulate the logic constellations of a field. Yet, such opportuni-
ties are often more relevant to subordinate professions and professionalizing occu-
pations as achieving ‘full’ professional status is commonly associated with higher 
gains in autonomy, prestige, and resources than securing and expanding an already 
dominant position within a field (cf. Abbott, 1988).  
Especially professionalizing occupations may perceive an opportunity to gain status 
when wider societal trends both induce a more reflexive stance towards their subor-
dinate status and provide a context in which professionalization efforts resonate 
well with shifts in overarching societal logics. Kitchener and Mertz (2012) describe 
such a situation for the professionalization projects of dental hygienists. Before the 
1970s, dental hygienists had regularly been employed in dentist offices and their 
work had been controlled by dentists as the unquestionably dominant profession in 
the field of dentistry. However, in the spirit of feminist and civil rights movements 
that began to shape the American society by the 1970s, dental hygienists, a predom-
inantly female occupation, “began to demand more respect, equality, and rights 
within the realm of paid work” (Kitchener & Mertz, 2012: 375). While inspired by 
wider societal trends, their professional project was further catalyzed by economic 
considerations. With an increase in dentist offices, the field of dentistry began to 
face an oversupply of dental services. Combined with the recession during the 
1970s and the introduction of set-fee-payment systems, dentists had to reconsider 
their cost-structures. This resulted in part-time work and independent contracting as 
the predominant form of hygienists’ employment, raising their motivation to eman-
cipate from dentists’ control. Eventually, hygienists were able to reduce the influ-
ence of dentists’ professional logic in the field and to successfully institutionalize 
alternative organizational archetypes that allowed them to autonomously provide 
dental services in niche markets such as nursing homes.  
Kitchener and Mertz’s (2012) study illustrates well how several contextual condi-
tions interlock to create a sense of opportunity that motivates professionals to en-
gage in institutional work. First, wider societal developments helped dental hygien-
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ists to both recognize that the subordinate position of their profession was neither 
natural nor inescapable and provided a favorable background against which they 
could legitimately express their claims for professional autonomy. Second, eco-
nomic pressures created a sense of urgency that added momentum to their profes-
sional project. Third, niche markets provided a space from which hygienists could 
exclude the professional logic of dentists while not risking harsh opposition in the 
initial stage of their professionalization efforts
21
.  
Overall, antecedents of professionals’ institutional work on the field-level can be 
categorized into wider social dynamics like shifts in values and economic develop-
ments, intraprofessional dynamics, and interprofessional dynamics that activate 
perceptions of opportunity or threat among professional collectives. As illustrated 
by the empirical studies discussed above, professional actors are usually motivated 
to engage in institutional work when several of these dynamics interact to create a 
situation in which a professions’ status is ‘at the crossroads’. Threats and opportuni-
ties for the status of a profession do, however, not only relate to its political and 
economic position in a field but also to its normative consistency. While profes-
sionals have been shown to engage in institutional work to establish and defend 
their profession as a source a of power (Freidson, 1988a; Muzio & Ackroyd, 2005), 
professions are also a source of identity for the individual professional (Chreim et 
al., 2007; Fagermoen, 1997). Thus, professionals may engage in institutional work 
not only in attempts to achieve dominance in a field (cf. Freidson, 1970b) but also 
to keep their profession aligned with the normative orientation of its members 
(Goodrick & Reay, 2010). Accordingly, while antecedents of professionals’ institu-
tional work can be reduced to whether they induce opportunities or threats to the 
profession, it is important to note that (i) different antecedents may interact in idio-
syncratic ways to foster or hamper professional projects, and (ii) that these may 
trigger different kinds of opportunities and threats (i.e. economic, political, or ideo-
logical). Hence, as also underlined by scholars’ focus on in-depth case studies of 
professional projects (e.g. Covaleski et al., 2003; Dent, 2002; Elston, 1991; 
Kitchener & Mertz, 2012), professionals’ institutional work needs to be studied 
with a deep awareness of the context in which it takes place.  
Having discussed when and why professionals become engaged in institutional 
work on the field-level, I will now proceed to explain in more detail the strategies 
and processes through which professional collectives manipulate the logic constel-
lations of a field.  
                                                 
21 Similar cases in which wider societal developments created opportunities for professionals to redefine their 
status within a field were observed in such different fields as French gastronomy (Rao, Monin, & Durand, 
2003), U.S. finance (Lounsbury, 2002), and U.S. healthcare (Galvin, 2002).  
 
C H A N G I N G  P R O F E S S I O N A L S  
102 
Processes: How Professionals engage in Field-level Change 
As elaborated in the preceding chapters (see section 3.3 and 3.4), professionals are 
endowed with a distinct set of resources that allow them to take a prominent role in 
processes of institutional change. In particular, their privileged access to profes-
sionalism as symbolic resource as well as political skills acquired from their central 
position in professional fields bring forth a distinct set of processes through which 
professionals’ manipulate the logic constellations of a field.  
Micelotta and Washington’s (2013) study on the maintenance work of the Italian 
registered professions and the legal profession in particular illustrates how profes-
sionals make use of their high status and their central position in societies to prevent 
change within their profession. In their longitudinal case study, the authors provide 
a detailed account on how the Italian government’s enactment of EU-regulation to 
foster transparency in professional services throughout the European Union failed 
due to the opposition of the regulated professions. Specifically, Italian professional 
associations reversed these governmental reforms through what the authors call 
“repair work”.  
In Italy, the system of the professions differs considerably from those in Anglo-
Saxon countries. First, Italy has a strict hierarchy between regulated and non-
regulated professions with the classic professions (e.g. medicine and law) enjoying 
special protection by the state. These are organized in so-called “Ordini” in which 
individual professionals have to be registered and which are granted the right of full 
self-regulation (ibd.: 1142). Second, the legal profession obtains a special status in 
Italy as it is not only a regulated profession but also centrally involved in govern-
mental processes. For example, their professional association – the National Foren-
sic Council (NFC) – is being “formally consulted in juridical matters and located in 
Rome at the Ministry of Justice” (ibd.: 1142). Lastly, the authors describe the Ital-
ian legal profession as highly conservative, with their codes of conducts prohibiting 
any market-like coordination of their practice such as the free negotiation of fees 
(ibd.: 1143). Accordingly, the new laws on the liberalization of professional ser-
vices – which increased competition and transparency among the regulated profes-
sions (e.g. by abolishing fixed fees and allowing advertisement in professional ser-
vices) – faced strong resistance as they broke the professions’ regulatory monopoly 
over their services. In particular, the governments’ quick implementation of these 
laws without consulting with the professions first was perceived as “simply unac-
ceptable” (ibd.: 1149).  
The regulated professions, spearheaded by the legal profession, responded to this 
regulatory shock with four intertwined forms of institutional work, each of which 
was aimed at re-excluding the market-logic from the regulation of the professions. 
The authors identify “re-asserting the norms of institutional interaction” as the first 
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strategy through which professionals sought to reverse the reforms that had been 
imposed upon them (ibd.: 1149). This form of institutional work was very drastic 
and illustrates well how professionals can leverage their central position in society 
to promote their professional project. The NFC incited their members to go on 
strike and to organize protests on the street. The resulting upheaval of legal profes-
sionals thus became highly visible and critically affected the functioning of the Ital-
ian legal system as trials had to be interrupted due to lawyers being on strike (ibd.: 
1149). As the authors point out, the protests reached a magnitude that “threatened to 
paralyze the country” (ibd.: 1143).  
However, while lawyers exploited their central position in the Italian society to ar-
ticulate their disagreement with the reform content and process, they also suggested 
negotiations with the government to achieve a cooperative revision of the reform. 
Revealing a conciliatory stance, the government agreed to retract the laws in ques-
tion and to invite the professions to public hearings before developing new reforms 
(ibd.: 1150). In the course of these hearings, the Italian regulated professions en-
gaged in what Micelotta and Washington (2013: 1150) describe as “re-establishing 
the balance of institutional power”. While the non-regulated professions supported 
the planned reforms in order to gain status, representatives of the regulated profes-
sions argued for the maintenance of their professional autonomy and the strict sepa-
ration of regulated and non-regulated professions (ibd.: 1151). Against the back-
ground of the government facing an internal crisis at the time of these negotiations, 
the Ordini began to further substantiate their role as legitimate regulatory institution 
of the professions by pointing towards the government’s current inability to lead a 
reform process. As representatives of the regulated and non-regulated professions 
fought over dominance in the reform process, hearings slowed down considerably. 
Eventually, the government failed to establish its control over the process and the 
associations of the non-regulated professions started to resign (ibd.: 1152).  
The advent of the NFC – as the Ordine of the most influential Italian profession – in 
the hearings marked a further turning point in the debate. Micelotta and Washing-
ton (2013: 1153) describe this episode as “regaining institutional leadership” and 
note that the NFC’s involvement in the process “turned out to be the death blow” 
for the government’s reform plans. Due to its special position in the Italian society, 
the legal profession was able to successfully argue for their right to develop a sepa-
rate reform for their profession. The resulting delegation of the reform design into 
the hands of the NFC enabled the legal profession to regain control over the neces-
sary changes in their profession. In the subsequent process of “reproducing institu-
tionalized practices” (ibd.: 1154), the NFC re-established their regulatory power 
and autonomy while working around the guidelines of the European Union. Specif-
ically, representatives of the legal profession argued that the commercial values that 
were promoted in the new EU legislation would jeopardize the integrity of the pro-
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fession and put young lawyers in an unfavorable position as they did not have the 
power to negotiate adequate fees for their services under free market conditions 
(ibd.: 1155). While the Ordini of the legal profession adapted their codes of con-
duct, they were accused of “ceremonial compliance” by the EU (ibd.: 115). Inter-
estingly, the NFC urged the government to take their side against the EU and de-
fend the autonomy of the professions. The government, however, remained unwill-
ing to mediate between the EU and the legal profession (ibd.: 1156). In the absence 
of governmental intervention, the reform was implemented under the authority of 
the legal profession itself who claimed that the incremental adaptions that had been 
made showed sufficient compliance with the EU guidelines. Eventually, and de-
spite the EU’s pressures to liberalize professional regulation, the Italian legal pro-
fession was able to maintain their conservative orientation, including fixed fees and 
a restrictive advertising policy for legal services. 
Overall, Micelotta and Washington’s (2013) study makes several interesting contri-
butions to the study of professionals’ institutional work. In particular, it shows that 
– against the background of today’s omnipresent pressures towards marketization – 
professionals remain powerful societal actors: While the Italian legal profession 
was not able to stop reforms from being implemented, they managed to re-establish 
their power through what the authors call “repair work”. 
At the same time, their study shows that professionals’ power rests upon the social 
acceptance of their authority. Specifically, the strategy of “re-asserting the norms of 
institutional interaction” uncovers that professionals were well-aware of the contin-
gent nature of their power. While their protests and strikes critically affected Italy’s 
legal system, the NFC attempted to reopen negotiations with the government rather 
than to simply defy regulatory change. As the authors note, this dual strategy of 
protesting against the changes while trying to open an arena for formal discussion 
and negotiation stemmed from the NFC’s anticipation that they could not push their 
resistance much further without risking coercive action from the government and 
thereby jeopardizing their chance to influence the inevitable reforms (ibd.: 1149). 
Being obviously aware that a profession’s authority is of normative nature while the 
state holds the monopoly over the exertion of coercive power, the Italian legal pro-
fession relied more on their ability to dominate negotiations than trying to exert 
force and risking retribution by the government. Accordingly, professionals lever-
aged their important role as a pillar of society to defend their right to be ‘heard’ 
within the political debates that shape a field. In line with this argument, the authors 
propose that once the negotiations had been opened, lawyers could draw on their 
“favorite weapon – rhetoric – to disarm the government’s arguments” (ibd.: 1152). 
Thus, while Micelotta and Washington (2013) illustrate well that professionals’ 
tight embeddedness in fields and their role as pillar of society enables them to force 
their will upon a field even after regulatory reforms have been implemented, it also 
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shows that professionals’ main strength lies in the provision of normative argu-
ments as to why they should be granted regulatory monopolies over their work. 
This use of discursive means to promote or resist field-level change is typical for 
professionals as I will further elaborate in the following paragraphs.  
As social scientists have noted, processes of social construction are based upon lan-
guage (Berger & Luckmann, 2007). Consequently, discursive strategies play a cen-
tral role in professionals’ institutional work on the field-level, starting with the con-
struction of the profession itself as professionals’ regulatory monopolies over their 
work do not emerge from ‘thin air’ but have to be legitimized (e.g. Martin et al., 
2009). While early sociological work from the functionalist tradition suggested that 
the existence of professions and their associated privileges are a ‘natural’ function 
of their socially important services and their inherent morality (Carr-Saunders & 
Wilson, 1964; Durkheim, 2013), more current research emphasizes the importance 
of discursively created categories that allow professionals to demarcate themselves 
from laypeople and members of adjacent professions (Denis et al., 1999; Lamont & 
Molnar, 2002). In his well-cited study on the discursive construction of the scien-
tific profession, Gieryn (1983) finds that the demarcation of science from non-
science rests upon a rhetorical boundary that allows the identification of ‘real’ sci-
ence (Gieryn, 1983: 781; see also: Lamont & Molnar, 2002: 178). Similarly, Alves-
son (1993: 998) points out that  – in the absence of clear-cut criteria for how a  pro-
fession is to be defined – professionals’ status is mainly dependent on the effective-
ness of their discursive categorization of themselves as legitimate ‘professionals’. 
As he puts it (Alvesson, 1993: 999):  
“Professionals' statements about themselves and, to some extent, researchers’ re-
productions of such statements, can be understood as elements in their strategies 
for achieving and maintaining the status of a profession. In line with modern soci-
ology of professions, it is rather claims about having these particular traits that 
motivate a specific social position and certain privileges, including monopoly of 
segments of the labour market that are of interest […].The myths of technocracy, 
certain knowledge, altruism, rationality and neutrality are seen as ideologies for 
justificatory purposes […].” 
While becoming a profession is critically dependent on discursively constructing 
the profession as an institution within a field, professional collectives are also par-
ticularly skillful in employing language as a tool to moderate field-level change. As 
having reached the status of a profession is a particularly valuable symbolic re-
source for professional collectives (see section 3.4.1), the discursive presentation of 
institutional change as ‘in line’ or ‘at cross’ with their professional logic is central 
to promoting or preventing change. Ironically, as the studies to be presented in the 
following will illustrate, professionals may even utilize the symbolic power of pro-
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fessionalism to legitimate changes that weaken the impact of their professional log-
ic in the field.  
In their case study on the role of professional accounting bodies in the institutional-
ization of the multidisciplinary practice as new organizational form in the field of 
professional business services in Alberta, Greenwood et al. (2002) find that profes-
sional associations endorsed change by providing discursive theorizations of new 
organizational templates. Contrary to the popular idea that professionals are con-
servative forces, Greenwood et al. (2002) show that professionals may promote 
change even if this change is perceived as a threat to the profession itself. Change in 
the field of professional business services began as the ‘Big Five’ accounting firms 
engaged in multidisciplinary practices that included legal, accounting, management 
consulting, and other advisory services. As these firms had considerable power 
within the field, employing over two thirds of public practice professionals (ibd: 63) 
and 20 percent of all registered accountants (ibd: 70), the accounting profession had 
little handle on the services these firms planned to offer. Yet, changing accountants’ 
professional role to business advisors and endorsing the new multidisciplinary prac-
tice required legitimization within the profession. In professionalized fields, norma-
tive legitimization plays a key role to change institutions as institutionalization in 
these fields depends on whether new practices – often regardless of their technical 
superiority – are viewed as appropriate against professional values. Accordingly, 
Greenwood et al. (2002) find that accounting bodies effectively theorized account-
ants’ new role as business advisors in multidisciplinary practices as legitimate by 
framing changes in the profession as inevitable and by justifying these changes as 
compatible with professional values. While accounting bodies acknowledged that 
increasing market pressures would pose a threat to the profession if it did not 
change, change was presented as an inherent, natural component of the profession. 
Further, engaging in business consulting was constructed as strongly in line with 
the characteristically high service orientation and the professional ethos of account-
ing. Here, accounting bodies clearly drew on professionalism as overarching, socie-
tal logic and as general principle on how to provide services rather than emphasiz-
ing the working content of the accounting profession. Interestingly, they enriched 
their profession with elements of the market logic – in the form of adapting to 
changed consumer preferences and to the strategic reconfiguration of large firms – 
by appealing to the key characteristics of professionalism. As the authors point out, 
the discourse “was conducted in the language of the professional, not that of the 
businessperson” (Greenwood et al., 2002: 70), implying that accounting bodies uti-
lized appeals to accountants’ objectivity and expert status to construct convincing 
arguments as to why business consulting should be carried out by accountants. 
Overall, Greenwood el al.’s (2002) work provides an interesting insight into how 
professionals utilize discursive means to endorse rather than resist field-level 
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change as it illustrates that professionals’ may use language to wrap change into a 
‘cloak of professionalism’, thereby subtly integrating potentially conflicting logic 
elements into their profession. 
In contrast to Greenwood et al. (2002), whose case study showed how professionals 
engaged in theorization to endorse change within their profession, Suddaby and 
Greenwood (2005) provide a more comprehensive study on how professionals em-
ploy discursive means to control field-level change, including how they build rhe-
torical strategies to openly oppose change. Specifically, they investigate the discur-
sive struggles between the legal and the accounting profession about the multidisci-
plinary practice as new organizational form in the field of professional business 
services. Expanding Greenwood et al.’s (2002) focus on theorization by providing a 
more detailed analysis on how language is used as a tool to promote and resist 
change in professional fields, they identify five rhetorical strategies of legitimacy 
(ontological, historical, teleological, cosmological, value-based), each of which 
comprises theorization and vocabulary construction. While lawyers sought to de-
legitimize the multi-professional partnership as it entailed an “expertise model” of 
professionalism (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005: 44) that favored elements of the 
market logic over traditional professional values, accounting associations and large 
accounting firms promoted the new organizational form by appealing to the con-
sumer benefits that would result from a re-organization of professional work. Both 
opponents and proponents of change employed institutional vocabularies that un-
covered conflicts between their conceptualizations of professionalism. These dif-
ferent stances towards what characterizes – or rather should characterize – profes-
sional work were then used to (de-) legitimize the new organizational form within 
theorizations that relied on e.g. appeals to moral values (value-based), a natural or-
der of things (ontological), or greater goals (teleological). While the proponents of 
change strongly relied on teleological arguments, legitimating the new organiza-
tional form primarily with appeals to its effect on service outcomes, opponents 
drew on ontological theorization in combination with moral vocabularies, empha-
sizing that laywers’ distinct professional ethics are incommensurable with the goal-
oriented processes of the multi-professional firm. Lawyers put particular emphasis 
on their special client-relations that supposedly necessitated ‘pure’ organizational 
forms and connected their working ethos to the higher societal purpose of their pro-
fession which must not be corrupted by commercial principles like the “one-stop-
shopping” (ibd.: 47) promoted in multiprofessional firms. Laywers’ appeals to their 
professionalism as morally superior logic “drew on traditional cultural ‘myths’ of 
‘professional identity as a ‘higher calling’” (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005: 49) and 
is thus in line with what other researchers have identified as popular strategy among 
professionals to defend their monopoly against external threats (Doolin, 2002; 
Pieterse et al., 2012; Thomas & Hewitt, 2011). Interestingly, accountants and the 
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‘Big Five’ as proponents of institutional change did not dismiss the logic of profes-
sionalism as organizing principle but rather sought to redefine professionalism 
through what Suddaby & Greenwood (2005: 50) describe as effort to “blur the cog-
nitive boundary between profession and market”. This finding underlines the gen-
eral persuasive appeal of professionalism as overarching logic (see section 3.3.2) as 
well as its power as discursive figure in professional fields: Proponents of change, 
who clearly promoted a stronger inclusion of market elements into the field, relied 
on redefining ‘good professionalism’ instead of openly proposing a market-oriented 
approach of providing professional services. How proponents and opponents of 
institutional change in the organization of professional services combined vocabu-
lary construction and theorization further illustrates that legitimization in profes-
sional fields rests on the subtle manipulation of social reality and the more visible 
proposition of how change should (not) be exerted. As Suddaby & Greenwood 
(2005) point out, the “rationale for change must be connected to the identity of the 
core actors” who, in this case, were professionals. Accordingly, neither proponents 
nor opponents questioned whether the field should be designed according to profes-
sional principles of organizing but rather subtly provided different ideas on what 
professionalism is. 
Integrating the findings of the studies presented above, I propose two main reasons 
why professionals’ institutional work is often critically dependent on discursive 
strategies. First, change within a profession is only achieved when new structures 
and practices are presented as legitimate against professional ethics as these endow 
a collective of actors with a distinct identity. As the study of Greenwood et al. 
(2002) illustrates, this can be achieved by ‘wrapping’ change into the language of 
the profession, thereby discursively aligning planned institutional change with the 
norms and values on which a profession rests. This importance of ‘professional 
language’ for the legitimization of changes within a profession is further empha-
sized by Covaleski et al. (2003). In their study on changes in the U.S. auditing field, 
they note that large accounting firms effectively utilized a “rhetorical velvet glove” 
(ibd.: 349) to redefine professional jurisdiction according to financial and political 
pressures.  
Second, the concept of professionalism can be leveraged as powerful discursive 
figure, either to de-legitimize field-level change as incompatible with professional 
values or to legitimize change as natural occurrence, in line with the inherent dy-
namics of professionalism,  or  even necessary to secure the prosperity of  a distinct 
professional logic within a field. As Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) show, appeals 
to professionalism may be used to legitimize and de-legitimize the same instance of 
institutional change at the same time when different actors propose different inter-
pretations of professionalism. The attractiveness and effectiveness of professional-
ism as discursive figure is rooted in both its high institutionalization in society and 
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its abstract nature that makes it adaptable to different contexts and applicable to 
multiple kinds of knowledge-intensive labor (Neal & Morgan, 2000; Wilensky, 
1964). As an overarching logic that conveys societal core values like rationality, 
independence, and social integrity to organizational settings, professionalism as 
such is widely accepted as a guiding principle in many organizational fields 
(Hwang & Powell, 2009). Collective professional actors – being representatives of 
a profession – can easily leverage the discursive power inherent to the general ac-
ceptance of professionalism as organizing principle by presenting changes as  
‘(non-)professional’ (Fournier, 1999; Jones & Livne-Tarandach, 2008; Turkoski, 
1995). However, the details of professionalism in specific contexts are open to in-
terpretation and selective mutation that may foster or restrict the integration of new 
logics into a professional field. As elaborated above, vocabulary construction is a 
central mechanism through which professionalism is infused with (new) meanings 
and hence a particularly relevant aspect to professionals’ discursive institutional 
work (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005).  
Yet, the relevance of vocabulary construction in professionals’ institutional work on 
the field-level is not restricted to the skillful (re-)interpretation and adaptation of 
what it means to be a ‘professional’. Rather, vocabularies have been found to play a 
central role in the creation of the professions since the construction of distinct vo-
cabularies helps to demarcate professionals form non-professional groups and enti-
ties (Gieryn, 1983). Further, vocabularies both reflect and constitute institutional 
logics (Ocasio, Jeffrey, & Nigam, 2015; Ocasio & Joseph, 2005). Thus, logic con-
stellations within a field can be manipulated by redefining centrals words and 
phrases, by enriching existent vocabulary structures with new words, and by rear-
ranging words to represent new meaning systems (Loewenstein, Ocasio, & Jones, 
2012). Against the background that professionals are endowed with the right to 
construct specialist vocabularies and to provide laypeople with meaning systems 
within assigned “spaces of reason” (Schildt et al., 2011: 84), such as health care (for 
a more detailed description see section 3.3.2), the manipulation of institutional ar-
rangements through vocabulary construction can safely be assumed to be an inher-
ent component of professionals’ political skillset.   
However, and somewhat surprisingly, there are only few studies that explicitly in-
vestigate how professionals construct vocabularies to promote or prevent field-level 
change (for exceptions see: Lefsrud & Meyer, 2012; Meyer & Hammerschmid, 
2006). Vocabularies, when acknowledged as discursive means in institutional work, 
are mostly viewed as only parts of ‘full’ legitimization strategies that comprise an 
explicit argument structure (Jones & Livne-Tarandach, 2008; Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005). Thus research is often overlooking the subtle, yet powerful in-
fluence of vocabulary construction on the logic constellations that guide a field 
(Ocasio & Joseph, 2005). Further, while the “linguistic turn” in the social sciences 
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(Alvesson & Karreman, 2000) has produced a plethora of studies on how field-level 
actors like professional collectives use language to (de-)legitimize change (Ahearn, 
2001; Astley & Zammuto, 1992; Hardy & Maguire, 2010; Hardy, Palmer, & 
Phillips, 2000; Lawrence & Phillips, 2004; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Oakes, 
Townley, & Cooper, 1998), language is mostly viewed as a strategic tool which 
political actors skillfully employ to manipulate the legitimacy of existing or new 
institutional arrangements (Ackroyd, 1996; Erkama & Vaara, 2010; Golant & 
Sillince, 2007; Green, 2004; Hardy & Phillips, 2004) with only few authors paying 
explicit attention to the constraining effects of language on institutional agency 
(Green, Li, & Nohria, 2009; Hardy & Phillips, 1999). 
The lack of studies on how professional construct vocabularies to manipulate logic 
constellations in a field and institutionalists’ particular emphasis on language as an 
enabler of agency creates a gap in the literature on professionals’ role in field-level 
change. Specifically, the question on how professionals’ institutional work is both 
enabled and constrained by language – vocabularies in particular – remains under-
researched. This shortcoming is certainly also owed to the underlying notion that 
professions are equal regarding their access to discursive strategies of institutional 
work. While researchers acknowledge that professionals – when compared to non-
professionals – are particularly skilled in using discursive strategies (Suddaby & 
Viale, 2011: 435), interprofessional hierarchies within a field have yet to be includ-
ed as contextual condition that may shape how different professionals’ construct 
vocabularies to promote or prevent institutional change. Accordingly, the study pre-
sented in the following chapter provides a critical discourse analysis investigating 
how actors of different status in the field of German health care employed vocabu-
lary construction as a discursive strategy to disrupt or maintain medical dominance.  
4.3 Empirical Study 1: Vocabularies as Enablers and 
Constraints in Institutional Work - Establishing New 
Modes of Task Division in German Health Care 
The following study seeks to expand our perspective on professionals’ discursive 
institutional work by drawing attention to the strategic construction of vocabular-
ies
22
. Focusing on the professional project of nurses in German health care, this 
study provides a typical case of professionals’ institutional work insofar as it illus-
trates political struggles between high-status and low-status professionals that were 
induced by wider field-level developments like increasing cost pressures and de-
mographic challenges. For nurses, as low-status professionals in German health 
                                                 
22 Earlier versions of this study have been presented at the EGOS Colloquium 2013 in Montreal, Canada and 
the 1st First Austrian Young Scholars Workshop in Management 2013 in Linz, Austria. 
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care, this situation provided an opportunity to promote their professional project as 
the dominance of the medical logic began to erode. For physicians, who already 
lost some of their privileges due to the expansion of market and state logics, nurses’ 
attempt to further professionalize by claiming medical tasks posed an additional 
threat to their professional status and thus evoked strong resistance. Moderated by 
state actors who endorsed new modes of task division as means to secure efficiency 
in public health care, nurses and physicians engaged in a fierce struggle about the 
boundaries of their task spheres (see also section 4.1).  
Focusing on how the institutional work efforts of each of the involved field-level 
actors was enabled and constrained by language, this study identifies three strategic 
patterns of vocabulary construction: (1) spanning vocabulary spaces, (2) analyzing 
vocabulary spaces and (3) neutralizing vocabulary spaces. The findings suggest that 
actors’ relative field status determines the choice of the strategic mode of vocabu-
lary (de-)construction. A tentative interpretation of these findings further suggests 
that low-status actors engage in ‘bounded boundary work’ as they try to promote 
new logic constellations within given vocabulary structures. Overall, this study ex-
pands extant literature on professionals’ institutional work on the field-level by 
drawing attention to vocabulary construction as a subtle discursive strategy while 
acknowledging that not all actors are equally enabled and constrained by language 
when engaging in institutional work.   
4.3.1 Introduction  
How do political actors in professional fields make use of vocabulary structures to 
promote or inhibit institutional change? This study seeks to answer this question by 
examining the discursive struggles on the redivision of medical tasks in German 
health care. While the notion that processes of social construction are based upon 
language is not new (Berger & Luckmann, 2007) and  the strategic use of language 
in institutional work efforts has increasingly received scholarly attention over the 
past years (Erkama & Vaara, 2010; Goodrick & Reay, 2010; Hardy & Phillips, 
2004; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Maguire et al., 2004; Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 
2004), the majority of research focuses on the enabling effects of coherent narra-
tives (e.g. Zilber, 2007) and explicit means of persuasion (e.g. Suddaby & Green-
wood, 2005). Vocabulary construction as means of institutional work has so far 
received less attention. This is surprising insofar as the study of vocabulary con-
struction holds significant potential to help “examine the puzzle of institutionally 
embedded agency” (Green & Li, 2011: 1690). On the one hand, vocabulary struc-
tures are constitutive elements of institutions (Loewenstein et al., 2012; Ocasio et 
al., 2015; Phillips et al., 2004) and hence provide constraints to agency. On the oth-
er hand, vocabularies are carriers of meaning, thus making their skillful re-
structuration a powerful source of agency (Jones & Livne-Tarandach, 2008; 
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Loewenstein, 2014; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Further, agents may specifical-
ly draw on the constraining effects of vocabularies to dominate discursive struggles, 
as the case study on the redivision of medical tasks in German health care will illus-
trate. The extent to which actors are enabled and constrained by vocabularies is 
likely to depend on their relative field status. As Maguire et al. (2004) observe in 
their study on the emergence of HIV/AIDS treatment advocacy, the particular sub-
ject position that actors obtain within a field determines the discursive means avail-
able to them and hence their potential of agency. The insight that actors’ relative 
field position affects their access to vocabulary construction as means of institu-
tional work is particularly relevant for professional fields like health care. While 
researchers have pointed out that professionals are particularly skillful in using dis-
cursive strategies as the construction of specific vocabularies is an inherent part of 
achieving and maintaining the status of a profession (Loewenstein, 2014; Schildt et 
al., 2011), they rarely account for the fact that not all professional groups enjoy the 
same status within a field (Battilana, 2011; Kirkpatrick et al., 2011). Accordingly, 
professionals may not only provide specific vocabularies to shape the meaning sys-
tems of a field but may also be constrained by given vocabulary structures.   
The goal of this study is hence to (i) explore the enabling and constraining effects 
of vocabulary structures in the discursive struggles of institutional change episodes 
and to (ii) examine to which extent the relative field status of an actor is associated 
with the availability of certain kinds of vocabulary construction in order to answer 
the question on how different actors make use of vocabularies to promote or inhibit 
institutional change in a professional field. My study makes two contributions to 
extant literature. First, it provides a new perspective on discursive institutional work 
by drawing attention to the construction of vocabularies as strategic means of dom-
inating a discourse beyond the provision of coherent legitimization accounts. In 
doing so, it addresses explicit calls to study the complex processes of institutional 
change and maintenance from the perspective of meaning systems that are con-
structed through vocabularies (Zilber, 2008: 164). Second, I identify three distinct 
strategic patterns of vocabulary construction which actors employ in the political 
struggle about changes in the regulatory boundaries between health care profes-
sions, thus illuminating how the relations between different professions in a field 
are shaped by their use of vocabularies. The strategic pattern of ‘spanning vocabu-
lary spaces’ is mainly employed by federal actors and physicians, both high status 
actors in the field of health care. By ‘spanning vocabulary spaces’ actors are able to 
determine the object – or the ‘what’ – of the debate apart from and beyond explicit 
reasoning about the legitimacy of this object. As the findings indicate, high-status 
actors are only successful in providing the vocabulary structure to the field-level 
discourse when their vocabularies are sufficiently specific with regard to the object 
of the debate. The strategic pattern of ‘analyzing vocabulary spaces’ is mostly used 
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by nurses as low status actors of the field. By analyzing the vocabulary structure 
provided by physicians, nurses sought to de-legitimize these actors by uncovering 
the ‘true’ motives behind physicians’ use of particularly distinct vocabulary struc-
tures. The findings suggest that, while analyzing opponents’ vocabulary structure 
may enable actors in creating specific counter-arguments, low status actors risk to 
get ‘caught up’ in the vocabulary structures provided by other actors. Finally, the 
strategic pattern of ‘neutralizing vocabulary spaces’ was used by federal actors after 
the debate on the redivision of medical tasks reached a deadlock. Neutralizing the 
existing vocabulary spaces included the provision of new categories to describe 
task-redivision that were able to integrate previous categories while being suffi-
ciently precise to redefine the object of the debate with a less value-laden term. 
Overall, my study underlines that, while the development of arguments and coun-
terarguments is an important means to (de-)legitimize new institutional arrange-
ments, the provision of vocabulary spaces might be an equally powerful instrument 
to dominate a debate as these help define the objects of (de-)legitimization efforts. 
As vocabulary structures reflect and constitute power relations in a field, the provi-
sion of vocabularies is a source of power while the usage of an actor’s vocabulary 
structures acknowledges and reinforces his right to provide the meaning system of a 
field. This insight provides a new perspective to the study of professionals’ institu-
tional work: While profession sociologists have emphasized that professionals have 
to constantly defend their jurisdictional and workspace boundaries against repre-
sentatives of adjacent professions (Abbott, 1988), this study highlights that bounda-
ry work is not necessarily a struggle among equals as low-status professions may 
draw on and thereby reinforce high-status professions’ definitional power in the 
field. Their attempt in expanding their (regulatory) boundaries may thus be ‘bound-
ed’ due to their inability to provide meaning systems of their own.  
4.3.2 Theoretical Background 
Discursive Institutional Work: Vocabularies as Enablers and Constraints of Agency 
Institutional work comprises actors’ more or less purposeful attempts of “creating, 
maintaining and disrupting institutions” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006: 125). While 
several scholars have explored a substantial number of conditions enabling institu-
tional agents (specifically ‘institutional entrepreneurs’) to challenge the institutional 
status-quo and illustrated a broad spectrum of strategies these actors employ to 
shape institutions according to their interest (Battilana et al., 2009; Lawrence et al., 
2009a), it has often been criticized for depicting these actors as overly reflective 
“heroes” (Battilana et al., 2009: 67). As a special kind of powerful agents, able to 
challenge the very institutions that constitute their norms and beliefs, they repre-
sented the polar opposite of the highly embedded and passive “cultural dope” pro-
posed by structural institutionalism (Leca & Naccache, 2006: 633). Institutional 
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work scholars promote a more balanced view on the dichotomy between structure 
and agency (Lawrence et al., 2011), often conceptualizing institutional change as 
outcome of multiple actors’ dispersed efforts (Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007). In this 
view, institutional change episodes are usually characterized by emergent processes 
of negotiation, bargaining, and conflict between change agents and their opponents 
rather than the result of a linear change process implemented by a single or few 
powerful agents. These processes of “interpretive struggles” (Hardy & Maguire, 
2008) come into existence through disruptive and creative institutional work on the 
one side and maintaining or otherwise creative institutional work on the other and 
are majorly influenced by the purposive use of discursive practices (e.g. Zilber, 
2002). Actors employ rhetorical means of persuasion (Greenwood & Suddaby, 
2005; Goodrick & Reay 2010), coherent narratives (Hardy & Maguire, 2010) and 
specific frames to give sense to actions and alter meaning systems (Benford & 
Snow, 2000). Yet, opponents may use discursive tactics equally skillful to maintain 
the institutional status-quo or argue for a different kind of institutional change, 
making discursive struggles neither “predictable [n]or controllable” (Hardy & 
Maguire, 2008: 205). While language can be considered to be one of the key re-
sources to any kind of institutional work and politically skilled actors often appear 
to be masters in exploiting discursive practices (Oakes et al., 1998), language – as a 
constitutive element of institutions – also puts considerable constraints on human 
agency (Green et al., 2009). Green and Li (2011) recently coalesced this dual func-
tion of language into a promising new research stream in institutional theory. “Rhe-
torical institutionalism” provides a new perspective on embedded agency by inte-
grating old and new rhetoric. For Green & Li (2011:1678) actors are embedded in 
systems of meaning created by “historical symbolic action” which provide structur-
al constraints to rhetorical acts of persuasion. In this understanding, structure is not 
exclusively defined by material practices and ‘real’ entities of social life. Rather, it 
is also language that drives actors’ unconscious perceptions of “social structure, 
relations and reality” (Green & Li, 2011: 1674). Hence, language itself is a power-
ful form of practice that defines institutional boundaries and thereby imposes struc-
tural constraints on agency. Agency, in turn, exists whenever actors become aware 
of the symbolic networks of meanings that constitute institutional logics and try to 
purposefully maintain or manipulate them. 
Extant research in discursive institutional work mostly focuses on the use of coher-
ent argument structures that are aimed at legitimizing or de-legitimizing institution-
al change (e.g. Goodrick & Reay, 2010; Hardy & Maguire, 2010; Zilber, 2007). 
Often, these argument structures are distinguished by the explicit rhetorical means 
of persuasion they employ (e.g. Brown, Ainsworth, & Grant, 2012; Erkama & 
Vaara, 2010; Green, 2004). However, episodes of institutional change are also 
shaped by the subtle networks of meaning that come into existence through the cre-
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ation and manipulation of vocabularies which are not necessarily embedded in 
complete legitimization accounts (Loewenstein et al., 2012). 
Vocabulary structures are constitutive elements of institutions (Phillips et al., 2004). 
They are the building blocks of collective social rules (Loewenstein et al., 2012) as 
they describe the motives which are considered “desirable, proper, and appropriate” 
(Suchman, 1995: 574) within the boundaries of an organizational field. It is vocabu-
laries that define meaning systems, render institutional logics visible and, as inte-
gral part of organizational fields, become institutions themselves (cf. Ocasio & 
Joseph, 2005). Loewenstein (2014) defines vocabulary structure as a combination 
of word frequency, word-to-word and word-to-example relations. Word-to-word 
relations describe how words are typically linked to each other within discursive 
acts like speeches or written statements. Word-to-example relations specify how 
words are to be interpreted and used as general classifications for a larger range of 
theoretical or empirical phenomena. Together with the frequency of specific key 
words these vocabulary networks “[demarcate] a system of cultural categories” 
(ibd.: 42).   
The constraints that vocabularies exert on institutional agency are both cognitive 
and strategic. First, as a field’s vocabularies become institutionalized through a 
field’s ongoing discourses, words and meanings are increasingly taken for granted 
and unconsciously reproduced by a field’s actors (Phillips et al., 2004). For exam-
ple, in their study on the institutionalization of Total Quality Management among 
56 of the largest U.S. industrial companies, Green et al. (2009: 23) observe “that the 
words ‘cost’ and ‘waste’ were virtually used interchangeably” by managers as the 
existence of a direct link between waste reduction and a decrease in production 
costs has become unquestioned. Schildt et al. (2011: 82) summarize the process 
through which vocabularies exert cognitive constraints on actors and hence impede 
agency as follows: “[I]ndividuals use institutionalized vocabularies to reason about 
their choices and understand their context with limited understanding of how and 
why these structures have become what they are.” 
Second, even if actors become aware of the meaning systems provided by vocabu-
lary structures – this may result from environmental jolts or inherent contradictions 
in the often multiple logics of a field (Seo & Creed, 2002) –  the use of a field’s 
vocabularies represents a crucial strategic precondition for effective institutional 
work. New institutional arrangements can only acquire legitimacy if they connect to 
a wider set “taken-for-granted beliefs and values” (Zilber, 2007: 1050), i.e. institu-
tional logics. Institutional logics “encode the criteria of legitimacy by which role 
identities, strategic behaviors, organizational forms, and relationships between or-
ganizations are constructed and sustained” (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005: 38). Ac-
tors need to draw on existing “standard vocabularies and legitimate accounts” 
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(Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006: 1005) to establish the indispensable connection 
between new organizational forms, professional roles or practices and the overarch-
ing institutional logics of a field (Loewenstein, 2014; Loewenstein et al., 2012). Put 
more simply, the acquisition of legitimacy presupposes comprehensibility and ap-
propriateness against the background of a field’s meaning systems. While cognitive 
and strategic constraints limit actors’ potential to diverge from a field’s vocabular-
ies, the skillful re-structuration and enrichment of existing vocabularies may enable 
actors’ institutional work efforts considerably. As “[s]hifts in meaning are both re-
flective of changing environments and contributors to institutional change” 
(Loewenstein et al., 2012: 53), iterative change in vocabularies may not only reflect 
a change in underlying logics but also bring about this change. Further, and perhaps 
more importantly, agents who succeed in controlling the meanings of contested 
practices through vocabulary construction constrain opponents within the discursive 
struggles of institutional change episodes (cf. Zilber, 2007). By finding new exam-
ples for categories and connecting words to new idioms, agents “infuse structures 
and practices with meaning” (Zilber, 2007: 1050). Opponents must reflect upon 
these meanings and redefine corresponding words to be able to purposefully deploy 
these words in their arguments. Hence, the extent to which actors are enabled by 
vocabularies depends on their skills in anticipating key words in field-level debates 
as well as their ability to expeditiously arrange meaningful vocabulary structures 
around them.  
Discursive Institutional Work in Professional Settings: Creating Boundaries  
As elaborated above, the legitimization and de-legitimization of new institutional 
arrangements generally relies on the use of language as it is language which infuses 
structures with meaning (Loewenstein et al., 2012; Ocasio et al., 2015; Ocasio & 
Joseph, 2005). In professional settings, discursive means of institutional work are of 
particular importance and professionals have been found to be “skilled rhetoricians” 
(Suddaby and Viale, 2011: 435). This is the case because the creation and mainte-
nance of professions relies strongly on the construction of discursive boundaries 
between different categories, particularly the distinction of expert versus laymen 
work (Fournier, 2000). To be able to claim regulatory power over specific areas of 
expertise, professionals need to convince the state that their work is special and im-
portant to society and thus eligible for formal mechanisms of protection (Larson, 
1979). They do so by constructing a meaning system around their profession that 
differentiates them from non-professional actors with regard to their knowledge and 
their moral integrity (Fournier, 1999; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005; Thomas & 
Hewitt, 2011; Turkoski, 1995). This kind of boundary work is inherently reliant on 
processes of discursive construction, as, for example, Gieryn’s works (1983, 1999) 
on the scientific profession illustrate. He concludes that the “cultural authority” that 
the scientific profession enjoys is the result of the successful “discursive attribution 
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of selected qualities to scientists, scientific methods, and scientific claims for the 
purpose of drawing a rhetorical boundary between science and some less authorita-
tive residual non-science” (Gieryn, 1999: 4-5).  
This cultural authority of professionals is, however, not only the result of successful 
persuasion but also relies on the creation and maintenance of specific vocabularies. 
Such professional vocabularies constitute and demarcate “spaces of reason” 
(Schildt el al., 2011: 84), that is, domains of knowledge in which professionals are 
granted definitional authority. Loewenstein (2014: 3) points out that vocabularies 
are “accounts of professions’ specialized knowledge”. As such, they foster the de-
velopment of professional identity through a common language that facilitates the 
enactment of professional practices (ibd.: 4-5). At the same time, using specialized 
vocabularies and having the authority to define meaning systems by the develop-
ment of specific vocabularies helps professionals to differentiate themselves from 
other professional and non-professional occupations. Being able to define specific 
words (e.g. “heart attack”, “criminal”, or “care”) adds to professionals’ “’owner-
ship’ of a social problem” (Åkerström, 2002: 531) that eventually translates into a 
regulatory monopoly and endows professionals with the capacity to exclude non-
professionals from engaging in their areas of expertise. While professionals may 
lend those vocabularies to non-professional actors, they remain in charge of defin-
ing the respective words and building meaningful relations between them (Loewen-
stein, 2014: 6). This division of discursive labor (Loewenstein, 2014; Putnam, 
1975; Schildt et al., 2011) enables professionals to exert influence in their organiza-
tional fields and makes them skillful in the construction of vocabularies.  
However, while any profession is endowed with a specific area of expertise around 
which they are expected to construct specific vocabularies that embody their expert 
knowledge, not all professions are equally able to provide vocabularies to structure 
the general discourses of their field. This, as I will show in the course of this study, 
is especially true for the low-status, or ‘semi’-professionals (Etzioni, 1969) of a 
field who still struggle to acquire full professional status. Accordingly, in the next 
section I will first elaborate on how the relative position of political actors in a field 
may affect how their institutional work efforts are enabled and constrained by the 
use of vocabulary structures.  
Field position and Discursive Institutional Work   
How actors use language and how they are used by language (Green & Li, 2011) is 
likely to depend on their relative position within a field. Generally, “different actors 
have differential capabilities and resources to exercise power based on their subject 
position in the relevant field” (Zilber, 2007:1037). Specifically, actors’ position in a 
field determines to which extent they are able to exert discursive power. By pro-
cesses of social construction, actors acquire the right to legitimately participate in a 
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discourse, i.e. the right to ‘be heard’ within a field (Hardy & Phillips, 2004).  As the 
high status of central actors in a field is conducive to the “acknowledgment and 
‘consumption’ of their discourse by other actors” (Battilana et al., 2009: 84), these 
actors are endowed with the power to determine the frames through which material 
reality is infused with specific meanings (Hardy & Phillips, 2004). However, as 
noted above, the discourses through which actors exert institutional work are noto-
rious struggles and field positions may change as discourses evolve. Also, subject 
positions that grant actors legitimacy in the eyes of several stakeholders may super-
sede hierarchical status and endow actors with specific discursive resources that are 
unavailable to other actors (Maguire et al., 2004). Furthermore, having “a louder 
voice” (Hardy & Phillips, 2004: 4) within a field’s discourse does not imply that 
these actors are immune to the constraining effects of institutionalized vocabularies. 
Institutional scholars have repeatedly emphasized that any agency is embedded 
(Holm, 1995), agents are not “hypermuscular” (Suddaby, 2010: 15), and discourses 
are “not infinitely pliable” (Hardy et al., 2000: 1228). As Battilana et al. (2009: 76) 
note, actors’ social position within a field does not only determine their access to 
resources and hence their relative power to establish new institutional practices but 
also their perception of a field. High status actors obtain their status through their 
central position in a field. This centrality implies a high degree of embeddedness in 
a field’s taken-for-granted meaning systems. As elaborated above, these systems of 
meaning are constituted by vocabularies. Hence, while high status actors are sup-
posedly skilled in deploying discursive means and are – due to their high legitimacy 
within a field – more likely to inform the overall discourse, they are also more like-
ly to draw on institutionalized vocabulary structures due to cognitive constraints 
resulting from their embeddedness in the field. Low status actors, on the other side, 
are “less privileged by the prevailing institutions” (Battilana, 2011: 817) and hence 
more likely to envision and pursue a redefinition of the prevalent meaning systems 
within a field by manipulating the vocabulary structures of a field’s discourse. 
However, as low status actors are endowed with considerably less legitimacy than 
high status actors they will have to put considerable effort into ‘being heard’ in a 
field’s discourse. Accordingly, low status actors are more reliant on connecting 
their ideas to the overarching institutional logics of a field by strategically drawing 
on a field’s dominant vocabularies. So, while high status actors are likely to face the 
cognitive constraints arising from institutionalized vocabularies, low status actors 
may be more able to envision and create innovative word-to-word and word-to-
example relations. Yet, to strategically enhance their legitimacy and obtain the 
‘right to speak’ in a field’s discourse, low status actors will need to build their ar-
guments on vocabularies that noticeably reflect a field’s central logics. In conclu-
sion, how actors’ relative field status relates to their deployment of vocabulary 
structures as means of institutional work is ambiguous and depends on the interac-
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tion of cognitive and strategic constraints with actors’ chance to ‘be heard’ in a 
field’s discourse. How the relative status of federal and professional actors affected 
their use of vocabulary structures to promote or prevent institutional change in the 
field of German health care will be examined in the following section.  
4.3.3 The Redivision of Tasks in German Health Care  
The health care sector is a particularly suitable setting for studying the construction 
of vocabularies as means of discursive institutional work against the background of 
different actors’ field positions for several reasons. First, the health care sector is an 
organizational field that is not only strongly shaped by professions (Currie et al., 
2012; Freidson, 1970b, 1970a, 1988b; Kitchener & Mertz, 2012; Relman, 2007; 
Saks, 2014; Scott et al., 2000) but is also characterized by high status differences. 
Specifically, most Western health care systems – despite increasing state involve-
ment and marketization – are still shaped by the dominance of the medical profes-
sion (Currie et al., 2012; Di Luzio, 2008; Thorne, 2002). The status differences be-
tween physicians and nurses are a good example for the professional hierarchies 
that characterize health care (Salhani & Coulter, 2009). In Germany, where nursing 
training does not regularly include an academic degree, these status differences are 
particularly high (Dent, 2002). Further, the creation of special vocabularies as a 
means to develop and defend areas of expertise, which are the foundation to a pro-
fessions’ regulatory boundaries and status, has been found to be particularly rele-
vant in the field of health care (McIntyre, Francis, & Chapman, 2012). Explicit calls 
for health care professions to develop and enact common vocabularies bear witness 
of the importance of language as a means of institutional agency in this field 
(Dixon, 1983). Accordingly, political actors in this field – professions in particular - 
can be assumed to be skilled in employing discursive strategies (Suddaby & Viale, 
2011). This makes the field of health care highly suitable for linguistic analyses as 
even subtle patterns of vocabularies are unlikely to be incidental. Lastly, drawing 
on the context of German health care for the study of the enabling and constraining 
effects of vocabularies on institutional agency also has pragmatic appeal. Due to 
high levels of legal regulation and the highly institutionalized practice of joint self-
government in German health care, discursive struggles between professional actors 
often take place in public, are usually well documented, and thus readily accessible 
to research. 
Setting 
In Germany, the delegation of low-risk medical tasks to nurses has always been a 
usual approach to secure prompt and continuous patient care in clinical practice. 
Within this task division, nurses were so far mostly perceived as ad-hoc assistants 
to physicians rather than health care professionals of their own. Accordingly, legal 
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plans to grant nurses the right to autonomously provide medical care, which, in le-
gal terms, depicts a ‘substitution’ of medical tasks (as opposed to a ‘delegation’ that 
leaves decision rights with physicians) represented a major shift in the German 
health care sector that had long been dominated by the medical logic. Table 4.1 
gives a brief overview over the key events in this episode of institutional change.  
Table 4.1: Key Events in the Negotiations on the Redivision  of Medical Tasks in Germany  
Date Event 
07/2007 Publication of the report “Cooperation and Responsibility - Prerequisites for Target-Oriented Health Care” by the 
Advisory Council on the Assessment of Developments in the Health Care System (SVR), arguing for a redivision  of 
medical tasks between physicians and other health care occupations such as nurses 
07/2008 Passing of the Long-Term Care Further Development Act which generally allowed the autonomous provision of  
medical treatment by nurses and other non-medical occupations within pilot programs 
10/2011 Proposal for a directive on the design of pilot programs by the Federal Joint Committee (G-BA), the highest institu-
tion of the German joint self-government of physicians, hospitals, and health insurances 
03/2012 Commencement of the proposed directive on the re-allocation of medical tasks within pilot programs 
  
4.3.4 Data and Methodological Approach 
Sources of Data 
The case study is based on several types of archival data. The data used in the anal-
ysis mainly consist of official documents such as reports and public statements. 
These were supplemented by conference protocols, comments, and articles of the 
respective professional or federal organization and their representatives. All archiv-
al data were collected searching the websites of the central federal, physician and 
nursing (umbrella) associations for documents including articles, statements, sum-
maries, and comments on the topic of rearranging professional responsibilities. 
Specifically, I included publications of the Federal Joint Committee (G-BA) and the 
Advisory Council on the Assessment of Developments in the Health Care System 
(SVR), publications of the German Medical Association (BÄK), and publications 
of the German Nursing Council (DPR). 
The G-BA is the highest institution of the German joint self-government of physi-
cians, hospitals, and health insurances and hence obtains a high status within the 
field of German health care. While the G-BA includes physician representatives it 
is subordinated directly to the Federal Ministry of Health and strictly obliged to 
make neutral decisions. The SVR, as second federal association included in the 
analysis, is responsible for the preparation of reports on current challenges and op-
tions for the further development of German health care. While the SVR itself does 
not possess any decision rights of its own, it is considered a central association 
within the German health care sector and its reports are usually much-quoted. Ac-
cordingly, the SVR obtains a high status within German health care. Both the G-BA 
and the SVR are representing federal interests. The BÄK is the umbrella associa-
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tion of medical self-government and represents the professional interests of German 
physicians. Within the (still) physician-centered German health care system, the 
BÄK obtains a particularly high status which is derived from the profession they 
represent.  Kuhlmann (2006: 69), in her comprehensive study on recent changes in 
German health care points out: “Physicians have overwhelmingly high social status 
and belong to the peak earners among academics […]. They face the advantages of 
state-regulated and limited access to medical schools and markets, in particulars 
SHI care”.  
As umbrella association of German nurses and midwifes, the DPR represents a 
group of low status actors in the field of German health care. While in Germany, 
nurses strive for an increased academization of their occupation and their recogni-
tion as a full ‘profession’, their status is still lower than in most European countries 
(Dent, 2002).  
The search of the respective websites was conducted using the German translations 
to the search terms “delegation”, “substitution”, “rearrangement”, “reallocation”, 
and “transfer” as these were the main labels under which a redivision of medical 
tasks was discussed. Duplicates and information irrelevant to the redivision of tasks 
between physicians and nurses (e.g. evaluations on the usefulness of “methadon 
substitution”) were removed. Overall, 112 documents could eventually be included 
in the analysis. To gain additional insights into the overall discourse in which the 
respective statements were embedded, I conducted a supplementary literature re-
view focusing on articles and reader comments in practitioner journals.
23
 Often, 
texts become meaningful only in their relation to other textual material (Phillips et 
al., 2004). Hence, locating specific texts in a wider discourse is of particular im-
portance when studying practices of institutional work as social reality is construct-
ed through collections of texts and the linkages between them (Leitch & Palmer, 
2010; Phillips & Hardy, 2002). Table 4.2 provides an overview of the actors and 
publications included in the analysis. 
Table 4.2: Actors and Data  
Field-level actor Representing organization   
Position within the field  
of health care 
Number of publications  
included in analysis 
Federal Actors 
Federal Joint Committee  (G-BA) High status actor 12 
Advisory Council on the Assessment of 
Developments in the Health Care System 
(SVR) 
High status actor 6 
Physicians German Medical Association (BÄK) High status actor 58 
Nurses German Nursing Council (DPR) Low status Actor 36 
    
                                                 
23 For pragmatic reasons I only included the search terms „delegation” and “substitution” combined with 
several synonyms for “medical tasks” in a google scholar search. Overall, 79  additional articles in practition-
er journals and other publications (e.g. press releases) were read in detail.   
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Valuable background information was provided by 17 semi-structured interviews 
with nursing directors and executive nursing specialists conducted as part of a larg-
er research project on the redivision of medical tasks within university hospitals. 
All of the interviewees were members of a central nursing association and hence 
familiar with current field-level discourses. The additional information gained from 
these interviews facilitated the interpretation of official texts and the unavoidable 
“reading between the lines” when studying the strategic use of language (Erkama & 
Vaara, 2010: 822). 
Method 
The methodological approach taken here is based on a critical discourse analysis 
that is supplemented with content analytical methods. Generally, critical discourse 
analysis (CDA) is particularly suitable for the study of language-based institutional 
work as its main focus lies on the study of social phenomena like the exertion of 
power rather than the textual units per se. Furthermore, most CDA scholars agree 
that discourse is “determined by social structure and contributes to stabilizing and 
changing that structure simultaneously” (Wodak & Meyer, 2009: 7). Putting a 
stronger focus on human agency and power relations, CDA better lends itself to the 
study of institutionally embedded agency than classical discourse analysis (Green & 
Li, 2011; Phillips & Oswick, 2012). Vaara, Sorsa, and Pälli (2010: 688) summarize 
CDA as “specific discourse analytic methodology that examines the role played by 
language in the construction of power relationships and reproduction of domina-
tion”. However, critical discourse analysis does not offer a systematic framework 
for analyzing smaller parts of a discourse like vocabularies. Content analysis, on the 
other side, provides specific tools for text analysis but is criticized for decontextual-
ization (Duriau, Reger, & Pfarrer, 2007). Combining both analytical approaches 
allows for an in-depth analysis of vocabulary construction as instrument of institu-
tional work while accounting for the context, specifically actors’ field position, in 
which the discursive strategy is embedded. In preparation of the in-depth analysis 
of text material published by the organizational actors involved in the renegotiation 
of task responsibilities in German health care, I conducted a screening of the overall 
material collected to gain a coarse overview of major themes and critical events 
shaping the discourse.  The actual coding of the text material was carried out using 
the content analysis software MaxQDA (Kuckartz, 2011). Coding included several 
stages, the most important of which are discussed below. First, I divided the materi-
al according to institutional actor and year of publication. In fact, some documents 
published on the website of a federal, physician or nursing organization had to be 
assigned to another organizational actor as they were part of a larger collection of 
official statements or used in reference to statements by other actors. Further organ-
izing of the material by year was of particular importance as it allowed tracing the 
development of vocabularies structures with regard to their enabling and constrain-
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ing effects on the overall discursive struggle. The second step of the coding in-
volved the inductive characterization of vocabulary structures. In line with Loe-
wenstein et al.’s (2012) framework, characterizing vocabulary structure included 
the identification of central words used by the respective actors as well as the un-
covering of linkages between these words and the word-to-examples relations. The 
coding approach taken here was very iterative, and included constant going back 
and forth between word categories and textual material. The final coding comprised 
32 word categories such as ‘substitution’, ‘qualification’ or ‘non-medical’ that were 
later summarized to the three broader categories ‘modes of task redivision’, ‘rea-
sons and effects of task redivision’ and ‘change in the professions’.   
Text excerpts were assigned to a code according to the central vocabularies used 
within the paragraph. Yet, as a key feature of vocabulary construction is the crea-
tion of word-to-word and word-to-examples relations, paragraphs were often as-
signed to two or more categories. The findings of the analysis are presented below. 
4.3.5 Findings24 
The discursive struggle about the redivision of tasks in the German health care sec-
tor is characterized by two major themes around which the involved parties ar-
ranged specific vocabulary structures. Namely, these themes were ‘current chal-
lenges in health care’ and ‘modes of task redivision’. All actors agreed that the pro-
vision of high-quality health care to patients in the face of an aging society was one 
of the major challenges in German health care. This consensus manifested in the 
frequent use of idioms that included the word ‘provision (of health care)’ and ‘pa-
tient’. The word ‘provision (of health care)’ can be found at least once in 76 per-
cent, the word ‘patient’ in 71 percent  of all documents in the analysis25 with no 
obvious differences in the frequency of use between physician, nursing or federal 
associations. This focus on the ‘provision (of health care)’ and the ‘patient’ is not 
surprising as it reflects the dominant goal of the organizational field: the provision 
of health care to patients as overarching task (cf. Reay & Hinings, 2009: 633). A 
lack of concern about the provision of health care to society would have discon-
nected actors from the field’s discourse. In Germany, the discourse in the field of 
health care is primarily shaped by its tradition of universal health care that promotes 
equal access of all citizens to high-quality health care (Bode, 2015). Hence, the in-
clusion of these words and their underlying meanings can be interpreted as neces-
sary precondition to identify as a legitimate member of the field and, as such, a dis-
                                                 
24  Text excerpts presented in the following have been translated from German by the author. 
25 As the publications of the different institutional actors differ considerably in length and quality (ranging 
from conference protocols to official recommendations), I refrained from counting absolute word frequency. 
Reporting absolute word frequencies might have led to the misimpression that specific words and idioms that 
were used repeatedly within single or few publications were central to the discourse.  
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cursive constraint by which all actors were equally affected. Yet, how the challenge 
of securing the provision of health care is to be addressed with regard to the alloca-
tion of medical tasks became the topic of a heated discussion. A central point of 
contention was the allocation of responsibilities in the context of a redivision of 
medical tasks. A redivision of task responsibilities can be distinguished into the 
modes of task ‘delegation’ and task ‘substitution’. In the legal sense, a substitution 
of medical tasks equals a re-allocation of medical responsibilities to nursing and 
other non-medical health care professions. Delegation, in turn, leaves decision 
rights with physicians. Divergences in the institutional (sub-)logics proposed by the 
involved actors caused different stances towards the mode of task redivision which 
fuelled the debate. Physicians, who traditionally enjoy the highest status among 
health care professionals, generally argued for the maintenance of their central posi-
tion as sole provider of medical treatment in the narrow sense. In this role, physi-
cians function as coordinators and decision-makers while secondary health care 
professions such as nurses may perform therapeutic measures only by the order of a 
physician. In contrast to the paradigm of ‘physician centrality’, nurses, who still 
obtain a low status position within German health care, depicted effective health 
care as the outcome of a combined effort of equally specialized and autonomous 
professionals. This paradigm of ‘professional equality’ that promoted the im-
portance of nurses’ professional logic in the provision of health care was supported 
by efforts to establish nursing as autonomous profession, including the increased 
academization of nursing training. Federal health care organizations, following their 
purpose of securing long-term public health, promoted a logic of ‘efficiency’ that 
transcended professional interests (cf. Scott, 2004). As will be elaborated below, the 
resulting discursive struggle illustrates how actors construct distinct vocabulary 
spaces to promote a specific institutional (sub-)logic and how these vocabulary 
spaces enable some actors while constraining others.  
2007-2008: Opening the debate  
Federal actors 
The publication of a report titled “Cooperation and Responsibility - Prerequisites 
for Target-Oriented Health Care” by the Advisory Council on the Assessment of 
Developments in the Health Care System (SVR) in 2007 marks the central starting 
point of an intense debate between federal, nursing and physician representatives 
about the appropriateness of an altered allocation of medical tasks between the dif-
ferent health care occupations. The report itself argues for an increase in coopera-
tion between health care occupations while not explicitly preferring a delegation 
over a substitution of medical tasks or vice versa. Rather, it argued for an efficient 
task redivision in the sense of a combination of both. With only three publications 
in 2007 and none in 2008, federal associations only selectively took part in the pub-
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lic debate. Nevertheless, especially the 2007 report of the SVR which specifically 
included a 60-page chapter on the redivision of medical tasks informed the public 
debate notably and – in the context of the overall discursive struggle – exposes sev-
eral interesting discursive features.  
Vocabulary construction: The vocabulary structure of the SVR report generally 
expresses an ostensibly neutral and conciliatory stance towards a redivision of 
tasks. While a widely presumed “inherent conservatism” (Brown et al., 2012: 301) 
of governmental publications might explain such distinctly uncontroversial vocabu-
lary structures, current research draws attention to the subtle, yet skillful deploy-
ment of discursive practices by governmental actors (Brown et al., 2012). The term 
‘provision (of health care)’ was typically combined with concerns about ‘efficiency 
and effectiveness’, reflecting federal actors’ responsibility for the long-term financ-
ing of health care. Considering that the theme ‘modes of task redivision’ was most 
highly contested within the debate between physicians and nurses, federal actors’ 
particular emphasis of the term ‘cooperation’ – as opposed to a focus on the redi-
vision of tasks as such – marks an interesting feature of federal actors’ vocabulary 
structure. Within its 2007 report, the SVR portrayed the terms ‘delegation’ and 
‘substitution’ as exemplary modes of intensified ‘cooperation’ and ‘collaboration’ 
between health care professions. Supporting the notion that delegation and substitu-
tion are merely different practical modes of an efficient allocation of medical tasks, 
federal actors framed ‘delegation’ and ‘substitution’ as legally different concepts, 
yet similar in their positive effects on ‘quality and efficiency’ or ‘quality and pa-
tient-safety’. Common word-to-word relations were ‘delegation and substitution’ or 
‘delegation or substitution’ that further mitigated differences between these con-
cepts. Notably, federal actors rarely embedded the highly contested task-redivision  
modes ‘delegation’ and ‘substitution’ in complete legitimization accounts but rather 
framed them as potential examples of the presumably inevitable increase in “effi-
cient [and] effective division of tasks in health care” (Question catalogue for offi-
cial responses following the publication of the SVR report, 2007). As federal actors 
had anticipated that “the medical profession reacts alarmed when the very founda-
tions of their authority […] are being shaken” (Member of the G-BA, 2011), the 
discursive reduction of contrasts between a delegation and substitution of tasks can 
be viewed as an attempt to appease opponents of institutional change. This interpre-
tation is supported by the SVR’s explicit acknowledgement of the importance of 
vocabularies within the debate. Recognizing the power of vocabulary creation, the 
SVR urged field actors to refrain from using hierarchical categories such as “medi-
cal profession and medical assistant profession” as they would stand in the way of 
a “modern, cooperation based understanding of collaboration between health-care 
occupations” (SVR report, 2007).    
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The discursive reduction of contrasts between a delegation and substitution of tasks 
can be viewed as attempt to create a fit between the ‘physician centrality’, encoded 
in the medical logic that was promoted by the most powerful opponents of federal 
actors’ plans to grant nurses increased autonomy. Although the SVR noted that the 
task division in German health care is characterized by a “not always efficient phy-
sician-centeredness” (SVR report, 2007), it remained mostly ambiguous about its 
preferred mode of task-division between health care professionals, hence leaving 
the future role of physicians in health care open to debate. Such discursive ambigui-
ty has been found to enable collective action in intra-organizational contexts 
(Jarzabkowski, Sillince, & Shaw, 2010). Yet, as the further course of the debate 
will illustrate, within episodes of institutional change, a lack of discursive specifici-
ty is likely to invite opponents to dominate discursive struggles through the exploi-
tation of these ambiguities. 
Physicians 
While the BÄK expressed its appreciation of an increased cooperation between 
health care occupations, it also insisted on the indivisibility of medical responsibil-
ity and the importance of preserving physicians’ central role as a measure to main-
tain patient safety. Physician associations had a particular interest in maintaining 
the institutional status-quo as they had to witness several institutional changes that 
weakened physicians’ influence in health care over the last years.26 Still, physicians 
are well-organized and highly visible actors in political decision making in Germa-
ny. As high-status actors within the field, physicians are experienced in political 
activities and deploy discursive strategies with great skill. This was also the case 
with regard to federal plans to re-allocate medical tasks to other health care profes-
sions. As the conference protocols and petitions from the 111
th
 German Medical 
Assembly in 2008 underline, vocabulary structures were created with great care and 
accuracy: One delegate even requested to delete any phrases in a resolution pro-
posal that “may lead to the misimpression that the medical profession would […] 
agree to a substitution of medical tasks”. Another delegate noted that a proposal 
should be rejected as its “text lacks specificity to an extent that it is dangerous” 
(Speech at the 111
th
 German Medical Assembly in 2008). 
Vocabulary construction: The BÄK noticeably relied on the creation of dichoto-
mies within their construction of vocabularies. Their vocabulary structure is built 
around ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ of the medical profession and pairs of ‘right prac-
tices’ versus ‘wrong practices’. In the center of their vocabulary creation efforts lies 
the distinction between ‘delegation’ and ‘substitution’. The term ‘delegation’ was 
                                                 
26 The most drastic among these changes was certainly the introduction of case-based reimbursement 
rates for medical treatment in 2003 (“G-DRG-System”) which curtailed medical autonomy in favor of 
treatment standardization and cost reduction. 
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often further specified as being ‘physician-relieving’ and contrasted to a ‘physician-
replacing substitution’. This explicit discursive distinction was introduced as early 
as 2008, when the passing of the Long-Term Care Further Development Act laid 
the legal foundations to an autonomous provision of medical treatment by non-
medical occupations. Most prominently in the context of the 111
th
 annual German 
Medical Assembly in May 2008, physicians reinforced the contrast between delega-
tion and substitution, e.g. by adopting a resolution titled “delegation yes – substitu-
tion no” that indicated a considerable qualitative gap between these two modes of 
task-redivision. How intensely physicians attempted to construct a negative, even 
hazardous image of ‘substitution’ becomes obvious in the usage of this term by the 
president of the Westphalian state chambers of physicians who, at the annual Ger-
man Medical Assembly in 2008, indignantly asserted that federal plans to transfer 
medical tasks to nursing professionals equal a “conscious and politically volitional 
substitution of medical tasks”. In fact, federal actors had at no point of the debate 
denied that ‘substitution’ was one mode in which a redivision of medical tasks was 
supposed to be implemented. Using the term ‘substitution’ in a way that connotes 
inherent danger was only possible by defining it as ‘physician-replacing’. When 
constructing this very prominent vocabulary structure, physicians relied on their 
hitherto central position in health care. Most notably, medical representatives did 
not refer to ‘substitution’ as a re-allocation of medical tasks to other health care pro-
fessionals but rather as generally ‘physician-replacing’ or ‘physician-replacement’. 
As, of course, the health care system is reliant on the provision of medical services 
by physicians, it is hardly challengeable that physicians as a profession cannot be 
substituted. Another dichotomy that became characteristic for physicians’ vocabu-
lary structure within the debate was the discursive distinction between physicians 
and other health care professionals. While ‘non-medical’ is not an uncommon de-
scriptive adjective when addressing several different groups of health care occupa-
tions (excluding physicians), physician associations used this specification more 
frequently than federal and nursing actors and often in direct contrast to the ‘medi-
cal’ profession, thereby underscoring differences between physicians and other 
health-care professions. 
This contrast was further reinforced by explicitly demarcating physicians from 
‘non-physicians’ as the title of a press release in 2008 suggests: “The Medical As-
sembly rejects a transfer of medical tasks to non-physicians”. This discursive re-
duction of other health care occupations to their ‘non-medical’ nature becomes par-
ticularly meaningful when taking into consideration that the “medical specialist 
standard” became one of the key phrases around which physicians built their legit-
imization strategies. While pointing out their general willingness to cooperate, phy-
sicians expressed their worries about the substitution of medical tasks as violation 
of patients’ right to be treated according to a “medical specialist standard”: 
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“[…] the medical specialist standard in diagnosis and therapy must be strictly 
obeyed because [it] assures patient protection.” (Presentation at the 111th  German 
Medical Assembly, 2008). 
The German medical profession rejects concepts and pilot projects that aim at an 
easing of physician qualification and diagnoses and therapies below medical spe-
cialist standard. The medical profession has developed its own approaches to pro-
mote physician-supporting and physician-relieving measures in the context of dele-
gation that – in the interest of the patient – stick to the principle of therapeutic re-
sponsibility of the physician […]” (Resolution of the BÄK, 2008)  
The presumed effects of treatment procedures that lack medical specialist standard 
were particularly graphically described in the context of the 111
th
 German Medical 
Assembly in 2008 when the president of the Westphalian state chambers of physi-
cians, one of the key speakers with regard to this topic, provided an example of a 
patient who was severely harmed while receiving medical treatment from an anes-
thetic nurse specialists:  
“What happens when the medical specialist standard is not being respected? […] 
On 24 October 2005, just 3 weeks after the practical implementation of the ‘medi-
cal assistants in anesthesia’, the so-called MAFA, a tragic incident at the Helios 
Clinic Erfurt occurred. During a harmless routine surgery, an 18-year-old patient 
suffered a cardiovascular arrest. The result: Severe brain damage. Anesthesia was 
occasionally monitored by a MAFA, the supervising anesthesiologist was simulta-
neously responsible for two other anesthetics.” 
By constructing a vocabulary structure which emphasized that other health care 
professionals are ‘non-medical’, physicians subtly underlined their proposition that 
e.g. nurses are not able to meet medical specialist standard. Aside from constructing 
meaningful dichotomies, physician associations, as experienced political actors, 
also sought to deconstruct federal actors’ vocabularies:  
“As one of the central theses in this report we find: ‘A not always efficient physi-
cian-centeredness becomes apparent in health care’. The term ‘physician-
centeredness’ is used in a context that connotes inefficiency and hierarchy. The 
opposite is true: Physician-centeredness is a quality characteristic! Who else, if not 
the physician, bears the burden of responsibility for the treatment of patients? Poli-
tics knows this, when it uses the word ‘physician-centered’ again in the context of 
‘physician-centered provision of health care’, this time with a positive connota-
tion.” (Speech at the 111th German Medical Assembly, 2008). 
In sum, physicians’ discursive efforts between 2007 and 2008 illustrate how vocab-
ularies are used to constrain potential opponents. By creating the ‘delegation versus 
substitution’ dichotomy, the BÄK exploited the discursive ambiguity of the phrase 
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‘cooperation’ which the SVR used as a neutral alternative to include both modes of 
task redivision. In doing so, physicians drew attention to the qualitative differences 
between a delegation and a substitution of tasks and restricted the debate to the dis-
cursive space between these poles of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ modes of task-redivision  
while not rejecting an increased cooperation per se. Particularly, by defining ‘sub-
stitution’ as ‘physician-replacing’ at an early stage of the debate, physicians con-
strained federal and nursing associations in neutrally deploying this term as mere 
description of a task-division mode. Further, physicians’ discursive strategy illus-
trates how the creation of vocabulary structures is a powerful instrument for subtle 
(de-)legitimatization attempts. Specifically, when arguing that patients have a right 
to a ‘medical specialist standard’, physicians drew on their implicit definition of 
nurses and other health care professions as being merely ‘non-medical’ and hence 
strengthened the perception of qualitative differences between the different health 
care occupations. While e.g. qualified nurses may be well capable of providing 
health care services according to medical specialist standard, ‘non-medical’ profes-
sionals were discursively separated from a “medical specialist standard”. 
Nurses 
In Germany, nurses are still far less present in health care politics than physicians. 
The German nursing council (DPR), as umbrella association of German nursing 
and midwifery, was founded in 1998 while the history of the German Medical As-
sociation goes back to 1947. Still, nurses vividly engaged in the discussion on al-
tered task-division modes in health care. For nurses, federal considerations to ex-
tend nurses’ medical autonomy marked an important step towards evolving from a 
non-professional occupation to a health care profession on par with the medical 
profession. Hence, nursing representatives exposed a positive stance towards a sub-
stitution of medical tasks. However, the discursive strategies employed by the DPR 
and its representatives between 2007 and 2008 expose that while nurses struggled 
for their recognition as professionals they arranged their arguments mostly within 
the vocabulary space proposed by physicians.  
Vocabulary construction: Like federal actors, the German Nursing Council focused 
on the terms ‘cooperation’ and ‘collaboration’ and related synonyms when framing 
changes in the modes of task division between health care occupations. As nurses 
are still low status actors within the field of health care, this characteristic of their 
vocabulary structure can be viewed as attempt to discursively ally with more pow-
erful actors of the field (cf. Boxenbaum & Battilana, 2005). Nurses’ strategic de-
ployment of vocabularies becomes particularly apparent in their frequent use of the 
terms “profession/al” or “professionalization”. Hereby, and in contrast to physi-
cians’ attempts of reinforcing nurses’ lower status as basically ‘non-medical’, nurs-
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ing representatives insisted on representing a nascent health care profession, an oc-
cupational status that has hitherto been reserved to physicians: 
“The medical fraternity […] has to realize that nursing is not a competitor but at 
partner in patient care. This, of course, implies that the nursing profession will get 
the right to write prescriptions […]” (DPR Newsletter, 2008). 
While nurses’ ideas of desirable task-division modes between nurses and physi-
cians differed considerably from those of physicians, nursing representatives fre-
quently referred to statements of physician associations. Specifically, nurses sought 
to de-legitimize physicians’ position within the debate by portraying physicians as 
‘ideology-driven’ actors who obscured their true motives:  
 “To ensure that patients and those in need of care are provided with medical ser-
vices in a resource-friendly […] way, an ideology-free discourse between the dif-
ferent professional groups health-care is essential. (Newsletter of the German 
Nursing Council, 2008). 
However, this meta-level strategy of dissecting physicians’ arguments put physi-
cians’ juxtaposition of the two different task division modes ‘delegation’ and ‘sub-
stitution’ also in the center of the DPR’s vocabulary structure though embedded in 
a different argument structure. While the term ‘substitution’ was rarely explicitly 
used between 2007 and 2008, nurses adopted the distinction between ‘delegation’ 
and synonyms for ‘substitution’ like ‘redistribution’ or ‘transfer’ and thereby invol-
untarily perpetuated the discursive dichotomy proposed by physicians:  
„Delegation or substitution?[…] physician representatives still have their difficul-
ties with the call for substitution (Newsletter of the German Nursing Council, 
2008). 
“A new argument is inevitable: It is about the question: delegation or transfer?” 
(Newsletter of the German Nursing Council, 2008). 
 
2009-2010: Reinforcing and enriching vocabulary structures  
Federal actors 
Apart from four short comments in 2009, the G-BA and the SVR mostly withdrew 
from the public debate on a task redivision in German health care between 2009 
and 2010. Yet, their vocabulary construction does not differ notably from that in the 
period between 2007 and 2008. In particular, the SVR further reinforced the pro-
posed similarity between delegation and substitution of tasks with regard to their 
effects:  
“The increased delegation and substitution of tasks to non-medical occupations 
leads to a relief and thus more freedom for the respective physicians.” (Special re-
port of the SVR, 2009) 




Similar to federal actors, the BÄK published significantly less statements and 
comments on the redivision of medical tasks between 2009 and 2010. This is most 
likely the case as this phase is characterized by the absence of significant legal pro-
gress concerning the practical implementation of new task division modes. Within 
the overall six conference protocols and press releases to be found between 2009 
and 2010, physicians mostly relied on their existing strategy of specifying and an-
tagonizing the task-redivision-modes of ‘delegation’ and ‘substitution’. 
Vocabulary construction: While the BÄK continued to use of the word pair ‘dele-
gation’ and ‘substitution’ excessively within their publications, the direct juxtaposi-
tion of these two terms – as it was the case in the years before – decreased between 
the years 2009 and 2010. However, the BÄK increasingly portrayed the substitution 
of medical tasks as a violation of the already much-quoted ‘medical specialist 
standard’ and hence an infringement of ‘patient rights’. Here, physicians repeatedly 
emphasized the misfit between a substitution of medical tasks and patient-
orientation as central element of the overarching field-logic, further defining the 
term ‘substitution’ as not only ‘physician-replacing’ but as an infringement of pa-
tient rights:  
„[...] [W]e must consider the level of patient protection. […] Substitution would 
undermine the patient right of a medical specialist standard.”(Presentation at the 
113
th
 German Medical Assembly, 2010).  
Nurses 
In contrast to federal actors and physicians, nurses used the phase between 2008 
and 2009 to reinforce and enrich their discursive strategy. Specifically, the DPR 
continued to dissect the ‘true nature’ of physicians’ reservations against a substitu-
tion of tasks and contrasted the political struggle with current developments on the 
practice level.  
Vocabulary construction: As the DPR mainly constructed its arguments as observa-
tions and comments on the ongoing debate, the discursive space between the poles 
‘delegation’ and ‘substitution’ was sustained within the DPR’s vocabulary struc-
ture. Between 2009 and 2010, the DPR further increased its use of synonyms for 
the redivision of medical tasks in their vocabulary structure. These were often used 
as interchangeable alternatives for delegation, substitution or both. For example, in 
an interview from 2010, the DPR’s president noted, that “there is no way around a 
reallocation of tasks”; in a newsletter article from 2009, the redivision of tasks is 
referred to as “division of labor”, “allocation of tasks” and “substitution”. While 
this enrichment of vocabulary structure can be interpreted as an attempt to expand 
the vocabulary space around the value-laden terms ‘delegation’ and ‘substitution’ to 
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support the idea that „[m]odern medicine and patient care follow the laws of task 
division among equals” (DPR newsletter, 2009), it had little impact on the overall 
discourse. 
Here, nurses’ discursive strategies illustrate how the use of certain vocabulary struc-
tures to promote a specific logic can become a constraint to agency. Physicians’ 
early linking of the word ‘substitution’ to an illegitimate infringement of patients’ 
rights impeded a neutral use of this formerly descriptive legal term. By employing a 
discursive strategy that relied on the dissection of the BÄK’s arguments, the DPR 
(involuntarily) reinforced the idea that delegation and substitution are two modes of 
task division that differ considerably. On the one hand, analyzing physicians ‘true 
motives’ enabled the DPR in questioning the legitimacy of physicians’ central posi-
tion in health care. On the other hand, by incorporating physicians’ vocabulary 
structure into its own arguments, the DPR implicitly confirmed physicians’ status 
as central actors of the field who are capable of defining the central object of the 
debate.   
2011-2012: Discursive deadlock and resolution 
Federal actors 
In October 2011, the Federal Joint Committee (G-BA) proposed a directive on the 
design of pilot programs to test the redivision of medical tasks, including task sub-
stitution. As comments and press releases of the G-BA suggest, the discursive 
means employed within the directive were carefully arranged to provide a more 
neutral context for the on-going debate about appropriate modes of task redivision.  
Vocabulary construction: As by 2011, the discursive struggle between physicians, 
nurses and federal actors had obviously reached a deadlock over the polarity be-
tween ‘delegation’ and ‘substitution’, the G-BA replaced both words by the neutral 
term ‘transfer (of medical tasks)’ within the proposed directive. As federal repre-
sentatives emphasized, this radical change in vocabulary structure was motivated 
by an attempt to contain the escalating debate:  
“Both parts [of the directive] refrain from using the terms delegation and substitu-
tion. Oriented towards consensus, conflict is being bypassed by using the term 
transfer.”(Commentary of a neutral member of the G-BA, 2011.)  
“[The compromise] does not rely on the used up conceptual poles but describes 
respective responsibilities positively […]”(Commentary of the neutral chairmen of 
the G-BA, 2011). 
As this change in vocabulary underlines, federal actors initial attempts’ to define 
the ‘substitution’ and ‘delegation’ of medical tasks as comparable examples of an 
increased ‘cooperation’ between health care professionals had been mostly unsuc-
cessful. The creation of this ostensibly neutral and ambiguous vocabulary structure 
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did not only fail to enable federal actors in their efforts to sponsor a new institution-
al practice. The inherent lack of clarity within the 2007 report of the SVR also 
turned out to become a major constraint in effectively promoting altered modes of 
task-division in health care as it allowed physicians to enrich the formerly merely 
legal terms ‘delegation’ and ‘substitution’ with normative meanings. As a neutral 
member of the G-BA put it, legislative authorities made a momentous mistake 
when not resolving the potential for conflict inherent to the terms ‘delegation’ and 
‘substitution’ in 2007: 
“The fuzzy transition [between these modes] cannot hide the conflict potential un-
derlying the antagonistic terms of delegation and substitution. Unfortunately, legis-
lature did not resolve this by a clear statement of intend towards delegation or sub-
stitution. Hence, the legal framework provided a welcome template for the involved 
actors to play out their conflicting positions on the foundation of an imprecisely 
formulated law.”                                        
Physicians  
Between 2011 and 2012, the BÄK notably increased its discursive efforts to pre-
vent a transfer of medical tasks to nurses and other health care occupations in the 
sense of a task substitution. Apart from taking the opportunity to provide an official 
statement within the course of the development of the directive, the BÄK continued 
to de-legitimize a substitution of medical tasks even after the directive had been 
passed by the German Federal Ministry of Health in 2012. While the commence-
ment of the G-BA directive marked a defeat for physician representatives, the prac-
tical implementation of a task substitution had only been allowed within pilot pro-
jects and was thus still in the ongoing process of institutionalization. 
Vocabulary construction: As the BÄK particularly relied on the meanwhile estab-
lished antagony between the delegation and substitution of tasks within their discur-
sive efforts, it sought to redefine the newly introduced term ‘task transfer’ as syno-
nym and mere cover-up for a planned substitution: 
“A transfer [of tasks], i.e. a substitution of medical practice to other health care 
occupations is being rejected.” (Resolution of the BÄK, 2011) 
“The BÄK and the DKG have – at that time – consistently rejected the introduction 
of § 63 para. 3c SGB V based on the rationale that it would imply a legal manifes-
tation of a transfer of medical practices in the sense of a substitution.” (Official 
response of the BÄK to the G-BA proposal, 2011)   
However, the direct contrast between a delegation and a substitution of tasks did 
not dominate the discursive strategies of physicians as much as it did between 2007 
and 2008. Rather, the BÄK put more emphasis on the term ‘delegation’ as suppos-
edly more appropriate mode of task-redivision. Arguably, this change in vocabulary 
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structure can be interpreted as recognition of an altered vocabulary space that had 
been introduced by the G-BA. This interpretation is supported by two further ob-
servations. On the one hand, the term ‘task transfer’ had been – after more than two 
years of negotiation – adopted as compromise between the 13 members of the G-
BA committee, including two physician representatives. On the other hand, the 
BÄK’s publications between 2011 and 2012 display a notable increase in the use of 
the terms ‘transfer’ and ‘medical science’ – two terms that are central to the G-BA 
directive and thus also define the new vocabulary space. Nevertheless, the BÄK 
continued to emphasize the importance of the medical specialist standard and en-
riched its vocabularies with the term “(medical) responsibility” that was further 
specified as a non-divisible characteristic of medical practice exerted by physicians:   
“Hence, every form of substituting medical responsibility by non-medical employ-
ees needs to be resolutely rejected” (Resolution proposal of the BÄK, 2011). 
Overall, the vocabulary structure of the BÄK between 2011 and 2012 was notably 
informed by the vocabulary space around the term ‘transfer (of medical tasks)’ that 
had been proposed by the G-BA. Yet, while the BÄK gradually reduced the crea-
tion of a contrast between the delegation and the substitution of tasks as polar oppo-
sites, it continued to separate the ‘medical specialist standard’ as well as ‘medical 
responsibility’ from nurses as ‘non-medical’ occupation. In doing so, physicians 
sustained a discursive sub-space that allowed them to dismiss the meanwhile legal-
ly permitted substitution of tasks as inferior against the background of patient rights 
and hence normatively illegitimate.  
“A transfer of medical services and responsibilities to non-medical health care oc-
cupations in the sense of a substitution would, however undermine the patients’ 
right to a medical specialist standard.” (Resolution of the BÄK, 2012) 
Nurses 
The DPR’s discursive strategies between 2011 and 2012 show an interesting com-
bination of change and stability. While the DPR continuously questioned physi-
cians’ integrity within their rhetorical legitimization strategies, their vocabulary 
structure reveals a change in the vocabulary space nurses drew on. 
Vocabulary construction: The vocabulary structure of the DPR between 2011 and 
2012 underwent a significant change after the G-BA directive introduced the term 
‘transfer’ in the second half-year of 2011 as conciliatory alternative to ‘delegation’ 
and ‘substitution’. While in 2011 the DPR still relied on the discursive space pro-
posed by physicians, the term ‘substitution’ is no longer used within its publications 
from the beginning of 2012 onwards. Instead, the DPR heavily drew on the terms 
‘transfer’ and ‘medical science’ as soon as the G-BA had published the first drafts 
of its directive proposal. In the context of the DPR’s increased usage of the term 
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‘cooperation’ between 2007 and 2008, this abrupt adoption of the G-BA’s vocabu-
lary strengthens the perception that the DPR sought to establish a discursive alli-
ance with a more powerful actor of the field that, in addition, had already laid the 
foundations to an institutional change that was likely to enhance nurses’ status.   
Table 4.3 provides an integrated overview of the vocabularies that each collective 
actor employed within the course of the debate.  
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After 2012: New regulation and structural changes in the field  
Following the intense debate between federal, nursing, and medical representatives 
between 2007 and 2012, the directive on the re-allocation of medical tasks within 
pilot programs that had been proposed by the G-BA was eventually passed in 
March 2012. While this was perceived as a step forward in the professional project 
of the nursing profession (DBfK, 2011), the regulatory changes did not translate 
into notable changes at the operational core of health care. By 2013, more than one 
year after the new directive had been passed, no pilot projects have been initiated 
(Hibbeler, 2013; Kälble, 2013; Roes, 2013). As the president of the German Nurs-
ing Council (DPR) – while welcoming new task spheres for nurses – pointed out, 
this was because the new directive was highly complicated (explicitly leaving open 
whether he thought that the directive was intentionally made hard to implement). 
Additionally, he emphasized that the new directive only applied to pilot projects 
that had to be jointly initiated by hospitals and SHI-funds, implying that changes in 
the physician-centered health care system of Germany are not to be expected any 
time soon (Hommel, 2013). Similarly, in 2014, the G-BA noted that “it will still 
take some time until there will be the first model projects for the transfer of medical 
tasks to nursing personnel” (G-BA, 2014d). In a press release from 2014, the DPR 
even revived the dichotomy between ‘delegation’ and ‘substitution’, specifically 
suggesting that despite the regulatory changes, the medical and the nursing profes-
sion were “again going round in circles in the discussion about delegation versus 
substitution” (DPR, 2014b). In sum, the redivision of medical tasks – while having 
gained regulatory legitimacy – is still far from being embedded in the normative or 
cognitive frameworks of German health care. Thus, the dominance of the medical 
logic may be challenged by economic pressures and increased state intervention but 
has yet to be replaced by a collaborative, multi-professional health care system that 
is shaped by equal professionals. How this dominance of the medical logic was 
enacted and reflected within the discursive struggles about the redivision of medical 
tasks will be discussed in further detail below.  
4.3.6 Discussion 
Existing research on the use of language in institutional work focuses mostly on the 
enabling effects of explicit means of persuasion (e.g. Suddaby & Greenwood 2005) 
and coherent argument structures (e.g. Zilber, 2007). More subtle strategies of vo-
cabulary construction have, however, received less scholarly attention. As the pre-
sent study suggests, a stronger emphasis on the construction and deconstruction of 
vocabularies can enhance our perspective on discursive institutional work in profes-
sional settings. 
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The analysis shows that institutionalized vocabularies which reflect the dominant 
institutional logics of an organizational field constrain agency regardless of an ac-
tors’ relative status within the field. In the present case, the focus on the “provision 
(of health care)” and the “patient” reflected the community logic that is a central 
pillar of German health care as a universalist health care system (Bode, 2014). This 
further strengthens the prevailing assumption that vocabularies reflect dominant 
institutional logics in which actors are embedded (e.g. Ocasio & Joseph, 2005) and 
which actors have to draw on to demonstrate their familiarity with the legitimate 
motives and frames of a field and thus their affiliation and legitimacy as partici-
pants in the respective field’s discourse. However, actors are not only embedded in 
and constrained by meaning systems that result from accumulations of historical 
symbolic action (Green & Li, 2011) but are also confronted with the limits of agen-
cy caused by ‘vocabulary spaces’ that come into existence when other actors active-
ly make use of the constraining effects of vocabulary structures. Hence, vocabulary 
structures hold in them constraining and enabling effects that shape discursive 
struggles apart from and beyond explicit means of persuasion. In the present case 
study on the redivision of medical tasks in Germany, three distinct patterns of vo-
cabulary construction are observable. These can be described as ‘spanning of vo-
cabulary spaces’, ‘analyzing vocabulary spaces’ and ‘neutralizing vocabulary spac-
es’. 
Patterns of Vocabulary Construction  
Spanning vocabulary spaces 
The strategic pattern of ‘spanning vocabulary spaces’ can be observed for physi-
cians and federal actors who both represent high status actors in the field of German 
health care. In its 2007 report, the SVR proposed a vocabulary space that focused 
on the term ‘cooperation’ as neutral and positively connoted description for an al-
tered task division between health care professionals. While the general necessity 
for increased cooperation as such was acknowledged by both professional groups, 
physicians provided an alternative vocabulary space by introducing the prominent 
distinction between ‘physician-relieving delegation’ and ‘physician-replacing sub-
stitution’ of tasks as polar opposites rather than comparable modes of task redi-
vision. In doing so, physician representatives exploited the neutral, yet ambiguous 
vocabulary structure around the term ‘cooperation’.  As Suddaby and Viale (2011: 
435) note, it is not uncommon that “professionals legitimate new categories […] 
simply by interpreting vague dictates of government or other dominant players 
within a field”. Yet, the case study illustrates that physicians did not only attempt to 
de-legitimate a substitution of tasks but dominated the debate by a vocabulary space 
that specified the object of the ongoing discourse. While the term ‘cooperation’ was 
continuously used by federal actors, it only provided the general background 
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against which actors discussed the appropriateness of specific modes task-
redivision. The answer to the question on what the debate was actually about was 
provided by physicians who specified the objects of the debate as task delegation 
and task substitution (and specifically not as a new mode of ‘cooperation’ or ‘task-
division’). As this result suggests, the success of ‘spanning a vocabulary space’ is 
not only contingent upon an actors’ status in the field but also on the distinctiveness 
of the vocabulary structure employed. While ‘cooperation’ was used to include a 
delegation and a substitution of tasks it was not specifically linked to a redivision of 
tasks. In fact, actors were unable to draw on this term to argue for or against a cer-
tain mode of task-redivision, as any kind of medical treatment involves coopera-
tion. Delegation and substitution, on the other side, provided a sufficiently precise 
description of distinct task-division-modes.  
Analyzing vocabulary spaces 
The strategic pattern of “analyzing vocabulary spaces” is employed by federal, phy-
sician and nursing representatives. However, federal actors merely urged other ac-
tors to refrain from using hierarchical categories such as “medical profession and 
medical assistant profession” (SVR report, 2007) and physicians only once referred 
to federal actors’ ambiguous use of the term “physician-centeredness” (Speech at 
the 111
th
 German Medical Assembly, 2008 ). In contrast to federal actors and physi-
cians, nurses, as low status actors within German health care, employed this strate-
gic pattern to a great extent. While embedding nursing in a vocabulary structure 
that emphasized its status as a ‘profession’ and nurses as ‘professionals’, the DPR 
also strongly relied on the dissection of physicians’ arguments when attempting to 
legitimate a new mode of task redivision. In particular, nurses noted that the “dis-
cussion ‘delegation versus substitution’ has to be ended” (Interview with the presi-
dent of the DPR, 2010) and that the “much-quoted ‘medical specialist standard’ 
[… ]is merely about defending a monopoly and privileges that have become obso-
lete a long time ago.” (President of the DPR 2012). Hence, ‘analyzing vocabulary 
spaces’ is a strategy of vocabulary deconstruction rather than vocabulary construc-
tion. As such, this strategic pattern puts actors at the junction of enabling and con-
straining effects of vocabulary structures. On the one hand, analyzing opponents’ 
vocabulary structures enables actors in questioning the legitimacy of opponents’ 
claims by drawing attention to underlying motives. On the other hand, the decon-
struction of opponents’ vocabularies necessarily includes a perpetuation of these. 
As the results of the debate on task redivision  in German health care suggest, low 
status actors – who are less likely to ‘be heard’ in the field – risk to confirm central 
actors’ status by drawing on their vocabulary spaces rather than being able to de-
legitimate their position by dissecting their vocabulary structure.   
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Neutralizing vocabulary spaces 
The strategic pattern of ‘neutralizing vocabulary spaces’ is primarily employed by 
the G-BA from 2011 onwards. The G-BA explicitly refrained from using the terms 
‘delegation’ and ‘substitution’ and integrated both modes of task-redivision into the 
neutral term ‘transfer (of medical tasks)’. The strategy of neutralizing vocabulary 
spaces differs from ‘spanning vocabulary spaces’ insofar as it presupposes the ex-
istence of vocabulary structures that define the objects of a debate. When actors, in 
this case the G-BA, become aware of the effects of these vocabulary spaces on the 
course of the debate, they can construct alternative and overarching vocabulary 
structures that include and neutralize contested terms. The introduction of the term 
‘task transfer’, as neutral alternative to describe both modes of task-redivision,  
opened an alternative and integrative discursive space that provided nurses – as 
low-status actors of the field – with a new vocabulary structure on which to build 
their legitimization strategies without perpetuating and thereby reinforcing the an-
tagonism between ‘task delegation’ and ‘task substitution’. That this new term 
marked the center of a powerful new vocabulary structure becomes particularly 
apparent in physicians’ struggle to redefine the ‘transfer (of medical tasks)’ as rhe-
torical cover-up for a substitution of medical tasks. Similar to the spanning of vo-
cabulary spaces, the successful neutralizing of vocabulary spaces necessitates a suf-
ficient specificity of the central terms employed. While the initial attempt to span a 
vocabulary space around the term ‘cooperation’ failed, the discursive poles ‘delega-
tion’ and ‘substitution’ could successfully be replaced by the term ‘transfer (of 
medical tasks)’ as it is general enough to include both modes of task-redivision and 
sufficiently precise to clearly relate to altered modes of task division in health care. 
Yet, as illustrated above, while nursing representatives did increasingly draw on the 
new vocabulary space that had been provided by federal actors, they never fully 
distanced themselves from the dichotomy between ‘delegation’ and ‘substitution’, 
further underlining physicians’ power in defining the object of the debate.  
Vocabulary Construction as Discursive Boundary Work 
As elaborated in the theory section, the discursive demarcation of professionals 
from non-professionals and the construction of boundaries between professions 
relies on the development and maintenance of specific vocabularies that constitute 
and reflect a professions’ “space of reason” (Schildt et al., 2011). As the case study 
has shown, however, the creation of vocabularies does not only enable profession-
als to gain status by defining and defending their areas of expertise. Rather, profes-
sionals may utilize their distinctive access to certain words and the meanings they 
convey to control the discourses of a field and thereby defend their dominant posi-
tion. This was the case for physicians who repeatedly subsumed other health care 
professions under the term ‘non-medical’, deliberately ignoring the technical and 
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hierarchical differences between e.g. nurses and physiotherapists and implying that 
the only relevant distinction in the professional hierarchies of the field was between 
medicine and non-medicine. This construction of vocabularies is a particularly il-
lustrative example of Abbott and Meerabeau’s (1998: 16) observation that the 
“power of the discourse is used to control the behavior of the aspiring profession”.  
More interesting, however, is the discursive boundary work of nurses as it illus-
trates well how discursive and thus political power is not only actively acquired but 
also passively granted as participants in a debate acknowledge each other’s vocabu-
laries.  
In the present case study, the emerging pattern of vocabulary (de-)construction rep-
resents a paradox insofar as nurses contributed to physicians’ discursive power 
while explicitly trying to reduce the dominance of the medical logic (which pro-
moted the physician as sole decision-maker in clinical practice) within the field of 
German health care. While the constant usage of physicians’ prominent distinction 
between ‘(physician-relieving) delegation’ and ‘(physician-replacing) substitution’ 
may have been a tactical move to demonstrate awareness of the field-level dis-
course, it also constrained nurses’ ability to emancipate from being subordinate to 
the medical profession. Specifically, within their discursive attacks on physicians’ 
jurisdictional monopoly over specific tasks in health care (such as writing prescrip-
tions), nurses’ granted them a discursive monopoly. Their attempt to expand their 
jurisdictional boundaries at the cost of the medical profession took place within the 
vocabulary spaces provided by these high-status actors, thus making nurses’ profes-
sional project an example of what could be called ‘bounded boundary work’.  
Whether such discursively ‘bounded boundary work’ contributes to the mainte-
nance of institutional structures within professional fields remains open to further 
research. Yet, it raises the question whether low-status actors can successfully at-
tack the hierarchies of a field by allowing high-status actors to discursively deline-
ate the central objects of the debate (in this case ‘delegation’ and ‘substitution’). As 
the creation of vocabularies is an essential part of defining and interpreting (i.e. 
making sense of) reality, it appears unlikely that the reproduction of high-status 
professionals’ vocabularies will add to the decline of their dominance. A tentative 
interpretation of the outcome in this case also suggests that nurses’ attempts to ex-
pand their task spheres were of limited success as even over a year after the respec-
tive directive had been passed, no pilot projects have been initiated.  
This kind of bounded boundary work has interesting implications for the study of 
institutional work in general as it gives a more nuanced understanding on the differ-
ent kinds of embeddedness with which institutional workers – in this case, profes-
sionals – may be confronted (cf. Garud et al., 2007). While nurses were well able to 
imagine alternative institutional arrangements, they were obviously either not able 
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or not willing to provide alternative vocabulary spaces to proactively shape the dis-
cussion about altered task divisions between nurses and physicians. Accordingly, 
institutionalists’ notion that low-status actors’ institutional creativity – which make 
them more likely to imagine and pursue alternative institutional arrangements 
(Battilana et al., 2009) – is not necessarily reflected in the means they use to pro-
mote institutional change.  
4.3.7 Limitations and Conclusion 
This study raised the question on how actors make use of vocabulary structures to 
promote or inhibit institutional change in professional fields. As exploratory single 
case study in a specific context, the findings of my study are, of course, of limited 
generalizability. Further, while this study could show that nurses, as the low-status 
actors within the discourse on task-redivision in German health care, relied much 
on the vocabulary structures provided by the high-status of the field, their motives 
remain ambiguous. Further research should thus focus more on when and why low-
status actors draw on the vocabulary spaces provided by high-status actors. Specifi-
cally, while this study provided first insights on how low-status professionals may 
reinforce given power structures by reflecting these in their ‘bounded’ use of dis-
cursive means, future research should examine in more detail whether low-status 
actors intentionally restrict their use of novel vocabularies and try to ‘borrow’ legit-
imacy by drawing on high-status actors’ vocabulary structures or whether such dis-
cursive constraints result from a lack of reflectiveness. In the case examined here, 
both of these mechanisms may have been present: Nurses may have unintentionally 
reinforced physicians’ power in defining the discourses and meaning systems in 
German health care when dissecting their arguments. Yet, they may have strategi-
cally aligned their vocabularies with the vocabulary spaces provided by federal ac-
tors who – just as nurses – were interested in a less physician-centered health care 
system. However, as these interpretations have to remain tentative for now, more 
research on actors’ motives behind the (de-)construction of specific vocabularies is 
needed. Similarly, more comparative research is needed to uncover the effects of 
using other actors’ vocabulary structures on the successful promotion (or preven-
tion) of institutional change. Other research on intra-organizational institutional 
changes in health care has already pointed out that a professions’ use of the “tools 
and techniques of its oppressors” (Thorne, 2002: 23) may be a promising strategy to 
gain or defend their status. However, it remains open whether this finding also per-
tains to the use of vocabularies as subtle, but powerful building blocks of social 
reality.  
Despite the aforementioned limitations, this study draws attention to the enabling 
and constraining effects of vocabularies as an instrument of institutional work. Spe-
cifically, the findings suggest that the strategy of actively creating vocabulary struc-
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tures to manipulate institutionalized meaning systems is not equally accessible to all 
actors of a field. This may lead to the paradox situation of institutional agents who 
challenge the structural hierarchy of a field while perpetuating the discursive hier-
archy.  
Overall, the results of the case study expose three distinct strategic modes of vo-
cabulary construction with the creative and original strategies of vocabulary con-
struction being mostly associated with high-status actors. While the strategies of 
spanning and neutralizing vocabulary spaces were primarily employed by federal 
actors and physicians both of whom obtain a high field-level status, nurses as low 
status actors of the field mostly relied on the strategy of analyzing the vocabulary 
spaces provided by physicians. By drawing on these vocabulary spaces, nurses, 
although strongly disagreeing with physicians on the content level, confirmed exist-
ing power relations in the field. In sum, this study provides a new perspective on 
the discursive struggles that entail institutional change by drawing attention to the 
importance of vocabulary construction in political struggles. Whenever actors ac-
quire interpretive control over a debate’s key words, they constrain opponents by 
providing the object (i.e. the ‘what’) of a debate. Hence, by spanning or neutralizing 
vocabulary spaces, actors can dominate discursive struggles regardless of whether 
their explicit legitimization accounts are being considered appropriate.  
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5 Professionals and Organization-Level 
Change  
Early neo-institutional theory has largely limited professionals’ role in institutional 
change on the organization-level to being enablers of convergent change. Profes-
sionals were conceptualized as little more than vehicles through which norms and 
values diffused into organizational structures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Institu-
tional dynamics that occurred within the realm of organizations appeared to be of 
little interest to institutional researchers for a long time. Yet, as elaborated above, 
organizations provide important arenas in which professionals actively promote or 
prevent institutional change while they enact their professional and organizational 
roles (see section 3.4.2). Given that the autonomous professional practice is on the 
decline and employment in large organizations has become the rule rather than the 
exception within professional work (Leicht & Fennell, 1997; Suddaby et al., 2009; 
von Nordenflycht, 2010), much attention has been given to how professional core 
values are affected by professionals’ increasing organizational embeddedness 
(Sorensen & Sorensen, 1974; Toren, 1975; Wallace, 1995), how professionals are 
to be managed (Conrad et al., 1996; Parkin, 2009; Raelin, 1986, 1989; Sorensen & 
Iedema, 2008), and how professionals resist managerial control (Armstrong, 2002; 
Pieterse et al., 2012). This focus on the dichotomy between professionalism and 
managerialism has reinforced the notion that professionals’ institutional work on 
the organizational level is often owed to their attempts to restrict managerial influ-
ence on their practice. Also, much research has focused on the interprofessional 
dynamics that result from the close collaboration and collocation of different pro-
fessional groups within organizations (Chreim, 2012; Currie & White, 2012; Dent, 
2002; Mitchell et al., 2011). Similarly to the control-resistance-paradigm that has 
informed the study of managerial influence in professional organizations, the dy-
namics between professional groups in organizations are often studied with a focus 
on inter-professional competition and conflict (Apesoa-Varano, 2013; Hall, 2005; 
Kirkpatrick et al., 2011). Research on professionals’ institutional work within or-
ganizations has thus been occupied with the defense of privileged roles against the 
influence of managers and other professionals, often reducing institutional dynam-
ics within an organization to struggles between two antagonistic groups.  
Accordingly, this chapter sets out to give a more nuanced understanding on when, 
why, and how professionals exert institutional work within their organizational con-
text. Specifically, this chapter seeks to move away from the ‘resistance’-centered 
perspective of professionals’ institutional work that is rooted in the assumption that 
professionals constantly struggle to defend their professional role against usurpation 
in the hierarchical systems of organizations. While acknowledging the critical in-
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fluence of their professional role on professionals’ agency in organizations, I want 
to provide a more balanced view on how organizational context – as a sphere in 
which the political and the practical meet – shapes professionals’ involvement in 
institutional change.  
As in the previous chapter, I will first provide further insights on current develop-
ments in German health care before expanding on the theoretical background and 
providing an original study to address selected gaps in literature. Hence, in the first 
section, I will elaborate on typical changes in German health care organizations, 
specifically hospitals, that occurred against the background of marketization and 
increasing state-involvement in the field (see section 4.1). Here, I will give some 
short insights on how these changes affected professionals’ roles in their organiza-
tion and how they fostered professionals’ institutional agency within their organiza-
tion. This concise overview on the general changes that characterized German hos-
pitals over the last decade will provide empirical background information to the 
study presented in the last section of this chapter. In the second section, I will dis-
cuss and integrate findings from extant empirical studies to show that professionals’ 
institutional work on the organizational level is more contextual and pragmatic than 
their abstract, political work on the field-level. Here, I will focus on when and why 
professionals work towards or against institutional change in their organizational 
roles, structures, and practices. In particular, I will elaborate on how professional 
and organizational roles may interact to induce reactive and prospective agency. 
Further, I will discuss how professionals leverage the resources available in their 
organizational context (e.g. social relationships with potential allies) to promote or 
resist institutional change before identifying major gaps in the literature on profes-
sionals’ intraorganizational institutional work. The final and main part of this chap-
ter comprises a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative study on change projects that 
promoted new task spheres for nursing professionals in the internal medical de-
partments of German university hospitals.  This study will add to current literature 
by focusing on when and why professionals are open rather than resistant towards 
institutional change, identifying three distinct constellations of organizational 
boundary conditions that led nursing professionals’ to react openly towards changes 
in institutionalized role divisions.  
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5.1 Setting: Increased Managerial Control and Blurred 
Professional Boundaries in German Hospitals 
With increasing economic pressures and new regulatory developments, German 
health care organizations – specifically inpatient facilities like hospitals – had to re-
evaluate their goals, structures, and practices to ensure organizational survival.  
One of the most striking changes in German hospitals is the proliferation of mana-
gerialism as an intraorganizational answer to the cost pressures that had been 
brought about by the new, prospective reimbursement system. While this change is 
probably best illustrated by the relative increase in privately-owned hospitals (in-
cluding ownership changes even in large university hospitals)
27
, that spread the idea 
of hospitals as revenue-generating firms, managerial techniques became more and 
more influential throughout the hospital sector and regardless of ownership struc-
ture (Bär, 2011; Schrappe, 2009). As Dent, Howorth, Mueller, and Preuschoft 
(2004: 733) find in their study on the modernization of a German hospital network, 
German hospital archetypes changed from the archetype of the “Public Sector Hos-
pital” to the “Public Sector Corporation”. This shift implied changes in the (i) inter-
pretive schemes, (ii) systems, processes and practices and (iii) structures of hospi-
tals (ibd: 733). In short, the logic constellations that guide hospitals have changed, 
translating the rise of the market and state logic on the field-level into a rise in man-
agerialism on the hospital-level.  
In contrast to other Western countries in which health care organizations commonly 
adopted more radical restructuration approaches, German hospitals are still reflect-
ing the long tradition of medical dominance that becomes increasingly questioned 
but is still notably informing hospital structures. In particular, physicians often re-
main in central positions within the hospital hierarchy as German law defines hos-
pitals as organizations which are under constant medical direction (§ 107 Abs. 1, 
No. 2 SGB V). Chief physicians, for example, have remained the sole directors of 
medical departments and still enjoy considerable decision autonomy over their de-
partments’ structures and processes (Jacobs, Marcon, & Witt, 2004). Accordingly, 
Kuhlmann et al. (2013: 1) describe the new modes of governance that characterize 
German hospitals as “partly integrated control”, meaning that managerial and pro-
fessional governance are being combined. While the medical professional logic 
informs the structures and practices for quality and safety control on the operational 
level, physicians’ influence on the top management level is constrained as German 
hospitals typically exhibit a collegial top management structure that is shared be-
tween the medical director, the nursing director, and the administrative director 
                                                 
27 Between 1991 and 2013 the share of privately-owned hospitals increased from 14,8  percent to 34,8 percent 
(Destatis, 2013). In 2005, the university hospitals of Gießen and Marburg were merged and sold to the ‘Rhön-
Klinikum’ corporation (Hanschur & Böhlke, 2009). 
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(Jacobs et al., 2004: 340). Additionally, cost control and accountability measures 
now mostly lie within the responsibilities of non-medical managers (Kuhlmann et 
al., 2013: 8). As medical work is increasingly scrutinized by non-physicians with 
regard to its quality and cost-effectiveness, the dichotomy between medical auton-
omy and managerial control has become a common source of conflict (Dent et al., 
2004: 738) and research shows that bureaucratic structures and perceived lack of 
autonomy are major causes for lower levels of work satisfaction among German 
clinicians when compared to their American counterparts (Janus et al., 2009). Yet, 
the diffusion of managerial techniques in hospitals also evokes tensions between 
administrative staff and non-medical health care professionals. Nurses, for example, 
have been reported to perceive the introduction of financial incentives into their 
salary system to be patronizing as it questions the inherently high quality standards 
of their professional work (Janning, 2008). Overall, the rise of managerialism in 
hospitals – both a symptom and the local instantiation of increasing political pres-
sures towards efficiency and accountability – led to an intraorganizational replica-
tion of field-level struggles between representatives of the market and the state log-
ic and health care professionals.  
However, the duality between managerialism and professionalism in German health 
care organization can hardly be reduced to struggles between different organiza-
tional groups. Professionals also experience intra-individual role tensions and am-
biguities as they are increasingly expected to fulfill managerial roles.  
The question on how German health care professionals, physicians in particular, are 
supposed to deal with the increasing relevance of managerial roles has received 
ambiguous answers. Often, practitioner literature encourages physicians to actively 
engage in management as the coordination and control of medical work would oth-
erwise be left to non-medical administrative staff, which would further reduce peer-
control and medical autonomy in hospitals (Ekkernkamp, 2011). Accordingly, re-
cent practitioner publications are much concerned with the specifics of additional 
managerial training for medical managers (Tecklenburg, 2011; Tecklenburg & 
Liebeneiner, 2010) and provide examples for useful managerial techniques to sup-
port physicians in their role as both medical professionals and managers (Dick, 
Krieg, & Schreiber, 2002). While formal managerial education and the tactical ac-
quisition of managerial techniques is evidently most relevant for physicians in the 
executive ranges of hospitals, the role of the ‘medical manager’ has also – though to 
a lesser extent – gained importance in the lower ranges of the organizational hierar-
chy, reaching down to the operational core of hospitals. Currently, health care pro-
fessionals are not only required to acquiesce to non-medical managers’ prescrip-
tions about the (cost-)efficiency of their work, but are increasingly expected to de-
velop a managerial perspective on their work (von Eiff, 2001). These new role ex-
pectations put health care professionals on all levels of the hospital hierarchy in a 
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situation in which they are ‘caught between two stools’ as they have to maintain 
professional integrity while contributing to the economic survival of their organiza-
tion. Consequently, literature reports mixed reactions among German health care 
professionals regarding the infusion of their organizational role with typical mana-
gerial elements.  
Jacobs et al. (2004), for example, find in their study on clinicians’ access to and 
interest in cost and performance information, that German hospital physicians are 
clearly interested in cost information and consider cost information to be an im-
portant factor for their clinical decision-making (e.g. by weighing different treat-
ment options) and their decisions on investments in medical equipment. Further 
evidence from interview data shows that clinicians have accepted their managerial 
role as a necessity against the background of field-level pressures and are willing to 
take on responsibility for their organizations’ economic survival. As one medical 
director stated, “[t]he medical staff think that the new DRG system is very compli-
cated but we must learn it. If we don’t learn the system it will be dangerous and our 
hospital will go broke” (Jacobs et al., 2004: 344). On the other side, the managerial 
role of health care professionals has been declared the cause of an “identity crisis” 
among physicians and the proliferation of the managerial perspective in hospitals 
has been depicted as “Trojan horse [that] carries economics into the daily medical 
work” (Woopen, 2009: 181)28.  
Overall, health care professionals’ reaction towards their double role as profession-
als and managers within their organization can probably be best summarized as the 
acceptance of a necessary evil. While professionals still remain skeptical over ad-
ministrative staff’s rising involvement in their work (Encke, 2008; Lesinski-
Schiedat, 2007), they seem to acknowledge the inevitability of increasing manage-
rialism in their working context. As Leschke (2013: 315) explains for the profes-
sional group of physicians: “The doctor, naturally, feels impelled to consider the 
efficiency of his work, which often causes remorse. Still, he gives in. Also in his own 
interest”. 
Besides being forced to balance professional and managerial roles, German health 
care professionals are increasingly confronted with new types of organizational ar-
rangements that foster the development of new roles which provide professionals 
with new opportunities to exert influence in their organizations. The general strive 
for efficiency, effectiveness, and quality in health care brought forth process-
oriented structures that transcended the strict division between ambulatory and in-
patient care and integrated several medical subspecialties (Mühlbacher, Nübling, & 
Niebling, 2003). With the rise of integrated health care centers (Knieps & 
                                                 
28 This and the following quote have been translated from German by the author. 
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Amelung, 2010), new administrative roles emerged to secure the coordination of 
patient- and disease-centered care across organizational and professional bounda-
ries. The proliferation of ‘case managers’ in German hospitals represents a typical 
example of these new administrative roles that enabled health care professionals to 
acquire new sources of authority. The role of a case manager in health care general-
ly comprises the “managing, coordinating, facilitating, and expediting patient care” 
(Carr, 2009: 333) and puts the involved professionals in a brokerage position be-
tween patients, physicians, and other health care professionals. In line with the 
global spread of advanced nursing practice that promotes more responsible and 
more managerial nursing roles (Sheer & Wong, 2008), case management in Ger-
man hospitals is typically exerted by specially trained nurses, increasing their lever-
age in the coordination of clinical care (Ewers, 1997; Wendt, 2012). Specifically, 
by acquiring the role of case managers, nurses do not only contribute to the effi-
ciency and effectiveness of service provision in their organization but also gain ac-
cess to an important position in the organizational hierarchy. Being able to coordi-
nate, schedule, and synchronize medical services partly reverses the traditional 
power relations between nurses and physicians, and thus resonates well with nurs-
es’ professional project on the field-level (see section 4.1). Accordingly, while 
medical professionals still represent the dominant professional group within Ger-
man hospitals, the focus on process efficiency induced structural changes that cre-
ated ‘power niches’ for non-medical professionals.  
Besides creating opportunities for low-status professionals like nurses to gain pow-
er through formal authority, the emergence of new administrative roles in hospitals 
also provided physicians with opportunities to buffer their work against managerial 
influence and gain strategic power in their organizations. As internal quality man-
agement systems became legally mandatory in 2004 (§ 135a SGB V), many hospi-
tals began to introduce formally defined and certifiable quality management sys-
tems such as the models provided by the European Foundation for Quality Man-
agement (EFQM), the  DIN EN ISO 9001:2000 norm, or the Cooperation for 
Transparency and Quality in Health Care (KTQ). These formal quality manage-
ment systems include the appointment of quality managers, an organizational role 
that is commonly fulfilled by clinical professionals who are familiar with the work-
ing processes on the operational level as well as capable of defining and controlling 
appropriate indicators of service quality. Often, it is physicians who work as full-
time or part-time quality managers
29
 as the role of the quality manager in health 
care presupposes sufficient clinical experience to be able to mediate between the 
                                                 
29 While quality managers in health care do are not generally required to have  a professional background in 
medicine, it is not uncommon that this role is filled by physicians (Blumenstock, Streuf, & Selbmann, 2005). 
Some specific quality managers, such as quality managers for blood transfusion (Kaiser, 2006), do, however, 
have to be medical doctors with a specific amount of clinical experience. 
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administrative and the clinical staff of a hospital (Haust-Woggon, 2011). Against 
the background of the critical importance of service quality in health care – both 
from a normative as well as from an economic and a regulatory perspective – quali-
ty managers occupy a strategically important position in the organizational hierar-
chy. They ensure compliance with critical quality indicators and regulatory norms, 
evaluating hospital doctors’ performance as peers while reporting to the hospital 
management as part of the administrative elite. The control of hospital quality man-
agement by medical professionals thus provides an illustrative example of how 
physicians strategically exploited an increase in administrative positions to protect 
medical dominance within the German hospital sector (cf. Kirkpatrick et al., 2011). 
While the accountability and efficiency turn in German health care has notably re-
duced the direct influence of clinical professionals on the structures and practices of 
their organizations, physicians seem to have adapted well to the increasing im-
portance of managerial roles as new sources of power in hospitals.  
However, the rise of managerialism in German hospitals did not only bring about a 
greater variety of administrative roles but also affected professional role divisions 
on the operational level. As questions about the most effective and efficient ‘skill 
mix’ among the health care workforce arose, more and more hospitals began to re-
evaluate the division of labor between medical and non-medical health care profes-
sionals in clinical practice (Aiken, Clarke, & Sloane, 2002). Some privately-owned 
hospitals even went so far as to introduce new occupations to achieve an optimal 
skill-mix that followed the example of industrial work specialization. As these new 
job profiles created additional competition for members of established professions, 
lacked state accreditation, and fostered the fragmentation of medical care, they 
evoked much criticism from both nursing and physician groups (Dielmann, 2010; 
Harder et al., 2008) and eventually remained a rather marginal phenomenon in the 
German hospital sector.  
Yet, the strive for an efficient division of labor in health care also led to a re-
evaluation of role divisions among the established health care professions. Against 
the background of doctors shortage and the costliness of medical work, more and 
more hospitals have started to implement structured models of task delegation from 
physicians to nurses (Heil, 2014). While health care regulation did not allow medi-
cal tasks to be fully transferred to nurses until 2012
30
, several pilot projects of task 
redivision , primarily in university hospitals, bear witness of the practical appeal of 
                                                 
30 Before the publication of a G-BA guideline for the transfer of medical tasks to non-medical health care 
professionals (G-BA, 2014b), the  redivision of tasks between physicians and nurses was only allowed in the 
form of a case-based delegation. This included autonomy in the exertion of the respective task while decision-
rights officially remained with the doctors. Yet, as will be illustrated in the empirical study in section 5.3, 
delegation projects in hospitals usually included a general transfer of specific task bundles rather than being a 
strictly case-based delegation of task execution.  
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enhancing nurses’ roles in the provision of health care services in hospitals (Hänsch 
et al., 2010; Rausch, Schäper, & Rentmeister, 2008; Schramm, 2007). Study find-
ings underline that a redivision  of tasks between physicians, nurses, and other non-
medical health care professionals may improve critical quality indicators like pa-
tient satisfaction and continuity of therapy (Meyenburg-Altwarg & Tecklenburg, 
2010) and holds significant potential to increase the overall efficiency of service 
provision in health care (Lussi, 2012; Neiheiser & Offermanns, 2008; Offermanns, 
2008). However, despite its positive effects on process efficiency and quality of 
care, the redefinition of health care professionals’ task spheres remains a challeng-
ing endeavor for hospitals.  
While assuming medical tasks resonates well with nurses’ professional project on 
the field-level as it opens opportunities to demonstrate and expand the professional 
qualification of nurses, the delegation of medical tasks has been found to increase 
nurses’ perceived workload (Meyenburg-Altwarg & Tecklenburg, 2010: 28). In 
addition, legal and task uncertainty are commonly discussed as main challenges 
when implementing new modes of task division between nurses and physicians 
(Achterfeld, 2014). While additional training and formal agreements to restrict 
nurses’ scope of liability are relatively easy to arrange in large hospitals, changing 
the social relations between different professional groups is rarely without struggle. 
Hospital physicians were generally open towards transferring routine-tasks to non-
medical professionals, however remained cautious about the potential implications 
of comprehensive task redivision  projects for the professional hierarchies between 
members of the medical and the non-medical health care professions (Heil, 2014; 
Klakow-Franck, 2010). For nurses, task delegation has been discussed ambiguously 
as both an opportunity for empowerment and a source of stress due to role insecuri-
ty and excessive work strain (cf. Tewes, 2014: 217f.). Given the potential economic 
benefits of a task redivision  between physicians and nurses and its ambiguous im-
plications for nurses’ professional role in an actual work context, it seems important 
to investigate when and why hospital nurses are willing to accept changes in their 
assigned task spheres.  
Accordingly, the study presented in section 5.3 will examine how organizational 
boundary conditions and characteristics of change projects interact to induce open-
ness towards new task spheres among nursing professionals. As in the previous 
chapter, I will first discuss extant empirical findings on professionals’ institutional 
work within their organizations and identify gaps in the literature before addressing 
these gaps with a self-contained empirical study. 
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5.2 Theory: Professionals’ Role in Organization-Level 
Change 
Within organizations, professionals exert institutional work both collectively 
through their respective professional or hierarchical groups (e.g. Kellogg, 2012; 
Kellogg et al., 2006) and individually in their roles as managers or employees (e.g. 
Battilana, 2011). While the technological and market environments by which or-
ganizations are characterized restrict professionals’ potential to pursue macro-
political agendas within their organization, professional organizations have been 
shown to provide an important sphere for agency that may help advance profes-
sional projects on the field-level. As elaborated in section 3.2.2, organizations may 
serve as springboard for the professional projects of subordinate professional 
groups but may also be conducive in reinforcing the dominant status of a profession 
by providing an additional system of hierarchization.  
Yet, professionals’ engagement in institutional work on the organization-level rare-
ly occurs as an explicit attempt to promote their professional project on the field-
level but rather results from more immediate dynamics inherent to the multiple, 
sometimes conflicting, roles that professionals have to fulfill when they become 
members of an organization (see section 3.4.2). Antecedents of professionals’ insti-
tutional work on the organization level can thus not be clearly categorized along the 
dichotomy of ‘opportunities and threats’ to their profession. Much rather, profes-
sionals’ institutional work at the organization level is induced by tensions and am-
biguities between professional and organizational roles.  
Antecedents: When and Why Professionals engage in Organization-Level Change 
As professional organizations represent contexts in which actors with diverse pro-
fessional backgrounds have to collaborate in ‘forced unity’ to cooperatively secure 
organizational survival, tensions between different groups of actors and their re-
spective roles are common (Apesoa-Varano, 2013; Hall, 2005; Kirkpatrick et al., 
2011; Mitchell et al., 2011; Salhani & Coulter, 2009). Mostly, these tensions result 
from diverging ideas on which logics are to be integrated when defining organiza-
tional goals, strategies, and structures (Coombs & Ersser, 2004; Raelin, 1986; 
Snelgrove & Hughes, 2000). As noted above (see also section 3.2.2), research has 
focused much on how professionals engage in maintenance work by resisting the 
control of their work by managers. Scholars have emphasized that the “relationship 
between professionals and managers [is no longer] an antagonistic one” (Dent, 
2003: 108), implying that professionals slowly open up to managerialism as inher-
ent element of their working context and get increasingly involved in management 
activities (see also section 3.2.2). Still, tensions between management and profes-
sionals remain a dominant theme in the study on when and why professionals exert 
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institutional agency within the context of their organization. For example, Waring 
and Currie’s (2009) ethnographic study of the implementation of patient safety sys-
tems in an English hospital shows that physicians are likely to engage in institution-
al work when they perceive managerial structures and practices to constrain the 
enactment of their professional role. While physicians’ role as organizational em-
ployees would imply acquiescence to formal organizational structures such as risk 
management systems, Waring and Currie (2009) find that hospital physicians – 
even though they agreed on the general importance of risk management in medical 
practice – were unwilling to accept managerial approaches to organizational safety. 
Their critical stance towards the implementation of a critical-incident-reporting sys-
tem as means of knowledge- and risk management primarily rested on physicians’ 
rejection of having their work codified and assessed by non-peers. As Waring and 
Currie (2009: 772) point out, the reasons for physicians’ negative reaction towards 
formal knowledge management systems lie in the importance of exclusive and im-
plicit knowledge for physicians’ power both within and beyond their organization. 
Generally, professional power is based on the widely shared perception that profes-
sional knowledge is tacit, embedded in practice, and that its successful application 
requires specific practical experience (Abbott, 1991). These characteristics of pro-
fessional knowledge make it largely inaccessible to laypeople and thus justify pro-
fessionals’ privileged position in organizations and in society as a whole. Hence, 
any attempt of external codification and control of professional knowledge poses a 
potential threat to professionals’ main source of power (cf. Adler & Kwon, 2013).   
Consequently, Waring and Currie (2009: 766f.) report that physicians motivated 
their critical stance towards the new incident-reporting-system by emphasizing the 
inappropriateness of the managerial perspective for assessing and improving risk in 
medical practice. A closer look at the findings reveals that physicians provided both 
pragmatic and normative arguments for their rejection of the new risk management 
system. Pragmatic arguments related mainly to the usefulness of the proposed sys-
tem for improving patient safety. The centralized risk-management-system com-
prised the accumulation of knowledge on patient safety through standardized re-
porting forms. Each department was supposed to use these forms to routinely report 
safety-relevant incidents and was further expected to employ standard procedures 
when communicating with the risk management department. Risk officers would 
then “translate and re-code reported information into a format that aligned with the 
assumptions and expectations of the national patient safety agenda” (Waring & 
Currie, 2009: 763) which included the codification of free-text narratives provided 
by the clinical staff into distinct risk variables. Physicians perceived this extensive 
gathering of information and the interpretation of clinical incidents by risk officers 
who lacked medical knowledge to be a pointless accumulation of data. They im-
plied that the interpretation of data by non-medical risk officers would be flawed 
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due to their lack of technical expertise and their recommendations for service im-
provement would consequently be of little value for actual medical practice. As 
illustrated by interview data, physicians considered the managerially-lead incident-
reporting-system to be little more than a display of bureaucratic rationality, a simple 
“collecting [of] data for the sake of it” (ibd.: 766). However, the mere perception of 
redundancy of the centralized risk-management-system was not the only reason for 
physicians to engage in institutional maintenance work. The fact that management 
acquired significant amounts of data about medical practice and inferred their own 
conclusions about the quality of physicians’ work evoked normative considerations 
about the intentions of the risk management department. One the one hand, physi-
cians felt that the reporting system was intrusive to medical practice, a “big brother 
thing”, as one physician called it (ibd.:766). On the other hand, physicians believed 
that a system of mutual reporting – particularly one that heavily relied on filling out 
standardized forms – was incommensurable with the logic of medical professional-
ism which promoted informal peer control. As a consequence, the medical staff 
largely refrained from reporting safety-relevant incidents and thereby effectively 
undermined managerial plans. However, with rising public, political, and organiza-
tional pressures towards the implementation of structured systems to ensure patient 
safety, the simple rejection of these systems proved to be a form of maintenance 
work that was “difficult to sustain” (ibd.: 767). Physicians thus began to develop 
more elaborate and less openly conflictual strategies for maintaining the dominance 
of the medical professional logic in their organization. Overall, Waring and Currie 
(2009: 770f.) identify three distinct strategies through which physicians were able 
to buffer their work from managerial control. In the department of obstetrics and 
gynaecology, physicians engaged in “co-optation”, appropriating control of the risk 
management system by integrating the new managerial methods of quality control 
into their existing local and physician-led procedures of quality assurance. The de-
partments of rehabilitation and acute medicine engaged in an “adaptation” of risk 
management. Specifically, physicians in these departments developed an alternative 
incident-reporting system that allowed for anonymous reports, was less complicat-
ed and bureaucratic, and promoted the collection of data by a central physician in-
stead of a non-medical risk officer. Through the development of this relatively ad-
vanced alternative system, physicians from these departments could easily justify 
their non-participation in the central system as patient safety was obviously well 
accounted for. Lastly, the department of anaesthesia was able to fully circumvent 
managerial intervention as this department had already had a voluntary reporting 
system in place for more than five years. Here, physicians could refer to the proven 
superiority of their system and could thus refrain from participation in the manage-
rially-led risk management system.  
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Two points from Waring and Currie’s (2009) study are particularly noteworthy 
when trying to understand professionals’ institutional work within the context of 
their organizations. First, while the authors provide an illustrative case for the well-
researched tension between management and professionals, they also show that 
managerial and professional ideas of appropriate organizational structure and prac-
tices do not necessarily diverge. With doctors stating that “the safety of patient care 
is paramount” to them (ibd.: 766), Waring and Currie (2009) uncover a situation in 
which the rejection of managerial systems is clearly associated with professionals’ 
fear of losing power rather than with fundamentally different ideas on how hospi-
tals should be designed. While potential loss of status and power are a common 
antecedent of any actors’ institutional work (professionals and non-professionals 
alike) (cf. Battilana, 2006, 2011), the case study presented here draws attention to 
the political dimension of professionals’ institutional work within their organiza-
tions. Specifically, physicians’ reaction towards the central risk management sys-
tem can be viewed as a local instantiation of the basic principles of their profession-
al project. As professional power is based on the control of a specific area of expert 
knowledge that allows for the definition and exclusion of ‘outsiders’, professionals 
are careful to maintain the impression that their knowledge base is inaccessible to 
non-professionals. If managerially-led risk management systems had uncovered the 
potential codifiability of professional knowledge, physicians would have faced the 
risk of being ‘manageable’ like regular employees and the medical profession could 
have lost a major base for the justification of their extensive professional autonomy. 
Thus, while professionals have generally adapted well to practicing in large organi-
zations (see also section 3.2.2), they still resist managerial control when it bears the 
risk of their profession being ‘de-mystified’.  Secondly, Waring and Currie’s (2009) 
findings underline that even if professionals’ institutional work is induced by a ste-
reotypical tension between professional autonomy and managerial intervention, 
their response strategies are contingent and embedded in context. While Waring 
and Currie (2009: 773) attribute differences in institutional maintenance strategies 
primarily to physicians’ different medical subspecialties, they also point out that 
professionals’ institutional work needs to be studied against the background of its 
embeddedness in “local, organizational and institutional levels”. As I will further 
elaborate on in the course of this section, this insight is particularly important to 
fully understand professionals’ institutional work as situated practice and to avoid a 
conceptual over-politicization of professionals’ agency within their organizations.  
While the dichotomy between managerial control and professional autonomy as a 
cause of professionals’ institutional work has become a classic tale in the sociology 
of the professions (Leicht & Fennell, 1997; Leicht et al., 2009; Reed, 1996) and – 
more recently – also in institutional research (Singh & Jayanti, 2013), profession-
als’ institutional work may also be induced by tensions between different profes-
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sional groups. Here, institutional work is not an attempt to sustain professionalism 
as basic principle of organizing but to promote or defend a specific kind of profes-
sional logic. However, like the conflicts between management and employed pro-
fessionals, interprofessional tensions often play out as struggles about who is to be 
in control and whose definitions of reality prevail within an organization. A promi-
nent and frequently cited example of intraorganizational tensions between different 
professional groups are conflicts between the medical- and the non-medical clinical 
staff in hospitals (Coombs & Ersser, 2004). While holitistic and efficient patient 
care is crucially dependent on close interprofessional collaboration (Keshet et al., 
2013), professional roles often supersede shared organizational roles as clinical em-
ployees, resulting in efforts to replicate or undermine the interprofessional hierar-
chies on the field-level (Sanders & Harrison, 2008).  
Organizational and professional role differences may become particularly relevant 
when the structural context of an organization changes. This is the case when e.g. 
technological or process innovations are being introduced. Like technological jolts 
on the field-level, the implementation of new structures and technologies can give 
impetus to professionals’ institutional work since they may shift power bases. This 
is the case because their roles are embedded in and depended on the structures of an 
organization (Kitchener, 2000; Leicht & Fennell, 1997; Leicht et al., 1995). Organ-
izational innovations such as the introduction of new technologies may decrease the 
taken-for-grantedness of organizational structures, including role divisions and pro-
fessional hierarchies, as they often render existing expertise obsolete and thus open 
a new space of expertise which professionals can leverage to gain status (cf. 
Suddaby & Viale, 2011). While within organizations, professional groups who 
compete for dominance on the field-level are likely to achieve ‘pragmatic truces’ 
that allow for effective collaboration (cf. Nelson & Winter, 1982), organizational 
innovation may destabilize these agreed-upon role divisions and hierarchies. At the 
very least, organizational innovations will ‘activate’ the cognitive and normative 
orientations against which different professional groups make sense of new struc-
tures and practices (Ferlie et al., 2005; Fitzgerald, Ferlie, Wood, & Hawkins, 2002). 
As different interpretations of reality are likely to cause tension between profes-
sional groups, innovations in professional organizations are commonly accompa-
nied by struggles over interpretive authority as different professional groups place 
their claims of expertise on the respective area of innovation.  
An example of how the implementation of technological and process innovations 
becomes both a trigger and an object around which different health care profession-
als seek to establish their claims of interpretive authority is provided by Ferlie et al. 
(2005). The authors study the implementation of eight different kinds of innova-
tions in health care organizations and find that ideological boundaries between pro-
fessional groups critically affect their implementation success. Two cases illustrate 
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particularly well how organizational innovations may trigger institutional work 
among professionals. The first case is the implementation of a new computer-
supported system to manage anticoagulation service provision to prevent strokes in 
acute care settings. Ferlie et al. (2005: 124) describe this case as a negative outlier 
case since this innovation never spread beyond the pilot project stage. Here, a com-
plex system of inter-professional boundaries and the maintenance of homogenous 
cognitive and normative communities played a key role in the non-spread of the 
innovation. While the implementation of the new system involved “hospital-based 
cardiologists, haematologists, and interns on the one side, and doctors and senior 
nurses in primary care and new professional groups of computer systems designers 
and Health Services researchers on the other” (ibd.: 125), the conflict between phy-
sicians and nurses shows the most typical pattern of institutional work among 
health care professionals: The new system required a shift of administrative respon-
sibility from interns to nurses that would have implied a new role for nurses. How-
ever, in the respective case, the responsible senior nurse “remained isolated” (ibd.: 
125) and thus unable to promote the new system. The reason for this lack of coop-
eration can be found in the maintenance work of physicians who replicated the typ-
ical medicine-nursing hierarchy of the field by remaining doubtful about a nurses’ 
competence to support this new technology. A second case in Ferlie et al.’s (2005) 
study that illustrates well how organizational innovations may motivate profession-
als to exert institutional agency is the introduction of a new service delivery system 
for the care of women in childbirth (ibd.: 120). Specifically, this innovation com-
prised a re-evaluation of risk in childbirth and encouraged the provision of more 
information to patients. While this innovation showed a generally more positive 
outcome than the case of computer-aided anticoagulation provision, it was still 
widely contested. In particular, midwifes’ and obstetricians’ diverging stances to-
wards the medicalization of childbirth (ibd.: 128) caused these professional groups 
to either work towards the maintenance of medical dominance or towards new role 
divisions within childbirth services. While obstetricians argued that, due to ambig-
uous scientific evidence, risk in childbirth is not easy to define (and thus should 
remain mainly in the sphere of medical specialists), midwifes emphasized the im-
portance of the mothers’ wishes and the lack of evidence for a superior outcome 
quality in ‘medicalized’ births (ibd.: 127). Ferlie et al. (2005: 128) summarize their 
findings by pointing to “social […] and […] cognitive or epistemological bounda-
ries between and within professions” that inhibit the diffusion of innovation within 
multiprofessional organizations such as hospitals. While the focus of their study is 
not explicitly on professionals’ institutional work in the narrow sense, it holds some 
valuable insights on when and why professionals promote or hamper institutional 
change within their organization. On the one hand, organizational innovations may 
directly challenge given role divisions between professional groups, threatening 
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privileges or providing opportunities for status increase (as illustrated by both the 
case of computer-aided anticoagulation and the case of childbirth). In these cases, 
organizational innovation induces institutional work as a means to gain or maintain 
intra-organizational status. On the other hand, organizational innovations may dis-
rupt given patterns of collaboration and depict an object of which organizational 
actors make sense against the background of their roles. Here, organizational inno-
vation brings diverging interpretations of reality to the surface and may lead profes-
sionals to engage in institutional work in an attempt to maintain the relevance of 
their cognitive and normative frameworks within their organization (as illustrated 
by the concept of ‘risk’ in the case of childbirth services). In short, as any innova-
tion necessitates interpretation, new technologies, structures, or practices may not 
only evoke intentional and projective attempts to gain power over other actors but 
may also induce less political institutional work in the sense of applying and de-
fending specific, ‘professional worldviews’ within the organization.  
In his well-cited mixed-method study on the structuration processes in radiology 
departments that occurred around the implementation of CT Scanners, Barley 
(1986) further illustrates how the introduction of new technologies may not only 
foster but ‘force’ professionals to engage in institutional work. Specifically, he 
shows that innovative technologies, which usually require special knowledge, may 
disrupt given role divisions in professional organizations to an extent that profes-
sionals have to completely restructure their roles around the new technology. 
Providing evidence from in-depth case studies in two hospitals, Barley’s (1986) 
study shows that new technologies induce agency for two reasons. First, a change 
in technology – especially when the use of the new technology is knowledge-
intensive – destabilizes the social hierarchies between different professional groups 
as these are based on exclusive and clearly defined areas of expertise. The use of 
new technologies often requires the application of specific, new knowledge that has 
yet to be assigned to a professional group’s area of expertise. Accordingly, new 
technologies do not only generate uncertainty with regard to its use but also create 
an ‘institutional vacuum’ as they provide new spaces of expertise that are open to 
contestation. Second, technology itself is a social object, a potential resource, which 
professionals can leverage to establish new role divisions within their organization. 
Hierarchies become structured around the tangible object of technology which, in 
turn, becomes an inherent part of an organization’s social order. 
Barley’s (1986) in-depth analysis of technology implementation as a challenge to 
intraorganizational social orders draws on the empirical cases of the radiology de-
partments in two hospitals (“Urban” and “Suburban”) in Massachusetts. Both of 
these hospitals introduced CT scanners, which, at the time of the study, were an 
innovative technology for diagnostic body-imaging. Radiologists and radiology 
technologists, the two main professional groups in radiology, commonly lacked 
O R G A N I Z A T I O N - L E V E L  C H A N G E  
161 
experience in operating these scanners. Hence, in both hospitals, the implementa-
tion of CT scanners proved to be a disruptive event. However, while both hospitals 
purchased the exact same type of CT scanner, the implementation of this new tech-
nology had quite different outcomes with regard to the role divisions between radi-
ologists and technologists. This was the case as the composition of the respective 
implementation teams differed and different patterns of structuration emerged. In 
the “Urban” hospital, a young radiologist who specialized in computed tomography 
during his residency training and an experienced radiologist who was familiar with 
body-scanning literature were key members of the implementation team. 
Knowledge about the new technology thus remained with the radiologists as the 
hitherto dominant actors in radiology. During the first applications of the CT scan-
ners, radiologists merely gave orders to technologists, never justified their some-
times contradictory orders, and even directly interfered with the control of the CT 
scanners. This behavior prevented technologists from learning about the new scan-
ners, led to confusion, and thus reinforced radiologists’ dominant role at Urban. 
Only when inexperienced radiologists began to take over CT duty, interaction 
changed. Radiologists, due to their lack of expertise in CT scanning, now common-
ly inquired technologists about appropriated courses of action while technologists 
provided them with advise when asked. Yet, the institutionalized authority structure 
was maintained since technologists were only approached for technical consultation 
while diagnostic expertise and overall responsibility remained with radiologists.  
At Suburban, however, the implementation of CT scanners induced institutional 
change, disrupting and eventually reversing the role divisions between radiologists 
and technologists. In contrast to Urban, the implementation team at suburban in-
cluded two technologists who were experienced in using the new body-scanning 
technology. Additionally, a new radiologist who had recently completed a fellow-
ship in computed tomography complemented the team. In the initial phase of im-
plementation, radiologists and technologists negotiated roles and duties in a collegi-
al atmosphere which Barley (1986: 91) describes as “tentative climate of joint prob-
lem solving […] that more closely resembled the ideal of complementary profes-
sions working in concert”. As technologists had sufficient expertise to safely oper-
ate CT scanners, radiologists gave them considerable discretion over routine deci-
sion and experienced technologists even began to administer injections. Still, the 
general role division between radiologists and technologists was not yet questioned. 
However, as less experienced radiologists were introduced to CT duty, the institu-
tionalized order between the two professional groups began to erode. Due to radiol-
ogists’ lack of experience, their orders were often based on wrong assumptions and 
included faulty suggestions. The more experienced technologists reacted with 
“clandestine teaching” (Barley, 1986: 91f.), subtly offering radiologists’ corrective 
information without trying to lecture them. However, as radiologists were unfamil-
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iar with interpreting the new images, the usual flow of diagnostic information from 
radiologists to technologists could not be sustained. As technologists began to regu-
larly provide diagnostic information due to the practical contingencies of CT duty, 
the roles between them and radiologists were reversed, causing discomfort among 
both professional groups. As a result, radiologists displayed increasingly hostile 
behavior towards technologists, e.g. blaming them for technical malfunctions of the 
CT scanners. Trying to alleviate conflicts, technologists took over routine decisions 
without consulting the radiologists anymore. Radiologists, in turn, noticed their 
obvious redundancy and thus avoided being in the CT room with technologists. 
According to Barley’s (1986: 94) observations, they engaged in a very peculiar type 
of institutional maintenance work to prevent their loss of authority: “When as-
signed to CT duty, most radiologists remained in the radiologists' office and several 
even went so far as to close the door to the office and shut the window between 
their desk and the secretary's desk”. Naturally, these attempts to “save face” 
through avoidance (ibd.: 94) reinforced technologists’ increasing autonomy and 
eventually helped institutionalizing the role reversal rather than preventing it.  
Interestingly, the structuration process in Suburban depicts a case in which technol-
ogy disrupted given role divisions and provided an opportunity for institutional 
change but was not perceived as such by the low-status group of radiology technol-
ogists. As Barley (1986: 94) notes, technologists were very hesitant to take over 
routine tasks and were generally very careful to not openly question radiologists’ 
authority. While technologists eventually redefined their roles in a way that allowed 
the effective use of the new CT scanners, their institutional work can be described 
as reluctant, born out of practical necessity rather than political strategizing. Ac-
cordingly, Barley’s (1986) findings underline that inter-professional tensions within 
an organization have to be distinguished from the highly political conflicts between 
professions on the field-level. In contrast to the field-level, where low-status profes-
sionals often seem to lurk for the opportunities to raise their status and strategically 
utilize societal changes and technological jolts to promote their professional project 
(Kitchener & Mertz, 2012; McDonald et al., 2009), professionals within organiza-
tions may not only lack this kind of political foresight but may even be unwilling to 
seize new, higher-status roles. Thus, while inter-professional tensions – particularly 
in the context of technological innovation – are likely to evoke institutional work 
within professional organizations, this work is not necessarily driven by political or 
even strategic considerations. As shown in Barley’s (1986) study, new constella-
tions of logics may emerge in an organization when professionals reluctantly enact 
new roles to re-establish workable hierarchies. 
As the preceding paragraphs have illustrated, professionals’ institutional work with-
in organizations often results from (i) their claims to enact their professional role 
against organizational constraints like managerial control and (ii) from the negotia-
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tion of role divisions (both organizational and professional) between adjacent pro-
fessional groups (often induced and/or catalyzed by the uncertainty  associated with 
technological innovations). In these cases, boundary work as the selective in- and 
exclusion of logics in specific areas of the organization is mostly equivalent to the 
protection or disruption of boundaries between different groups of actors who rep-
resent these (professional) logics. Yet, professionals’ institutional work on the or-
ganization-level is not only induced by tensions between professionals and manag-
ers or between different groups of professionals.  
As professionals derive their status within an organization from both their profes-
sional role and their role in the organizational hierarchy, they are more likely to 
experience role ambiguity that motivates them to take institutional action (Witman 
et al., 2011). How professional and organizational roles interact to create impetus 
for disruptive institutional work among professionals is well illustrated by Battilana 
(2011). In her study on the enabling effect of social position in promoting divergent 
organizational change in UK health care organizations, she finds that actors’ pro-
fessional and organizational status predict how likely they are to initiate divergent 
change in their organization. As hypothesized, members of low-status professions 
(i.e. non-physicians) were more likely to initiate change that diverged to a greater 
extent from the given templates of role division among professionals. Also, actors 
who held higher hierarchical positions in their organizations were more likely to 
promote change that diverged from the established modes of role division among 
professionals.
31
 Interestingly and in contrast to the hypothesized effect, Battilana 
(2011: 828) finds that members of low-status professions who obtain a high hierar-
chical position in their organization are less likely to promote new models of role 
division between professionals. While she initially assumed that actors who belong 
to less privileged professional groups would draw on the resources provided by 
their high status in the organizational hierarchy to shift institutional practices to 
their profession’s advantage, the opposite was the case. Battilana (2011: 830) ac-
counts for this unexpected finding by proposing that members of low-status profes-
sions who made it to ‘the top’ of their organization may no longer feel the obliga-
tion to raise their professions’ status, may even feel threatened by professional 
peers, or may identify more with their organizational role and strive to secure their 
                                                 
31 Low professional status is hypothesized to induce disruptive institutional work as only changes in the sta-
tus-quo hold potential for these professionals to gain status. However, the engagement of actors with a high 
hierarchical status in disruptive change – which may potentially undermine the system that endowed these 
actors with status – seems counterintuitive at first. Battilana (2011: 822) motivates this hypothesis with the 
idiosyncrasies of the NHS system that incentivizes the implementation of new, more efficient, modes of ser-
vice provision in hospitals. As individuals in high hierarchical positions of public organizations are expected 
to comply with political objectives, hospital top-managers are more likely to implement change that aligns 
their organization with these goals. Hence, professionals engaged in disruptive institutional work within their 
organization when their role within the organizational hierarchy included the demonstration of compliance 
with regulatory demands. 
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legitimacy as top-managers by distancing themselves from their low-status profes-
sion. 
Regardless of the underlying reasons, this particular finding in Battilana’s (2011) 
work offers valuable insights for the study of professionals’ role in institutional dy-
namics on the organizational level. First, it generally emphasizes that professional 
and organizational roles interact to induce or prevent specific forms of institutional 
work. Second, it illustrates remarkably well how professionals’ contextual embed-
dedness in the hierarchical system of an organization may effectively detach them 
from their professional project on the field-level. While the findings show that pro-
fessional status in itself was an important driver of disruptive institutional work, 
they also show that organizational status may not only interact with, but, in fact, 
negate the effect of professional status. A tentative interpretation of this result may 
be that professionals – regardless of their strong embeddedness in their profession –
exert institutional work to secure and promote the systems from which they benefit 
the most. While their profession often is the system from which they gain the most 
in terms of power and status, their role in their organizational embeddedness may – 
under specific circumstances – provide them with more benefits than their member-
ship in a profession and hence become more relevant to the decision on whether 
and how to engage in institutional change. In Battilana’s study (2011), non-
physicians in high organizational positions opted to maintain the status-quo of the 
structures from which they gained their highest status by not promoting new modes 
of role division between physicians and non-physicians within their organizations. 
Overall, the main insight here is the relevance of professionals’ organizational role 
for their institutional work. While often downplayed in institutional research on 
professionals in organizations, they need to be viewed as both, professionals who 
have become members of organizations and members of organizations with a pro-
fessional background (Brock et al., 2014).  
In sum, research suggests that professionals engage in institutional work on the or-
ganization-level because of the inherently fuzzy boundaries between institutional 
logics in this setting, which leads to tensions and ambiguities. The relations be-
tween logics become fuzzy because managerial involvement disrupts the enactment 
of ‘pure’ professionalism, because different professionals have to closely collabo-
rate despite of different cognitive and normative frames, and because professionals 
have to fulfill multiple roles that rest on different logics. As opposed to the field-
level, professionals’ do not respond to general opportunities and threats for their 
profession but to concrete tensions that are evaluated not only against normative 
ideals but also against practical contingencies (see also section 5.3). As will be 
elaborated in the following paragraphs, the ‘real-life’ context of an organization 
which detaches professionals from the abstract ideal of professionalism that popu-
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lates field-level discourses is also reflected in the strategies they use to exert institu-
tional work.  
Processes: How Professionals engage in Organization-level Change 
As professionals’ institutional work within organizations is often found to be aimed 
at resisting changes in their professional and/or organizational role which may in-
duce shifts in hierarchies, much attention has been given to how professionals work 
towards the maintenance of institutional arrangements, including organizational 
role divisions, structures, and practices, (Dent, 2003; Kellogg, 2011; Kellogg et al., 
2006; Numerato, Salvatore, & Fattore, 2012; Singh & Jayanti, 2013). 
Since organizations – in contrast to fields – provide a context in which different 
professionals work together more closely and hence find it easier to establish alli-
ances to work towards or against change, strategies of cooperation and co-optation 
have often been found to be a central element of their institutional work efforts. For 
example, Kellogg (2012) and Currie et al. (2012) provide detailed accounts on how 
different health care professionals leveraged intraprofessional hierarchies to form or 
break up coalitions in order to eventually maintain the institutional status-quo with-
in their organization. 
How professional subgroups divided reformer coalitions to prevent an alternative 
logic of surgery from spreading through their organization, is well-illustrated by 
Kellogg (2012). In her study on the implementation of a work-hour reform in the 
surgical wards of two hospitals, she finds that defenders used “status-based counter-
tactics” (ibd.: 1047) to emphasize intraprofessional hierarchies and thereby co-opt 
agents from the reformer coalition into the defender group. Specifically, Kellogg 
(2012) presents a comparative case study of the ‘Advent’ and the ‘Calhoun’ hospi-
tal, both of which tried to implement a politically prescribed work hour reform to 
reduce the work of surgical residents from 100 to 120 hours per week to 80 hours 
per week. While Advent eventually succeeded in adapting work practices to effec-
tively cut the working hours of residents, reform implementation at Calhoun failed. 
Initially, residents and chiefs in neither of the hospitals were particularly open to-
wards the planned changes. While chiefs and seniors were not opposing a cut in 
working hours per se, they did object to the practice changes that would have been 
necessary to allow for more moderate working hours. Chief and senior physicians 
would have been expected to encourage interns to hand off work to so-called “night 
floats”, to support them in their post-round to-dos, and to instruct them to not come 
in on Saturdays (ibd.: 1552). The cut in working hours and a change in practices 
from individualistic, ‘trusting no one’-working practices to a more cooperative or-
ganization of work in surgery violated the roles and practices that were central to 
surgeon’s identity. Specifically, handing work over and cutting hours appeared in-
commensurable with the idea of being an ‘iron man’ who relied solely on himself 
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and was fully committed to his work, neglecting personnel relationships and well-
being while still single-handedly fulfilling complicated tasks, even when under  
intense pressure (ibd.: 1552). As performance was primarily measured by the extent 
to which residents, both male and female, were able to display these macho behav-
iors, defenders of the old practices were able to use the importance of being an ‘iron 
man’ as a powerful leverage to disrupt reformer coalitions. Further, despite their 
common adversary and their belief in the benefit of well-rested residents, reformer 
coalitions were heterogeneous and consisted of three distinct subgroups: female 
chiefs, a few male chiefs, and interns (ibd.: 1553). Due to the heterogeneity of the 
reformer group and the importance of stereotypical male behavior as an indicator of 
status in surgery, defenders relied on gender-based stereotypes to de-legitimize 
practices and segregate male reformers from the reformer coalitions. On the one 
hand, opponents discursively constructed the new practices as being typically fe-
male, reflecting “emotionality, helpfulness, and sensitivity to the needs of others” 
(ibd.: 1555). On the other hand, defenders sanctioned male reformers’ association 
with the reformer group by attacking their status, calling them “softies” (ibd.: 1555) 
and shunning them. Specifically, they combined a system of sanctions and rewards 
to disengage male reformers from the reformer coalitions. They excluded persistent 
reformers from what Kellogg (2012: 1556) calls the “Boy’s Club”, a social space 
that included typical macho activities like checking out nurses and rating the attrac-
tiveness of female visitors. As these behaviors created a sense of belonging and 
were inextricably linked to gaining and maintaining the ‘iron man’-status on which 
surgeon’s standing in a ward rested, male reformers – fearing for a loss of status 
among their peers – began to distance themselves from the female reformers and 
the now ‘female’ practice of cutting work hours. Further, opponents reinforced 
male reformers’ disassociation from the reformer coalition by reintegrating them 
into the ‘Boy’s Club’, showing notable solidarity with those who disengaged from 
reformer practices and “rewarding them with male camaraderie and games” (ibd.: 
1556). While Kellogg (2012) observed these strategies in both Advent and Cal-
houn, they were only successful in Calhoun where the implementation of the work 
hour reform eventually failed. The explanation provided for these diverging out-
comes gives an interesting insight on how professionals’ institutional work strate-
gies and idiosyncratic conditions within their organizational contexts interact to 
make such strategies more or less successful. While surgery is generally dominated 
by men who commonly made up about 70 percent of the surgical staff in both hos-
pitals, an unusual shift in the gender distribution of the surgical ward of Calhoun 
had occurred prior and during the implementation of the work hour reform. Specifi-
cally, Calhoun experienced a strong increase of female surgeons in chief resident 
positions from about the usual ten or fifteen to 38 percent. This, in turn, caused 
male residents to experience a stronger ‘baseline’ threat to their status, expressing 
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concerns that “women are taking over” (ibd.: 1557). This perception of threat was 
reinforced by a female resident applying for a postresidency position in trauma sur-
gery, a position that had hitherto been exclusively held by male surgeons. Beside 
this competitive threat, male residents also experienced a threat to their distinctive-
ness as females in Calhoun were more prone to disclosing typical ‘male’ behavior, 
e.g. by wearing the exact same work attire, telling drinking stories, and engaging in 
nicknaming (ibd.: 1558). Thus, the categories of ‘male’ and ‘female’ behavior were 
more at risk of being uncovered as social construction rather than inherent qualities 
of the respective group of residents. Accordingly, defenders had a particularly high 
interest in keeping the boundary between ‘high-status-iron-men’ and ‘low-status-
females’ intact. As a consequence, male reformers were more concerned about los-
ing their “male privilege” (ibd.: 1558) by associating with female reformers and 
advocating ‘female’ practices and thus more likely to abandon their reformist 
stance.  
Overall, Kellogg (2012) illustrates well how professionals’ leverage perceptions of 
group membership and associated privileges to split up reformer coalitions and 
thereby prevent institutional change within their organization. Further, she shows 
how specific conditions in the organizational context may lead to an increasing rel-
evance of intra-professional differences, which professionals may use as a resource 
in their strategies of institutional work. Interestingly, Kellogg (2012) provides a 
case in which the changes in question did – at first sight – not seem to have major 
implications for the overall logic of surgery and had been endorsed by a political 
body of the medical profession (specifically, the American Council for Graduate 
Medical Education) but were still heavily contested. Yet, as the results show, pro-
fessionals may reject even minor changes in work practices when these affect cen-
tral components of their professional logic. What is considered a central component 
of their logic obviously depends on what the majority of professionals perceive to 
be the source of their privileges. In the case of surgery, this was a particularly high 
level of masculinism. However, such elements of logics are not static and may gain 
or lose relevance depending on contextual conditions. As Kellogg’s (2012) results 
show, mundane coincidences such as a specific composition of an organizations’ 
workforce at a given time may affect the salience of logic elements and thus drasti-
cally shape the outcome of professionals’ institutional work efforts.  
While Kellogg (2012) focuses on how reformer coalitions were divided to disem-
power them and thereby prevent institutional change, other research has focused on 
how professionals co-opt other actors within their organizational context to create 
coalitions across professional boundaries that allow for the effective maintenance of 
the institutional status-quo. In their study on clinical geneticists’ institutional work 
in UK health care organizations, Currie et al. (2012) find that geneticists co-opted 
nurses and general practitioners to foster new modes of work division in a way that 
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helped them to subtly maintain their privileged status. Examining pilot projects 
within the mainstreaming genetics policy initiative of the NHS, the authors investi-
gate how clinical geneticists worked towards the maintenance of their inter- and 
intraprofessionally high status as specialist doctors. They present findings from 11 
in-depth case studies from three distinct work streams through which the main-
streaming genetics initiative was implemented. While the overall political goal was 
to make specialist treatment more efficient and more readily available to patients, 
three different kinds of pilot projects emerged as separate work streams to include 
genetics services into regular patient care. These work streams differed with regard 
to the kind of professionals by whom geneticists’ services were to be provided. The 
‘Cancer genetics’ (CG) work stream  aimed at providing integrated care, including 
easier access to genetics services, within primary care. Here, specialized genetics 
nurses were supposed to deliver risk assessments and referral services. In the ‘Non-
cancer service development’ (SD) work stream, genetics nurses were supposed to 
deliver genetics services in the mainstream areas of hospitals. The ‘General practi-
tioner with special interest’ (GPSI) work stream included general practitioners to 
become knowledgeable in genetics services and provide them within the primary 
care setting. In contrast to the two former work streams, GPSI created intra-
professional competition between geneticists who, as specialist doctors, were en-
dowed with a higher status than regular physicians.  
While the cases studied show considerable heterogeneity between and within the 
workstreams, Currie at al. (2012) point to the importance of co-opting other profes-
sionals as an institutional strategy. This strategy was most obvious in the SD work 
stream. Specifically, in one organization that implemented the SD work stream, 
Currie et al. (2012: 947f.) find that geneticists did not resort to aggressive opposi-
tion to secure their task spheres against nurses but instead actively helped to rede-
fine  nursing roles in a way that was beneficial to both of their professional groups. 
Clinical geneticists encouraged nurses to autonomously lead the day-to-day man-
agement of the mainstreaming genetics project and supported them with educating 
and policing work to make nurses ‘fit’ for their new roles. While this approach ap-
peared to promote institutional change, geneticists utilized nurses’ new roles to del-
egate routine tasks, thereby securing the essence of their high status, that is, expert 
work. In contrast to the other pilot projects within this work stream, where open 
conflict and struggles over authority were more prevalent, this strategy of co-opting 
nurses proved to be more successful. Currie et al. (2012: 947) explain this by elabo-
rating on how the co-optation of mainstream nurses lead to a “normative network of 
support” that secured the sustainability of the pilot project. Through this very subtle 
form of maintenance work, geneticists did not draw attention to the persistence of 
their dominant role as they did not show open resistance that is typically associated 
with professionals’ maintenance work. Eventually, geneticists could not only secure 
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their status but successfully utilized their network to expand their influence intro 
mainstream clinical activity (ibd.: 950).  
The creation of networks was similarly important to geneticists’ maintenance work 
in the ‘Cancer genetics’ work stream that promoted integrated care. Here, clinical 
geneticists, striving to defend their specialist role against both physicians and nurses 
in mainstream medicine, created a network with doctors from different disciplines 
and carefully delegated unwanted responsibilities while extending their remits into 
the working sphere of other doctors. Interestingly, non-geneticists welcomed these 
changes as useful assistance rather than perceiving geneticists’ involvement in their 
working areas as threat (ibd.: 953). Further, clinical geneticists worked towards the 
maintenance of the status-quo by supporting specialist cancer nurses to defend their 
higher intra-professional status against potential competition from the new genetics 
nurses. Specifically, geneticists designed the genetics mainstreaming projects in a 
way that ensured specialist cancer nurses to remain on top of the nursing hierarchy, 
thereby co-opting them as fellow ‘higher-status professionals’. In the ‘General prac-
titioner with special interest’ work stream, geneticists co-opted other medical pro-
fessionals (e.g. the GPSIs) by emphasizing the common background of medical 
professionalism, which promoted specialization as a means to reduce medical risk. 
As an effect, GPSIs were more willing to accept persistent supervision by clinical 
geneticists, thereby allowing for the maintenance of intra-professional stratification. 
Overall, Currie et al.’s (2012) study illustrates well how other than the inter-
professional hierarchies on the field-level may become relevant when professionals 
attempt to defend roles that endow them with a special status. Here, medical profes-
sionalism – as the logic on which specialists’ particularly high status rests – was 
being defended against modification in the sense of a more collaborative and less 
hierarchical structure of medical care. Ironically, geneticists utilized potential allies’ 
interest in gaining or maintaining status to maintain their own central position in 
health care organizations. Specifically, the co-optation of nurses to subtly reinforce 
the specialist status of clinical geneticists shows how professionals establish alli-
ances with members of subordinate professions who seek to rise in the hierarchy of 
their own profession. While institutional scholars have generally emphasized that – 
due to the social nature of institutions – successful institutional work includes the 
“mobilization of allies” (Battilana et al., 2009: 67), Currie et al.’s (2012) study 
shows how professionals utilize coalition partners’ desire for a higher status to pur-
sue their goal of maintaining extant systems of sub- and superordination. In a way, 
clinical geneticists did not mobilize ‘true’ allies who were similarly interested in the 
maintenance of institutional arrangements. Much rather, they exploited other actors 
as a resource to defend the dominance of medical professionalism as this logic 
promoted the ideal of ‘superiority through exclusive expertise’ and thus endowed 
geneticists with their particularly high status. Regardless of whether geneticists co-
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opted physicians from other subspecialties or nurses, hierarchy and status always 
were central motives for the formation of coalitions. In the SD work stream, clini-
cians enabled nurses to raise their status, endowing them with autonomy and 
providing them with new, more prestigious tasks while enhancing their own status 
by protecting the core of their specialist tasks and freeing up additional time for 
their expert work. Co-opting nurses into this new system hence created “a situation 
of mutual gain” (Currie et al., 2012: 950) in which each professional group could 
expand their task sphere while clinical geneticists remained in control of their spe-
cialization area and thus, their source of higher intraprofessional status. In the GPSI 
stream, clinical geneticists were able to build a coalition with specialist cancer 
nurses as both of them had a common interest in maintaining their high status with-
in their respective profession. Lastly, in the CG work stream, geneticists created a 
coalition within their own profession, leveraging the persuasive appeal of medical 
professionalism and physicians’ common interest in lowering patient risk while 
subtly recreating hierarchies within the group of medical professionals. Thus, de-
pending on which group of potential allies was perceived most useful in maintain-
ing the specialist position and high status of geneticists, they built coalitions across 
professions, drawing on their common background as ‘elite’ within their respective 
profession, or teamed up with members of their own profession by downplaying 
intra-professional status differences and emphasizing threats to the profession as a 
whole.  
As both Currie et al.’s (2012) and Kellogg’s (2012) studies show, professionals 
may exploit status hierarchies that exist within and between professional groups to 
either break up or create coalitions to oppose institutional change. Thus, while the 
status that professionals obtain from their membership in a specific profession may 
be highly relevant to promoting or resisting field-level change (e.g. Micelotta & 
Washington, 2013), organizational settings foster the enactment of more differenti-
ated roles and thus provide a context in which intra-professional differences be-
come more salient for institutional work. Specifically, non-professional hierarchies 
as well as finer hierarchical gradations within the professional workforce may be 
used to foster or hamper institutional change. Professionals may selectively ‘acti-
vate’ different systems of hierarchy that are available within an organization (e.g. 
by utilizing intra-professional stratification) to generate a sense of similarity or dif-
ference among organizational members and thereby create or disrupt coalitions. 
These coalitions are an effective measure to change or maintain intra-organizational 
institutions such as roles, task spheres, or working conditions as (de-)insti-
tutionalization depends on whether a sufficient number of actors engage in the re-
production of structural or practical arrangements, thus making them normatively 
accepted and taken-for-granted social reality (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; 
Galaskiewicz, 1985). As opposed to the field-level, where status heterogeneity 
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within a profession is often actively managed to secure their political power against 
adjacent professions and other political stakeholders (Greenwood et al., 2002; 
Ramirez, 2013), professionals in organizations appear to be more pragmatic institu-
tional workers who may also selectively disregard their professional affiliation. 
They are more likely to act as heterogeneous subgroups and choose their allies ac-
cordingly, even straightforwardly crossing professional boundaries to build allianc-
es that enhance their chances of successful agency. As organizations offer spaces in 
which organizational and professional hierarchies interact, they provide a multitude 
of dimensions along which potential sub-groups can develop, thus making strategic 
coalitions as means of institutional work more readily available (cf. DiBenigno & 
Kellogg, 2014).  
While finding allies is obviously a central component of professionals’ institutional 
work within their organization, this strategy is commonly paired with discursive 
and non-discursive legitimization tactics. As the promotion or prevention of institu-
tional change requires that new institutional roles, structures, and practices are 
viewed as (less) desirable and appropriate (Suchman, 1995: 574), institutional 
workers need to establish a convincing rationale as to why their organization should 
or should not be guided by new logic constellations. As elaborated on in section 
4.2, professionals tend to rely on the manipulation of language to convey percep-
tions of (il)legitimacy. Accordingly, both of the studies discussed above include –
more or less explicitly – discursive forms of institutional work. Currie et al. (2012: 
956) emphasize that professionals’ successful acquisition of allies was also based 
on the use of discursive strategies such as theorizing new modes of task division to 
be particularly risky. By presenting themselves as “arbiters of risk”, geneticists 
were able to tactically de-legitimize changes in professional roles as the reduction 
of patient risk was a theme which doctors from all specializations could agree on as 
a legitimate goal of medical practice. While not explicitly elaborating on the discur-
sive aspect of professionals’ institutional work, Kellogg’s (2012) study also points 
to the importance of linguistic means to maintain the institutional status-quo. Here, 
opponents of change relied on framing reformers’ behavior as “weak” or “namby-
pamby” to undermine their status within surgery and eventually break up reformer 
coalitions (ibd.: 1555).  
However, in opposite to studies on professionals’ attempts to promote or impede 
institutional change on the field-level (see section 4.2), research on professionals’ 
institutional work in the context of their organization has focused less explicitly on 
the role of discursive strategies. While the linguistic turn in organization research 
has obviously sparked much interest in how organizational processes depend on 
and are altered through the use of language (Alvesson, 1993; Alvesson & 
Karreman, 2000; Bordia, Jones, Gallois, Callan, & DiFonzo, 2006), research on 
discursive processes in professional organizations is rather occupied with the ques-
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tion on how field-level discourses inform organizational processes (Doolin, 2002; 
Thomas & Hewitt, 2011) and how organizational communication affects public 
discourse (Hardy & Maguire, 2010; Hardy et al., 2000; Hardy & Phillips, 1999) 
than with studying how professionals carefully arrange discursive strategies to 
shape intra-organizational institutions (for exceptions see: Iedema et al., 2004). 
A reason for this particular difference in field-level and organization-level research 
can be found in both the lack of public political debates on the level of the individu-
al organization and the variety of other influence opportunities that organizational 
structures offer professionals to successfully exert agency. While this should by no 
means imply that language is unimportant to professionals’ intraorganizational in-
stitutional work, discursive strategies are often used in conjunction with other influ-
ence tactics as Daudigeos’s (2013) study on staff professionals’ institutional work 
in a multinational construction firm illustrates. His study, though dealing with a 
very specific subtype of clinical professionals, offers interesting insights on the “the 
real-life experience of institutional workers inside organizations, and their practical 
agency” (ibd.: 721). Starting with the question on how occupational safety and 
health (OSH) professionals exert influence despite their lack of formal authority, 
Daudigeos (2013) identifies several interlocking tactics that these staff profession-
als use to promote a culture of occupational safety. As opposed to members of 
‘classic’ professions like medicine or law, staff professionals typically lack legiti-
macy as they are positioned outside traditional organizational hierarchies. Accord-
ingly, staff professionals like OSH professionals struggle to exert influence in their 
organization. Investigating how OSH professionals promote the use of safety prac-
tices in their organization despite these constraints, Daudigeos (2013: 374ff.) finds 
that their institutional work unfolds through two main activities, that is, “relational 
legitimacy-building” and “unobtrusive influence tactics“. Relational legitimacy 
building is achieved by external and internal networking. External relationships 
with social relations with “professional bodies, governmental institutions, and rele-
vant academic institutions and research institutes” (ibd.: 735) enabled OSH profes-
sionals’ creative institutional work as these provided access to valuable symbolic 
resources. Specifically, OSH professionals integrated arguments from their profes-
sional association in their discursive legitimization strategies. Further, diffuse per-
ceptions of legitimacy were directly transferred from external parties to OSH pro-
fessionals as the staff on the operational level lacked a deeper understanding of 
field-level relations, including the relevance of specific governmental and profes-
sional bodies. Internal networking relied on three tactics: OSH professionals tried to 
gain support from individuals with a high hierarchical status, they found allies in 
core-departments like sales to promote safety practices among customers, and they 
met with other OSH professionals to exchange information  (ibd.: 736f.).  
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Unobtrusive influence tactics comprised the “adaptive framing of issues” and the 
“instrumental use of organizational processes, programmes, and systems” (ibd.: 
738). Adaptive framing was a dynamic use of different arguments to legitimize 
safety practices. OSH professionals adjusted the normative appeal of their argu-
ments to fit their audience, “selectively using managerial, administrative, account-
ing, legal, technical, and moral arguments” (ibd.: 738). Interview excerpts like 
“There is a real problem with the willingness of the management […]. There is al-
ways a need to show usefulness” (ibd.: 739) illustrate that these professionals rather 
integrated their counterparts’ guiding logic into their arguments than relying on the 
legitimacy of their own professional rationales. Further, OSH professionals used 
symbols like giving awards to operational staff who voluntarily adopted safety 
measures, using their definitional authority over the realm of organizational safety. 
The probably most interesting tactic of OSH professionals to exert institutional 
work was the instrumental use of organizational processes, programs, and systems. 
OSH professionals deliberately manipulated the information flows within these 
structures to institutionalize safety practices. This included selective provision of 
information to decision-makers (ibd.:739), fostering intra-organizational competi-
tion between subsidiaries by circulating comparative statistics on their respective 
safety performance (ibd.: 740), integrating safety contents into training programs 
while urging managers to enroll their employees in these programs (ibd.: 740), and 
even subtly shaping technical core procedures such as the design of construction 
plans through validation and advice (ibd.: 740). Lastly, OSH professionals lever-
aged the power of their organization to institutionalize safety practices among cus-
tomers and subcontractors and further promote a holistic safety culture in the organ-
izations’ internal and external environment.  
Although Daudigeos’s (2013) study does not provide a case from a classic profes-
sional setting, it illustrates well how professionals combine their embeddedness in a 
profession with the social and structural resources they find in their organization to 
‘sneak’ institutional change in. OSH professionals’ external ties with e.g. their pro-
fessional associations allowed them to actively exert influence through a mecha-
nism that institutionalism has traditionally conceptualized as normative isomor-
phism with individual professionals as passive carriers of external, normative pres-
sures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Specifically, OSH professionals used their ac-
cess to external bodies to gain legitimacy both by directly borrowing rhetorical ar-
guments from these collective actors and by positioning themselves as intermediar-
ies between their organizations and the field, translating diffuse regulatory pres-
sures into specific organizational practices. Trying to fully enact their roles as safety 
professionals in the face of their position outside the traditional organizational hier-
archy, OSH professionals further utilized internal sources of legitimacy, borrowing 
authority from allies with high positions in the formal hierarchy or gaining access to 
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central organizational functions such as sales. This tactic illustrates well how pro-
fessionals make use of legitimacy sources that are specific to the level of the organ-
ization when their status as ‘professionals’ does not suffice to successfully exert 
institutional work. Especially by allying with central departments, they were able to 
integrate safety practices into the operational core of the organization, fostering a 
broad diffusion of these institutions. The way in which OSH professionals em-
ployed discursive means also shows how these professionals combined aspects of 
professionalism with their organizational embeddedness to raise the effectiveness 
of their institutional work efforts. Their use of adaptive framing illustrates that these 
actors, though having interpretive authority over safety-related issues, were aware 
of the fact that arguments based on their own professional logic had little leverage 
within their organization as they only obtained a position at the periphery of the 
organizational hierarchy. Thus they dynamically adapted their rhetoric to accom-
modate the different occupational backgrounds of their audience rather than insist-
ing on profession-specific, normative accounts to promote the use of safety practic-
es. Yet, how actors combine resources associated with their professional and their 
organizational role is probably best illustrated by OSH professionals’ intentional 
but unobtrusive manipulation of intraorganizational processes, programmes, and 
systems. Daudigeos (2013: 743) summarizes his findings as follows:   
“Their manipulation of information flows related to their area of activity, and their 
virtual monopoly on their specific areas of expertise, allow them to facilitate the 
spread of specific organizational practice. In so doing, they rely heavily on the or-
ganization’s existing infrastructures, such as its information system”. 
Obviously, OSH professionals relied on their authority to define organizational 
safety and their full control over safety-related information to select and distribute 
information in a way that helped them promote what they considered appropriate 
safety practices. What Daudigeos (2013: 743) refers to as “monopoly on their spe-
cific area of expertise” has already been discussed above, employing Schildt et al.’s 
(2011: 84) concept of “spaces of reason” which are a key source of professional 
power (see section 3.3.1). Professionals control specific areas of knowledge in 
which their discursive definitions of reality are unquestioned. Information can be 
presented in a specific way or even completely withheld from non-professionals 
who, as laypeople in the respective area of expertise, have to fully rely on profes-
sionals’ assessment. Daudigeos (2013: 743) thus excellently illustrates how profes-
sionals leverage this source of power within their organizations. In their profession-
al role, OSH professionals have authority over the contents of ‘organizational safe-
ty’. In their organizational role as staff employees, they gained access to structures 
that helped them to diffuse the informational contents they deemed appropriate for 
the promotion of their safety goals. Or, as Daudigeos (2013: 743f.) more eloquently 
puts it: “[…] professionals have the freedom to select evidence and create mental 
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categories that influence other members’ goals and behaviour, and our study re-
veals that this privileged position can be an important tool in their institutional 
work.”  
Besides showing how professionals combine resources from their professional and 
their organizational roles to achieve change within their organization, Daudigeos’s 
(2013) study also provides an interesting insight on professionals’ dual embed-
dedness in their profession and their organization. Extending the observation that 
organizational roles may counteract the enactment of professional roles (see the 
discussion of Battilana’s (2011) study above), he finds that OSH professionals ap-
parently felt a high moral obligation towards their profession that allowed them to 
exploit and manipulate organizational structures in an ethically questionable way 
for the sake of the ‘higher good’ they tried to promote (Daudigeos, 2013: 745). This 
insight further supports the idea that professionals’ attempts of agency need to be 
studied in context, accounting for both their professional and their organizational 
role.  
How extant structures are used to introduce new logics in professional organiza-
tions is further illustrated by Keshet (2013) who investigates the institutional work 
of actors who fall more clearly into the category of classic professionals. Specifical-
ly, she provides an ethnographic study that examines how dual-trained physicians, 
who are also knowledgeable in complementary and alternative medicine (CAM), 
promote the use of these alternative treatment concepts in regular hospitals and sick 
funds. Dual-trained physicians faced normative tensions within their professional 
role as they are embedded in two institutional logics that pertain to the same work-
ing environment. Thus, these professionals were prone to acting as institutional 
workers who sought to integrate CAM into the conventional health care organiza-
tions they worked in (ibd.: 612).  
Keshet (2013) finds that these dual-trained physicians utilized isomorphic pressures 
to infuse health care organizations with the CAM logic of holistic rather than seg-
mented, symptom-oriented care. Their institutional work efforts related to both the 
field- and the organization-level and show how legitimacy can be transferred to 
new practices by complying with the structural demands of dominant logics, in this 
case, the traditional biomedical logic. On the field-level, dual-trained physicians 
imitated the structures of conventional medicine, establishing professional (sub-)as-
sociations and holding special conferences (ibd.: 616-617). Within their organiza-
tions, the dual-trained physicians in Keshet’s (2013) sample could leverage both 
their hierarchical status and their experience with conventional medical practice. 
The dual-trained physicians in her study “usually held a status of senior physician, 
which enabled them to initiate and champion new practices” (ibd.: 612). Being fa-
miliar with the specifics of traditional medical practice they subtly but effectively 
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embedded CAM as additional service in surgery departments. The tactics they used 
were similar to those that Daudigeos (2013: 738) identified as “unobtrusive influ-
ence tactics”, yet did not rely on tangible structures like IT-systems but on abstract 
concepts of appropriate patient treatment. Specifically, rather than challenging the 
traditional medical logic that focused on diseases and corresponding symptoms, 
they started to introduce their CAM treatments as an additional service to help with 
patient problems like e.g. anxiety or nausea that could not be addressed during the 
usual surgical routines (ibd.: 615). However, as they got into contact with the pa-
tients, they began to make a full diagnosis, connected the symptoms, and incremen-
tally began to provide the kind of holistic care that was at cross with the biomedical 
logic (ibd.: 615-616). Through this initial compliance with the formal requirements 
of the traditional, biomedical logic, dual-trained physicians were able to bypass po-
tential conflicts and – as already noted for Daudigeos’s (2013) study – managed to 
‘sneak’ the new logic in. In sum, Keshet’s (2013) study provides additional evi-
dence that within organizational settings, professionals’ can easily promote change 
by ‘borrowing’ legitimacy from existing structures while subtly infusing those with 
new logics. 
Overall, professionals’ institutional work on the organization-level exhibits some 
interesting particularities that call for an explicit differentiation of professionals’ 
agency on the field-level from that on the organization-level. First, professionals’ 
institutional work in organizations is less often induced by general perceptions of 
opportunity and threat for the profession as a whole. Rather, institutional work 
evolves from tensions about areas of authority that define professional and organi-
zational roles. Also, and in contrast to the field-level, professionals often fulfill dual 
roles in organizations which may lead to intra-individual tensions and induce spe-
cific kinds of institutional work as professionals try to resolve role ambiguities (see 
Battilana, 2011; Keshet, 2013). Further, as organizations provide a context in which 
the structuring of work is an immediately relevant aspect of institutional work, the 
political component of institutional change may become secondary. As nicely illus-
trated by Barley’s (1986) study (see above), lower-status professionals may even be 
reluctant to actively grasp opportunities to increase their status within an organiza-
tional context. Specifically, radiology technologists only began to redefine their 
roles when institutional change seemed inevitable to maintain organizational func-
tioning. Second, organizational embeddedness does not only affect when and why 
professionals engage in institutional work but also how. Within organizations, pro-
fessionals exert institutional work that differs both in scope and in kind when com-
pared to their institutional strategies on the field-level. This is because organizations 
offer unique opportunities for institutional agency such as building alliances that 
transcend professional boundaries and utilizing organizational structures as unob-
trusive paths of influence.  
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The findings discussed above clearly point towards the importance of accounting 
for professionals’ organizational context as an arena of political and practical ac-
tion. Even when focusing on intra-organizational dynamics that clearly reflect field-
level discourses (such as the much trumpeted managerialism-professionalism-
conflict), researchers must be aware that professionals in organizations face ‘real-
life’, work-related contingencies beyond the largely abstract, political sphere that 
constitutes the field-level. Studying institutional work in professional organizations 
while assuming that organizations are a ‘mere small-scale replication of the field’, 
would thus not do justice to the technological, practical, and micro-political idio-
syncrasies of organizations which may shape the processes and outcomes of institu-
tional work considerably.  
While scholars have acknowledged the relevance of specific organizational bounda-
ry conditions for the dynamics of change in professional organizations (Fitzgerald 
et al., 2002), we still lack comparative research that systematically investigates how 
organizational boundary conditions interact to inform professionals’ institutional 
work. This gap in literature is both understandable and puzzling at the same time. 
On the one side, the complexities of professionals’ institutional work and their in-
terrelations with idiosyncratic organizational boundary conditions call for methodo-
logical approaches that allow for close attention to details. Consequently, research-
ers have primarily engaged in qualitative research, examining single or few cases to 
provide dense analyses of specific instances of professionals’ institutional work 
(e.g. Kellogg, 2012; Reay et al., 2006). On the other side, more comparative studies 
are needed to systematically uncover relevant inter-organizational differences that 
affect professionals’ institutional work. Due to the context-dependent, intertwined, 
and often improvised nature of institutional work, resorting to large-scale, quantita-
tive studies does not appear suitable to provide a deeper understanding of how or-
ganizational boundary conditions affect professionals’ institutional work. However, 
qualitative studies that leave the realm of in-depth process analyses and seek to un-
cover patterns of boundary conditions that shape intra-organizational institutional 
dynamics remain rare. This is surprising insofar as neo-institutionalism is no 
stranger to the study of organizational configurations and their relation to institu-
tional dynamics (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). Moreover, scholars have explicitly 
called for more configurational research to gain a fuller understanding of what 
combinations of boundary conditions motivate institutional work and affect its out-
come (Battilana et al., 2009: 95). Yet, these calls seem to have been largely ignored 
in the study of professionals’ institutional work on the organization-level.  
Another shortcoming in the literature that should have become obvious from the 
preceding discussion of extant research is the implicit conceptualization of profes-
sionals as conservative actors who mostly engage in more or less obvious mainte-
nance work. Similarly to the previously identified research gap, this is understanda-
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ble, yet surprising against the background of the current scholarly discussion. The 
increased interest in how professionals resist managerial involvement in their work 
obviously results from the inherent tensions between professionalism and bureau-
cratic structures together with the empirical observation that today, a large part of 
professionals work in organizations (see section 3.2.2). Additionally, institutional 
work literature faces a chronic underexamination of maintenance work while stud-
ies of creative institutional work are overrepresented (Lawrence et al., 2013). The 
question on how professionals prevent their work from being infiltrated by man-
agement or adjacent professional groups provides an appropriate and relevant ex-
ample for the study of institutional maintenance work (e.g. Currie et al., 2009).  
Accordingly, the strong focus on professionals’ maintenance work seems like the 
logical consequence of the renewed liaison between the sociology of the profes-
sions and institutional research. Especially health care has become the prime exam-
ple for tensions between professionals and management and hence also a main set-
ting for the examination of how professionals’ resist managerially induced change 
(Doolin, 2002; Hoff & McCaffrey, 1996; Numerato et al., 2012; Waring & Bishop, 
2010). To be fair, only few studies claim an institutional perspective, and an elabo-
rate understanding of how professionals avoid ‘being managed’ is of great practical 
relevance. However, the persistence of the idea that professionals mainly exert in-
stitutional agency to prevent changes in their organizational roles is somewhat sur-
prising as the control-resistance-dichotomy in institutional research on profession-
als has already been criticized (McDonald et al., 2013: 52). This criticism, I argue, 
is very appropriate as the isolated focus on resistance obfuscates our understanding 
of the conditions that enable change in professional organizations and directs man-
agerial attention towards the anticipation of struggles rather than the exploitation of 
opportunities (see e.g. Ferlie et al., 2005; Kellogg, 2012). From a theoretical per-
spective, the focus on professionals who become institutional workers to resist in-
stitutional change downplays the practical and pragmatic aspects of professionals’ 
institutional work in their organization. As members of an organization, profession-
als do not necessarily focus on the wider political implications of institutional 
change within their organization. Thus, they respond to changes in their organiza-
tional roles not only as professionals but also as employees who take the practical 
contingencies of their daily working routines into consideration when evaluating 
role changes.  
In sum, current literature is characterized by relative lack of studies to systematical-
ly investigate the relation between organizational boundary conditions and profes-
sionals’ reaction towards institutional change while at the same time fostering the 
perception of professionals as opponents to change in organizations. Accordingly, 
instead of focusing on how professionals resist institutional change within the con-
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text of their organizations, the following study will start with the question on when 
and why professionals react openly to proposed changes.  
5.3 Empirical Study 2: Openness to Institutional Change - 
Altered Task Responsibilities in German University 
Hospitals 
The following study seeks to add to research on professionals’ institutional work 
within their organizational context by providing a systematic answer to the question 
of when and why professionals react openly towards institutional change
32
. In con-
trast to extant research that focuses much on how professionals exert maintenance 
work, either in the form of resisting managerial control or by defending their organ-
izational and professional roles against other professional groups (Martin et al., 
2009; Sanders & Harrison, 2008), this study tries to identify constellations of 
boundary conditions that affect professionals’ initial reaction towards proposed in-
stitutional change. Specifically, this study investigates under which conditions nurs-
ing professionals are open to changes in institutionalized task-divisions that have 
the potential to majorly affect their professional roles. Drawing on a fuzzy-set 
qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) of change projects in the internal medical 
departments of 14 German university hospitals, I find three configurations of 
boundary conditions that foster nursing professionals’ openness to changes in their 
working practices. While the three types “Pragmatic Progress” (high functional and 
low institutional pressure), “Authorized Professionalism” (high institutional pres-
sure and involvement of a high-status change agent in a change project with low 
divergence), and “Guided Professionalization” (low institutional pressure and in-
volvement of a high-status change agent in a change project with high divergence) 
equally cause nurses to be open towards institutional change, they differ in the 
mechanisms that caused this openness. Further evidence from semi-structured in-
terviews suggests that configurations of boundary conditions only foster nursing 
professionals’ openness towards changes in institutionalized roles when they pro-
vide them with both pragmatic and normative legitimization accounts.  
Overall, this study expands extant research on professionals’ institutional work in 
several ways. Obviously, this study rejects the idea that change in professional or-
ganizations should be studied under the premise of professionals being opponents 
of change, drawing attention to (potentially modifiable) boundary conditions that 
evoke positive reactions towards specific role changes. Further, by accounting for 
the localized circumstances in which professionals make sense of institutional 
                                                 
32 Earlier versions of this study have been presented at the EGOS Colloquium 2014 in Rotterdam, Nether-
lands and the Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management 2014 in Philadelphia, PA. 
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change, this study provides new insights to support the idea that “professional 
groups should not be excessively homogenized” (Waring & Currie, 2009: 773). In 
particular, for each of the configurations that induced openness towards change, 
nurses provided a specific and distinct explanation for their positive reaction to-
wards change. This finding suggests that the same kind of professionals in similar 
organizations who react similarly to similar role changes may, in fact, be guided by 
different rationales. Complementing other research which suggests that the same 
logic may be supported by different organizational arrangements (Currie et al., 
2012), this study tentatively proposes that the same kind of observable change may 
be rooted in different constellations of logics. Consequently, this study adds to insti-
tutional research by calling for a careful distinction between visible institutional 
practices and underlying rationales. Lastly, this study offers a methodological con-
tribution to the empirical analysis of professionals’ institutional work, addressing 
explicit calls to employ qualitative comparative analysis for the examination of in-
stitutional agency (Battilana et al., 2009: 95).  
5.3.1 Introduction 
The change of institutionalized practices has been at the heart of institutional re-
search for over a decade (Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002). Within this line of re-
search, the health care sector has been one focus of attention due to its strong insti-
tutional pressures (Scott, 2004) and the drastic changes brought upon health care 
systems all over the world by regulatory interventions (Kirkpatrick et al., 2011; 
Ruef & Scott, 1998) as well as the “professional projects” (Suddaby & Viale, 2011) 
of different health care professions. Scholars and practitioners alike have been striv-
ing to explain when and why institutional change occurs (Beckert, 1999; Holm, 
1995; Seo & Creed, 2002) and how it is successfully implemented (Lawrence & 
Phillips, 2004; Maguire & Hardy, 2009).  However, current research has largely 
focused on divergent changes on the field-level (Galvin, 2002; Leblebici et al., 
1991; Ocasio & Joseph, 2005; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010), initiated by powerful 
individuals or groups (Garud et al., 2007; Leca & Naccache, 2006; Tracey, Phillips, 
& Jarvis, 2011). Changes in the institutionalized practices within organizations 
have, however, received far less attention even though it is the organizational level 
on which most institutional practices are enacted (Goodrick & Salancik, 1996). Fur-
ther, while extant research has provided us with valuable insights on how the pro-
cess of institutional change unfolds, it has so far concentrated on the actors who 
initiate institutional change (Battilana, 2006, 2011; Battilana, Gilmartin, Sengul, 
Pache, & Alexander, 2010) and their struggles to legitimize these changes (Maguire 
& Hardy, 2009; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005; Vaara & Tienari, 2008). Whenever 
recipients of changes in institutionalized practices (e.g. non-executive physicians or 
nurses in hospitals) are explicitly included into the study of institutional change, 
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they are often conceptualized as antagonistic force to change agents’ efforts (Levy 
& Scully, 2007; McNulty & Ferlie, 2004). This rather one-sided depiction of 
change recipients as potential opponents obfuscates our understanding of when and 
why they are open towards changes in institutional practices. This question is of 
particular interest for professional organizations like hospitals as managerial discre-
tion over professionals’ work is usually limited (Ferlie et al., 2005; Fitzgerald, 
Ferlie, & Hawkins, 2003; Raelin, 1986) and resistance to change particularly hard 
to overcome (cf. Ackroyd et al., 2007). Addressing this gap in literature, this study 
examines when and why nursing professionals are open to changes in their task 
responsibilities. In order to provide a fuller understanding of professionals’ reac-
tions to changes in institutionalized practices, this paper explores how different 
boundary conditions of institutional change jointly affect professionals’ openness to 
such change. Employing the configurational method of fuzzy-set qualitative com-
parative analysis (fsQCA), this study explores which configurations of functional 
and institutional pressures, divergence of change and involvement of high-status 
change agents are necessary and/or sufficient for hospital nurses to be open towards 
changes in their task responsibilities. Configurational approaches like fsQCA ap-
pear to be a valuable addition to existing research as they transcend the idiosyncra-
sy of single case studies, yet maintain the strengths of qualitative research by 
providing a holistic picture of the phenomenon in question (Meyer, Tsui, & 
Hinings, 1993).  
This study offers two key findings. First, this study shows that nursing profession-
als are open to changes in their task responsibilities when they face (1) low levels of 
institutional pressure towards nursing professionalization as well as high workloads 
(Pragmatic Progress), when they face (2) high levels of institutional pressure to-
wards nursing professionalization in conjunction with the involvement of high sta-
tus change agents who sponsor a project with little divergence from the status-quo 
(Authorized Professionalism) or when they face (3) low levels of institutional pres-
sure towards nursing professionalization in conjunction with the involvement of 
high status change agents during a divergent change project (Guided Professionali-
zation). Second, by providing additional case evidence, this study suggests that pro-
fessionals are open to changes in institutionalized practices when boundary condi-
tions interact to trigger both pragmatic and normative legitimization accounts.  
The contributions of this study are two-fold. First, the results of this study suggest 
that professionals’ reactions towards altered task responsibilities are driven by both 
pragmatic considerations on process efficiency and the normative aspects encapsu-
lated in their concepts of professionalism. Thus, this study shows that neither prax-
is-oriented nor normative explanations alone provide an adequate perspective on 
professionals’ reaction to institutional change. Second, while “accounts of physi-
cians’ resistance to change in their traditional role identity continue to surface in the 
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literature” (Chreim et al., 2007: 1515), this study focuses on nurses’ reactions to 
changes in their task responsibilities in an attempt to expand our perspective on in-
stitutional change in professional organizations towards an inclusion of secondary 
or ‘semi- professionals’ (Evetts, 2011). In doing so, this paper addresses recent calls 
to incorporate health care professionals other than physicians in the study of institu-
tional change in health care organizations (Reay & Hinings, 2009: 648). This study 
will be structured as follows. First, I will outline the theoretical background by giv-
ing an overview of relevant context conditions and characteristics of change in in-
stitutionalized practices that may affect professionals’ openness to such change. 
Next, I will introduce changes in nurses’ task responsibilities as research setting. To 
empirically explore when and why nursing professionals are open to changes in 
their task responsibilities, I will perform a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analy-
sis with data on change projects in the internal medical departments of 14 German 
university hospitals. The resulting configurations will then be discussed in greater 
detail drawing on additional case evidence. The paper will conclude with a brief 
summary of the findings and their implications for research focusing on change in 
the institutionalized practices of health care organizations.   
5.3.2 Theoretical Background  
Openness to change is generally defined as “change acceptance and positive view 
of changes” (Wanberg & Banas, 2000: 132). Openness to institutional change pre-
supposes that changes are viewed as “desirable, proper, or appropriate” (Suchman, 
1995:574), i.e. legitimate against a set of wider norms and beliefs. Whether changes 
in institutionalized practices are considered legitimate depends on several boundary 
conditions that pertain to the context in which such changes occur and the charac-
teristics of the change projects themselves. First, perceptions of legitimacy are ma-
jorly shaped by actors’ task and institutional environment (Oliver, 1992). Through 
functional or institutional pressures, the legitimacy of old templates of work organi-
zation may decrease and new institutional practices may be adopted (D'Aunno, 
Succi, & Alexander, 2000). Second, current research emphasizes that the status of 
actors who initiate and implement institutional change is critical to whether new 
practices are perceived as legitimate (Battilana, 2006). Third, characteristics of the 
change project itself, namely the extent to which a new practice diverges from dom-
inant templates of work organization, determine its legitimacy (Kraatz & Zajac, 
1996). In the following section, I will elaborate in more detail on how these differ-
ent characteristics and context conditions of institutional change may affect profes-
sionals’ openness to new working practices.  
  
O R G A N I Z A T I O N - L E V E L  C H A N G E  
183 
Functional and Institutional Pressures  
Openness to changes in task responsibilities first depends on the extent to which 
context conditions motivate professionals to consider new modes of task division. 
The task environment exerts functional pressures on actors to address their respec-
tive tasks in an effective and efficient manner (Hinings et al., 2004; Oliver, 1992). 
Hence, the adoption of new institutional practices and templates has been associat-
ed not only with social but also with functional pressures (Dacin et al., 2002; 
Roggenkamp, White, & Bazzoli, 2005; Westphal, Gulati, & Shortell, 1997). When-
ever institutionalized practices fall short of efficiency demands, actors experience 
contradictions between taken-for-granted practices and functional pressures. These 
contradictions are likely to raise actors’ reflexivity about once institutionalized 
practices and therefore increase chances that institutional practices will be reevalu-
ated against the background of their efficiency and usefulness (Seo & Creed, 2002). 
Accordingly, functional pressures are considered important drivers of change in 
institutional practices when “functional necessity or perceived utility of an estab-
lished practice” (Oliver, 1992: 578) decreases. While functional pressures may mo-
tivate professionals to reconsider the usefulness of institutionalized modes of task 
division, institutional pressures determine whether changes in institutional practices 
are perceived as appropriate.  
Institutional pressures reflect how salient specific institutional logics are within a 
field or within an organization and convey expectations on how actors are supposed 
to behave to secure their status as legitimate members of an organizational field or a 
professional group (Ruef & Scott, 1998). In professional organizations, normative 
pressures resulting from membership in a profession play a particular important 
role (Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006) and have been found to significantly affect pro-
fessionals’ behavior in organizations (e.g. Ferlie et al., 2005). Scott (2008b: 225) 
notes that professional membership exerts normative pressures on actors’ behavior 
through internal “collegial controls” and “normative controls […] built into the role 
systems and identities associated with membership in a profession”. Through train-
ing and socialization processes professionals internalize the norms and values en-
capsulated in their specific professional role (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Actors 
who fail to behave in line with their specific professional logic are likely to face 
contempt and reprehensions by their peers (Kellogg et al., 2006). Consequently, 
whether professionals are open to changes in their task responsibilities is contingent 
upon the compatibility of these changes with the logics prevailing in their direct 
institutional environment (Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006). Overall, both functional 
and institutional pressures may increase professionals’ openness to institutional 
change through economic necessities and considerations on the appropriateness of 
altered institutional practices.  
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Involvement of High-Status Change Agents  
Whether professionals accept and have a positive view on changes in institutional-
ized practices is further dependent on the actors involved in the initiation and im-
plementation of the change project (Chreim et al., 2013; Fitzgerald et al., 2002; 
Reay et al., 2013). As institutional scholars have emphasized, individuals with a 
high intra-organizational status are generally in a better position to promote institu-
tional changes due to the availability of material and symbolic resources (Battilana, 
2006). Their formal authority endows these actors with both decision rights and 
access to resources that facilitate the legitimization of change. Specifically, high 
status change agents like senior managers possess the skills to frame changes in a 
way that resonate well with the dominant norms and values of an organization and 
its members (Battilana et al., 2009). In line with these arguments, Moore & Leathy 
(2012: 139) find in their study on the introduction of clinical nurse leaders in U.S. 
health care that nursing professionals experienced “the lack of support by nurse 
administrators” as one of the most fundamental problems when trying to establish 
their new role. However, in professional organizations, high-status change agents 
commonly occupy dual roles as professional peers and managers (Llewellyn, 
2001). Hence, the involvement of these high-status actors in change projects may 
also be viewed as managerial intervention aimed at constraining professional au-
tonomy on the operational level (Raelin, 1986). For example, in their study on the 
introduction of patient safety systems in a hospital, Waring & Curie (2009) find that 
managerial involvement may cause professionals to reject changes as they think 
that managers are “unable to understand the realities of clinical work” (ibd.: 771).  
Overall, the involvement of high-status change agents in the initiation and imple-
mentation of altered institutional practices is likely to exert an important influence 
on professionals’ openness to these changes as managerial involvement provides 
legitimacy to altered institutional practices while also constituting a threat to pro-
fessional autonomy.  
Divergence from Status-quo  
Institutionalists distinguish between convergent change in line with dominant insti-
tutional templates of work organization and divergent change which deviates from 
the dominant institutional arrangements (Beckert, 2010). Divergent change is 
commonly described as a challenging endeavor as it lacks the legitimacy associated 
with changes that reproduce and reinforce dominant field-level logics (Battilana et 
al., 2009). The extent to which new institutional practices diverge from established 
templates of organizing exerts an important influence on professionals’ reaction 
towards them as practices are tightly linked to professional roles as integral part of 
actors’ identities (Currie, Finn, & Martin, 2010). As Nelson and Irwin (2014) point 
out, there is a considerable overlap between "who we are" and "what we do” and 
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changes in institutionalized practices are interpreted against the background of their 
implications for professional identities. Particularly in professional organizations 
where interaction and status are majorly influenced by professional roles 
(Kitchener, 2000; Leicht & Fennell, 1997), divergent changes in institutionalized 
modes of task-division may be viewed as both opportunity and threat. When pro-
fessionals experience a large discrepancy between their current roles within their 
organization and their professional projects (Suddaby & Viale, 2011), they will be 
likely to accept more radical shifts in their task responsibilities. In line with this 
thought, Battilana (2011: 821) theorizes and empirically demonstrates that 
“[n]ondoctors, being in a challenger position […] are more likely to be willing to 
transform to a greater extent the existing model of role division among profession-
als”. Professionals who, however, feel advantaged by current institutional arrange-
ments are unlikely to be open towards changes that diverge from the template 
which endows them with higher status and the associated privileges (cf. Schilling, 
Werr, Gand, & Sardas, 2012). Overall, the extent to which changes in institutional-
ized practices diverge from the status-quo is likely to affect professionals’ openness 
to these changes as professional roles and role-based identities are contingent upon 
the practices through which they are enacted.  
5.3.3 Rationale, Data, and Method 
The Delegation of Medical Tasks in German University Hospitals  
Nursing in Germany is currently undergoing profound changes with regard to nurs-
es’ training and their professional role in relation to physicians. In the past decade, 
German nursing associations have made tremendous effort to promote the profes-
sionalization of nursing. When contrasting nurses’ professionalization projects in 
Italy and Germany, Dent (2002: 156) observes that German nurses have focused 
more on the workplace than on their legal status. Accordingly, a key issue in the 
professionalization effort of German nursing has been the redivision of medical 
tasks between physicians and nurses. However, that does not imply that the as-
sumption of medical tasks is always viewed positively. While German nursing 
scholars generally consider increased delegation of medical tasks as a first step to-
wards the professionalization of nursing (Dreier et al., 2010; Rogalski, Dreier, 
Hoffmann, & Oppermann, 2012), research has found that nurses may also reject the 
assumption of medical tasks in a “struggle to attain independence from doctor-
driven work” (Dent, 2002: 158). The relevance of task delegation for nurses’ pro-
fessional project and their ambiguous reactions on the practice-level make this em-
pirical phenomenon particularly interesting for the study of professionals’ reaction 
to changes in institutional practices.  
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This study relies on qualitative data from change projects in internal medical de-
partments of German university hospitals to explain when and why nurses are open 
towards the assumption of medical tasks. University hospitals provide a particularly 
favorable setting to study changes that affect professional roles as teaching hospi-
tals have been described as “best site to learn about professionalism” (Apesoa-
Varano, 2013: 333) due to their educational mission. Further, university hospitals 
represent a very homogenous basic population facing similar institutional and task 
environments. While one would expect professionals from organizations as homog-
enous as university hospitals to disclose similar reactions to comparable changes in 
institutional practices, this was not the case in the study presented here. In fact, re-
actions ranged from a resolute rejection of the proposed changes to an overwhelm-
ing openness. Further, it is noteworthy that while nurses’ reactions to the change 
projects varied considerably, there was no case in which physicians objected to 
nurses exerting medical tasks.  
Data 
The nursing directors of all 32 German university hospitals were approached to 
provide interviewees from internal medical departments in which initiatives to del-
egate tasks from medical to nursing personnel could be observed. Overall, 18 hospi-
tals were willing to participate in the research project, yet only 14 could provide 
information on delegation projects from internal medical departments. To ensure 
comparability between the delegation projects, all cases from other than internal 
medical departments were excluded from further analysis. On average, I conducted 
interviews with three interview partners in each hospital. Wherever possible, I in-
terviewed the manager of the project as well as a member of the nursing staff (often 
the head of the ward) and a member of the medical staff to validate statements on 
the change project. Interviews were semi-structured and had an average duration of 
55 minutes. Interviewees were assured anonymity to avoid social desirability bias. 
Also, participation in the interviews was voluntary. The interview data was used to 
collect information on nurses’ reactions towards change (Openness to Change) as 
well as information on the characteristics of the change project itself (Divergence 
from Status-quo) and the Involvement of High-Status Actors. Information on the 
Functional and Institutional Pressures was collected using archival data from hos-
pitals’ mandatory quality reports. The measurement of the outcome and each ex-
planatory condition is described in more detail below.   
Method 
To explore how context conditions and characteristics of change jointly influence 
nurses’ openness to changes in their task responsibilities, I employed fuzzy-set 
fsQCA. While firmly established in the political sciences, organizational research-
ers have only recently begun to employ fsQCA in organization research (e.g. Crilly, 
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Zollo, & Hansen, 2012; Fiss, 2007). Building on Boolean logic, FsQCA is a partic-
ularly suitable method to discover configurations of conditions that lead to a specif-
ic outcome. In contrast to variable-oriented quantitative methods, fsQCA does not 
seek to explain the net effects of single variables but rather allows researchers to 
compare cases as combinations of several causal conditions (Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2012). Further, fsQCA allows researchers to uncover equifinal causal 
paths to the outcome of interest (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010) and conditions 
that reside on multiple levels (like the characteristics and the context of institutional 
change) can be incorporated into fsQCA without further requirements (Rohlfing, 
2012). As fsQCA relies on the relation between set-memberships in conditions and 
outcome variables, each variable has to be translated into a set (e.g. the outcome 
“Openness to Change” has to be turned into the set “High Openness to Change”).  
Hence, the outcome and each explanatory condition presented below were rede-
fined as sets before the analysis. FsQCA further requires the researcher to deter-
mine whether a case is more a member or a non-member of a given set. This proce-
dure is called ‘calibration’ and includes the definition of three threshold values to 
indicate full membership, full non-membership, and a crossover point at which cas-
es reach a point of maximum indifference regarding their membership in a specific 
set (Ragin, 2008). Depending on the kind of data used (quantitative or qualitative) 
the calibration procedure can rely on theoretical knowledge combined with in-depth 
knowledge of the cases and/or the empirical distribution of quantitative data 
(Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 32f.). While external criteria are supposedly pref-
erable when calibrating fuzzy-sets, lack of external qualitative and quantitative cri-
teria for set-calibration is a common phenomenon in the social sciences (Ragin, 
2008: 86). Hence, while relying on externally derived thresholds wherever possible, 
some sets had to be calibrated based on in-depth knowledge of the cases as well as 
knowledge of the empirical setting (cf. Fiss, 2011; Greckhamer, Misangyi, & Fiss, 
2013). In the following section, I will explain in detail how the outcome and each of 
the explanatory conditions were measured and calibrated.  
The outcome variable “Openness to Change” was measured drawing on the inter-
view data described above
33. Interviewees were asked to describe nurses’ reactions 
towards the change project and elaborate on the extent to which change was wel-
comed among nurses. Set-memberships were determined using a qualitative coding 
approach (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 35f.). Interview data were first summa-
rized into short descriptions of nurses’ reactions towards the planned changes in the 
respective departments. These descriptions were then coded into six categories be-
tween 0 (i.e. nurses refused change) and 1 (i.e. nurses were very open to change) as 
                                                 
33 Interview excerpts presented in the following have been translated from German by the author.  
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suggested by Ragin (2008:31). Table 5.1 gives an overview of the coding scheme 
while table 5.2 illustrates how each case was coded into a fuzzy-set category. 
Table 5.1: Coding Scheme of “Openness to Change” 
Description of Category Fuzzy-set Coding 
Very low openness to change: changes neither viewed positively nor accepted.  0 
Low openness to change: changes viewed rather negatively and hardly accepted.  0.2 
Rather low openness to change: changes viewed rather negatively but eventually accepted.   0.4 
Rather high openness to change: changes viewed rather positively and overall accepted. 0.6 
High openness to change: changes viewed generally positively and largely accepted.  0.8 
Very high openness to change: changes viewed positively and accepted.  1 
  
Table 5.2: Illustrative Quotes and Case Summaries for Outcome “Openness to Change”  
Case 
ID  
Summary Illustrative Quotes Outcome 
1 
The delegation of medical 
tasks became an ongoing 
point of contention. Nurses’ 
openness to change was very 
low. 
“[...] Our willingness [to participate in the project] is not very high.” (Head of the 
Ward: 196) 
“[T]here are notable little wars […]”. (Head of the Ward: 159) 
“Much is just being blocked. There is no collaboration.” (Physician: 31) 
0 
2 
Nurses expressed some 
concerns regarding increased 
workload which influenced 
the implementation process. 
Still, nurses were generally 
open towards changes. 
“Well,…we had  to dismiss concerns that one group is being overburdened while the 
other group [i.e. physicians, note from author] may increase their personal comfort.” 
(Nursing Director: 35) 
“[…] Those who worked in practice also knew how annoying it is to call for the 
doctors, let’s say, the third time, so he can apply that medicine…these very practical 
things, that everybody knows and that annoy everyone […]” (Nursing Director: 44) 
0.6 
3 
While openness was not 
overwhelming nurses gener-
ally appreciated the oppor-
tunity to assume medical 
tasks. 
“But regarding infusion…that would actually make things faster for us. We would 
be through with the patient in less time […] Well, that would actually be a relief” 
(Nurse on tasks to be delegated: 124) 
 “When we first started with the topic we did experience resistance from the heads of 
the team. They said ‘We have to protect our employees; they are working at their 





Nurses were very open 
towards changes in their task 
responsibilities.  
“It was […]There was no resistance or anything like that.“ (Nursing Director: 37) 
 “Well, I think that the employees thought it was very useful. Because, in the end, it 
structures and facilitates your daily routine.” (Head of the Ward: 167) 
1 
5 
Nurses refused to assume the 
medical tasks in question. 
The situation was described 
as difficult with regard to the 
delegation project. 
“It was rather like…well, the nurses just refused to assume medical tasks…“ 
(Nursing Director: 56) 
“[…] That is a point of contention ever since I can remember.” (Head of the Ward: 
25) 
 “The way I experience it, is: ‚We don’t want this here’. Maybe that is a specific 
problem of [our department].” (Physician: 118) 
0 
6 
Nurses were majorly op-
posed to assuming medical 
tasks. It took significant 
efforts to implement the 
delegation project. 
“We had our problems in the beginning, I am not gonna lie about that. It was not 
welcomed with open arms.“  (Head of ward: 37) 
 “It was pretty bad at the beginning. Motivation was pretty bad. “ (Head of the Ward: 
430) 
“Of course, there was resistance among nurses. There are still nurses who are not 
comfortable with it.” (Physician: 23) 
0.2 
7 
Nurses were generally open 
towards task delegation. 
Reservations were few and 
only situational in times of 
resource scarcity. 
“Well, I think because of our rather good staffing level it [the project] turned out 
very positive…it was not so much about workload… it was rather seen positive here 
[in our hospital] (Nursing Director, 41) 
“They realized that [it means] you don’t have to call [the doctors] all the time […] 
So, many see the positive development it brings…However, it is always a double-




Many nurses in this depart-
ment were skeptical towards 
the delegation of tasks 
because of workload consid-
erations.  
 
“Well, yes, it was just like it sometimes is in life. It did not cause us to stop the 
project […] but […] there were some people who were discontent, who saw this as 
additional workload, as overstraining.” (Nursing Director: 52) 
 “Many had the impression ‚We are full with work, there is no more space in this 




Nurses were very open 
towards the delegation 
project. While few uttered 
concerns about an increasing 
workload, employees’ 
reaction was generally 
described as ‘excited’. 
“Well, you have to say […] there was[...]a great consent, almost excitement, if you 
want to say so […] So, in general we were able to build upon a broad consent among 
our employees” (Project Manager: 112) 
 “And if you ask [employees] in the ward ‘So, how are you dealing with this?’[...] 
There will not be a single one telling you: ‘We are scared’ or ‘Help! “What will we 
have to deal with here?’” (Head of the Ward: 40) 
1 
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Table 5.2 (continued): Illustrative Quotes and Case Summaries for Outcome “Openness to Change” 
Case 
ID  
Summary Illustrative Quotes Outcome 
10 
Nurses had severe reserva-
tions about the delegation of 
tasks because of workload 
and legal considerations.  
“In the beginning, nurses had a lot of reservations […] That was a little difficult 
[…]” (Project Manager: 23) 
“It was tough […]. And the nurses had already said ‘We don’t wanna be the doctors’ 
henchman; that is important!’[…].But we had to be extremely cautious. It was not a 
topic where nurses were generally willing [like:] ‘Yes, we are gonna do that’[...]” 
(Project Manager: 105) 
0.2 
11 
Nurses were eager to assume 
medical tasks in question. 
Only very few concerns 
about new medical responsi-
bilities were mentioned. 
“It was ok for the nurses and for the doctors. We agreed exceptionally quickly. 
[Nurses] asked ‘Gee, why aren’t we allowed to do that? [….]” 
“So, it was basically ‘preaching to the choir’?” (Interviewer) 
“Yes, exactly!” (Head of the Ward: 163)   
1 
12 
Nurses were very open 
towards assuming medical 
tasks. Overall, the project 
was described as ‘no big 
deal’ with regard to con-
cerns. 
“[T]hey were very positive about that, they almost pushed to the front and wanted to 
participate [in the project]. “(Project Manager: 54) 
“[They reacted] well! Well, most said ‚Finally!’ […] Now we don’t have to wait for 
the doctor to draw blood in the morning, [now] we can integrate this completely 
differently into our work processes.” (Head of the Ward: 87) 
1 
13 
Nurses were very open 
towards the delegation 
project because of patient 
and work process considera-
tions.  
“Everyone was interested [in the project]. A good collaboration – also in the pa-
tients’ interest.” (Head of the Ward, 35) 
“So, I feel it was perceived as useful without exception […] I think everyone thought 




Few concerns about tech-
nical and jurisdictional 
questions were uttered. 
However, nurses were 
described as open towards 
the project. 
 
“I didn’t seriously experience [reservations] in this ward […]” (Nursing Director, 
189) 
„Well, I think it was […] especially with regard to the application of chemothera-
py…there was a lot of myth attached to it. […] But it has always been that [….] a 
relatively [big] part of the nurses said ‚Actually, we are on site anyway and know 
[how to do this].” (Head of the Ward, 149) 
 “Well, I didn’t encounter anyone who would say ‚No can do’.” (Head of the Ward, 
307) 
0.8 
     
 
The “Functional Pressure” that nurses experience in a department was measured 
using archival data from the hospitals’ official quality reports (G-BA, 2014a). 
These reports belong to the official reporting demanded by German hospital law (§ 
137 Abs. 3 Satz 1 Nr. 4 SGB V). I approximated the functional pressure which 
nurses in a department experience through their relative workload. With increasing 
workload, actors are forced to address their tasks in a more effective and efficient 
manner and hence experience functional pressure to reconsider institutionalized 
modes of task division. Measuring the relative workload of nurses in a department 
involved several steps as hospital departments may not only differ in the quantity 
and quality of medical cases to be treated in a certain time period but also in their 
absolute personnel resources. In a first step, the number of both nursing full-time-
equivalents (FTEs) and medical cases per year were collected for each department. 
In a second step, the relative complexity of the cases treated in each department was 
approximated by calculating the average cost weight for the ten most common cas-
es. These cost weights are provided by the G-DRG-System (German-Diagnosis-
Related Groups) that is part of the German health care reimbursement system and 
were established to capture the relative complexity of medical cases (Pierdzioch, 
2008). The cost-weights determined from the ten most common cases were multi-
plied with the absolute number of cases treated in each department per year. The 
overall number of nurses in a department was then divided by the weighted number 
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of cases per year
34
. The resulting measure captures the number of nurses per ‘nor-
malized’ case per year with a lower number of nurses per ‘normalized’ case per 
year equaling higher functional pressure. I relied on the TOSMANA Threshold Set-
ter (Cronqvist, 2009) to derive thresholds for non-membership, full membership as 
well as a cross-over point for each case using data on the respective basic popula-
tion. Each case was then calibrated accordingly.  
The extent of “Institutional Pressure” towards altering nurses’ task responsibilities 
was also measured using archival data on nurses’ formal education to be found in 
the quality reports issued by the hospitals (G-BA, 2014a). Specifically, I used the 
quantity of different categories of advanced nursing training available in the respec-
tive department to measure institutional pressure towards the assumption of medical 
tasks. Advanced nursing training includes specialized training like “oncology nurs-
ing” but also additional academic education like bachelor’s and master’s degrees in 
nursing. Departments that disclose a high number of different categories of addi-
tional nursing training obviously sponsor a nursing logic that includes academiza-
tion and specialization similar to that of the medical profession
35
. A high extent of 
advanced nursing education would thus be in line with the nurses’ professional pro-
ject on the field-level which promotes increased qualification and a corresponding, 
systematic expansion of nurses’ task spheres as important steps in the further pro-
fessionalization of nursing (DBfK, 2013: 5). Hence, I consider the extent of addi-
tional training categories to be a valid measure to capture the extent to which field-
level pressures towards a more professionalized nursing role – including the adop-
tion of new task responsibilities – have translated into intra-organizational institu-
tional pressures. Employing the TOSMANA Threshold Setter (Cronqvist, 2009), 
three thresholds (non-membership, full membership and the cross-over point) were 
derived for each case using data on the respective basic population (e.g. all oncolo-
gy departments of German university hospitals). Each case was then calibrated ac-
cordingly.  
The extent of “Involvement of High-Status Change Agents” in the task delegation 
projects was measured using interview data. Interviewees were asked to describe by 
whom the change project had been initiated and implemented. Similar to the out-
come variable, the measurement relies on qualitative information on each case de-
rived from the interview data (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012: 35f.). To create dis-
tinct categories, the complete interview material was first coded inductively to iden-
tify meaningful qualitative differences between cases that are definite members 
                                                 
34 The resulting measure was multiplied by 100, thus reflecting the number of nurses per 100 ‘normalized’ 
cases per year as the initial measure proved to generate numbers too small for analysis in fsQCA.  
35 Accounting for the fact that departments with a larger overall quantity of nursing personnel are more likely 
to exhibit a larger number of additional nursing training categories, the number of training categories was 
weighted by the overall number of nurses in the respective department.  
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(and non-members, respectively) of the set “High Involvement of High-Status 
Change Agents”. The coding outcome disclosed that “Involvement of High-Status 
Change Agents” in the change project could be differentiated by the extent to 
which senior management was involved in both the project initiation and the im-
plementation process. Cases were coded into a four-value fuzzy-set accordingly. 
Table 5.3 describes the coding scheme in more detail.  
Table 5.3: Coding Scheme of “Involvement of High-Status Change Agents” 
Description of Category Fuzzy-set Coding 
Project initiated and implemented by department management. 0 
Project initiated by department management. Supported by senior management. 0.33 
Project initiated by senior management. Joint implementation effort with respective department management. 0.67 
Project initiated and implementation pre-structured by senior management. 1 
  
The extent to which a change in task responsibilities qualifies as a “Divergence 
from Status-quo” was measured using interview data in conjunction with a task 
categorization framework by the German Hospital Institute (Offermanns, 2008) 
First, interviewees were asked to name the tasks included in the respective change 
project. These tasks were then coded into categories between 1 (low-complexity 
medical tasks to be delegated without special training) and 5 (high complexity med-
ical tasks that necessitate special training) provided by the German Hospital Insti-
tute. This coding scheme explicitly lists the tasks belonging to each category and 
hence provides an objective framework for categorizing each medical task included 
in the delegation project. As all change projects included the delegation of more 
than one task, an integrated measure was developed to determine to which extent 
the change project as whole can be described as divergent. This integrated measure 
was created by first coding each task of a change project according to the scheme 
described above and then calculating the squared sum of the coding results.
36
 This 
approach was taken to account for the different implications of tasks of different 
medical complexity with regard to their divergence from the status-quo of medical 
dominance. Using the squared sum of the medical tasks’ complexity category al-
lowed for a sharper distinction between change projects that mostly included tasks 
already at the periphery between medical and nursing tasks and projects that mostly 
                                                 
36 For example, the intravenous application of chemotherapy was considered to be a complex task due to the 
associated risks of extravasation (i.e. when cytotoxic agents infiltrate the tissue surrounding the vein where 
they can cause massive damage such as  tissue dying off). Hence, the German Hospital Institute assigned this 
task to the fifth category (high complexity medical tasks that necessitate special training). On the other side, 
drawing blood from a vein was assigned to the second category of rather low-complexity medical tasks which 
could be delegated after a brief instruction. The measure for “Divergence from Status-quo” accounts for these 
large qualitative differences between the different tasks by e.g. assigning delegation projects that comprised 
one highly complex, clearly medical task a raw value of 25 (i.e. 52) while assigning delegation projects with 
two rather low-complexity tasks a value of 8 (i.e. 22+22). This procedure is grounded in the idea that the sta-
tus-quo of medical dominance can be attacked by either a comprehensive delegation of low-complexity tasks 
(implying a re-structuration of clinical role divisions) or a less comprehensive but more radical shift in re-
sponsibilities.   
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included tasks that had formerly been at the center of the medical sphere. This 
measure implies that divergent changes can be achieved by both the delegation of 
numerous low-complexity tasks and the delegation of relatively few but highly 
complex medical tasks. This measure of divergence is in line with recent calls to 
give up the “dichotomous approach that contrasts divergent and non-divergent 
change” and to rely on more nuanced measures of divergence that reflect “the ex-
tent to which changes diverge from the institutional contexts within which they are 
implemented” (Battilana et al., 2009: 93).  In the absence of valid external thresh-
olds to determine to which extent a task delegation project constitutes divergent 
change, the distribution of the sample was first inspected for obvious value gaps. 
The TOSMANA Threshold Setter (Cronqvist, 2009) was then employed to derive 
thresholds for non-membership, full membership as well as a cross-over point.  
Table 5.4 depicts the raw data collected for each delegation project while table 5.5 
comprises the thresholds derived for the explanatory conditions that had to be cod-
ed indirectly. The set membership values resulting from the calibration of the out-
come and all explanatory conditions were integrated into the fuzzy-set data matrix 
(Fiss, 2011; Ragin, 2000). The fuzzy-set data matrix (see Table 5.6) provides the 
empirical basis for further analysis of the data in fsQCA. 

















1 Radiooncology 2.03 0.13 0 32 0 
2 Oncology 1.39 0.04 1 93 0.6 
3 Nephrology 3.52 0.07 0.67 41 0.6 
4 Oncology 1.59 0.03 0.33 50 1 
5 Oncology 0.56 0.19 0 41 0 
6 Oncology 1.92 0.09 0.67 102 0.2 
7 Gastroenterology 0,67 0.08 1 61 0.8 
8 Oncology 1.68 0.03 0.67 36 0.4 
9 Cardiology 1.50 0.01 1 36 1 
10 Oncology 2.29 0.02 0.67 77 0.2 
11 Gastroenterology 1.06 0.04 0 45 1 
12 Oncology 2.66 0.03 1 82 1 
13 Oncology 1.11 0.05 0 79 1 
14 Oncology 1.45 0.01 0.67 61 0.8 
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High Institutional Pressure 
   
                        Cardiology 0.06 0.04 0.03 
             Gastroenterology 0.07 0.05 0.02 
                        Nephrology 0.08 0.04 0.03 
                            Oncology 0.12 0.07 0.02 
Radiooncology 0.16 0.10 0.05 
High Functional Pressure 
   
                        Cardiology 1.05 1.6 2.15 
             Gastroenterology 1.6 2.2 2.8 
                        Nephrology 1.8 2.7 3.9 
                            Oncology 1.3 2.05 2.4 
Radiooncology 1 2.25 3.25 
Divergence from Status-Quo 26 67 88 
    












1 0.71 0.85 0 0.07 0 
2 0.93 0.12 1 0.98 0.6 
3 0 0.89 0.67 0.13 0.6 
4 0.81 0.08 0.33 0.22 1 
5 1 1 0 0.13 0 
6 0.37 0.79 0.67 0.99 0.2 
7 1 0.99 1 0.39 0.8 
8 0.72 0.1 0.67 0.09 0.4 
9 0.64 0 1 0.09 1 
10 0.02 0.06 0.67 0.81 0.2 
11 0.99 0.2 0 0.17 1 
12 0 0.09 1 0.89 1 
13 0.98 0.24 0 0.85 1 
14 0.90 0.03 0.67 0.39 0.8 
      
Analysis 
The fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis was exerted using the software 
package fsQCA 2.5 (Ragin & Davey, 2009). FsQCA includes several methodologi-
cal steps of which the most important are explained below. FsQCA generally dis-
tinguishes between necessary and sufficient conditions. To be considered necessary 
for the outcome to occur, a condition must always be present when the outcome is 
present (Rohlfing & Schneider, 2013). A condition is commonly regarded neces-
sary when it meets a consistency value of at least 0.9 (Ragin, 2006). Each condition 
presented above (as well as its negation) was tested using the fsQCA 2.5 necessary 
conditions procedure. However, none of the conditions proved necessary for the 
outcome “Openness to Change” to occur. Conditions are considered sufficient for 
the outcome to occur if the outcome is always present when the condition is pre-
sent. In fsQCA 2.5, sufficient conditions are analyzed using the Quine-McClusky 
Algorithm. The Quine-McClusky algorithm can only be applied if the researcher 
first translates the fuzzy-set data matrix into a truth table that displays the dichoto-
mized combinations of conditions of a given fuzzy-set data matrix. With four ex-
planatory conditions the truth table for the present study includes 16 (2
4 
) rows. 
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However, it is common in social sciences that not every theoretically possible com-
bination is covered by an empirical case (Ragin, 2009). In the present study, only 
rows that are covered by at least one empirical case were included in the analysis. 
Further, fsQCA requires the researcher to specify a consistency threshold that indi-
cates a minimum extent to which fuzzy-set membership in the conditions is associ-
ated with membership in the outcome (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). In line with 
current methodological recommendations, I applied a consistency threshold of 0.80 
(Skaaning, 2011). The results of the analysis are presented below.  
5.3.4 Findings 
The standard analysis procedure in fsQCA 2.5 produces three kinds of solution 
terms: a complex, an intermediate and a parsimonious solution. The complex solu-
tion is also referred to as “conservative solution term” as this solution is based on 
observable empirical data only and does not require the researcher to make any as-
sumptions about logical remainders (i.e. non-observed cases) (Schneider & Wage-
mann, 2012: 162). Hence, in accordance with the explorative focus of this study, I 
refrained from presenting the parsimonious or intermediate solution
37
 and will draw 
on the complex solution for further interpretation. The findings of the complex so-
lution are summarized in table 5.7. The notation style employed here is based on 
Ragin & Fiss (2008) and is commonly used in set-theoretic research (e.g. Crilly et 
al., 2012; Greckhamer, 2011). In this notation, black dots () indicate conditions 
that are present in the respective solution while crossed-out cicles () indicate con-
ditions that are absent. Blank spaces are used to indicate a condition that may be 
either present or absent (‘don’t cares’). 
Table 5.7: Complex Solution of Sufficient Explanatory Conditions for Openness to Change  
 
Solution 
Conditions 1 2 3 
Functional Pressure     
Institutional Pressure    
Involvement of High-Status Change Agents    
Divergence from Status-quo  
 
  
Consistency 0.854 0.958 0.787 
Raw Coverage 0.586 0.186 0.326 
Unique Coverage 0.397 0.127 0.109 





Overall Solution Consistency 0.839 
Overall Solution Coverage 0.850 
                                                 
37 These are available from the author upon request.  
38 Cases 1,5,6,8 and 10 were excluded from further analysis because they failed to meet the consistency 
threshold of 0.80.  
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Results (see table 5.7) indicate that there are three sufficient solutions explaining 
under which conditions nurses react openly towards changes in their task responsi-
bilities. The overall solution consistency of 0.839 is above the consistency threshold 
of 0.8 applied in extant research (e.g. Fiss, 2011). While the consistency of the solu-
tion terms 1 and 2 is also well above the consistency threshold, solution 3 fails to 
meet this threshold by 0.013. However, with a consistency value above 0.75, solu-
tion term 3 still adequately resembles the subset-relations between explanatory 
conditions and the outcome found in the empirical data (Ragin, 2006; Ragin, 2008). 
The overall solution coverage of 0.850 is high, implying that 85 percent of the 
fuzzy-set memberships in the outcome “Openness to Change” are explained by the 
three solution terms.  Particularly noteworthy is the relatively high unique coverage 
of solution term 1 which, on its own, explains almost 40 percent of the fuzzy-set 
memberships in the outcome. The fact that case 2 is explained by solutions 1 and 3 
shows that there are equifinal causal paths to the outcome “Openness to Change”.  
The following section provides an in-depth discussion of each solution term draw-
ing on additional evidence from the cases covered by each solution. 
5.3.5 Discussion 
Solution 1: Pragmatic Progress 
Solution 1 suggests that under conditions of “Absence of Institutional Pressure” 
within a department in conjunction with “Functional Pressure” nurses react openly 
towards changes in their task responsibilities. This solution depicts a situation in 
which nurses are confronted with high workloads while not experiencing a high 
degree of formal professionalization in the sense of advanced nursing education in 
their department. As interviewees explained, nurses in these departments were open 
towards changes in their task responsibilities mostly because of efficiency consid-
erations. While the existing low degree of institutional pressures to pursue a specif-
ic, ‘professionalized’ nursing role leaves room for the development of multiple, 
locally adapted concepts of nursing, the relatively high workloads in these depart-
ments motivate employees to (re-)define their professional role according to effi-
ciency demands. As the project manager from Case 9 explained, the redefinition of 
nursing has been a point of discussion in the course of project implementation. 
However, the main focus remained on the question of how nursing roles have to 
change to improve process efficiency:   
“And these points of discussion were also ‘How do we define ourselves as nurses 
[…] in the future?’ And you have to move away a little from old traditions to be 
able to say ‘Yes, of course, we can bed [patients] very well and care [for them] 
very well and wash patients very well […] but you have to think about […] how can 
I design the profession in a way that fits the given boundary conditions, meaning 
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that it fits the work processes well, becomes effective and […] is aligned with [em-
ployees’] qualification […]” (Project Manager, Case 9: 112). 
Evidence from the Cases 13 and 14 further illustrates that nurses legitimized chang-
es in medical task division mainly by drawing on efficiency considerations in the 
sense of improved working processes. Specifically, nurses often described former 
working processes as tedious and time-consuming and physician availability as the 
bottleneck of many treatment processes:  
“It’s a relief and we really enjoy doing this and the patient may leave more quickly 
[…] Applying it [note: infusion therapy] on our own is way faster than having to 
search for the doctor and then wait again […]” (Head of the Ward, Case 13: 197.) 
„It was a common wish and desire […] the question on how to design processes 
and how […] for example, to improve patient flow […]” (Nursing Director, Case 
14: 213). 
Improvements in process efficiency were also described as nurses’ main focus with 
regard to the redivision of task responsibilities in Case 4. Additionally, political 
considerations regarding the redivision of tasks and resulting aspects of profession-
alization were explicitly described as irrelevant, further supporting the interpreta-
tion that, in the situation described by this solution, changes in task responsibilities 
are evaluated against a practical rather than a professional perspective:  
“Have there been any references to the field-level debates […]?” (Interviewer) 
„No. It was not discussed in that way. It rather resulted from practice […] they 
looked at the patient process and thought about what made sense in the process – 
for the patient!” (Head of the Ward, Case 4: 117) 
Similarly, when asked about a potential normative component of the redivision of 
tasks between physicians and nurses, the nursing director of the hospital of Case 13 
referred to a “healthy pragmatism” (377) by which the department in question was 
characterized. While almost all interviewees from the cases described by Solution 1 
emphasized that anticipated improvements in their respective working processes 
were a major driver of nurses’ openness to changes in their task responsibilities, 
they also commonly referred to considerations on patient well-being. For example, 
in Case 11 the head of the ward explained nurses’ openness towards a redivision of 
task responsibilities as following:   
“It’s like this: we are having the chemotherapy delivered by [another department]. 
And sometimes the last chemo is being delivered by 3.30 or 3.45 in the afternoon. 
[…] That means I can start the chemo by 4.45 the earliest. But by then the ward 
physician is often gone and the doctors on duty would have to do that. That’s virtu-
ally impossible! […]And it was often the case that the last chemo was applied by 
2.30 in the night. And then we said:‘That’s unacceptable; we have to find another 
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solution!’ […] and now every trained nurse may apply chemo – [that’s] time sav-
ing. And [it creates] patient satisfaction, first and foremost. Because when you get 
woken up at 2.30 by the doctor on duty you are gonna ‘thank’ him, right?” (Head 
of the Ward, Case 11: 39-42). 
While in some of the cases covered by Solution 1, nurses expressed concerns about 
anticipated workload increases, process and patient considerations were commonly 
prioritized. As the head of the ward in Case 9 described, slogans like “Sure, then 
we are going to do this and that and then we will have to rip ourselves apart even 
more” (29) were not uncommon despite of a generally high openness towards a 
redivision  of tasks. However, nurses seemed to realize that they had to take on re-
sponsibility for specific medical tasks to keep the working processes going:  
“I am sure that it’s better when an experienced nurse does particular tasks than 
when a medical student […] does that, who gets here and has to be trained first [...] 
sometimes they even show up with outdoor shoes and without proper scrubs 
[…]Many of them haven’t even seen a tourniquet. And then the sheets or the pil-
lowcase or whatever is full of blood…Now we are doing that ourselves, the patients 
are satisfied and we are getting the blood in time. I think that’s pretty good.”  
(Head of the Ward, Case 9: 121).  
As interview data suggests, the lack of a strong concept of professionalized nursing 
drew the focus of discussion to pragmatic aspects of work organization while high 
patient loads drew attention to process inefficiencies that affected both nurses’ work 
organization and patient satisfaction negatively. Notably, the configuration of con-
ditions described by Solution 1 caused nurses’ sensitivity to patient well-being to 
supersede individual workload considerations. In this solution, the normative legit-
imization accounts nurses provided when explaining why they reacted openly to-
wards the planned changes reflect what is commonly considered a “traditional” 
nursing role that evolved around a logic of “unconditional care” (Kirpal, 2004: 
217). Hence, while Solution 1 describes a situation in which nurses did not refer to 
the field-level discourse on task delegation and nursing professionalization, nurses’ 
openness towards altered task responsibilities is still also fostered by normative 
considerations. However, new modes of task division were not perceived as legiti-
mate because of their potential to change nurses’ role and status. Nurses rather 
viewed the assumption of medical tasks as a chance to provide better care to the 
patients. Thus, in the cases described by Solution 1 the redivision of tasks gained 
normative legitimacy by appealing to empathic patient care as a strong normative 
theme at the very roots of the nursing profession.  
Overall, this solution discloses that professionals are open to changes in their task 
responsibilities when context factors challenge institutionalized practices in a way 
that allows professionals to find legitimization accounts for new modes of task divi-
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sion regardless of their divergence and the involvement of high status change 
agents. Specifically, in Solution 1 “Functional Pressure” interacts with “Absence 
of Institutional Pressure” to foster a problem-centered perspective on the redivision 
of task responsibilities that can be summarized as “Pragmatic Progress”. The ab-
sence of normative prescriptions on the professional development of nursing al-
lowed a process- and patient-oriented view on task delegation. While it may at first 
seem counter-intuitive that high workloads are a part of a configuration fostering 
openness towards the assumption of new tasks, the functional pressure in these de-
partments exacerbated the effect of even minor process inefficiencies. Under these 
conditions, nurses are often confronted with the “patients’ resentment” (Head of 
the Ward, Case 11:65) because of idle time and delayed discharge. Somewhat iron-
ically, Solution 1 shows how the pursue of a traditional, ‘caring’ nursing role to-
gether with frustration about inefficient work processes led to an encroachment of 
the medical sphere. This solution thus also illustrates how professional roles may 
change on the macro-level by micro-level attempts to better fulfill and improve a 
given role at a given time.  
Solution 2: Authorized Professionalism  
Solution 2 indicates that nurses were open towards changes in their task responsi-
bilities under conditions of “Institutional Pressure” within their department in con-
junction with the “Involvement of High-Status Change Agents” during the change 
project which is characterized by the “Absence of Divergence from Status-Quo”. 
This solution describes a situation in which nurses in a department with a high de-
gree of formal professionalization are confronted with rather minor changes in their 
task responsibilities which are supervised and supported by the nursing directorate. 
In contrast to Solution 1, Solution 2 describes a situation in which normative con-
siderations about nurses’ professional role as well as their qualification were more 
central to the causal path leading to nurses’ openness to change. Interview data 
suggests that, in this situation, openness to change is driven by both, considerations 
on process efficiency and the desire to increase recognition of nurses’ qualification. 
Similar to the cases covered by Solution 1, a redivision of medical tasks was per-
ceived as a means to facilitate and accelerate working processes:  
“Searching for a doctor is very laborious. You have to call him, which annoys 
nurses. If however, they are personally responsible, they [… ] do the entire process 
and complete it. You can actually tell that […] it is more of a relief than 
stress.”(Project Manager, Case 3: 63). 
“[It was seen as positive], because it has been attempted to integrate these activi-
ties into the processes. So that the processes improved […] [quoting nurses] ’I'll 
better do the job myself before I’ll let others organize my work.’” (Nursing Direc-
tor, Case 7: 107). 
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However, process considerations were complemented by nurses’ desire to re-design 
working processes in a way that reflects their qualification. As a nurse from Case 3 
pointed out, the opportunity to perform medical tasks was an integral part of what 
she considered a job that matches her qualification as trained nurse:  
“[T]hey [the nursing students] are actually being trained to do that. They can do it. 
[I mean], why not? That’s what professional training is for, right? And that is what 
I also learned […]it was out of the question for me to just make beds and wash and 
feed patients. [If I wanted to only do that] I would have gone to a nursing home.” 
(Nurse, Case 3:135).  
Similarly, the project manager described nurses’ general motivation to participate in 
a task-redivision-project as follows:  
“We are re-structuring and want to increasingly work according to our qualifica-
tion. And in this context, we could assume medical tasks and delegate other tasks.’ - 
That’s how it was for the professional group of nurses.” (Project Manager, Case 
3:55). 
Being confident about their qualification, nurses had occasionally assumed some of 
the tasks in question ‘off the record’. In both cases explained by Solution 2, nurses 
welcomed the involvement of senior management in the redivision of tasks as it 
provided structure and legitimacy to the hitherto inofficial case-by-case mode of 
task delegation. In Case 7, the head of the ward explained that “delegation of medi-
cal tasks […] was ‘legalized’” (Head of the Ward, Case 7: 28) through the change 
project and that the formalization of delegable (as well as non-delegable) tasks by 
senior management endowed nurses with legal security when exerting medical 
tasks but also with the formal legitimacy to refuse the assumption of specific tasks:  
“It is recorded in there [in the formal guideline] that you don’t have to do it. For 
example, that is very important when a really persistent doctor says ‘But you have 
to do that’. Then the [nurse] will print it out for him and tell him ‘Here it is in black 
and white: I don’t have to do this.” (Head of the Ward, Case 7: 146).  
In Case 3, the aspect of recognizing nurses’ qualification by senior management 
seemed to play a more important role than the “legalization” described in Case 7: 
“[…] There was a part saying ‘We are doing this from time to time anyway, it 
wouldn’t work any other way. And it is good that it’s finally seen.’ […] ‘We have 
done that the whole time and no one recognized it before.’ (Project Manager, Case 
3: 76). 
Notably, in both cases explained by this solution nurses were more open than re-
sistant towards changes (with a membership of 0.6 in the set “Openness to 
Change” and 0.8, respectively) yet neither of the two cases qualifies as full member 
in the set “Openness to Change”. Hence, Solution 2 captures cases in which the 
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configuration of conditions is just sufficient to generate more openness than re-
sistance towards change. A main reason for this result can be found in high institu-
tional pressure towards a professionalized nursing role as part of this solution. 
While nurses were confident enough to exert supposedly simple medical tasks on a 
case-by-case basis, a high degree of formal professionalization in these departments 
also raised their awareness of professional boundaries. For example, the head of the 
ward in Case 7 emphasized that she and “almost all of my colleagues” rather want-
ed “to do [our] actual job well than to assume someone else’s tasks” and that they 
“enjoy[ed] primary nursing tasks more than taking over some doctor’s tasks” 
(Head of the Ward, Case 7: 56).  
Accordingly, she believed that the formalization of delegable tasks by senior man-
agement plays a decisive role in the redefinition of nurses’ primary tasks: 
“I think that […] the intravenous injections, that is not like we see that as ‘delega-
tion’ anymore. It is just the standard. And the other [tasks; note: tasks to be dele-
gated in the future] […] it would be probably helpful to make them a standard. And 
to also foster acceptance by saying ‘Ok, that’s now part of my original tasks’ […].”  
(Head of the Ward, Case 7: 209). 
Overall, Solution 2 discloses that nurses react openly to changes in their task re-
sponsibilities when characteristics of the change project and situational factors fit in 
a way that allows nursing professionals to legitimize changes in the division of 
medical tasks as appropriate means to formally reinforce dominant concepts of 
evolving nursing professionalism. Solution 2 illustrates particularly well how dif-
ferent boundary conditions of changes in professional task responsibilities interact 
to foster openness towards these changes. While the institutional environment in the 
departments covered by Solution 2 sponsored a highly professionalized nursing 
role, providing nurses with the confidence to exert ‘small’ medical tasks on a case-
by-case basis it also raised awareness of professional boundaries and the desire for 
professional self-determination. For these nurses, legitimization of the formerly 
‘inofficial’ task delegation and recognition of their qualification by senior manage-
ment was a major driver of their general openness towards the planned changes. 
Hence, this solution can best be summarized as “Authorized Professionalism”. The 
fact that the medical tasks to be delegated do not qualify as divergent change is a 
necessary part of this overall sufficient configuration as it allows nurses to enact a 
professionalized nursing role while professional boundaries between nursing and 
medicine remain intact, preventing nurses who are confident in their role as well-
trained health care professionals from becoming physicians’ “henchmen”. 
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Solution 3: Guided Professionalization  
Solution 3 states that nurses were open towards changes in their task responsibili-
ties under conditions of “Absence of Institutional Pressure” within their depart-
ment in conjunction with “Involvement of High-Status Change Agents” during the 
change project that included tasks which qualified as “Divergence from Status-
Quo”. The situation described by Solution 3 is similar to Solution 2 with regard to 
the normative considerations about nurses’ current and future role in health care. In 
contrast to Solution 2 but equal to Solution 1, Solution 3 depicts a situation in 
which the respective departments are not defined by a high degree of formal profes-
sionalization. Accordingly, in the absence of institutional pressures towards specific 
forms of nursing professionalization, nurses’ attention focused on practical im-
provements in their work situation. As both project managers from Case 12 pointed 
out, efficiency gains were apparently an important driver of nurses’ very positive 
stance towards the assumption of medical tasks:  
“They [the nurses] can absolutely improve the structure of their whole work and 
they can get through the processes more quickly. And that is what many, very many, 
have reported as very positive.” (Project Manager 1, Case 12: 65) 
“[…] they just notice ‘I don’t have to wait, I can do that right now, the patient isn’t 
ringing the bell and keeps asking – where is the doctor? When will I get my infu-
sion? I need a new [intravenous] access, this one doesn’t work anymore‘– So, on 
that level, they think that it is very useful.”  (Project Manager 1, Case 12: 154) 
However, the divergence of the changes implemented in the departments covered 
by Solution 3 in conjunction with the high degree of “Involvement of High-Status 
Change Agents” implies a fundamental change in working structures that is legiti-
mated by senior professionals’ active support. Consequently, the situation described 
by Solution 3 provided nurses in the respective departments with an opportunity to 
redefine their professional status. As the head of the ward from Case 12 pointed 
out, the rationale behind nurses’ openness towards changes their working structure 
combines process and professional considerations:  
“[It was about] [c]hanges in the working process. We thought about how we could 
reposition the profession of nursing differently. A second thought [was]: how can 
we transfer tasks that don’t necessarily have to be exerted by nurses to other occu-
pational groups? And that is how it came into existence that we implemented 
changes in tasks. Changes in working structures. (Head of the Ward, Case 12: 59) 
“[…] It was about time – a restructuration of working processes was important to 
all professional groups. I am thinking doctors shortage, nurses shortage. How can I 
cover tasks? With which professional group?[...] Also, […] many cleaning tasks 
were still exerted by nurses and are now being assigned to the service personnel 
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[…] As a nurse you don’t need three years of training to clean a bed. I don’t need 
this.”  (Head of the Ward, Case 12: 137) 
Despite the fact that potential process improvements and associated efficiency gains 
were comparably important, Solution 3 differs from Solution 1 in the mechanisms 
causing nurses’ openness to change. While patient considerations were not unmen-
tioned by the interviewees, they did not appear to be the primary source of open-
ness towards the delegation projects. In Solution 1, low resource endowment and 
low levels of formal professionalization in a department interacted to foster a prob-
lem-centered perspective on task delegation with nurses who seemed to ‘accept 
their fate’ as being responsible for well-working processes for the patients’ benefit. 
Solution 3, however, describes a situation in which nurses were more focused on 
opportunities to evolve professionally and to broadly improve working processes. 
Given the comprehensive redefinition of working processes, including the delega-
tion of complex medical tasks in the departments described by Solution 3, nurses 
were anxious about their legal status when assuming medical tasks. Accordingly, 
the involvement of the nursing directorate in the change project was described as 
particularly important as it provided “legal security” (Nursing Director, Case 2: 
44) and a “safe ground” (Head of the Ward, Case 12: 161) for the exertion of med-
ical tasks. Overall, Solution 3 discloses that nursing professionals are open towards 
changes in their task responsibilities when context factors and characteristics of 
change interlock in a way that provides them with legitimization accounts to expe-
rience the planned changes as safe means to achieve both considerable efficiency 
gains and increased professionalization (as opposed to existing professionalism). 
The three conditions “Absence of Institutional Pressure”, “Involvement of High-
Status Change Agents”, and a change project that constitutes “Divergence from 
Status-Quo” interact to create a situation in which nurses are enabled to redefine 
their professional role in a way that matches local working processes with nurses’ 
qualification. In the departments described by Solution 3, the absence of specific 
institutional pressures leaves room for individual, department-specific modes of 
nursing professionalization. While the divergent changes promoted in the delega-
tion projects captured by Solution 3 allow radical process improvements that prom-
ise large efficiency gains, these extensive re-structuration projects also necessitate 
the support of senior professionals. Accordingly, this solution is best described as 
“Guided Professionalization”.  
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Professionals’ Openness to Change in Institutional Practices: Pragmatic and Nor-
mative Accounts 
The three solutions discussed above show that nurses are open to changes in their 
task responsibilities when either context conditions alone or context conditions and 
characteristics of change interact to provide them with both pragmatic and norma-
tive accounts to experience the changes in question as legitimate.  All three config-
urations of conditions presented above trigger efficiency considerations that out-
weigh potential concerns about increasing workloads. However, they diverge in the 
normative accounts they provide. While Solution 2 and 3 describe situations in 
which nurses’ openness to changes in their task responsibilities is (also) fostered by 
normative considerations on how nurses should be employed according to their 
existing and evolving qualification, Solution 1 describes a situation in which nurses 
pursue a more traditional nursing role that puts patient needs at the center of nurses’ 
attention. However, all solutions incorporate two aspects of professional develop-
ment. Nurses reacted openly towards enhanced task spheres when they experienced 
these changes as improvements in working processes and when they perceived a fit 
with the professional role they followed in the given situation. The interpretation 
that professionals’ openness to change necessitates the availability of both, prag-
matic and normative legitimizations accounts, is further corroborated by interview 
evidence from the cases in which nurses resisted changes in their task responsibili-
ties. For example, in Case 5, the head of the ward explained that the assumption of 
medical task was perceived as useful since “it takes more effort to call someone 
than to just do it myself” (65). Yet, nurses’ openness to new modes of task division 
was very low as change in institutionalized practices lacked normative legitimacy 
due to “the old doctor-nurse-conflict [about] who is responsible for what and who 
is burdening whom with work” (Head of the Ward, Case 5: 157). Specifically, 
nurses were critical towards the assumption of task which they perceived as genu-
inely medical: “The oncologist is actually the one to treat patients with infusion 
therapy. If nurses start to do this, what will the oncologist be doing then?” (Head of 
the Ward, Case 5: 41) 
Consequently, context conditions and characteristics of change must interact in a 
way to provide professionals with legitimization accounts that reflect the usefulness 
and appropriateness of institutional change. However, case evidence also suggests 
that the availability of pragmatic and normative legitimization accounts does not 
imply that professionals need to experience equilibrium between the pragmatic and 
normative legitimacy of new practices as long as they perceive both practical and 
professional benefit of institutional change. 
C H A N G I N G  P R O F E S S I O N A L S  
204 
5.3.6 Limitations and Conclusion  
This paper employs institutional theory combined with a fuzzy-set qualitative analy-
sis of 14 change projects in university hospitals to explain when and why nurses 
react openly towards changes in their tasks responsibilities. Results indicate that 
openness to changes in task responsibilities is contingent upon boundary conditions 
of change that allow professionals to find both pragmatic and normative accounts to 
legitimize changes in their working structure. A key finding of this study lies in the 
apparent importance of pragmatic process considerations for changes in institution-
alized practices. This finding adds to recent “less dramatic” explanations of institu-
tional change as phenomenon originating in everyday organizational practices 
(Smets et al., 2012: 898). Yet, the findings also underline that, while field-level dis-
courses hardly influence professionals’ reactions to change in specific organizational 
situations, boundary conditions of practice changes must allow for normative legiti-
mization accounts rooted in professionals role concepts. Future research might draw 
on these findings to inquire how pragmatic and normative legitimizations accounts 
must complement each other for professionals to react openly towards changes in 
institutional practices. Further, the results of this study should remind institutional 
researchers to carefully distinguish between change in institutional practices and 
changes in the normative accounts that underlie professional roles. As indicated by 
Solution 1 of this study, professionals may be open to changes in their task responsi-
bilities while not pursuing a new professional role. In fact, professionals considered 
an expansion of their task spheres in a paradox effort of ‘changing to stay the same’ 
which disconnected their intra-organizational institutional agency from their profes-
sional project on the field-level (see also: McCann et al., 2013). 
While this paper holds contributions for the study of change in institutional practices 
in the context of professional organizations, readers should bear in mind that the 
generalizability of my study is limited due to its qualitative approach and a restricted 
focus on specific change projects in the context of university hospitals. Further, this 
study relies on a group-based measure of “Openness to Change”. While the enact-
ment of altered institutional practices is a collective social phenomenon, future re-
search might include the level of the individual to allow for a more fine-grained 
view on professionals’ openness to change.   
   
  205  
6 Professionals and Routine-Level-Change 
Professionals’ institutional work on the routine-level is special in many respects. 
Routines are the patterns of professionals’ daily work – the mundane and common, 
the tragic and boring patterns of their work with clients, colleagues, and superiors 
(Becker, 2004; Greenhalgh, 2008; Pentland & Feldman, 2005). Routines are the 
most micro-level structures in which institutional agency takes place; they are nest-
ed in organizational contexts and serving as an arena for the enactment of field-
level logics (Powell & Colyvas, 2008: 277-282). Yet, routines are also executed to 
address specific tasks in specific times and places, making them susceptible to in-
ternal dynamics that may eventually foster institutional change. As a consequence, 
institutional work on the routine-level occurs within a complex interplay between 
enablers and constraints to agency. On the one hand, agency on the routine-level 
seems easier as adaptations in routines are commonplace and the political implica-
tions of actors’ adherence to or rejection of logics are less obvious. Thus, institu-
tional change or maintenance on the routine-level occurs more subtly and is less 
often accompanied by explicit struggles about the general appropriateness of new 
roles, new practices, and new structures that emerge from changes in the routine 
(e.g. Barley, 1986). On the other hand, routines are tightly embedded in multiple 
ideological and material systems that may constrain agency. Practical and techno-
logical necessities on the task-level, for example, may prevent the consistent en-
actment of specific institutional logics (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013; Smets et al., 
2012), organizational control systems may sanction deviance from extant practice 
(Nathanson & Morlock, 1980; Ritzer & Walczak, 1988; Sorensen & Sorensen, 
1974), and early neo-institutionalism would even predict routine participants to be 
unable to imagine alternative arrangements within their routines due to their institu-
tionally conditioned cognitive frames (Feldman & Pentland, 2003: 99). Profession-
als’ institutional work on the routine-level is thus a product of multi-level influ-
ences that interact to induce or prevent agency. Specifically, whether and how pro-
fessionals change or maintain their routines may depend on macro-institutional fac-
tors from the field-level, the technological and social structures of the organization 
in which a routine is embedded, characteristics of the routine participants, and char-
acteristics of the tasks to be addressed by the routine (cf. Adler & Kwon, 2013).  
To account for the multiple nestedness of routines and their dual function as micro-
level arenas of logic enactment and coordination devices to ‘get work done’, the 
following chapter will integrate institutional and routine literature to provide a 
comprehensive view on when, why, and how professionals exert institutional work 
on the routine-level. While both literatures provide important insights on routines as 
arena in which actors may exert institutional agency, neither does fully address that 
routines are both social structures that convey meaning and endow actors with a 
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certain (professional) identity (see also section 3.2.3) and coordination devices 
through which organizational functioning, efficiency, and eventually economic sur-
vival is achieved. Institutional literature, due to its primary interest in how social 
structure shapes and is shaped by individual and collective action, tends to view 
routines as either stable structures that carry institutional norms and values and 
thereby constrain actors  (Zucker, 1987) or – more recently – as social practices in 
which institutional logics are enacted and reconfigured (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 
2013; Smets et al., 2012). Interestingly, the duality between structure and agency 
has been addressed in routine research with the conceptual differentiation between 
the ostensive and the performative aspect (Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Pentland et 
al., 2012; Rerup & Feldman, 2011: 587;  see also section 3.2.3) but has yet to find 
its way into institutional research.  
Routine research, on the other side, could profit from a more explicit acknowl-
edgement of the socially embedded nature of routines. Feldman (2000: 614), for 
example, points out that “[r]outines are performed by people who think and feel and 
care. Their reactions are situated in institutional, organizational and personal con-
texts”. She implies that routine change is not a mere convergence to their most effi-
cient form but an ongoing dynamic that originates from actors’ socially conditioned 
reactions to performative feedback. Yet, recent calls for a more contextualized view 
of routines and their role “in (re)creating institutional contexts (and vice versa)” 
(D'Adderio, Feldman, Lazaric, & Pentland, 2012: 1782) underline that the embed-
dedness of routines is still one of the major ‘blind spots’ in routine research.  
While integrating institutional and routine research in the study of professionals’ 
institutional work on the routine-level may advance both of these literatures, it also 
helps to gain a more detailed understanding of the processes that underlie profes-
sionals’ engagement in institutional change or maintenance on the routine level. 
This is (i) because professionals’ work is particularly strongly shaped by social ex-
pectations and (ii) professionals’ work typically occurs around a clients’ specific 
problem in a specific situation that requires the case-specific application of complex 
knowledge. One the one hand, professionals are socialized into a dense network of 
norms and values on what constitutes ‘professional conduct’ and derive their identi-
ty from exerting special work in a specific way (see also section 3.2.3). Thus, pro-
fessionals are prone to consistently enacting their professional logic within their 
work, suggesting high degrees of stability in their routines. This aspect of profes-
sional work corresponds with central assumptions of neo-institutionalism such as 
the reproduction of socially conditioned norms that lead to structural stability in 
routines (Zucker, 1977). On the other hand, one of the elements that constitute ‘pro-
fessional conduct’ is the purposeful application of tacit knowledge to a clients’ spe-
cific problem under great levels of autonomy. This idiosyncratic nature of expert 
work would suggest that agency within professional routines is better explained by 
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routine literature which emphasizes the inherently improvised nature of routine per-
formances. Additionally, professionals, as noted above, are not only professionals: 
In their roles as managers and employees they may even intentionally distance 
themselves from their professional logic and change their routines according to ef-
ficiency demands or in order to raise outcome quality even if their professional log-
ic would prescribe different courses of action.  
In short, professionals’ institutional work on the routine-level is more ambiguous 
than their agency on the field- and the organization-level as is occurs as a response 
to institutional pressures and immediate practical contingencies that affect profes-
sionals’ routines simultaneously. The goal of this chapter is to investigate how dif-
ferent configurations of these boundary conditions affect professionals’ institutional 
work on the routine-level. To do so, I will first provide the empirical background to 
the study that will be presented in the third section. Specifically, I will elaborate on 
how the recent changes in German health care affected treatment routines and how 
health care professionals reacted towards these alterations in their daily work. In the 
second section, I will provide a concise literature review, integrating findings from 
institutional and routine research, to illustrate when, why, and how professionals 
generally engage in institutional work within their daily routines, drawing special 
attention to the incremental, subtle nature of institutional work on the routine-level. 
I will close this chapter with an empirical study that addresses the question of when 
and why medical professionals enact formal rules in their treatment routines. Em-
ploying a ‘routines as generative systems’-perspective, this study seeks to identify 
configurations of boundary conditions that lead health care professionals to partly 
renounce their individual autonomy within their working routines and instead ad-
here to formal rules. This study expands routine research by explicitly accounting 
for the multiple levels in which a routine is embedded, putting particular emphasis 
on the institutional pressures and the socialization processes that characterize pro-
fessionals’ work. Further, this study adds to research on professionals’ institutional 
work by systematically elaborating on how both social and practical considerations 
of professionals’ work induce change on the micro-level. Specifically, this study 
sheds light on when and why medical professionals enact artifacts that essentially 
collide with key aspects of their professional logic, namely their professional au-
tonomy. It suggests that medical professionals enact formal rules in their routines 
when these rules can be used as a resource for either coordinative and legitimization 
purposes.  
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6.1 Setting: Standardization of Medical Routines in German 
Health Care 
Changes in routines are often logical consequences of field-level-changes as the 
design of organizational routines that are considered appropriate against the back-
ground of wider sets of norms and values supports organizational legitimacy (Guler 
et al., 2002; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009; Lounsbury, 2001; Roggenkamp et al., 2005; 
Walston, Kimberly, & Burns, 2001; Westphal et al., 1997). Thus, whenever the 
social expectations on how organizations should be structured change, so will the 
routines that constitute the core of any organization (Becker, 2004, 2005). Accord-
ingly, the political pressures towards more cost-efficiency and accountability (see 
chapter 4.1) and the rise of managerialism in German health care (see section 5.1) 
have also affected the operational core of health care organizations, that is, profes-
sionals’ everyday working routines.  
With a rise in efficiency and accountability pressures together with an increase in 
multi-morbid patients, new medical technologies and a rapid expansion of treat-
ment options, practitioners are confronted with countervailing forces that need to be 
balanced within their routines. On the one hand, the professional logics of health 
care workers, medical professionals in particular, would prescribe autonomous rou-
tine performances that are primarily guided by physicians’ expert assessment of 
each patient’s individual needs. On the other hand, resource scarcity within hospi-
tals and tight quality controls by SHI-funds put constraints to the enactment of med-
ical autonomy within treatment routines.  
Both efficiency pressures and the call for more accountability in health care fos-
tered efforts to reduce process and outcome variability in medical services. These 
have been translated into a notable rise in the standardization of health care rou-
tines, e.g. in the form of comprehensive catalogues of standard operating proce-
dures (SOPs) or through clinical pathways that predefine each step of a specific 
treatment routine (Börchers, Neumann, & Wasem, 2007; Roeder, Hensen, Hindle, 
Loskamp, & Lakomek, 2003; Roeder & Küttner, 2006). This rise in standardization 
has evoked mixed reactions among the medical profession; specifically because it 
has diverging implications for medical practice. On the one hand, ‘evidence-based 
medicine’ has been advocated by the medical profession itself as a way to integrate 
state-of-the art medical scientific knowledge into daily medical practice and as a 
means of quality assurance (Raspe, 1996, 2003). Clinical guidelines that promote 
evidence-based medicine are provided and regularly updated by the Association of 
the Scientific Medical Societies in Germany (AWMF) and are supposed to aid clin-
ical decision-making while not being legally binding (AWMF, 2015). However, 
these general guidelines comprise a broader corridor of scientifically proven ‘min-
imal care’, to be adapted according to an individual patients’ needs rather than a 
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strict definition of each step of the routine that has increasingly been propagated in 
hospitals after the introduction of the DRG-system (Lelgemann & Ollenschläger, 
2006). Within hospitals, clinical pathways – while also based on scientific evidence 
and practical experience – are often implemented with particular efficiency- and 
quality-goals in mind (Lohfert & Kalmár, 2006; Roeder, 2003; Roeder & Küttner, 
2006). Given the idiosyncratic nature of medical practice and guidelines’ implicit 
proposition of an ‘average patient’ under ‘average circumstances’, the use of clini-
cal pathways has been decried by practicing physicians as “cookbook medicine” 
(Sturm, 2013: 223). Official statements of physicians implied that strict clinical 
pathways are an instantiation of the (false) belief that medical routines can be regu-
lated and optimized in a mechanical way and that the excessive use of guidelines 
may threaten the individuality of both the patient and the treating physician (Clade, 
2002). While physicians commonly employed normative appeals to the special 
bond between a physician and his patient to substantiate their argument that the 
very nature of medical work forbids a strict alignment of medical practice with 
formally defined rules (Helmchen, 2005), their ambivalent stance towards measures 
of treatment standardization is also notably informed by their fear of losing control 
over their work (Helmchen, 2005; Kolkmann, 2002b; Kolkmann, 2002a; Nauck & 
Jaspers, 2013).  
Generally, medical professionals are normatively committed to provide care ac-
cording to scientific principles (Berger, Richter, & Mühlhauser, 1997). Their goal 
to consistently align their work with state-of-the-knowledge is, for example, re-
flected in the strongly formalized system of medical education and qualification. 
This reduction of variance in medical work through the consistent application of a 
clearly defined body of scientific knowledge is even one of the reasons why the 
medical profession is granted extensive regulatory autonomy (Freidson, 1970b, 
1984). Accordingly, medical routines necessarily carry in them a certain extent of 
standardization that results from peer-control and physicians’ moral commitment to 
provide their patients with scientifically proven, state-of-the-art-medicine 
(Timmermans & Berg, 2003).  
However, as medical practice is increasingly exerted within the boundaries of large 
organizations and managerial control has become the new norm in health care pro-
vision (see section 5.2), physicians have become more aware and more critical of 
the implications of standardized medical routines (Clade, 2002; Encke, 2002; 
Helmchen, 2005). Clinical pathways have become an attractive tool for hospital 
managers to not only ensure that their organization provides state-of-the-art health 
care, in line with political quality goals, but to also raise efficiency, by e.g. reducing 
patients’ length of stay (Rotter et al., 2010; Rotter, Kugler, Koch, & Gothe, 2006; 
Stephen & Berger, 2003). While clinical pathways have been discussed to enable 
physicians in dealing with the increasing complexity of their work against the 
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background of technological and scientific progress and multi-morbid patients 
(Wienke, 1998), the instrumental use of these rules to achieve managerial goals has 
commonly sparked physicians’ resistance (Encke, 2002). This is because the en-
actment of clinical pathways directly restricts physicians’ characteristic autonomy, 
implying that they become limited in adapting their performances according to their 
patients’ individual needs, their own experience, and specific contextual conditions 
(Kolkmann, 2002a). This limitation of medical autonomy has implications for phy-
sicians’ professional identity as discretion over the operational core of their work is 
one of the key principles of medical professionalism (Cavenagh, Dewberry, & 
Jones, 2000; Rappolt, 1997; Sullivan, 2000), and has thus long remained untouched 
by the ever increasing regulation in German health care. While physicians have 
repeatedly emphasized that they do not object to using scientifically proven guide-
lines as a tool to keep treatment in line with the latest medical standards (Berger et 
al., 1997; Kienzle, 2007; Prütz, 2012), the context in which clinical pathways were 
implemented left little room for arguing that these were solely meant as a tool to 
support clinical decision making. Specifically, with the DRG-system in place and 
the ubiquitous propagation of managerial techniques, medical professionals’ be-
came increasingly pressured to justify their routines not only from a medical but 
also from an economical perspective (BÄK, 2007; Bär, 2011; Boldt & Schöllhorn, 
2008). As a consequence, the implementation of clinical pathways was often per-
ceived as giving further leverage to managerial interests, providing non-medical 
managers with an additional means to exert control over medical work (Clade, 
2002; Kolkmann, 2002b). Even though physicians always remained in charge of 
how to treat a particular patient, clinical pathways served as a template for ‘medical 
standard practice’, thus making medical routines accessible to non-medical manag-
ers and enabling them to question each practitioner’s performance (Roeder, 2003). 
Accordingly, reports from hospital practice indicate that physicians felt restricted in 
their medical autonomy. Examining the implementation of pathways in the urology 
department of a German university hospital, Pühse et al. (2007) report that physi-
cians exposed a critical stance towards pathways despite the fact that these path-
ways had initially been developed as a formal agreement among practitioners on 
appropriate courses of action within treatment routines. Specifically, even though 
(justified) deviations from the pathways had been allowed, practitioners criticized 
the rigid prescriptions of how they should proceed when documenting, diagnosing, 
and treating a patient (Pühse et al., 2007: 3091).   
On the other side, more and more members of the medical profession have 
acknowledged the benefits of employing clinical pathways in their daily work. In 
particular, pathways have been discussed as a means to inform and actively inte-
grate the patient into the treatment process, as a tool to support coordination among 
different health care professionals, and as an instrument to foster training and learn-
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ing processes within medical routines (Schwarzbach & Ronellenfitsch, 2008: 2514-
2515). However, physicians who promoted the advantages of clinical guidelines 
were usually cautious to emphasize that these rules are to be used as decision-
making support tool to help practitioners align their work with current scientific 
knowledge, yet should never be applied in a technocratic, deterministic manner 
(Nast et al., 2013).  
Apparently, physicians anticipated both the practical and the symbolic implications 
of a proliferation of clinical guidelines. As noted above, especially hospital physi-
cians risked a further loss of control over their work as clinical guidelines made the 
formerly implicit and often ‘mystified’ practice-part of medical knowledge accessi-
ble to managers, thus allowing non-peers to more closely examine the performanc-
es of medical professionals. While clinical pathways primarily pertain to health care 
professionals’ daily routines, their proliferation had strong political connotations as 
it questioned the superiority of medical autonomy and peer-control as means of 
coordination. Given that many medical professionals considered clinical pathways 
to be an adaption of industrial methods to the clinical context, their diffusion repre-
sented a challenge to the very core of the medical profession, that is, the autono-
mous application of complex knowledge while considering the specific needs of 
each patient (Clade, 2002; Encke, 2002; Helmchen, 2005; Kolkmann, 2002a). Con-
sequently, the enactment of guidelines in medical routines has not only been dis-
cussed with regard to their immediate effects on medical routine performances but 
became the subject of political debate. While the German Medical Council 
acknowledged the value of guidelines as a way to translate scientific knowledge 
into medical practice, it also explicitly condemned any attempt to misuse such 
standards for economic purposes and warned of their potential to de-professionalize 
medicine (Bundesärztekammer, 2002; see also: Graf-Baumann & Meyer, 2008: 2). 
Some medical officials expressed even more drastic opinions on the alignment of 
medical routines with care pathways. In an interview, Jörg-Dietrich Hoppe, late 
president of the German Medical Council, urged practitioners to carefully consider 
whether and how to employ pathways in their daily work as a voluntary standardi-
zation of medical treatment may foster the public perception of doctors as “arbitrar-
ily interchangeable service providers” (Flintrop, Stüwe, & Gerst, 2008: 927). Tak-
ing an even more critical stance, Vilmar (2008), honorary president of the German 
Medical Council, describes the development and use of pathways as an economic 
tool for controlling and rationing health care services not only as a threat to medical 
autonomy but as a threat to “human freedom as such” (ibd.: 92)39.  
In sum, the standardization of health care routines, while constantly on the rise, is 
heavy with meaning against the current developments in German health care. From 
                                                 
39 Both quotes have been translated from German by the author. 
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a practical perspective, the enactment of clinical pathways may be considered both 
a bureaucratic hassle that increases documentation and complicates medical work 
and a helpful tool that facilitates coordination and learning in diagnostic and treat-
ment routines. From a symbolic perspective, the alignment of medical performanc-
es with formally defined rules may demonstrate commitment to state-of the art 
medicine but also submission to an economically motivated rationing of health care 
(Kolkmann, 2002b). Specifically, the decline of medical autonomy and the ‘demys-
tification’ of medical knowledge may not only affect individual practitioners’ pro-
fessional identity but holds far-reaching political implications: Medicine may in-
creasingly be viewed as mere provision of predefined services which would consid-
erably weaken the medical professions’ position in health care politics and make 
their privileges (such as self-government) harder to defend against the state, SHI-
funds, and even adjacent professions (see also section 5.1).  
These countervailing forces make it hard to predict whether and when physicians in 
hospitals will integrate pathways into their routines. Most hospitals, on the other 
side, have a high interest in structuring their processes according to well-defined 
formal rules to address the efficiency and accountability pressures that rest upon 
them. Given that many hospitals invest considerable resources into developing and 
implementing clinical pathways while physicians, as professionals, remain free to 
not enact these rules in their daily work (Encke, 2008: 26), it is important to under-
stand what drives physicians’ decision to consistently align their performances with 
clinical pathways. Accordingly, the study in section 6.3 will deal with the question 
on when and why professionals are willing to restrict their autonomy and allow 
pathways into their routines. Before presenting this study, I will provide an over-
view on when, why, and how professionals generally exert institutional work within 
their routines. Specifically, I will integrate findings from institutional and routine 
research to identify theoretical gaps in the study of when, why, and how profes-
sionals integrate or reject new logics along the courses of their daily work.  
6.2 Theory: Professionals’ Role in Routine-Level Change 
On the routine-level, professionals carry out institutional work as both professionals 
with specific, socially conditioned identities that are reflected in what they do and 
how they do things (see section 3.2.3) and as routine participants who engage in 
effortful accomplishments to address specific tasks in specific contexts (Pentland & 
Rueter, 1994: 488). Given this dual purpose of routines as sites for processes of 
social construction and as systems of work coordination, professionals are incentiv-
ized to exert institutional work on the routine-level either when it promises to create 
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more appropriate routines in the normative sense or more efficient working pro-
cesses through better outcomes, less input, or both
40
.  
Antecedents: When and Why Professionals engage in Routine-Level Change 
As already implied in section 3.4.2, institutional change on the routine level may 
occur when professionals enact different logic constellations in response to per-
formative feedback, eventually leading new logics to ‘creep up’ into their ostensive 
aspects. Elaborating on the mechanisms that lead to internal routine dynamics, 
Feldman (2000: 620) distinguishes between “repairing”, “expanding, and “striv-
ing”. Routine participants repair a routine when their performances prove to gener-
ate outcomes that are different from the originally intended outcome or when they 
“produce an unintended and undesirable outcome”. Continuous repairing of a rou-
tine may result in routine stability and thus often corresponds to institutionalists’ 
idea of maintenance work:  While being aware of alternative performances, actors 
deliberately seek to prevent change in their routines as the given arrangement 
proves to be more efficient or more appropriate (cf. Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; 
Lawrence et al., 2009a; Lawrence et al., 2009b). Expanding and striving, as two 
further mechanisms of internal routine dynamics, are more likely to generate 
change in routines. Expanding may occur when routine performances open up new 
opportunities and actors make use of these. Striving, in turn, may occur when actors 
perceive the outcome of their actions to fall short of their ideals (while not neces-
sarily short of intended results). As Feldman (2000: 620) points out, striving im-
plies that routine participants “continue to alter the routine so that it allows them to 
do the job in a way that seems better to them”, allowing for both a normative and a 
pragmatic interpretation of what constitutes ‘doing a better job’.  
While each of these routine dynamics may lead to institutional work in the sense of 
a selective enactment and rejection of different institutional logics, I would like to 
point out that change and stability in routines is not necessarily the outcome of in-
stitutional work but may take place within a given set of logic constellations that is 
not challenged or altered. To give an example, medical professionals may adapt 
their treatment routines when encountering adverse outcomes such as unusually 
high complication rates among their patients by adjusting the frequency of consul-
tations or by administering different drugs. Yet, neither of these options would im-
ply a deviation from the medical professional logic. If, however, medical profes-
sionals opted to alter their routines by regularly consulting with nurses about treat-
                                                 
40 The literature review is based on the same search and selection procedure as described in chapter 4. Yet, 
due to the focus on both institutional and routine research, the initial search procedure was complemented 
with the following search terms, resulting in 42 additional studies that have been considered for the literature 
review on professionals’ institutional work on the routine-level: “profession*” AND “routine change”; “pro-
fession*” AND  “change in routines”; “profession*” AND “change in organizational routines”; “profession*” 
AND “routine dynamics”; profession* AND "organizational routine*". 
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ment schemes, they would subtly (and possibly unintentionally) exert disruptive 
institutional work by allowing for a greater influence of nurses’ professional logic.  
Given the goal of this thesis, the following paragraphs will focus only on instances 
of agency that (also) relate to the maintenance or change of cognitive and norma-
tive principles that guide routines. However, and in contrast to institutional work 
scholars’ notion that institutional work is “purposive action […] aimed at creating, 
maintaining and disrupting institutions” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006: 215), I will 
also include cases in which professionals engaged in non-projective institutional 
agency that promoted the enactment of specific logic constellations but was not an 
intentional attempt to alter or defend institutional arrangements. I will do so be-
cause incremental changes in routine participants’ perceptions on appropriate 
courses of action are an important driver of (de-)institutionalization processes on 
the routine level but may emerge as a simple ‘by-product’ in the strive for efficient 
and effective working routines (McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Smets & 
Jarzabkowski, 2013).  
How routine outcomes that fall short of professionals’ goal to satisfy client needs 
induce an unintentional re-combination of logics in professionals’ routines is illus-
trated by Smets and Jarzabkowski (2013). While I have already provided a short 
discussion of this paper in section 3.3.2, I would like to highlight some aspects that 
illustrate particularly well how performative feedback from within the routine first 
uncovers differences in the ostensive aspects of routine participants (see also sec-
tion 3.2.3) and then encourages the enactment of new logic combinations to re-
establish a functioning routine. Smets and Jarzabkowski’s (2013) study on cross-
national transactions in a multinational law firm, that involved the collaboration of 
German and English lawyers, shows that urging pressures to improve routine out-
comes may induce both reflexivity and motivation among professionals that ena-
bles the creation of new routines. The authors particularly emphasize that a “work-
level-crisis” (ibd.: 1299) in which inefficiencies and delays caused client dissatis-
faction, led German and English lawyers to reconsider their collective working rou-
tines. As the rejection of each other’s professional logics as guiding principles for 
the consultation and service routines caused unsatisfactory outcomes, the two 
groups of lawyers were unable to maintain their diverging ostensive aspects.  While 
routine researchers have already emphasized that actors may adapt their routines in 
response to outcomes remaining under aspiration levels (Feldman & Pentland, 
2003), Smets and Jarzabkowski (2013) provide an interesting institutional explana-
tion on why routine performances may not achieve the intended outcome. In their 
case study, German and English legal professionals – due to their differences in 
socialization – have developed diverging ideas on how legal service routines are to 
be exerted. Thus, the crossnational routines were characterized by multiple osten-
sive aspects which resulted in coordination problems and, eventually, led to lower 
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outcome quality. This possibility of multiple ostensive aspects has only recently 
been acknowledged in routine research (Safavi, 2014), but has important implica-
tions for professionals’ institutional work on the routine-level. As professional so-
cialization is usually a strong aspect of routine participants’ identity, which they 
develop and enact within their work (Pratt et al., 2006), diverging ostensive aspects 
in multiprofessional routines are not easily integrated and necessitate reflexivity and 
purposeful effort to translate into coordinated performances. Smets and Jarzabkow-
ski’s (2013) findings underline this argument as they reveal that it took four cycles 
of institutional work for lawyers to resolve the logic complexity within their work 
and generate a shared ostensive aspect. While at first, logics were separated by 
keeping individual performances in line with each of the logics (cycle 1) and ex-
plicitly constructing performances and underlying logics as incommensurable (cy-
cle 2), persistent negative feedback from routine performances pushed lawyers to-
wards a re-evaluation of their representations of what constitutes an appropriate 
legal service routine. Accordingly, they began to improvise, first generating hybrid 
performances around specific client needs (cycle 3) before finally establishing for-
mal modes of training and socialization that fostered the development and stabiliza-
tion of ostensive aspects (cycle 4).  
Two insights from this study are noteworthy for expanding our understanding of 
when and why professionals engage in institutional work on the routine-level. First, 
on the routine-level, it may not be the co-existence of several logics as such that 
drives institutional work but rather its effects on the coordination of performances. 
This is because ideas on appropriate work organization primarily show in their en-
actment rather than being explicitly discussed, as routines are not arenas for politi-
cal negotiation. In short, diverging institutional frameworks induce agency because 
they inform the ostensive aspects of the routine participants which, in turn, become 
obvious in professionals’ performances as the immediate applications of their ideas 
of appropriate conduct. Second, internal routine dynamics that stem from performa-
tive variability are not only generally more likely in professionals’ routines due to 
their inherent complexity and client orientation (Faraj & Xiao, 2006), but may also 
be driven by diverging ostensive aspects that are more likely to occur when profes-
sionals with different institutional backgrounds need to collaborate within routines 
(cf. Currie & White, 2012; Elissen, Van Raak, & Paulus, 2011). 
While both routine researchers and – more recently – institutionalists provide con-
vincing accounts as to why antecedents of institutional dynamics on the routine-
level may be found in the routine itself (Feldman, 2000; Greenhalgh, 2008; 
Hilligoss & Cohen, 2011; Jarzabkowski et al., 2009; Pentland et al., 2012; Reay et 
al., 2013; Reay et al., 2006; Rerup & Feldman, 2011; Safavi, 2014; Smets & 
Jarzabkowski, 2013; Smets et al., 2012; Williams, 2001), several studies suggest 
that professionals’ institutional work on the routine-level may be induced by exter-
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nal interventions that expand or shift the logic constellations that have hitherto 
dominated professionals’ ostensive aspects (Barley, 1986; Bruns, 2009; Harris et 
al., 2014; Kellogg, 2009; Kellogg, 2011). In contrast to internal dynamics in which 
ostensive aspects are shaped by feedback from performances, external interventions 
may directly disrupt existing accounts on how a routine is to be exerted, leading to 
a response that – in the case of professionals – often includes the purposive mainte-
nance of their routine.  
An often-cited example of an external intervention that may disrupt professionals’ 
ostensive aspects of their routines is the introduction of formal (procedural) rules 
that contain explicit descriptions on what routine participants should focus their 
attention on, which steps they should include in their routine, and how they are 
supposed to execute each step of the routine (Brunsson & Jacobsson, 2000; Busch, 
2011; Jacobsson, 2000; Rozich et al., 2004; Savage & Langlois, 1997; 
Timmermans & Berg, 2003). Formal rules may induce institutional agency on the 
routine-level when they have the potential to alter or enhance the logic constella-
tions that shape professionals’ ideas on how to go about their work. Specifically, 
when their respective professional logic and formal routine prescriptions provide 
mutually exclusive behavioral repertoires, professionals are confronted with a 
forced-choice-situation that necessitates purposeful institutional work to either 
maintain or adapt their routines. While research on professionals often suggests a 
general incommensurability between the typically autonomous professional work 
and the adherence to formal rules (e.g. Scott, 1982: 229), the introduction of rules 
into professionals’ routines does not necessarily induce the strict maintenance of a 
given routine. For example, Bruns (2009) as well as Garrow and Grusky (2013) 
show in their studies on the enactment of rules in professionals’ work that profes-
sionals may partially and selectively maintain or change their routines in response 
to rule implementation, depending on the extent of conflict between their guiding 
logic and the rule.  
Bruns’s (2009) ethnographic study in a molecular biology laboratory of a leading 
U.S. research university shows that the implementation of formal rules may induce 
institutional maintenance work among professionals in the form of a selective en-
actment of rule elements. Employing a routine-theoretical perspective, Bruns 
(2009) investigates when and why scientists’ routine performances systematically 
differ from the routine prescriptions of organizational safety rules. Her case study 
provides a typical example in which state regulation had been translated into stand-
ard operating procedures on the organizational level to ensure professionals’ com-
pliance with legal requirements. Specifically, an Environmental Health and Safety 
office (EHS) had been formed to provide safety trainings and formal rules to ensure 
that laboratory scientists exerted their routines in line with safety regulations. The 
maintenance of a high level of laboratory safety was crucial to secure the legitimacy 
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of the research facility and protect it from legal sanctions. Hence, the goal of the 
EHS was to “eliminate or minimize hazards that the research could inflict on the 
scientists, the public, and the environment” (Bruns, 2009: 1407). While general 
safety rules were issued by the EHS, these had to be adapted to the specific circum-
stances and health risks in each of the laboratories. The examined laboratory was 
classified as “bio level 2”, implying that scientists were regularly handling poten-
tially infectious human cell lines, radioactive material and liquid nitrogen, as well 
as sharp instruments which increased their risk of injury and infection (ibd.: 1408). 
Thus, safety rules in this laboratory included the general EHS guidelines on person-
al safety as well as further specifications on how to dress, when to use gloves, and 
how to proceed when specific substances are being handled. Yet, regulatory pres-
sures and university’s great efforts to generate a climate of safety did not ensure 
that scientists diligently engaged in all of the prescribed safety practices. According 
to Bruns’s (2009: 1413) observations, scientists’ performances were strongly 
aligned with safety prescriptions that ensured the protection of their experiment. 
Rule elements that (only) related to the protection of scientists’ physical health 
were, however, at best randomly enacted. Bruns (2009: 1407-1410) explains this by 
pointing towards the two-dimensional nature of safety in the setting of scientific 
research. Scientists’ idea of safety was primarily related to the protection of their 
experiment. On the one hand, the professional norm on “nonintervention” (ibd: 
1410) prescribes that scientists should absolutely prevent any contamination of their 
experiment to ensure that they do not interfere with the experimental outcome. On 
the other hand, securing the experiment against contamination also has concrete 
practical implications for researchers as “laboratory experiments are very delicate” 
(ibd.: 1410) and the reproduction of an experiment could set scientists back by 
months or even years of work. Safety as organizational goal, in turn, was primarily 
conceptualized as the protection of scientists’ and public health and thus instrumen-
tal to avoiding legal prosecution and the loss of organizational legitimacy (Bruns, 
2009: 1407f.).  
From an institutional perspective these divergent ideas of safety can be viewed as 
an expression of two logics, namely, scientific professionalism and the logic of bu-
reaucracy. Within their daily routines, scientists worked towards the maintenance of 
their professional logic that emphasized the primacy of the experiment over their 
own safety and over the formal rules of their organization. Interestingly, scientists 
did not explicitly resist those safety rules that did not add to the accuracy of the ex-
periment but opted to frequently ignore them in their daily work. An excerpt from 
Bruns’s (2009) fieldwork illustrates particularly well that the non-enactment of 
rules that promoted scientists’ personal safety was not an intentional act of deviance 
but rather a consequent enactment of the scientific logic that put the focus on the 
integrity of the experiments. When Bruns (2009: 1417) asked a postdoctoral student 
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why she would not wear gloves during her work on a Petri dish, she responded that 
the cells she was examining were already dead, implying that she could not possi-
bly harm the experiment.  Bruns (2009: 1417) further elaborates that her interview 
partner did “not consider the possibility that the cells contain an infectious virus 
that she could be exposed to in case of an accident”. While institutionalists might 
argue that the non-enactment of rules was merely a non-reflective automatism, 
Bruns (2009: 1416) explicitly points towards a discrepancy between interview data 
and scientists’ performance, implying that scientists were well-aware of their organ-
izations’ safety rules as they “readily reproduced the understanding of safety pro-
moted in EHS trainings, manuals, and inspections” during interviews but opted to 
only selectively enact these rules in their performances. Here, scientists’ institution-
al work consisted of what institutionalists might refer to as selective decoupling (cf. 
Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008). Specifically, scientists fully aligned their perfor-
mances with their professional logic which led to the enactment of only those ele-
ments of organizational safety rules that were conducive to the protection of their 
experiments. A particularly interesting insight from Bruns’s (2009) study is how the 
interaction between formal rules, as an external intervention, and performative 
feedback from within the routine induced a specific form of agency among scien-
tists. As carriers of bureaucratic elements, the enactment of formal rules can be as-
sumed to collide with professionalism in general (Adler & Kwon, 2013; Bozeman 
& Rainey, 1998; Sorensen & Sorensen, 1974). However, as Bruns (2009:1420) im-
plies, specific rule components were in line with scientists’ professional logic that 
emphasizes the importance of protecting the experiment to obtain publishable re-
sults. Consequently, scientists utilized specific elements of the organizational safety 
rules to bring their performances in line with their professional norms and to social-
ize new team members accordingly. Rule components that did not appear to be 
conducive to the protection of scientists’ experiments were, in turn, only randomly 
translated into practice. Especially this non-enactment of rule components illus-
trates well how scientists’ maintenance work resulted from an interaction between 
external interventions and performative feedback. On the one hand, the introduction 
of safety rules induced reflexivity among scientists about their everyday perfor-
mances, as a quote from one member of the laboratory illustrates. When asked to be 
photographed, he gave permission but added: “Maybe I should wear glasses . . .” 
(ibd.: 1418), implying that he was aware of his deviation from organizational safety 
rules. On the other hand, scientists’ negligence of rule elements that referred to per-
sonal safety was seemingly justified by their experience that the laboratory has been 
largely accident-free for at least six years (Bruns, 2009: 1410). Bruns (2009: 1417) 
concludes that, “[t]he memory in the laboratory that the scientists operate on does 
not contain any recent occurrence of accidents” which contributed to “making per-
sonal safety seem less urgent”. Thus, for purposes of personal protection scientists 
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relied on their characteristic decision-making autonomy and their expertise even 
though organizational safety rules explicitly demanded to “treat all compounds as 
potentially harmful” (ibd.: 1409). Specifically, Bruns’s (2009: 1418) observations 
and interview data reveal that scientists typically rationalized the non-enactment of 
rules by implying that they were able to assess the risk of the respective perfor-
mance. For example, one scientist who refrained from wearing long pants or safety 
glasses while handling a slightly radioactive substance noted that the material was 
not very harmful, concluding that he did not “have to protect [himself] too much” 
(ibd.: 1418). This selective enactment of organizational safety rules can be viewed 
as a consequent enactment of scientists’ professional logic through both, their fo-
cusing on the protection of their experiments against contamination and their 
demonstration of professional autonomy and expertise. Yet, I would like to point 
out an important detail that may add to our understanding of how logics may be 
combined within professionals’ daily routines. While scientists obviously main-
tained the dominance of their professional logic and freely decided whether and 
when to enact rules on personal safety, they also opted to align their performances 
with rules on experiment safety and socialized new members of the laboratory ac-
cordingly, thus integrating typical bureaucratic elements (i.e. formal rules as means 
of coordination) into their work. This was because formal rules that protected the 
experiment against contamination helped to achieve outcomes that are deemed de-
sirable within the scientific professional logic while, for personal safety rules, the 
benefit of rule enactment did not outweigh the necessary restriction of professional 
autonomy. Consequently, Bruns’s (2009) study may be conceptualized as an in-
stance of maintenance work on the routine-level but still shows how new logics 
may be selectively included in professionals’ work when they provide them with 
resources that support the enactment of their professional logic. This conclusion is 
well in line with recent institutional research which emphasizes that professionals 
may be guided by more than one logic, especially when these logics are comple-
mentary (Goodrick & Reay, 2011). While professional logics and the logic of bu-
reaucracy are generally assumed to be conflictual (Freidson, 2001; Sorensen & 
Sorensen, 1974), scientists’ selective enactment of formal rules on the routine-level 
shows how professionals may borrow elements from other than their own logic and 
thereby incrementally und unintentionally work towards institutional change.  
Overall, Bruns’s (2009) study nicely illustrates that professionals’ institutional 
work on the routine-level may come into existence when external interventions in-
duce reflexivity about their performances while commensurability of these inter-
ventions with professional norms and performative feedback affect whether profes-
sionals engage in the change or maintenance of their routines. Further, it shows that 
professionals’ (selective) divergence from formal organizational rules is not neces-
sarily an instance of strategic effort to exclude bureaucratic elements from their 
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work but may be ‘agency by passive omission’ rather than ‘agency by active defi-
ance’ that typically occurs in the non-political context of everyday working rou-
tines.  
Garrow and Grusky (2013) offer another study that addresses the question of when 
and why formal rules are being enacted in professional settings. While their quanti-
tative study does not provide detailed accounts on routine participants’ rationale 
behind the (non-)enactment of rules in their routines, it draws attention to the multi-
level contexts of professional work that may affect whether and how professionals’ 
exert agency within their routine performances.  
Specifically, they examine the influence of field-level logics on the enactment of 
formal rules in professional settings. They focus on the implementation of regulato-
ry guidelines for HIV/AIDS pretest counselling in social work, hypothesizing that 
(in)compatibilities of these artifacts with field-level logics serve as a precursor to 
institutional agency on the routine-level. The authors test their hypotheses using a 
sample of 90 HIV/AIDS health organizations and 216 frontline practitioners in Los 
Angeles County. All of these organizations offered HIV pretest counselling, yet, as 
the authors note, they do not operate according to the same dominant logics (ibd.: 
111). Accordingly, counselling routines were embedded not only in different tech-
nological and practical contexts but also in diverging normative and cognitive sys-
tems. In addition, and as typical for professional settings, practitioners had large 
degrees of discretion when structuring their work. As Garrow and Grusky (2013: 
105) point out, they become “lower level policy makers” (ibd.: 103) since the “en-
forcement of CDC guidelines is weak”. Thus, regulatory force and direct control of 
professional practice can be excluded as potential explanation for the extent to 
which practitioners align their work with formal prescriptions.  
To examine the effect of higher-level institutional logics on practitioners’ micro-
level agency, they cluster the organizations in their sample into four organizational 
fields according to their central logics. The medical logic, according to which hos-
pitals and emergency departments were structured, focused on the re-establishment 
of health as a biochemical state through medical interventions (ibd: 111). The pub-
lic health logic applied mostly to public health clinics and featured the prevention 
of infectious diseases through education, preventive medical care, and treatment 
(ibd.: 111-113). The social movement logic characterized small, nonprofit organiza-
tions for HIV and AIDS advocacy whose primary clients were risk groups such as 
homosexuals or homeless people. This logic specifically comprised “advocacy, 
prevention, education, and psychosocial services” (ibd.: 113). Finally, the multi-
service-logic, which represented the normative and cognitive framework according 
to which nonprofit health organization for uninsured, low-income clients were 
structured, promoted a holistic approach to HIV counselling. This logic combined 
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medical, social, and psychological perspectives to foster the overall well-being of 
the client in all of these areas (ibd.: 113).  
As the guidelines of the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) specifi-
cally prescribed HIV pretest counseling to include elaborate information on several 
relevant, interdependent topics surrounding potential HIV infection (that is, the 
transmission and prevention of HIV, the process of testing, the implications of a 
positive or negative test result, and the reduction of risk), the authors chose “Com-
prehensiveness of HIV Pretest Counseling” as the dependent variable. They meas-
ured this outcome with an aggregated index that indicated how many of 11 individ-
ual topics had been covered during counselling (ibd.: 110). Garrow and Grusky 
(2013: 113) theorize the medical logic to be least in line with the CDC recommen-
dations for HIV counselling, and the public health and social movement logics to be 
most commensurable with the process and outcome goals of the CDC. The multi-
service logic, they conclude, “is moderately consistent with the aims and assump-
tions of HIV test counselling” (ibd.: 113). Consequently, they propose that practi-
tioners who work in hospitals and emergency departments are least likely to align 
their performances with the CDC recommendations while practitioners from public 
health clinics and nonprofit organizations for HIV and AIDS advocacy are assumed 
to be most likely to fully enact the CDC guidelines.  
To specifically uncover the net effect of field-level logics on agency within profes-
sionals’ daily work, the authors further accounted for several, multi-level variables 
that may affect whether and to which extent actors are willing to align their work 
with political guidelines. These included both individual-level variables and organi-
zation-level variables. Individual level variables comprised professional orientation 
which captured whether the respective practitioner was a professional (i.e. a physi-
cian or a nurse), practitioners’ general work experience, their training in and 
knowledge of HIV testing and counselling, and clients’ need profile (measured by 
both their HIV status and by whether they belonged to a risk group) (ibd.: 114). 
Organization-level variables comprised overall workload, degree of formalization 
(measured by automation and reliance on formal rules) as well as further control 
variables such as size, age, and ownership type (ibd.: 115).  
As hypothesized, Garrow and Grusky (2013: 116) find that professionals provide 
less comprehensive HIV counselling, thus keeping their routines unaligned with the 
prescriptions of the CDC. While the authors explain this finding with physicians’ 
and nurses’ particular focus on biomedical causal connections that largely excluded 
psychological and social factors (ibd.: 107), it also illustrates that professionals’ 
make use of  and defend their characteristic autonomy when confronted with formal 
regulation. However, even when accounting for this and all other individual and 
organizational influence factors that may affect whether practitioners’ enact regula-
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tory guidelines, Garrow and Grusky (2013: 118) can verify their hypothesis that 
field-level logics have a considerable effect on whether formal rules translate into 
routine performances. Employing further post hoc analyses, they discover that “on-
ly the medical and social movement logics differ significantly in counseling com-
prehensiveness” (ibd.: 119). The medical logic was associated with the least com-
prehensive HIV counselling, implying that the performances of practitioners who 
worked in the respective field diverged greatly from CDC guidelines.  
Although this study does not specifically focus on professionals’ institutional work 
on the routine-level, it provides several important insights regarding the nestedness 
of professionals’ institutional agency and the relation of professional logics to for-
mal means of work control. First, this study clearly shows that routine performanc-
es are strongly affected by the normative and cognitive frameworks on the field-
level, thus illustrating the multi-level embeddedness of routines in social systems 
that – at first glance – may appear irrelevant to the daily, often improvised, work 
performances of individuals. The impact of field-level logics on practitioners’ like-
lihood to align their routines with political recommendations is particularly interest-
ing for our understanding of when and why professionals enact or reject rules as 
carriers of a bureaucratic logic (see Adler & Kwon, 2013: 954). As earlier research 
has shown, professionals’ socialization plays an important role in their everyday 
work as being a member in a profession and behaving accordingly is a central ele-
ment of routine participants’ identity (Brown & Lewis, 2011; Fagermoen, 1997; 
Korica & Molloy, 2010; Mitchell et al., 2011). However, as Garrow and Grusky’s 
(2013) findings suggest, professional membership may not be the only and not even 
the primary antecedent of professionals’ agentic behavior in routines. Specifically, 
whether and how professionals engage in institutional work on the routine-level 
may not only be affected by their professional logic and ‘pressures from below’ 
such as performance feedback and idiosyncratic tasks (see e.g. Bruns, 2009) but 
also by their embeddedness in larger institutional systems. While Garrow and 
Grusky (2013: 125) concede that their findings may be biased due to a possible 
self-selection of practitioners into organizations that best reflected their personal 
“world views”, their study still provides compelling evidence to further nurture the 
idea that professionals are far from being a homogenous group whose behavior is 
exclusively guided by its professional logic (see also Goodrick & Reay, 2011; War-
ing & Currie, 2009: 773). Second, while professionals as specific group of actors 
may be guided by other logics, this study also illustrates how strongly professional 
logics can shape routine participants’ behavior, even if these actors do not formally 
belong to the respective profession. The finding that practitioners – regardless of 
their professional orientation – covered less topics in their HIV counseling when 
they worked in organizations that embodied the medical logic implies that the med-
ical professional logic may unfold its effects on the routine-level not only through 
R O U T I N E - L E V E L  C H A N G E  
  
223 
medical professionals (i.e. physicians) as routine participants. Specifically, medical 
professionalism ‘infected’ non-professionals when it was the dominant logic within 
an organization, causing non-professionals like social workers to detach their work 
from regulatory guidelines even if their own professional logic would suggest oth-
erwise. In a way, these non-professionals became agents for the medical profession 
by maintaining the dominance of the medical logic in HIV counseling routines even 
though they had not been socialized as medical professionals.
41
  
Overall, Garrow and Grusky’s (2013) central findings can be conceptualized as 
being similar to those of Bruns (2009): Professionals may exert institutional agency 
within their routines when their dominant logic collides with the prescriptions of 
formal rules. Yet, Garrow and Grusky (2013) provide a new perspective on where 
professionals’ dominant logic may originate, suggesting that professionals’ agency 
within routines may be the outcome of incompatibilities between formal rules and 
the dominant logics of their organizations while tensions between formal rules and 
routine participants’ specific professional logic may be secondary.  
The relevance of professionals’ multi-level embeddedness for institutional work 
within their routines is further elaborated by Adler and Kwon (2013), who addi-
tionally take into account the complex interrelations between professionals’ indi-
vidual preferences, their embeddedness in organizations and fields, and the charac-
teristics of their respective profession. Drawing on the example of clinical guide-
lines in medicine, the authors develop a model that specifically conceptualizes for-
mal rules as “carriers of institutional change” (ibd.: 930), with changes in a profes-
sion being the result of a “contested diffusion process” around these artifacts (ibd.: 
930). According to the authors, whether individual professionals will allow a new 
logic into their routines by enacting formal rules depends on individual preferences 
and experiences as well as characteristics of their organization and is moderated by 
the degree of professionalism within their organization and their occupation. The 
extent to which professionalism moderates the relation between organizational and 
occupational variables is, in turn, moderated by field-level variables, specifically 
the characteristics of professional associations, demands for accountability, and 
competitive pressures (ibd.: 951-953). By developing this complex model on inno-
vation diffusion in professional settings, Adler and Kwon (2013) raise several inter-
esting points that earlier studies have failed to address when examining profession-
als’ institutional work on the routine-level. A central point of their model is certain-
ly that a general (in)compatibility between professional logics and the formal pre-
scriptions encoded in e.g. clinical guidelines is not a sufficient explanation as to 
why professionals enact or reject these rules and the logics they convey. Adler and 
                                                 
41 Unfortunately, the authors do not report interaction effects between professional orientation and field-level 
logics on comprehensiveness of HIV counseling, thus leaving open whether professionals in settings in which 
their logic dominates are more or less likely to align their performances with CDC guidelines.  
C H A N G I N G  P R O F E S S I O N A L S  
224 
Kwon’s (2013) model on guideline diffusion as contested and complex process 
(ibd.: 954) suggests that professionals’ institutional agency on the routine-level may 
be induced by a situated fit of their (socially conditioned) preferences with the rule 
or lack thereof, respectively. Whether such a situated fit comes into existence, is, in 
turn, dependent upon social and structural boundary conditions to be found in their 
organization and the wider institutional environment.  
While, unlike routine researchers (e.g. Howard-Grenville, 2005; Parmigiani & 
Howard-Grenville, 2011), Adler and Kwon (2013) do not specifically elaborate on 
practical, task-related boundary conditions, they acknowledge that professionals’ 
reaction towards guidelines is not only dependent upon institutional and social fac-
tors but is, for example, also driven by the strategies, structures, and systems their 
organization provides (ibd.: 943-946). A particularly noteworthy feature of their 
model is the emphasis on interrelated dynamics as antecedents to professionals’ 
agency. Specifically, they theorize the extent of professionalism to moderate the 
relationship between organizational and individual variables and professionals’ 
likelihood to engage in what Adler and Kwon (2013: 930) call the “mutation of 
professionalism”. The implications to be drawn from their model for the study of 
professionals’ institutional agency on the routine-level are as follows: Profession-
als’ institutional work within their routines may be induced by the introduction of 
artifacts like guidelines. Yet, the direction of their agentive behavior – this may be 
the adoption or rejection of these rules as prescriptions for their performances – is 
informed by a complex interplay of multi-level variables, implying that profession-
als’ institutional work on the routine-level should never be studied as isolated pro-
cess. Routines are not only nested in institutional and organizational structures but 
there may also be complex interrelations between these different levels that eventu-
ally play out as agentic behavior within the routine. Additionally, Adler and Kwon 
(2013) explicitly elaborate on different extents of professionalism within occupa-
tions, again underlining that professionals’ institutional agency is not only depend-
ing upon the context in which their routines take place but also upon the kind of 
profession to which they belong as ‘appropriate professional conduct’ may differ 
significantly between different professions.  
All of the studies discussed above have conceptualized the introduction of formal 
rules as an important antecedent of professionals’ institutional work on the routine-
level. This is the case because formal rules, by providing specific prescriptions on 
how to perform routines, do not only fulfill a coordinative function but – as Adler 
and Kwon (2013: 954) note – also embody specific logics. Generally, the introduc-
tion of formal guidelines challenges the typically non-formalized, autonomous way 
of organizing work which is a central element of professionalism (Armstrong, 
2002; Rappolt, 1997). This, however, should not imply that the introduction of rules 
in professionals’ routines necessarily leads to institutional maintenance work in the 
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sense of non-enactment. As the preceding reviews should have illustrated, profes-
sionals may enact rules when these prove to be a useful tool to achieve goals that 
are considered desirable from a professional perspective (see Bruns, 2009) or when 
professionals’ contextual embeddedness attenuates the ‘offensiveness’ of formal 
routine prescriptions to their professional identity (see Garrow & Grusky, 2013).  In 
sum, rules may disrupt professionals’ taken-for-granted ways of working by pre-
scribing on how actors should guide their attention and how they should go about 
their work. Yet, whether the introduction of external routine prescriptions may re-
sult in change or maintenance of the routine depends on the social and practical 
context conditions in which a routine is situated (see Adler and Kwon, 2013).  
The introduction of formal rules provides a classic example of an external interven-
tion on the routine-level that may induce institutional agency as rules specifically 
comprise a prescription of appropriate conduct that may explicitly collide with pro-
fessionals’ concepts of how to execute their work. Yet, institutional work on the 
routine-level may also be induced by structural or technological changes in the 
wider context of routines which destabilize the routines without imposing specific 
alternative templates (Rerup & Feldman, 2011). Examples are provided by 
Fältholm and Jansson (2008) and Barley (1986), whose study on the implementa-
tion of CT scanners in radiology departments has already been discussed earlier 
under the aspect of professional role change (see section 5.2).  
Fältholm and Jansson (2008) examine the restructuration of a Swedish hospital in a 
qualitative interview study. Their research question on why the implementation of 
process orientation fails, leads them to focus on health care professionals’ routines 
as source of structural stability. Fältholm and Jansson’s (2008) study comprises a 
typical case of restructuration that could have taken place in many Western health 
care systems. During the merger of two hospitals, hospital management sought to 
change the structural design of these hospitals to reflect a strong process orientation 
as it is usually found in successful industrial corporations. In an attempt to enable 
the re-structuration of the new hospital according to patient or diagnostic groups 
and to foster inter-professional collaboration, the formerly 50 clinics were clustered 
into eight departments (ibd.: 222). However, despite of this structural change, the 
distinction of former medical specialties re-emerged as health care professionals 
maintained their institutionalized routines that were organized around functional 
areas rather than diagnoses or patient groups. While the authors explain this primar-
ily with “integrating secondary routines” (ibd.: 230) that comprised deeply institu-
tionalized ideas on how hospitals should be structured, I would like to add that 
these second-order routines are most likely the result of physicians’ normative ideas 
on how to structure medical work. Specifically, as the newly implemented struc-
tures transcended the boundaries between medical specialties to foster the devel-
opment of new, process-oriented routines they failed to provide physicians with an 
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opportunity to enact their professional identity. This is because medical profession-
als obtain their identity mainly from their specialization, thus striving to design rou-
tines to reflect expertise as a dimension along which work should be structured. As 
Fältholm and Jansson note (2008: 230), the initial re-clustering of clinics into de-
partments “rendered members of the medical profession ‘homeless’ and eventually 
led to the introduction of sections”. These sections were small-scale replications of 
the former clinic structure that emerged from professionals’ maintenance work on 
the routine-level. In effect, these new structures seemed to even “further reinforce 
traditional and deeply integrated organizational routines within the hospital and 
therefore hamper the development toward a process orientated organization” (ibd.: 
230). While Fältholm and Jansson (2008) do not elaborate much on physicians’ 
specific strategies to maintain their routines, their study illuminates that external 
interventions may induce institutional work among professionals when they chal-
lenge identity-relevant aspects of routines such as the criteria along which routines 
are developed (in this case, the functional orientation of medical specialization). 
In opposite to Fältholm and Jansson (2008), Barley’s (1986) case study describes a 
situation in which external interventions did not provide any normative ideas on 
how professionals’ routines should be designed. As already briefly touched upon in 
the comprehensive discussion of his study on section 5.2, professionals’ institution-
al work on the routine-level may be induced by an interaction between shocks in 
the context of the routine and learning from routine performances. Due to the im-
plementation of the new CT scanners in radiology, both radiologists’ and radiology 
technologists’ ostensive aspects of the diagnostic routine were rendered useless. 
While “radiologists’ dominance was routinely enacted” (Barley, 1986: 87) before 
the arrival of CT scanners, the unfamiliar technology disrupted routine participants’ 
ostensive aspects (see also: Edmondson et al., 2001), including the taken-for-
granted hierarchy between radiologists’ and radiology technologists’ professional 
logics. Thus, in both of the examined departments, radiologists and technologists 
had to re-establish a routine around the new technological artifact by improvising 
and adapting their performances. Through learning processes they found new, prac-
ticable ways of interaction and eventually established new diagnostic routines that 
ultimately lead to a reversal of professional roles (see section 5.2). In contrast to the 
introduction of formal rules, CT scanners as such did not prescribe any new behav-
ioral repertoire and thus did not induce institutional work as a strategy to defend 
professional logics. Much rather, these artifacts led to insecurity about appropriate 
courses of action which resulted in the (somewhat reluctant) enactment of new log-
ic constellations in the routine. Accordingly, Barley’s (1986) study illustrates well 
how institutional work on the routine-level does not only occur as a (more or less 
purposeful) attempt to defend routines as arenas of identity enactment but as a mere 
improvisation against the background of new technologies.  
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Overall, the review of extant research suggests that there are three major anteced-
ents to professionals’ institutional work on the routine-level all of which induce 
agency as they disrupt or at least destabilize professionals’ taken for-granted con-
cepts on how to go about their work (i.e. the ostensive aspects of their routines). 
First, feedback from the inherently improvised routine performances may urge pro-
fessionals to reconsider their ideas of appropriate conduct and may promote the 
enactment of new logic constellations. Especially in the typically multi-professional 
routines of modern organizational life, negative performative feedback like insuffi-
cient routine outcomes may uncover differences in the guiding logics of routine 
participants that need to be resolved through institutional work to secure the func-
tioning and effectiveness of routines (see Smets and Jarzabkowski, 2013). Second, 
external interventions like the introduction of formal rules may prescribe specific 
courses of action that carry in them new logics which professionals may either en-
act to foster bottom-up change in their profession or reject to maintain their extant 
professional identity (see Adler and Kwon, 2013). Third, changes in the structural 
or technological context of routines may eliminate the possibility to continue enact-
ing institutionalized ways of work organization and hence necessitate new forms of 
coordination that may bring about new constellations of logics to guide profession-
als’ daily work (see Barley, 1986). As noted in the introductory paragraphs of this 
section, routines are both mechanisms of work coordination and arenas of identity 
enactment. Antecedents of institutional agency on this level of professionals’ work 
thus either directly challenge the social orders that are demonstrated in routine per-
formances or urge actors to reflect upon the efficiency of given routines. As I will 
further elaborate in the following paragraphs, this simultaneity of the social and the 
pragmatic in routines and their immediate relation to the accomplishment of work 
(much more immediate than in the negotiation of roles on the organizational level) 
leads to processes of institutional agency that are subtle, unspectacular, and some-
times hardly noticeable but nevertheless important in stabilizing or disrupting insti-
tutional arrangements. 
Processes: How Professionals engage in Routine-Level Change 
Despite institutionalists’ rising attention to the micro-processes of institutional dy-
namics (Johnson, Smith, & Codling, 2000; Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Reay et al., 
2006), research that specifically focuses on how professionals exert institutional 
work on the routine-level remains scarce. Professionals – as “inhabitants” of institu-
tions (Delbridge & Edwards, 2013; Hallett & Ventresca, 2006) – make their profes-
sion ‘come to life’ by developing and reproducing their professional logic in their 
daily social interactions (Everitt, 2013). Yet, as routines primarily focus on the ac-
complishment of specific tasks such as treating patients, institutional work on the 
routine-level often remains subtle, not articulated in explicit negotiations about ap-
propriate structures and practices, but actualized in the way professionals enact their 
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routines (Rerup & Feldman, 2011: 578-579). Thus, on the routine-level, profes-
sionals integrate, reject, combine, and mutate logics against the background of hav-
ing to complete the task at hand in an effective and efficient manner. Put more 
simply: They exert institutional work along the way of doing their job. Albeit some 
institutional work scholars argue that the mere reproduction and (non-)enactment of 
logics in routines is not an instance of institutional work as it lacks the intention to 
disrupt, create, or maintain institutions (Lawrence et al., 2013; Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence et al., 2009a), recent research has emphasized that im-
plicit, non-projective agency that takes place on the routine-level is an important 
part of institutional change and stability (Jarzabkowski et al., 2009; Smets & 
Jarzabkowski, 2013). For example, Kroezen et al. (2014) show that the profession-
alization of low-status professionals is not only dependent on whether regulatory 
changes grant them expanded authorities but also whether these are enacted on the 
ground. Specifically, they find that Dutch nurses failed to translate new professional 
jurisdiction on the prescription of medication by nurses into actual status gains 
within their workplace as they reproduced the logic of medical dominance within 
their routines, e.g. by consulting “with their medical specialist before or after pre-
scribing a medicine” (ibd.: 113). On the other side, demonstrating professional 
knowledge and conduct in everyday-work is a precondition for achieving and de-
fending the regulatory boundaries of professions on the field-level (Abbott, 1988; 
Deverell, 2000; Fournier, 2000; Martin et al., 2009). Accordingly, while institution-
al agency within routines may often appear unspectacular and is often overseen as 
routines are primarily established to accomplish work and secure the functioning of 
the organization (Becker, 2004; Greenhalgh, 2008), it adds to the disruption, 
change, and maintenance of professions and the institutions that surround them (see 
also section 3.4.2). 
Two studies that illustrate particularly well how professionals work towards the 
maintenance or change of specific logics constellations along with and against the 
contingencies of their daily work are those of McPherson and Sauder (2013) and 
McCann et al. (2013), both of which I will discuss more deeply in the following 
paragraphs.  
McPherson and Sauder (2013) provide an illustrative case study on how profes-
sionals smooth the way for institutional dynamics on the routine-level by selective-
ly enacting logics other than their own professional logic within their daily work. In 
their ethnographic study on the micro-level interactions that take place in the daily 
routines of a drug court, they find that – in contrast to the predictions of classic neo-
institutional theory – professionals may strategically deviate from their own profes-
sional logic to influence court decisions in a way that reflects their preferred out-
comes. Specifically, the authors focus on how different professionals employed 
different sets of logics when negotiating cases that evoked uncertainty and disa-
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greement about appropriate courses of action. Drug courts, as an alternative branch 
of the jurisdictional system that is supposed to deal “with legal offenses related to 
drug use” (ibd.: 169), are described as an organizational field in which four distinct 
logics prevail.  According to McPherson and Sauder (2013: 172), these are the logic 
of criminal punishment, the logic of rehabilitation, the logic of community account-
ability, and the logic of efficiency. Each of these logics represents a specific field-
level manifestation of larger societal logics (i.e. the logic of the state, the profes-
sion, the community, and the corporation; see also section 3.3.1) and while all of 
the four logics were equally salient in the everyday interactions at the drug court, 
actors were more closely associated with one or another logic. Probation officers 
and sheriffs were most-embedded in the logic of criminal punishment that empha-
sized the importance of obedience to authority and the benefit of formal sanctions 
and control. While drug courts are explicitly designed to provide alternative ap-
proaches to sanction and prevent drug-related crimes, they need to maintain their 
“associations with traditional court practices in order to be taken seriously as part of 
the correctional system” (ibd.: 172). Accordingly, the logic of punishment remained 
an important part of the drug courts’ working processes. The logic of rehabilitation 
which focused on the “whole person”, (ibd.: 174), encouraged rehabilitation and 
change instead of punishment, and was mostly linked to counselors and clinicians, 
whereas the logic of community accountability focused on the interest of the gen-
eral public rather than on the participant as an individual and was primarily associ-
ated with the public defenders. Lastly, the logic of efficiency was the primary logic 
of state’s attorneys and directed “attention toward maximizing utility and following 
a rational business model” (ibd.: 175) since the drug court was supposed to provide 
quicker and more cost-effective processes than regular courts.  
In their ethnographic study of the drug court’s internal team meetings that took 
place before the official court proceedings to negotiate sanctions and discuss each 
case from different positions, McPherson and Sauder (2013: 178) observe that the 
above-mentioned actors regularly drew on logics other than their “home-logic” to 
frame participants’ motives and behaviors in a way that would direct the court’s 
eventual decision towards their preferred outcome. More specifically, team mem-
bers invoked different logics when the specific situation at hand would generate 
unanticipated levels of uncertainty that forbid the application of default procedures 
and when disagreement among the involved professionals ensued. This was the 
case for 25 percent of all cases negotiated during McPherson and Sauder’s (2013) 
period of observation and usually occurred when team members were unable to 
reach quick consensus because they lacked experience with a specific participant’s 
situation, because of unclear evidence, or because of an open contradiction between 
participant’s behavior and the logic that was hithertho employed to assess his case 
(ibd.: 176). The latter illustrates particularly well how professionals had to adapt 
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their use of logics to performative feedback from their routine: In one specific case, 
the defendant openly admitted to using the drug court program as “ticket out of jail” 
(ibd: 176), a behavior and motive that was apparently incommensurable with a re-
habilitation logic that assumed the participant’s true desire to change and to seek 
recovery. Thus, this case severely constrained the repeated usage of the rehabilita-
tion logic to frame the participant’s actions. Eventually, a probation officer was able 
to portray the participant as having a “prison mentality” (ibd.: 176) which resulted 
in his exclusion from the drug court program.  
As McPherson and Sauder (2013: 180) point out, actors – while naturally favoring 
their home logic when framing a case – used logics in a surprisingly flexible man-
ner, not only deviating from their home logic but also employing the same logic to 
argue for different interpretations of the case and to suggest different courses of 
action such as more or less severe sanctions. Accordingly, the authors conclude that 
actors reflectively drew on logics in an purposive attempt to “push the court’s deci-
sions in desired directions” (ibd.: 177). Substantiating their claim that logics were, 
in fact, used as tools to influence court decisions and not as post-hoc rationalization 
accounts, the authors point out that actors utilized logics to give sense to the dis-
cussed cases prior to any actual court decision (ibd.: 177). An additional quantita-
tive evaluation of the case data further proves that the use of logics did not only 
generally affect the court’s final decisions (in 87 of 107 cases, the court’s decision 
deviated from an estimated default decision) but that there was also a striking corre-
lation between the course of action that had been suggested by the respective pro-
fessional and the severity of the final verdict with 85 percent of the recommenda-
tions being translated into a court decision. Interestingly, what the authors denote as 
“hijacking” of institutional logics (ibd.: 180), that is, the use of logics with which 
the respective professionals were not primarily associated, proved to be more effec-
tive in influencing court decisions. In 87 percent of the cases in which team mem-
bers invoked the primary logics of other professional groups, their recommenda-
tions were reflected by the court’s verdict whereas only 73 percent of “home logic” 
use translated into the desired outcomes (ibd.: 180). The authors explain this find-
ing with the signaling effect of logic use: Drawing on non-home logics signals that 
team members ‘step out of their box’ and thus helps to facilitate negotiations as it 
enables consensus-building among actors with different cognitive and normative 
orientations (ibd.: 180-181).  
Further elaborating on why professionals tended to relatively freely draw on the 
different logics available in the drug court, McPherson and Sauder (2013: 182-183) 
suggest that “hijacking” logics was not only a strategic measure to promote actors’ 
individual interest. They attribute the use of logics in team meetings to both its 
pragmatic and social function. First, besides the obvious value of logics as strategic 
tool to influence court decisions, the  authors suggest that drawing on non-home 
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logics also “publicly endorses the legitimacy of competing frameworks in a way 
that might be beneficial in future discussions and negotiations” (ibd.: 183), thus 
endowing the respective professionals with goodwill from other team members. 
Second, as McPherson and Sauder (2013: 183) discovered that professionals did 
not exclusively employ other logics to argue for sanctions that would be in line with 
their home-logic (e.g. probation officers arguing for more severe sanctions, or clini-
cians demanding less severe sanction), they suggest that hijacking logics also has 
the social function of creating “cohesion among group members” (ibd.: 183). This 
is because the selective utilization of different logics within the team meetings 
would also represent a collective legitimization of logic multiplicity that  was a pre-
condition for the drug court’s overall functioning as an arena of multi-professional 
collaboration (ibd.: 183).  
Despite the authors’ observation that professionals in the drug court maintained 
logic complexity by being “surprisingly fluid in their use of available logics to 
solve the practical problems of the court” (ibd.: 179), they also find that team mem-
bers faced restrictions in their application of logics, thus illuminating how profes-
sionals’ institutional work on the routine-level is constrained by their embed-
dedness in social and practical boundary conditions. They distinguish three types of 
constraints that limited professionals’ access to logics as tools to actively frame 
court cases in a specific way, specifically, procedural, definitional, and positional 
constraints. Procedural constraints applied when formal rules and norms (such as 
procedural guidelines of national associations) pre-determined the course of action. 
This constraint accounted for the 75 percent of court cases in which internal team 
negotiations merely consisted of agreeing that the case should be handled according 
to the default logic (ibd.: 175). If professionals had employed logics in these ‘stand-
ard cases’, they would probably have jeopardized their personal legitimacy as any 
additional discussion about such cases would have been considered “unnecessary 
and even inappropriate” (ibd.: 183-184). Definitional constraints relate to the suita-
bility of a specific logic in creating arguments for more or less severe sanctions. 
The logic of criminal punishment was particularly effective for demanding more 
severe sanctions whereas the opposite was true for the rehabilitation logic. Both the 
logics of community accountability and efficiency were largely neutral with respect 
to their usability as tool to argue for more or less punitive actions. Finally, position-
al constraints restricted professionals’ in their use of logics because of their relative 
position within the network of actors in the drug court. As McPherson and Sauder 
(2013: 185) point out, probation officers served as central hubs within the drug 
courts, thus being more adept in using different logics while counselors were rather 
peripheral actors, not well-embedded in the network of drug court actors, and ac-
cordingly invoked non-home logics significantly less frequently. 
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McPherson and Sauder’s (2013) study provides several interesting insights on how 
professionals exert institutional work within and through the accomplishment of 
their daily routines while specifically accounting for the institutional, social and 
practical boundary conditions that may enable and constrain agency on this level of 
professionals’ work. First, and in stark contrast to early neo-institutional accounts 
that emphasize professionals’ inability to distance themselves from their own logic 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; van Mannen & Barley, 1984), they show that the se-
lective and purposeful use of different logics may become a regular part of profes-
sionals’ working routines. At the same time, the authors acknowledge that not all 
professionals could freely use any logic for any purpose, contributing to the idea 
that research on professionals’ institutional work needs to account for profession-
als’ contextual embeddedness. While McPherson and Sauder (2013: 185) attribute 
interprofessional differences in the frequency of ‘hijacking logics’ to professionals’ 
relative position in the drug court’s network, this finding would also resonate well 
with recent research that points towards the degree of professionalization as an an-
tecedent to professionals’ openness to include new logics into their work (Adler & 
Kwon, 2013). Second, McPherson and Sauder (2013) provide a more nuanced un-
derstanding on professionals’ institutional work on the routine-level as both a by-
product of pragmatic and strategic task accomplishment and as purposeful endeavor 
to stabilize the multiprofessional collaboration that is necessary to secure the func-
tioning of the routine and, eventually, the organization. Given that professionals’ 
work increasingly takes place in complex environments in which several logics 
simultaneously prevail (see section 3.3.1), McPherson and Sauder (2013) add an 
interesting insight to the study of how professionals exert institutional agency with-
in their routines: While professionals are more prone to drawing on their own logic 
when giving sense to their tasks (in this case, the assessment of drug court partici-
pants), they do not slavishly stick to their cognitive and normative frames. Much 
rather, they exploit others’ logics strategically to promote their desired outcomes, 
but they also acknowledge others’ logics to stabilize routines even if it means that 
their logic will never fully govern the routines in which they participate. Thus, this 
study illustrates that professionals may not only exert institutional maintenance 
work in their routines to protect their work from being infiltrated by other logics but 
that they may actually loosen the boundaries between their and other logics to ena-
ble routine stability in a multiprofessional working context. The authors summarize 
this aspect of their study by concluding that “the need to meet the pressing demands 
of the local organization (e.g., the drug court) overrides more remote professional 
and institutional differences” (ibd.: 186), thus making professionals’ institutional 
work a means to secure the functioning of the routine rather than the attempt to 
generally resolve institutional complexity (see also Barley, 1986; Smets & Jarzab-
kowski, 2013). 
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Third, while emphasizing the pragmatic and local nature of professionals’ institu-
tional work, McPherson and Sauders (2013: 182-183) also point to the political di-
mension of professionals’ flexible use of different logics in their routines which 
blurs the boundaries between their own and other professional logics. They imply 
that this constant switch in perspectives illustrates how professional jurisdictions 
are negotiated on the ground as the selective employment of non-home logics rep-
resents the (temporary) appropriation of authority over what I have already dis-
cussed above as “spaces of reason” (Schildt et al., 2011), that is, specific areas of 
expertise. Overall, this study provides a balanced view on professionals as pragmat-
ic enactors of institutional logics who – despite their professional embeddedness – 
may become agents of routine stability who accept and even promote logic com-
plexity to secure the efficient functioning of multiprofessional working routines.  
McCann et al. (2013) elaborate more explicitly on how professionals’ institutional 
work within their daily routines may relate to their professional project on the field-
level, or, in the specific case they study, fails to do so. The authors employ an eth-
nographic research approach that is complemented with semi-structured interviews 
to examine how paramedics in an UK ambulance trust subtly engage in institutional 
work along their daily routines. In the UK, paramedics have only recently been 
treading the path of professionalization, developing from a former blue-collar oc-
cupation to a full profession, or – as the authors suggest – a “para-profession” (ibd.: 
753). On the field-level, paramedicine exhibits typical features of a profession such 
as being organized in a professional association, requiring formal certification and 
training, and offering courses in tertiary education (ibd.: 756-757). These features 
are, however, relatively new to paramedicine and have evolved in response to regu-
latory pressures from the NHS which integrated subordinate health care professions 
such as paramedics into “Allied Health Professions (AHPs)” that were controlled 
and regulated by the “Health Professions Council (HPC)” (ibd.: 755). In effect, par-
amedicine did not take the conventional route to professionalization but experi-
enced “professionalization from above” (ibd.: 756). This kind of externally struc-
tured professional project emerged from a paradox governmental intervention 
which promoted the professionalization of health care occupations while restricting 
the self-governance of these emerging professions through a tight system of formal 
performance measures, thus discouraging the development of normative codes of 
conduct within the profession and replacing peer-control with managerial control 
(ibd.: 756). Accordingly, practitioners were not fully socialized into the new model 
of paramedic professionalism, maintaining what McCann et al. (2013: 765) de-
scribe as “blue-collar professionalism” within the context of their daily routines. 
The authors find two major themes that characterize the routine-level work of par-
amedics. The first is the organizational control of their work (ibd.: 760). While 
emergency ambulance work is commonly associated with rather high levels of dis-
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cretion due to its ‘on the road’ nature that prevents direct managerial control, the 
authors find that the paramedics in their study were, in fact, tightly controlled by 
management. Due to managers’ physical absence from paramedics working space, 
they coordinated and constrained paramedics’ routines through “remote control” 
which included extensive “radio communications and electronic position monitor-
ing of vehicles” (ibd.: 760). Yet, when paramedics arrived at the accident and 
emergency departments (A&E), managers also exerted direct control, even “shoo-
ing people off” (ibd.: 761) in an attempt to hit quantitative performance targets de-
spite resource restrictions. Measures of remote control were, for example, strict 
standards regarding the allocation of meal time slots. Also, paramedics were regu-
larly demanded to justify their actions over radio, making them very cautious about 
deviations from protocols such as being off the road for too long as this would have 
caused suspicion and further managerial investigation (ibd.: 761-762). These organ-
izational boundary conditions led to a strong internalization of ‘command-and-
control’ as guiding principles of paramedics’ work who engaged in “self-limiting 
their discretionary actions, except when clearly forced to do so by emergency situa-
tions” (ibd.: 762). Yet, even in emergency situations, paramedics were uncomforta-
ble with breaking protocol and remained as close as possible to the rules while pre-
paring explanations for any deviation (ibd.: 763). This strong enactment of the 
managerial logic was, however, not owed to the belief that managerial forms of 
coordination led to superior outcomes but rather a pragmatic adaptation to the con-
textual conditions in which paramedics’ routines were situated. Obviously, this kind 
of acquiescence to the practical constraints of their work was not conducive to par-
amedics’ professional project on the field-level as frontline staff failed to demon-
strate professional autonomy within their daily routines.   
The second central theme that emerged from McCann et al.’s (2013) ethnographic 
study – “the reproduction of blue-collar professionalism” (ibd.: 765) –  provides 
more insights on how the professional identity of frontline paramedics led to insti-
tutional maintenance work which hampered the full professionalization of paramed-
icine. While paramedics in emergency ambulance work mostly followed “rules to 
the letter“(ibd.: 763), they created what could be called ‘pockets of autonomy’ 
along their routine performances. These provided them with a sense of value 
against managerial oppression and the demanding, often ‘dirty’ work they had to 
endure on a daily basis. At the same time, however, this enactment of a blue-collar 
professional identity undermined the field-level professional project: This is be-
cause paramedics’ blue-collar professionalism was more about cutting corners, be-
ing “streetwise”, and taking pride in handling the risky and unpleasant parts of 
emergency health care rather than claiming autonomy over an abstract field of ex-
pert knowledge (ibd.: 766-767). McCann et al. (2013) provide several examples of 
how paramedics maintained their idea of professionalism during their daily work. A 
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particularly interesting observation was the very considerate handling of patients 
that demonstrates the “implicit moral position” (ibd.: 767) of ambulance crews. 
Specifically, paramedics ostensibly tried to shield sick patients from the sight of a 
deceased patient in the crowded area of an A&E department; thus, showing empa-
thy and a moral obligation appeared central to their professional identity. While a 
sense of moral superiority is clearly associated with classic professionalism 
(Durkheim, 2013; Postema, 1983), paramedics enacted a specific kind of morality 
that separated them from other health care workers: Even against the background of 
immediate time and performance pressures, paramedics behaved thoughtfully and 
focused on the patients’ dignity when other professionals (e.g. nurses) failed to do 
so, thereby showing their characteristic “deep sensitivity born of street experience” 
(ibd.: 767). Yet, the authors also report some questionable practices that were en-
acted as part of blue-collar professionalism. These were obviously aimed at protect-
ing a sense of discretion against the background of hard working conditions, mana-
gerial oppression, and contemptuousness. For example, ambulance teams intention-
ally slowed down the process of patient transportation when carrying non-
emergency patients to cope with the constant time pressures they normally faced. 
Further, purloining material such as sheets and pillows was considered normal and 
even the researchers were encouraged to engage in this informal kind of resistance 
that had become a regular part of paramedics’ daily work (ibd.: 768-769). Both of 
these practices appeared to have become an integral part of paramedics’ ostensive 
aspects, a ‘normal step’ within the respective routines. While neither of them par-
ticularly contributed to the goal of providing adequate emergency care to patients, 
these small acts of deviance helped to maintain paramedics’ professional identity as 
‘street-smart’ professionals who operate under strong managerial influence but are 
not under full managerial control.  
In sum, McCann et al.‘s (2013) study shows that professionals exert institutional 
work along and within their regular routine performances by enacting their specific 
ideas of appropriate conduct while also dealing with the practical constraints that 
place routines between ideals and necessities. While the general insight that profes-
sionals’ institutional work on the routine-level occurs against the background of 
practical contingencies is in line with earlier research (e.g. Keshet et al., 2013; Reay 
et al., 2013; Reay et al., 2006; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013; Smets et al., 2012), 
McCann et al. (2013) also provide some unique insights on how institutional agen-
cy is exerted within the context of professionals’ routines.  
First, while McCann et al. (2013) examine the special case of an emerging profes-
sion, their findings challenge the idea that professionals try to enact field-level con-
cepts of professionalism within their routines. In explicit contrast to early neo-
institutionalist notions of professionals as carriers of norms who shape organiza-
tional structure by enacting these norms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), McCann et 
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al. (2013) show that intra-organizational boundary conditions do not only restrict 
the enactment of professional logics within routine performances but may lead to 
the development of separate concepts of professionalism. In the case of emergency 
ambulance work, managerial control was internalized to an extent that paramedics 
constructed paramedic professionalism as a permanent ‘workaround’ against the 
realities of ‘dirty work under time and performance pressures’. As a consequence, 
ambulance workers did not display any consequent attempt to exclude managerial 
logics from their routines. Professional identity was developed and enacted through 
the appropriation of small ‘pockets of autonomy’ – as I would call them – which 
popped up during the daily routines of ambulance work (see also: Kellogg et al., 
2006). As a consequence, paramedics’ strong embeddedness in a restrictive organi-
zational context did not cause an incomplete enactment of field-level professional-
ism but fostered the emergence of a separate professional project.  
Second, this study underlines the importance of professional identity to explain 
agency in routines. While other studies have emphasized that pragmatic aspects of 
work organization that may lead professionals to disregard their professional logic 
to secure the overall functioning of the routine (e.g. McPherson & Sauder, 2013; 
Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013), McCann et al. (2013) focus on how paramedics 
maintain a sense of professional self by adapting their routines in a way that reflect-
ed discretion and dignity. Importantly, paramedics, while discontent with the tight 
and sometimes inapplicable rule system, did not resort to a defeatist attitude but 
developed their own interpretation of professionalism in the context of managerial 
control, taking pride in their ‘street wisdom’. Lastly, McCann et al.’s (2013) study 
also points to the importance of institutional work on the routine-level for profes-
sional projects as a whole. As the case of paramedics shows, professionalization 
simultaneously takes place in the field, in the organization, and in the routine. 
While establishing regulatory frameworks and professional associations on the 
field-level are important structural pre-conditions for developing and maintaining a 
profession, these may become hollow relicts of failed professionalization when 
frontline-practitioners fail to act accordingly. Even though the case of paramedics is 
special in many respects, it should be taken as a reminder that the contextual condi-
tions in which professionals have to exert their routines may not only detach them 
from the professional project on the field-level and hamper the enactment of their 
professional logic. As McCann et al. (2013) show, the internalization of practical 
constraints may induce the fragmentation of a profession into ‘political profession-
als’ and ‘frontline professionals’ who – while formally embedded in the same pro-
fession – pursue different normative concepts of professionalism.  
As the preceding literature review has shown, professionals’ institutional work on 
the routine-level reflects both their interest in enacting a specific professional iden-
tity and their awareness of practical necessities that constrain the utilization of rou-
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tines as a political arena. Accordingly, any instance of professionals’ institutional 
work on the routine-level must take into account that routines are a level of profes-
sionals’ work on which social expectations and pragmatic aspects of work coordi-
nation matter equally. However, especially research on when and why professionals 
are willing to enact artifacts that carry specific normative implications seems to 
disregard that professionals’ routines are located in a complex interplay between 
social and practical boundary conditions. In particular, the integration of formal 
rules into professionals’ routines has been studied under the more or less implicit 
assumption that the degree of compatibility between the behavioral prescriptions of 
formal rules and professionals’ general ideas of appropriate conduct are the main 
explanatory variable for professionals’ (non-)adherence to rules (Bruns, 2009; 
Garrow & Grusky, 2013). Given that autonomy over one’s routine performances 
constitutes a core feature of professionalism, scholars have even proposed that rules 
– as a typical bureaucratic mechanism of coordination – are generally incommen-
surable with professional practice (Marcus, 1985; Ritzer & Walczak, 1988; Scott, 
1982; Sorensen & Sorensen, 1974).  
However, as the increasing embeddedness of professionals in large organizations 
has fostered the proliferation of bureaucratic means of coordination in profession-
als’ work (see section 3.2.2), professionals can regularly be witnessed to enact for-
mal rules within their routine performances (Currie & Harvey, 2000; Knai et al., 
2014). Against the predictions of classical neo-institutional theory, this is a puzzling 
phenomenon as one would expect professionals to consistently resist the enactment 
of rules because of their strong professional norms and their socialization as auton-
omous actors whose identity is contingent upon the discretionary application of 
their expert knowledge (Armstrong, 2002; Marcus, 1985). Recent micro-
institutional studies have found that professionals may selectively distance them-
selves from their professional logic to enable coordination within their routines 
(McPherson & Sauder, 2013). Still, the insight that professionals may temporally 
deviate from the norms of their profession against the practical contingencies of 
their work does not explain when and why professionals prefer the coordination of 
their work via rules as opposed to the coordinative mechanisms prescribed by their 
profession, that is peer-control and professional norms.   
As elaborated on in the discussion of Adler and Kwon’s (2013) conceptual paper on 
medical guidelines as carriers of institutional change, explanations of when and 
why professionals exert institutional work within their routines by enacting (or re-
jecting) rules and the logics they convey must take into account the multiple levels 
in which professionals’ work is embedded. Despite Adler and Kwon’s (2013) theo-
retical contribution, extant research still lacks empirical studies that (i) 
acknowledge the simultaneous embeddedness of professionals’ routines in organi-
zational, task, and institutional contexts and that (ii) systematically uncover config-
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urations of interdependent boundary conditions to explain when and why profes-
sionals are willing to integrate rules into their routines when these obviously con-
flict with core ideals of their profession. Accordingly, the following study will ex-
amine when and why professionals pave the way for institutional change in their 
profession by accepting rules into their daily routines while specifically accounting 
for the social and practical pressures that characterize professionals’ work.  
6.3 Empirical Study 3: When Do Rules Persist in Routines? A 
Fuzzy-set Analysis of Care Pathway Enactment in 
Clinical Treatment Routines 
The following study, while employing routine-theoretical-perspective, seeks to add 
to both routine-research and research on professionals’ institutional work on the 
micro-level
42
. Examining when and why medical professionals enact care pathways 
in their treatment routines, it sheds light on the antecedents of micro-level institu-
tional work that may add to institutional change in the profession at large. As Adler 
and Kwon (2013: 954) point out, care pathways embody the “logic of efficiency 
and accountability”, thus ruling out the explanation that medical professionals enact 
care pathways because they generally fit with their professional logic (cf. Garrow 
and Grusky, 2013). Much rather, and as elaborated above (see section 6.1), medical 
professionalism and the application of formal process rules are commonly regarded 
as incommensurable. This is because the adherence to rules necessarily reduces 
physicians’ potential to demonstrate the autonomous application of expert 
knowledge as a core principle of their professional logic (Pearson, Goulart-Fisher, 
& Lee, 1995). Further, this very autonomy that physicians are granted in their 
treatment routines impedes managerial control, thus making the adoption or rejec-
tion of care pathways dependent on whether contextual conditions lead physicians 
to perceive "guideline adoption as consistent with their professional autonomy” 
(Adler and Kwon, 2013: 936). Additionally, current research emphasizes that pro-
fessionals’ decisions on which logics to enact or reject in their routines may emerge 
“from practical-evaluative improvisations” (Smets and Jarzabkowski, 2013: 1284). 
Thus, any explanation that focuses solely on the institutional aspects of profession-
als’ agency in routines necessarily draws an incomplete picture of the realities in 
which institutional work occurs. At the same time, and as elaborated above, profes-
sionals remain social actors, willing to conform to their professional norms within 
their daily work as ‘what they do’ is central to the development and the mainte-
nance of their professional identity (see section 3.2.3).  
                                                 
42 This study was jointly conducted with Hendrik Wilhelm. Earlier versions have been presented at the EGOS 
Colloquium 2012 in Helsinki, Finland and the Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management 2013 in 
Orlando, FL. 
R O U T I N E - L E V E L  C H A N G E  
  
239 
Consequently, to examine when and why physicians enact care pathways, this study 
relies on a routine-theoretical perspective to conceptually distinguish abstract ideas 
on appropriate conduct (stored in the ostensive aspect of a routine) from the practi-
cal aspects of task accomplishment (the performative aspect) that interact to induce 
change or stability in professionals’ routines. This study proposes that the enact-
ment of care pathways depends on configurations of four boundary conditions that 
together reflect the social pressures and practical necessities that characterize pro-
fessionals’ daily work. Specifically, this study suggests that institutional pressure 
from the field-level, extent of professional expertise, task frequency, and task com-
plexity interact to foster rule enactment in professionals’ routines. Drawing on a 
fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) of 19 medical-treatment rou-
tines performed in ten internal-medicine departments of university hospitals in 
Germany, this study uncovers three configurations of the aforementioned boundary 
conditions, each of which offers a distinct explanation as to why physicians prefer 
to align their work with care pathways despite the central importance of autonomy 
for medical professionals. These configurations can be distinguished according to 
how physicians utilize rules in these situations, generating the solutions ‘reducing 
risk,’ ‘securing status,’ and ‘surviving stress’. Building on these findings, this study 
proposes a configurational model of rule enactment by professionals participating 
in organizational routines, thus contributing to the question of when and why writ-
ten organizational rules are enacted by autonomous professionals. 
The following study expands extant research on professionals’ institutional work in 
three ways. First, it illuminates the interdependent nature of practical and social 
boundary conditions of professionals’ work, explaining the enactment of rules as 
the outcome of its social appropriateness, coordinative efficiency, or both against 
the specific work situations in which professionals operate. Second, this study ex-
plicitly accounts for the multi-level-embeddedness of professionals’ routines which 
are not only affected by their immediate organizational and task-contexts but also 
reflect professionals’ awareness of social expectations in the field. Accordingly, this 
study adds to our understanding of institutional agency on the routine-level as a 
response to pressures that emerge from other levels, thus cautioning scholars to 
study institutional work not only against the background of its immediate contexts 
(see also Garrow & Grusky, 2013). Lastly, like the study presented in section 5.3 of 
this thesis, the following study offers a methodological contribution to extant re-
search by using a comparative approach to the question of when and why profes-
sionals engage in institutional agency that might change their profession. Specifi-
cally, the use of fsQCA allows accounting for the idiosyncrasies of each case while 
providing systematic insights on the boundary conditions that foster professionals 
to voluntarily restrict their characteristic autonomy within their daily work.   
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6.3.1 Introduction 
When and why do professionals participating in organizational routines enact writ-
ten rules? Organizational routines are usually defined as repetitive and recognizable 
interdependent activities involving multiple actors that represent the primary means 
through which organizations perform and prevail (Cyert & March, 1963; Feldman 
& Pentland, 2003; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Organizational routines in professional 
organizations, such as medical treatment routines in hospitals, are characterized by 
the autonomy of the professionals participating in the organizational routine 
(Bohmer, 2009; Edmondson et al., 2001; Klein, Ziegert, Knight, & Xiao, 2006). A 
written rule is enacted in an organizational routine when a knowledgeable observer 
is unable to detect a frequent and substantial violation of a written organizational 
rule across routine performances (cf. Desai, 2010; Taylor, 1993; Tyler & Blader, 
2005). The enactment of written organizational rules, defined as codified ideal-type 
representations of an organizational routine (March, Schulz, & Zhou, 2000; 
Pentland & Feldman, 2005; Schulz, 2008), directly conflicts with the professional’s 
autonomy to perform a routine without interference. 
Theories on written rules suggest that the enactment of written rules by profession-
als participating in organizational routines is uncommon. Prior explanations empha-
size that routine participants enact written rules because managers monitor and in-
centivize employees to do so (Kohn, 1999; O'Reilly, 1989; Ouchi & Maguire, 
1975), or because enacting written rules is embedded in routine participants’ identi-
ty (Ouchi, 1979; Tyler & Blader, 2005; Weber, 1922). While these explanations 
apply to business organizations whose employees act with limited autonomy, they 
do not explain when and why professionals participating in organizational routines 
enact written rules. First, managers and supervisors usually lack actual control over 
the daily work of professionals, such as physicians working in a hospital (e.g., 
Raelin, 1986). Second, professionals are granted considerable degrees of freedom 
and the core principle of professional identity –  the full autonomy over one’s own 
work –  is incompatible with enacting written rules (Allen, 2010; Berg, 1997; Scott, 
1982). Researchers studying written rules have for the most part failed to theoreti-
cally explain when and why professionals participating in organizational routines 
enact written rules, despite substantial empirical evidence documenting that profes-
sionals do enact written rules (e.g., Faraj & Xiao, 2006; Gustafsson et al., 2011; 
Vanhaecht et al., 2006).  
This study addresses this gap between established theory and empirical evidence by 
turning to the characteristics of the organizational routines in which participants 
enact written rules. It builds on the organizational routines-as-generative-systems 
perspective (Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Parmigiani & Howard-Grenville, 2011; 
Pentland & Feldman, 2005) to conceptualize the enactment of written rules within 
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organizational routines as effortful accomplishments of routine participants (charac-
terized by a specific level of professional expertise) who perform organizational 
routines to address tasks (characterized by specific levels of task complexity and 
frequency). This study conceptually expands the organizational routines-as-
generative-systems perspective to a multilevel framework that accounts for the in-
stitutional context in which a routine is embedded (level of institutional pressure 
demanding the enactment of a written rule). It does so because professionals are 
more embedded in their profession as a field-level institution than in the organiza-
tion (Pratt et al., 2006). 
This study empirically explores what configurations of these four explanatory con-
ditions cause professionals participating in an organizational routine to enact writ-
ten rules by conducting a comparative case analysis of the enactment of care path-
ways in the treatment routines of university hospitals. This setting is favourable 
because university hospitals usually have extensive experience in designing and 
implementing written rules (Vanhaecht et al., 2006). Focusing on university hospi-
tals therefore allows ruling out explanations of rule enactment that draw on rule 
design and capability of rule implementation. The empirical analysis relies on 
qualitative and quantitative data from 19 treatment routines and care pathways in 
ten internal-medicine departments of university hospitals in Germany. It employs 
fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to explore which configura-
tions of institutional, organizational, and task conditions are necessary and/or suffi-
cient for professionals to enact care pathways as part of a hospital department’s 
treatment routines. Furthermore, eight additional interviews with physicians work-
ing in internal-medicine departments have been conducted to discuss possible ex-
planations for the findings and to collect additional illustrative evidence. 
This study provides two key contributions. First, it identifies three multilevel con-
figurations where professionals enact written rules in an empirical setting character-
ized by high levels of improvisation and little managerial oversight: when institu-
tional pressure is high, written rules will become enacted in routines addressing 
tasks of high complexity (“reducing risk”). In this situation, routine participants 
face strong social norms to conform to specific written organizational rules while 
also being at particular risk of social and legal repercussions when deviating from 
established rules, especially those for complex tasks that are more likely to generate 
unfavorable outcomes. Written rules will further become enacted in routines when 
institutional pressure is high and routine participants with high expertise execute 
tasks at high frequency (“securing status”). In this situation, because high task fre-
quency reveals systematic deviations from gold standards, routine participants who 
do not enact rules are at a particularly high risk of losing status. Finally, when insti-
tutional pressure is low, participants will enact written rules when they have low 
levels of expertise and face high task volumes of low complexity (“surviving 
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stress”). In this situation, the enactment of written rules effectively supports these 
actors in guiding and reflecting upon their routine performances, helping them to 
avoid excessive stress in the early stages of their professional career. As a second 
contribution, the multilevel framework presented here, highlights that rule enact-
ment depends on conditions of the organizational routine and the external and in-
ternal organizational context. While routine participants’ rationale for enacting rules 
differs in each of the three solutions found in this study, it can be concluded that 
written rules become enacted when they function as a resource to routine partici-
pants and provide routine participants with confirming experience when enacting 
the written rule. Therefore, theories of organizational routines need to be broadened 
to include the interplay of multilevel dynamics to explain when and why profes-
sionals participating in organizational routines enact written rules. 
6.3.2 Theoretical Background 
Written Rules and Professional Autonomy 
Written rules are commonplace in professional organizations. The diffusion can 
mainly be attributed to the pressures professional organizations face. These organi-
zations are increasingly expected to provide services efficiently and to be accounta-
ble for those services (Leicht & Fennell, 1997; Leicht & Lyman, 2006). The enact-
ment of written rules in organizational routines is critical for professional organiza-
tions to function, as failure to do so may lead to economic inefficiency and organi-
zational de-legitimization (Bohmer, 2009; Courpasson, 2000; Powell, Brock, & 
Hinings, 1999). On an organizational level, written rules contribute to a more effi-
cient service provision, as they may alleviate role ambiguity within the complex 
environment of professional work (Organ & Greene, 1981: 249) and professionals 
have been found to employ written rules as instruments to reinforce professional 
socialization within organizations (Abernethy & Stoelwinder, 1990). As an instru-
ment for external legitimization, enacting written rules effectively conveys the im-
pression that service provision is consistently based on well-proven and objective 
standards that promote the safety of such things as medical services (Rozich et al., 
2004; Timmermans & Almeling, 2009; Timmermans & Berg, 1997, 2003). Hence, 
it is important to understand when and why professionals participating in organiza-
tional routines enact written rules, because the enactment of written rules is crucial 
for professional organizations to persist and prevail. 
While written rules have spread in professional organizations, researchers have not 
been able to effectively explain when and why professionals enact written rules in 
the core organizational routines of professional organizations. Research on organi-
zational rules provides two dominant explanations on when and why rules become 
enacted (Tyler & Blader, 2005). The command-and-control perspective proposes 
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that rule enactment is a function of external rule enforcement through hierarchical 
control (e.g., Ouchi, 1979, 1980; Weber, 1922). Organizations engage in formal 
monitoring activities and incentivize actors to ensure that routine participants ad-
here to written rules (Adler & Borys, 1996; Kohn, 1999; O'Reilly, 1989). Research 
from this theoretical perspective focuses on managers’ motives to employ rules 
(e.g., Canales, 2014) and suggests that the enactment of rules depends on their en-
forceability by external authorities (Eisenhardt, 1985; Lehman & Ramanujam, 
2009). While prominent in the economic literature, managerial monitoring and in-
centivizing have been found to have limited effect in organizations (Gouldner, 
1954; Streatfield, 2001). For example, Tyler and Blader (2005), using two empiri-
cal studies on employee rule adherence in various types of organizations, show that 
the influence of incentive- and monitoring-based, command-and-control approach-
es rarely achieve sustainable rule enactment. Guo and Yuan (2012) provide addi-
tional evidence for the limited effect of external control and sanctioning on the en-
actment of rules. In their study on the violation of written information-security 
rules, they find that organizational sanctions have no significant direct effect on rule 
violations, while personal self-sanctions and workgroup sanctions both significantly 
foster the enactment of rules. The authors attribute this result to the proven short-
term effect of punishment and potential resentments towards organizational sanc-
tioning, while self- and workgroup-sanctions appeal to personal accountability and 
social status within a relevant peer group. This limited effect of external control for 
the enactment of organizational rules is particularly relevant in the context of pro-
fessional work. Professional autonomy results in an asymmetry of power between 
professionals participating in a routine and supervisors, an asymmetry that allows 
professionals to play a dominant role in enacting or neglecting written organiza-
tional rules (Ferlie et al., 2005). Physicians, for example, “[…] traditionally en-
joy[s] a collective autonomy over the content and conditions of medical practice” 
(Doolin, 2002: 373). 
In contrast to the command-and-control perspective, the self-regulatory perspective 
suggests that rule enactment may become part of an actor’s identity. From this per-
spective, routine participants enact written rules because it is the “individual’s in-
trinsic desire to follow organizational rules” (Tyler & Blader, 2005:1144). Son 
(2011), in his study on the enactment of information-security policies, finds that 
these rules are more likely to be enacted when they are perceived as legitimate and 
are congruent with employees’ moral values (intrinsic motivation) than when they 
are enforced through deterrents like impending termination of work contracts (ex-
trinsic motivation). In sum, research from this perspective suggests that rule enact-
ment can be achieved by the socialization of routine participants into organizational 
culture until individual and organizational goals converge (Hu, Dinev, Hart, & 
Cooke, 2012). 
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However, professionals are unlikely to exhibit intrinsic desires to enact written or-
ganizational rules, as their work is inherently defined by high levels of individual 
autonomy that forbids the slavish enactment of organizational rules (Freidson, 
2001). Autonomy is the defining characteristic of professional work, shaping both 
the everyday performances of professionals and their professional identities 
(Doolin, 2002; Marcus, 1985), because autonomy allows professionals to skilfully 
apply complex, often tacit, knowledge to solve their clients’ specific problems in 
the best way possible (Greenwood, 1957). In line with these arguments, empirical 
research has shown that professional socialization inoculating professionals with 
the norm of autonomy often dominates organizational regulation (e.g., Ferlie et al., 
2005; Kellogg, 2009). Accordingly, established theoretical perspectives on rule en-
actment fail to explain when and why professionals enact written organizational 
rules because both established rationales (command-and-control and self-
regulatory) fail to consider autonomy as the key characteristic of professional work. 
Professionals’ autonomy in routine performances, however, might cause divergence 
between a prescriptive written rule and the actual routine performance (e.g., Bruns, 
2009; Ciborra, 2000; Suchman, 1983). 
The following section draws on the organizational-routines literature to identify 
four multi-level conditions that provide a starting point for explaining when and 
why professionals participating in organizational routines enact written rules. 
Against this backdrop, it is argued that the enactment of written rules by profes-
sionals in organizational routines depends on a complex interplay between counter-
vailing forces. 
Organizational Routines as Generative Systems 
Research on organizational routines has recently begun to conceptualize organiza-
tional routines as generative systems. Organizational routines function as generative 
systems because routine participants exert agency (Parmigiani & Howard-
Grenville, 2011). To understand how and why routine participants exert agency, 
research has focused on the interplay of the performative and the ostensive aspect 
of organizational routines (Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Pentland & Feldman, 2005). 
The performative aspect captures the “real actions, by real people, in specific times 
and places” (Feldman & Pentland, 2008: 302), whereas the ostensive aspect cap-
tures the “abstract, generalized idea of the routine” (Feldman & Pentland, 
2003:101). Contrasting ostensive and performative routine aspects allows routine 
participants to scrutinize whether and why intended routine outcomes are achieved 
(e.g., whether and why an established medication provides the appropriate treat-
ment), and whether and why unintended and undesirable outcomes are produced 
(e.g., patients treated with this medication exhibit an excessive duration of stay). 
The performative and ostensive aspects of routines have a reciprocal relationship: 
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the performative aspect creates, maintains, and modifies the ostensive aspect, while 
the ostensive aspect is employed to guide, account for, and refer to the performative 
aspect. Routine participants demonstrate their agency when consciously introducing 
variation in the performative routine aspect (e.g., by treating a patient using a new 
medication). Routine participants will draw on their ostensive aspects to guide this 
performative variation, to derive accounts for why the variation was introduced, 
and to refer to this varied organizational routine. In turn, such performative varia-
tion may modify the ostensive aspects of routine participants and thereby influence 
future performative aspects of the organizational routine (e.g., future treatments of 
similar patients may eschew the old medication in favor of the new medication).  
This mutually constitutive relationship between performative and ostensive aspects 
provides the foundation for routine participants to exert agency, thereby making 
organizational routines generative systems capable of drifting away from a once-
implemented written rule (Feldman & Pentland, 2003, 2008; Pentland et al., 2012). 
The exertion of agency with regard to rule-enactment is even more likely in profes-
sional routines, as most routine participants are autonomous professionals obliged 
to follow professional norms rather than formal organizational controls (Freidson, 
2001). 
Written Rules as Enacted Artefacts in Organizational Routines 
While written rules may keep individuals’ activities and organizational routines “on 
track” (Schulz, 2008: 228; see also: Avadikyan et al., 2001), the enactment of writ-
ten rules is not a deterministic process (Reynaud, 2005; Suchman, 1983; Taylor, 
1993). Written rules relate to the ostensive and performative aspect; however, they 
represent a distinct entity (Pentland & Feldman, 2005): on the one hand, rules artic-
ulate how patterns of interaction should form in principle; thus, they shape the rou-
tine participant’s abstract notion (i.e., the ostensive aspect) of an organizational rou-
tine (D'Adderio, 2008). On the other hand, an observer may notice a resemblance 
between a specific routine performance (i.e., the performative aspect) and a specific 
rule when routine participants enact that rule. For example, physicians participating 
in a treatment routine for renal transplant evaluations may have a binder with a 
printed-out care pathway on renal transplant evaluation on them. While the renal 
transplant care pathway documents an ideal-type representation of the renal trans-
plant evaluation routine, it is neither identical with the ostensive representations of 
this treatment routine maintained by individual routine participants, nor is it identi-
cal with specific performances of this treatment routine. 
Enacting written rules is an effortful accomplishment. Enacting a written rule with-
in a specific routine performance requires routine participants to apply the abstract 
norms and categories depicted in the written rules to a specific situation (Blau, 
1955; Taylor, 1993; Wittgenstein, 1958). Surmounting this gap between the ab-
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stract written rule and the specific situation requires routine participants’ effort, in-
corporating the routine participants’ ostensive representations of the routine as well 
as the performative aspects of the task at hand (Anand, Gray, & Siemsen, 2012; 
Feldman, 2004; Orlikowski, 2000). 
In professional organizations, routine participants’ ostensive aspect is primarily 
shaped by their professional expertise. As actors gain professional expertise, their 
ostensive aspect will develop a fuller repertoire of routine iterations, incorporating 
also a broader basis to evaluate and rationalize the appropriateness of routine per-
formances (cf. Miller, Pentland, & Choi, 2012; Pentland et al., 2012; Turner & 
Fern, 2012). For example, senior physicians internalize substantial professional ex-
pertise on all relevant treatment routines in their specialty. Their expertise is usually 
based on many years of thorough training and strict formal evaluations, contrib-
uting to the development of a broad and deep ostensive representation of all treat-
ment routines within their specialty. In contrast, most junior physicians, after just 
having completed medical school, lack such broad and deep ostensive representa-
tion of medical treatment routines. Such representations, as captured by the routine 
participant’s professional expertise, contribute to the routine dynamics fostering or 
forestalling the enactment of written rules. For example, routine participants lack-
ing professional expertise and thus elaborate ostensive representations of a treat-
ment routine they are about to participate in, may enact the written rule to avoid 
losing sight of the different elements and associations in a task and their signifi-
cance within the organizational routine performance (Becker, 2005; Lippman & 
Rumelt, 1982). Written rules may provide useful templates for guiding, accounting 
for, and referring to performative aspects when actors cannot draw on their own 
professional expertise for reliable conceptions of appropriate conduct or if personal 
guidance by professionals with expertise is unavailable (cf. Hutchins, 1995). 
Tasks addressed within the performative aspect of a routine performance are com-
monly characterized by the frequency of task occurrence and task complexity
43
 (cf. 
Miller, Choi, & Pentland, 2014; Pentland et al., 2011; Zollo & Singh, 2004). Com-
paratively simple tasks that are frequently executed provide feedback more often 
and exhibit a structure more suitable for drawing inferences regarding the links be-
tween action sequences and the attained outcomes than do highly complex tasks 
that are seldom executed (Zollo & Winter, 2002). In complex but frequent tasks, 
routine participants may experience ambiguity by losing sight of the different ele-
ments and associations in a task and their significance within the organizational 
routine performance (Becker, 2005; Lippman & Rumelt, 1982). Depending on the 
routine participants’ ostensive representations of the routine, written organizational 
                                                 
43 The complexity of a task addressed by an organizational routine shall be defined as the number and se-
quence of actions employed in accomplishing the task as well as how those sequences vary across time 
(Pentland, Haerem, & Hillison, 2011). 
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rules may support routine participants in particular when performative experiences 
are infrequent and complex. However, given that only a limited number of excep-
tions can be covered by written rules, written rules may also become cumbersome 
to enact due to the large number of exceptions inherent to complex tasks (Galbraith, 
1973; March & Simon, 1958; Milliken, 1987; Thompson, 1967; van de Ven, 
Delbecq, & Koenig, 1976). In contrast, when tasks are frequent and of little com-
plexity, even routine participants with little professional expertise may quickly de-
velop ostensive aspects that cover all relevant aspects of the routine. 
In sum, the enactment of written rules can be assumed to be contingent on the 
boundary conditions routine participants experience when performing the routine. 
In the following section, it will be argued that the institutional context in which rou-
tine participants are embedded complements task- and organization-based condi-
tions. This institutional embeddedness of routine participants has largely been ig-
nored by prior research on organizational routines. While the institutional pressure 
originates at a different ontological level, integrating this perspective complements 
existing explanations on the routine level and may provide explanations of rule en-
actment. 
Institutional Embeddedness of Routine Participants 
Actors participating in a routine may enact written rules because they consider them 
to be reliable guides of appropriate behavior (March, 1994). What is considered 
appropriate depends on the social expectations that apply to an actor in a given con-
text. Social expectations matter, as “[…] identities and their contentions come all 
wrapped in larger structures and processes that predate them” (White, 1992: 6). For 
example, physicians are expected to provide patients with high-quality medical 
treatment according to current medical standards. These standards are usually de-
veloped in collective efforts incorporating medical practitioners and scientists. Stu-
dents of medicine learn these standards in their training, while senior practitioners 
are required by law to attend continuing education where current standards are 
taught. If practitioners fail to meet these standards, they are subject to legal sanc-
tions (Ulsenheimer, 1996). 
The social expectations that apply to an actor are captured by the institutional pres-
sure that an institutional field exerts. The institutional pressure provides an indica-
tion of what is “desirable, proper, or appropriate” (Suchman, 1995: 574) and de-
scribes the social context against which routine participants have to account for 
their performances. Drawing on a written rule legitimized in the institutional field 
provides an indication of actors’ “conformity to a specific standard or model” (Ruef 
& Scott, 1998, p. 880), thereby securing routine participants’ status as legitimate 
actors in a field (Thomas, Walker, & Zelditch, 1986). In contrast, deviating from 
written rules legitimized in the institutional field is likely to attract scrutiny and 
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contempt by other actors embedded in the same field and put routine participants at 
risk of social sanctions (cf. Meyer & Rowan, 1977). These sanctions may, for in-
stance, include the withdrawal of certificates by accreditation bodies and profes-
sional associations or the loss of public endorsement (Deeds, Mang, & Frandsen, 
2004:12). Further, routine participants who fail to comply with institutionalized 
expectations may face social disapproval in their work environment such as “snide 
comments” and isolation by peers (Kellogg, 2009: 679). To dispel any doubts re-
garding the appropriateness of their conduct, routine participants are likely to em-
ploy a legitimized written organizational rule for a particular routine when account-
ing for, seeking guidance for, or referring to specific routine performances. 
These preceding arguments suggest four explanatory conditions (routine partici-
pants’ professional expertise, task complexity, task frequency, and institutional 
pressure) that help explain when professionals participating in a routine will enact 
written rules in routine performances. However, each explanatory condition influ-
ences and is influenced by the other explanatory conditions, so that they eventually 
coalesce over time into holistic configurations, which in turn influence the enact-
ment of written rules in organizational routines. To identify configurations of the 
aforementioned conditions that foster the enactment of written organizational rules 
by professionals in organizational routines, an exploratory comparative case study 
was conducted. To analyze the data, fsQCA was applied as a method that enables 
the identification of equifinal and multilevel explanations. In the following section, 
the empirical setting in which the case studies have been conducted will be intro-
duced. 
6.3.3 Sample and Method 
Research Approach 
Building on the above theory, an investigation was designed to understand when 
and why professionals participating in organizational routines enact written rules. 
This study focuses on care pathways as an example of written organizational rules. 
In hospitals, care pathways are one of the most-common written organizational 
rules prescribing treatment routines (Timmermans & Almeling, 2009). Care path-
ways typically define “[…] a number of steps to be taken when specified conditions 
are met: how general practitioners should proceed when they suspect a new case of 
diabetes […],” for example (Timmermans & Berg, 2003: 25). Care pathways are 
designed to provide medical professionals with current and evidence-based medical 
knowledge that align specific treatment routine with medical standards (Bohmer, 
2009). The enactment of care pathways in clinical settings is promoted by interna-
tional associations such as the European Pathway Association and examples on the 
design, implementation, and effects of care pathways are regularly published in 
R O U T I N E - L E V E L  C H A N G E  
  
249 
medical journals such as the International Journal of Care Coordination. While 
medical standards are promoted and evaluated across organizations –  on the level 
of the professional field – the specific care pathways used in hospitals represent 
local translations and therefore represent organizational rules (Campbell, Hotchkiss, 
Bradshaw, & Porteous, 1998) that “connect the world of practice with the world of 
knowledge” (Zander, 2002:107). 
The design and application of care pathways are usually subject to extensive scien-
tific scrutiny. Care pathways are based on medical standards and are therefore 
backed up by clinical evidence based on randomized-control trials demonstrating 
their medical appropriateness to treat a specified illness (see Rotter et al., 2010; 
Vanhaecht et al., 2011). Care pathways provide an appropriate baseline for treating 
the disease they are designed for. Information on specific care pathways is readily 
available to clinicians, since it is published in numerous medical journals and ad-
vanced by institutions such as The Cochrane Collaboration. Despite being promot-
ed by the medical profession as a way to ensure consistent application of current 
medical knowledge in treatment routines, the enactment of care pathways collides 
with the principle of medical autonomy. For example, Rappolt (1997: 978) points 
out that care pathways “[…] have a paradoxical relation to professional autonomy, 
since despite being the quintessence of medical knowledge at the collective level, 
they diminish the technical autonomy of the individual practitioner.” Accordingly, 
while care pathways are an accepted means for treatment standardization in the 
medical community, enacting care pathways is an effortful accomplishment for 
physicians, as it implies subduing their autonomy. Therefore, the enactment of care 
pathways within treatment routines can be assumed to be a theoretically adequate 
and practically relevant research context within which to examine the enactment of 
written organizational rules by professionals. 
Given the lack of an encompassing theoretical framework explaining the enactment 
of organizational rules, as well as this study’s research interest exploring configura-
tions of conditions that contribute to this phenomenon, a case-based method was 
used (Morgan & Smircich, 1980). Within a pilot study, 14 chief physicians from a 
broad spectrum of disciplines working in university and non-university hospitals 
were interviewed to discuss changes in treatment routines that they supervised after 
regulatory changes in Germany. These interviews demonstrated a great diversity of 
terms and associations linked to “care pathways” and their enactment in treatment 
routines, a situation requiring a more reflective mode of data collection than would 
have been possible using a large-scale survey. Cases were selected on the basis of a 
theoretical sampling procedure (Eisenhardt, 1989). To generate insights on how 
institutional, organizational, and task conditions affect the enactment of organiza-
tional rules, hospitals were required to operate under similar economic conditions 
and regulatory regimes but differed considerably with regard to the explanatory 
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conditions. University hospitals, as maximum providers of medical care, appeared 
particularly suited to provide cases relevant to this study’s research interest. While 
university hospitals face competitive pressures similar to those of non-university 
hospitals, they also represent a clearly defined population that is subject to identical 
economic challenges and regulatory regimes (Reinhold, Thierfelder, Müller-
Riemenschneider, & Willich, 2009). Because of their extensive experience with 
medical research studies, university hospitals are accustomed to designing, imple-
menting, and updating appropriate care pathways (cf. Vanhaecht et al., 2006; 
Vanhaecht et al., 2010). Hence, the organizations that constitute the sample of this 
study are well versed in crafting workable care pathways. Differences across cases 
in the enactment of written rules are therefore likely due to the boundary conditions 
professionals face when enacting written rules. By focusing on the university hospi-
tals’ internal-medicine departments, which offer a broad but comparable spectrum 
of treatment routines, variations in the institutional, organizational, and task condi-
tions are likely to account for the enactment of care pathways. 
Sample and Data Collection 
This research was conducted as part of a larger qualitative study of work organiza-
tion in hospitals. The nursing directors of all 32 German university hospitals were 
approached to gain access to their internal-medicine departments. Following this 
initial approach, 16 hospitals agreed to provide access. The data collection draws on 
archival data provided by hospitals’ mandatory quality reporting, the medical data-
base MedLine (2012), and interview data from the respective departments.
44
 
To avoid common-method bias (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986), the interviews were 
only used to inquire which care pathways implemented in the respective depart-
ments had become enacted and which had not. The explanatory conditions were 
operationalized and measured on the basis of publicly available data on the hospital 
departments. Most of this data was found in the quality reports issued by the hospi-
tals (G-BA, 2012b). Because these reports belong to the official reporting data de-
                                                 
44 While there are potential drawbacks to collecting data via interviews, data collection via participant obser-
vation or archival data was not feasible in this study setting. In order to detect the enactment of a care path-
way across all explanatory conditions, a large number of observed treatment routine iterations across time 
would have been required. In order to detect differences between specific treatment actions and written care 
pathways, these observations would have to be conducted by knowledgeable medical personal. This mode of 
data collection would have been extremely resource consuming, given the number of actions and cycle times 
of a single treatment routine execution (Pentland & Feldman, 2008). Furthermore, given the complexity of 
such an observation, errors or incomplete documentation would have been likely. While relying on archival 
data would have bypassed many of the problems linked to observations (Pentland et al., 2011), matching the 
medical documentation of individual patients with written care pathways was not legally feasible due to strict 
data-protection standards. Against this backdrop, and considering that this inquiry does not intend to study or 
compare individual treatment routine performances and how these eventually deviate from care pathways, the 
data collection via interview was judged to be appropriate. 
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manded by German hospital law (§ 137 Abs. 3 Satz 1 Nr. 4 SGB V), this data can 
be expected to be valid. 
Interviews were arranged with physicians, nurses, and case managers to learn about 
the enactment of care pathways in their departments. To reduce the possible biases 
that may have influenced the respondents’ assessments, a number of precautions 
were taken: First, to reduce cognitive biases and errors resulting from faulty 
memory, the questions focused on past facts and behavior, not their beliefs and in-
tentions (Golden, 1992). Second, to avoid social-desirability response bias, all in-
terviewees were assured of their complete anonymity and communicated that all 
identifying information was to be removed upon transcription of the interviews. 
Participation in our interviews was voluntary. Third, wherever possible, at least two 
people were interviewed – including at least one of each healthcare profession – per 
department (e.g., nephrology) to ensure reliable statements. In a few cases, the au-
thors were also granted access to the case managers of the respective departments 
for validation purposes. Interviewees from the same department showed a very high 
agreement rate. Given that the interviews documented instances in which care 
pathways had not become enacted, despite university hospitals being experienced 
designers and users of care pathways, the data-collection method can be assumed to 
be valid. 
In total 48 semi-structured interviews in were conducted, including 22 background 
interviews with nursing directors and hospital quality-of-care managers, as well as 
26 semi-structured interviews with healthcare professionals from internal-medicine 
departments. Approximately half of these university hospitals’ internal-medicine 
departments either had not attempted to introduce care pathways or employed sim-
pler standard operating procedures and were therefore excluded from further analy-
sis. In one case, an interview partner was able to provide information on two de-
partments, as she had been a member of two medical teams. The interviews were 
conducted in German – the native language of the interviewers and all interviewees. 
Because of the work-intensive environment, interview duration ranged between 20 
and 104 minutes, with an average of fifty minutes. In nine cases, interviews had to 
be interrupted because patients required the interviewee’s attention. Given that the 
data collection was part of a larger research project, the interviews focused on care 
pathways as one of several facets of work organization in hospitals. Following the 
analysis of the data, eight additional interviews were conducted with junior and 
senior physicians working in the internal-medicine departments of two university 
hospitals. These interviewees did not participate in the primary data collection. 
These additional interviews were used to critically discuss possible explanations for 
the findings. These additional data not only support the interpretations and conclu-
sions drawn, but also provide additional illustrative evidence that will be presented 
in the discussion section below. 
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Measures 
Outcome: Enactment of care pathways was measured using interview data. All in-
terviewees were specifically asked which diagnoses/procedures in their department 
are practiced on the basis of care pathways, as well as from which care pathways 
practitioners regularly and substantially deviate. They were also asked which diag-
noses/procedures are associated with care pathways that have been fully imple-
mented in the past yet are no longer enacted. The interviews sought to identify 
which care pathways had become an element of daily practice beyond the initial 
implementation period. With the exception of brief conversations, which were doc-
umented with written notes, all interviews were recorded digitally and transcribed 
for further analysis (Bryman, 2008). Based on the interview data, a list of treatment 
routines was derived, including which care pathways had been implemented and 
noting whether or not physicians enacted the care pathway in the respective treat-
ment routines. An example for the enactment of care pathways is provided by Case 
1 in the dataset. Here, patients who were about to receive a renal transplant were 
usually treated according to a written care pathway that was implemented about 
nine years ago. While the interviewee admitted that exceptional cases required phy-
sicians to deviate from the pathway to allow for flexible routine performances to 
ensure patient safety, he pointed out that the pathway for the evaluation of renal 
transplant patients was enacted in everyday practice because “especially in the case 
of transplantation, it is reasonable to reflect upon the preparation procedures. Al-
so, because [the pathway] coordinates interaction.” Accordingly, in Case 1, care 
pathways were coded as being enacted. Non-enactment of a care pathway, on the 
other hand, can be observed in Case 14, where a care pathway for the treatment of 
arterial hypertension had been implemented but failed to become enacted. As the 
interviewee put it: “Hypertension is being [treated] according to the maxim: ‘Well, 
I am pretty familiar with that, I am just going to do that [my way].’” Case 14 was 
coded as non-enactment of care pathways. 
Institutional pressure. Institutional pressure on the field-level was measured by the 
number of citations of the most-frequently-cited scientific article on care pathways 
applicable to the respective treatment routine. While research lacks a commonly 
accepted measure for institutional pressure (cf. Greenwood, Oliver, Suddaby, & 
Sahlin-Andersson, 2008; Honig & Karlsson, 2004; Oliver, 1997), the number of 
citations can be considered a valid proxy, since practitioners draw on this research 
to inform their practice and are held accountable to this current state of knowledge 
(Timmermans & Berg, 2003). The more widely disseminated an article that de-
scribes and tests a specific care pathway in the professional and scientific commu-
nity constituting the institutional field, the harder it is for practitioners to justify a 
treatment that is not aligned with that medical standard (Bohmer, 2009). Further-
more, if the most-cited article on a care pathway for the respective treatment routine 
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is very frequently referenced in subsequent articles, the prevailing opinion on the 
use of care pathways can be assumed to be rather homogenous. Random samples of 
the cited articles were inspected to ensure that findings were largely in favor of the 
respective care pathway. The more homogenous a field’s expectations are, the 
stronger the pressure towards conformity becomes - in this case the enactment of 
care pathways (Oliver, 1991). The search for scientific publications was conducted 
via MedLine (2012) using an array of search terms.
45
  
Professional expertise. The level of expertise within the department executing the 
respective treatment routine was calculated using the ratio of specialist doctors 
(“Fachärzte”) to all other clinicians within the department in question.46  Specialists 
have mastered the highest level of medical training available, having undergone 
five to seven additional years of practical training, and are therefore highly experi-
enced in performing medical-treatment routines (Egan & Jaye, 2009; Maclachlan, 
1997). Thus, the ratio of specialists to all other clinicians within a department can 
be assumed to validly capture the average level of professional expertise present in 
a department. 
Task complexity. Task complexity was calculated using the average complexity of 
the medical cases treated using the corresponding treatment routine. This infor-
mation was collected from the so-called G-DRG (German Diagnosis Related 
Groups) weights that are typically assigned to each treatment routine. These cost 
weights indicate the relative complexity of a certain diagnosis-related group and are 
updated annually to provide the basis for health-insurance providers’ reimburse-
ment rates for clinical treatments (Pierdzioch, 2008). The weights are determined 
by InEK, a public organization set up by the German government (Schreyögg et al., 
2006: 272). As a first step, the medical procedures constituting the respective rou-
tine were matched with the related G-DRG codes. These matches were then vali-
dated using expert ratings provided by the head of the accounting department of 
one of the largest German hospitals. In a second step, the respective G-DRG 
weights were weighted according to their relative occurrence in the German hospi-
tal field to account for the patient composition receiving the respective treatment. 
The average weight of the respective G-DRG codes per treatment routine was then 
                                                 
45 As search terms, all synonyms for care pathways described by the European Pathway Organization (2012) 
were used: “clinical pathway*”, “clinical care pathway*”, “care pathway*”, “critical pathway*”, “care 
path*”, “integrated care pathway*”, “case management plan*”, “care map”. Furthermore, the search was 
restricted to articles published in English or German. 
46 While care pathways usually prescribe all relevant treatment steps for a specific disease and these steps also 
may include nursing work, the present study focuses on medical doctors as routine participants. This decision 
naturally excludes nurses and other service personnel from our analysis. However, given that this study in-
tends to explain the enactment of rules in a context where application of rules is not mandated by working 
contracts—and medical doctors in Germany represent the only participants of a treatment routine who exert 
legally sanctioned discretion regarding the treatment of patients—excluding nurses and other service person-
nel from the analysis seems warranted. 
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calculated. These values constitute the data on task complexity and can be assumed 
to be a valid measure because G-DRGs are by law designed to capture treatment 
complexity (KHEntG § 9 Abs. 1). 
Task frequency. The frequency of a task was measured by the number of treatments 
performed by the hospital department within the year 2012. 
Table 6.1 depicts the raw data collected for each treatment routine. 
Table 6.1: Cases and Raw Data 
Case ID University Hospital Internal Medicine Department Treatment Routine 
1 I Nephrology Renal Transplant Evaluation 
2   Renal Dialysis 
3  Cardiology Cardioversion 
4 II Nephrology Renal Transplant Evaluation 
5   Renal Puncture 
6   Shunt 
7  Cardiology Angiography 
8 III Oncology Plasmacytoma 
9 IV Cardiology Angina Pectoris 
10 V Nephrology Arterial Hypertension 
11   Renal Biopsy 
12   Renal Insufficiency 
13 VI Oncology Bone Marrow Transplantation 
14  Nephrology Arterial Hypertension 
15   Renal Biopsy 
16 VII Gastroenterology Peritoneal Puncture 
17   Pleural Punctuation 
18   Trans-Arterial Chemo Embolization 
19   Mini-Laparoscopy 
 











1 13 1.25 2.27 10 Enacted 
2 11 1.25 1.35 8900 Enacted 
3 0 1.21 0.49 164 Enacted 
4 13 0.50 2.27 16 Enacted 
5 0 0.50 0.91 1 Non-Enacted 
6 0 0.50 0.95 85 Enacted 
7 1 0.50 0.92 6307 Enacted 
8 0 0.63 1.09 228 Non-Enacted 
9 76 1.01 0.55 623 Enacted 
10 2 0.56 0.53 83 Enacted 
11 1 0.56 0.91 218 Enacted 
12 11 0.56 1.35 242 Enacted 
13 7 1.25 15.70 216 Enacted 
14 2 0.86 0.53 56 Non-Enacted 
15 1 0.86 0.91 155 Enacted 
16 0 0.64 0.76 610 Enacted 
17 0 0.64 0.67 101 Enacted 
18 11 0.64 1.11 81 Enacted 
19 6 0.64 1.06 366 Enacted 
 
  




Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis was used to explain the enactment of 
written organizational rules using the four explanatory conditions derived in the 
theory section. While researchers have recently begun employing fsQCA to test 
theory (e.g., Bell, Filatotchev, & Aguilera, 2014; Fiss, 2011), the method was origi-
nally developed and applied to smaller data sets to elaborate theory (Greckhamer et 
al., 2013). FsQCA has a number of advantages for the present study. FsQCA treats 
each case as a complex configuration of causal factors with a specific outcome and 
analyzes which set of relations is necessary and sufficient for the outcome to occur 
(Ragin, 1987, 2000). A conception of causation based on necessary and sufficient 
conditions is particularly suitable to explore how conjunctions of mechanisms are 
connected to an outcome (e.g., institutionalist and routine-based mechanisms inter-
acting in causing enactment of written rules). Furthermore, fsQCA allows equifinal 
explanations because this method does not assume only one constellation of fea-
tures among all observed cases that causes the outcome (Fiss, 2011). Emergent pro-
cesses, such as the processes causing enactment of written rules in organizational 
routines, are typically equifinal in form (Crutchfield, 2008). The analytical focus of 
fsQCA meets this study’s objective to explore emergent processes that cause en-
actment of rules in organizational routines. Finally, fsQCA techniques are suitable 
for analyzing multilevel data structures (Crilly, 2013; Rohlfing, 2011). Given the 
multiple ontological levels inherent in the conceptualization of the enactment of 
rules in routines, fsQCA as a multilevel method represents the appropriate method 
for the present inquiry. 
The fsQCA presented here follows standard procedures of preparing and conduct-
ing (e.g., Fiss, Cambré, & Marx, 2013; Ragin, 2000). To ensure transparency, the 
analysis is based on the standard software package fsQCA version 2.5 (Ragin & 
Davey, 2009), which proceeds stepwise through each analytical moment. These 
steps encompass the calibration of raw data to fuzzy-set membership values. The 
following paragraph will thus elaborate on how the outcome as well as the explana-
tory conditions were calibrated. 
Enactment of Care Pathways. The outcome (enactment of care pathway) was cali-
brated dichotomously. Set-membership values were assigned to outcomes based on 
a simple logic: the enactment of care pathways following an initial implementation 
phase must imply a fuzzy-set membership value of 1 because lower values would 
falsely indicate qualities of non-enactment. Therefore, all treatment routines exhib-
iting enactment of care pathways were assigned set-membership values of 1, 
whereas treatment routines exhibiting non-enactment of care pathway enactment 
were assigned set-membership values of 0. 
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Institutional Pressure. The calibration of “high institutional pressure” draws on 
exogenous threshold values for full membership, full non-membership, and the 
crossover point. The full-membership threshold and the crossover point were de-
rived by conducting an additional MedLine search on care pathways limited to the 
respective specialty area (e.g., nephrology). The search results were analyzed for 
the most-cited article published in the respective subject area. Given the theoretical 
assumptions on institutional pressure, this number indicates full set membership for 
a specific department type. In line with this rationale, the threshold for full non-
membership in the set was set to 0.5 citations.
47
 The crossover point was derived by 
inspecting the distribution of the MedLine citation records for a value break among 
the citation clusters (Crilly et al., 2012). 
Professional Expertise. The set “high professional expertise” was calibrated using 
the basic population. More specifically, a measure for actors’ professional expertise 
was calculated (specialist/non-specialist) for all internal-medicine departments in 
the sample (e.g., nephrology) across all university hospitals in Germany. Threshold 
values for full membership, full non-membership, and the crossover point were de-
rived for each department type by visually inspecting the data for value breaks be-
tween clusters (Crilly et al., 2012). 
Task Complexity. Calibration of the set “high task complexity” was based on the 
German hospital reimbursement system. This system assigns the DRG value 1 to 
treatments of average complexity (InEK, 2012). Accordingly, a measured routine 
complexity of 1 provides a highly appropriate qualitative anchor for the set’s cross-
over point. Lacking theoretical criteria indicating threshold values for full member-
ship and full non-membership, these anchors were derived by inspecting the distri-
bution of the average DRG values reported by all German hospitals for obvious 
value breaks (Crilly et al., 2012). 
Task Frequency. The set “high task frequency” was calibrated using basic popula-
tion information. Again, the official quality reports of all German university hospi-
tals were used. First, data on the number of treatment-routine executions (e.g., renal 
biopsy) in the respective departments per report year were gathered. To derive 
threshold values for full membership, full non-membership, and the crossover 
point, these distributions were inspected for value breaks (Crilly et al., 2012). These 
breaks supposedly indicate qualitative differences in the levels of treatment fre-
quencies (Crilly et al., 2012).  
                                                 
47 Setting the threshold to 0 was not possible, as the sample includes cases exhibiting no citations on care 
pathways. Thresholds cannot be placed on values covered by empirical data (Ragin, 2000). 
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Table 6.2 provides an overview of the thresholds used for calibrating the raw data. 
The four explanatory conditions and the outcome of each case were calibrated to 
fuzzy-set membership values accordingly (see Table 6.3).  









   
                        Cardiology 76 15 0.5 
             Gastroenterology 27 5.5 0.5 
                        Nephrology 13 6.5 0.5 
                            Oncology 26 3.5 0.5 
Professional Expertise 
   
                        Cardiology 1.3 0.8 0.37 
             Gastroenterology 1.8 1.2 0.71 
                        Nephrology 1.3 0.95 0.6 
                            Oncology 1.4 0.9 0.45 
Task Complexity 1.8 1 0.7 
Task Frequency 
   
Angina Pectoris 650 400 216 
Angiography 6935 3780 875 
Arterial Hypertension 143 66 43 
Bone Marrow Transplantation 185 144 50 
Cardioversion 325 132 70 
Mini-Laparoscopy  240 70 20 
Peritoneal Puncture 487 281 83 
Plasmacytoma 178 130 30 
Pleural Punctuation 77 38 22 
Renal Biopsy 195 116 50 
Renal Dialysis 6300 3700 900 
Renal Insufficiency 157 85 18 
Renal Puncture 50 18 5 
Renal Transplant Evaluation 51 32 9 
Shunt 30 16 4 
Trans-Arterial Chemo Embolization 40 19 3 
 











of Care Pathway 
1 0.95 0.93 0.99 0.05 1 
2 0.89 0.93 0.79 1.00 1 
3 0.04 0.92 0.01 0.62 1 
4 0.95 0.02 0.99 0.11 1 
5 0.04 0.02 0.29 0.00 0 
6 0.04 0.02 0.38 1.00 1 
7 0.05 0.11 0.31 0.92 1 
8 0.03 0.14 0.58 1.00 0 
9 0.95 0.78 0.01 0.94 1 
10 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.66 1 
11 0.06 0.03 0.29 0.98 1 
12 0.89 0.03 0.79 1.00 1 
13 0.61 0.89 1.00 0.99 1 
14 0.10 0.32 0.01 0.21 0 
15 0.06 0.32 0.29 0.81 1 
16 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.99 1 
17 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.99 1 
18 0.68 0.03 0.60 1.00 1 
19 0.52 0.03 0.57 0.99 1 
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Causal analysis in fsQCA builds on the notion of necessary and sufficient condi-
tions. Since procedures uncovering sufficient conditions cannot be relied on to un-
cover necessary conditions,  necessary and sufficient conditions were analyzed sep-
arately, beginning with the necessary conditions (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010). 
Logically, necessary conditions are always present if the outcome is present, and 
there must not be an instance in which the outcome is present and the condition 
absent (Schneider & Wagemann, 2007). By convention, a consistency value of at 
least 0.9 is required for indicating necessary conditions (Goertz, 2006). To test for 
necessary conditions, the “necessary conditions” procedure provided by fsQCA 2.5 
was applied. In scrutinizing the results of the analysis, the consistency values of all 
conditions (as well as their negations) were found to be well below 0.9, suggesting 
that fuzzy-set membership values of the explanatory conditions across all cases are 
lower than outcome-membership values (Ragin, 2006). Therefore, none of the con-
ditions was considered necessary for the enactment of care pathways in treatment 
routines. The analysis was continued by testing for sufficient conditions. 
For a sufficient condition, the outcome is always present if the condition is present; 
and there must not be an instance in which the condition is present and the outcome 
absent (Schneider & Wagemann, 2007). The Quine-McClusky algorithm provided 
by the fsQCA 2.5 software package was used to uncover sufficient conditions caus-
ing rule enactment by professionals, applying a consistency threshold (0.90) that is 
stricter than the consistency threshold (0.75) suggested by Ragin (2006). In the 
course of the minimization procedure, the fsQCA 2.5 software allows for three 
types of solutions. Whereas the parsimonious and intermediate solutions incorpo-
rate logical remainders to varying extents, the complex solution incorporates only 
statements about situations that occur empirically (Ragin, 2000) and therefore rep-
resents the most-conservative approach (Vis, 2012). Accordingly, this analysis re-
lies on the complex solution. The findings are presented below. 
6.3.4 Findings 
Table 6.4 presents the configurations of conditions associated with the enactment of 
care pathways. The presentation of these results relies on the established notation 
style suggested by Ragin and Fiss (2008). Black circles indicate the presence of a 
condition, while crossed circles indicate the absence of a condition. Blank spaces 
indicate a “don’t care” situation in which the condition may be either absent or pre-
sent. 
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Condition 1 2 3 
    High Institutional Pressure   
High Professional Expertise   
High Task Complexity   
High Task Frequency 
  
Consistency .99 .95 .91 
Raw Coverage .35 .17 .40 
Unique Coverage .18 .05 .31 
Cases Covered 
1, 2, 4, 12, 
13, 18, 19 
2, 9, 13 
6, 7, 10, 11, 
15, 16, 17 
Overall Solution Consistency .94 
Overall Solution Coverage .71 
 
The complex solution (Table 6.4) indicates three sufficient equifinal solutions ex-
plaining the outcome of care-pathway enactment. Solution 1 states that the presence 
of high institutional pressure and high task complexity are sufficient for the enact-
ment of care pathways to occur, whereas Solution 2 states that the presence of high 
institutional pressure in conjunction with both high levels of professional expertise 
and high task frequency are sufficient for this outcome. Solution 3 states that the 
absence of high institutional pressure in conjunction with the absence of high levels 
of professional expertise, the absence of high task complexity, and the presence of 
high task frequency, are sufficient for care pathways to become enacted. The over-
all solution consistency (0.94) and individual solution consistency terms (0.99, 0.95 
and 0.91) are well above the minimum consistency (0.80) recommended by Ragin 
(2008). This result indicates that there is an appropriate correspondence between 
the empirical data and the set-theoretic relationships captured in the solution terms 
(Fiss et al., 2013). The relevance of the different solution terms is expressed by the 
coverage scores, which are calculated from the percentage of cases that represent a 
given solution term within the outcome (Ragin, 2006). As indicated by the solution 
coverage, all three solutions together account for approximately 71 percent of the 
fuzzy-set membership values in the outcome. While this result implies that most of 
the outcome is explained by the solution terms, it also indicates some degree of un-
explained idiosyncrasy. As indicated by the unique coverage measures, which are 
lower than the solution coverage, some cases are explained by all three solution 
terms. This result indicates that equifinality is present in this phenomenon. 
                                                 
48 Cases 8, 3, 5, 14 were excluded from the analysis because the truth table rows containing these cases failed 
to meet the consistency threshold (0.90). 
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6.3.5 Discussion 
This study provides a foundation for understanding when and why professionals 
participating in organizational routines enact written rules. Previous research on 
organizational routines has provided evidence that routines and rules frequently 
drift apart (Anand et al., 2012; Bruns, 2009; Ciborra, 2000). The present analysis 
uncovered organizational rules that were implemented within the very same hospi-
tal department and had become enacted in one instance (Case 15) but not in the 
other (Case 14). Interestingly, the written rule not enacted in this department was 
enacted in another hospital department (Case 10). With these patterns in mind, at-
tributing the varying outcomes to differences in designing, implementing, and up-
dating care pathways across departments seems implausible. Instead, the following 
discussion focuses on the interaction between organizational rules, routines partici-
pants, and organizational context. 
Exploring Rule Enactment by Professionals in Organizational Routines 
The analysis found no necessary condition explaining written rule enactment in 
routines. Accordingly, enactment of written rules does not depend on a single, key 
mechanism driving routine participants’ behavior (cf. Dionysiou & Tsoukas, 2013; 
Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). However, the analysis revealed three equifinally sufficient 
explanations for the occurrence of rule enactment. The following section will 
demonstrate how and why these configurations of conditions foster rule enactment. 
To clarify and illustrate the central mechanism of each configuration fostering rule 
enactment, interview quotations from the expert discussions will be provided. 
Situation 1: Reducing Risk 
Solution 1 suggests that high institutional pressure and high task complexity cause 
enactment of care pathways, irrespective of task frequency and professional exper-
tise of routine participants. The expert discussions revealed that in this situation, 
routine participants may enact organizational rules to reduce sanctioning risks. Care 
pathways covered by high institutional pressure are organizational rules that are 
based on widely accepted treatment standards. Failure to enact written rules based 
on such standards will raise contempt by peers and, given that undesired treatment 
outcomes may result, legal prosecution. At the same time, Situation 1 encompasses 
treatment routines that address highly complex tasks. Complex tasks (e.g., bone 
marrow transplantation) require substantial coordination between routine partici-
pants and are frequently considered risky. Treatment routines addressing such tasks 
usually incorporate a larger number of routine participants performing interdepend-
ent routine steps. Without care pathway enactment, “coordination between the phy-
sicians involved would not work at all, because [the different specialists participat-
ing in the treatment routine] work completely differently” (Interviewee 1). In this 
situation, routine participants are not only confronted with high institutional pres-
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sure to conform to specific written organizational rules but also risk social and legal 
repercussions when deviating from these rules. 
Enacting written rules allows routine participants to both facilitate coordination, 
thereby reducing the risk of causing objectionable routine performance outcomes, 
as well as to visibly conform to written rules based on accepted standards. A senior 
physician provided illustrative evidence for this risk-reducing mechanism: “Bone 
marrow transplants are delicate, and you have to be very careful to avoid the pa-
tient slipping away – the patient may very easily die” (Interviewee 3). Against this 
background, he pointed out that institutional pressure causes “peer pressure from 
fellow physicians to perform according to the care pathway; performing according 
to your private preferences would simply demonstrate professional incapacity” and 
added that “you want to avoid exposing yourself as someone not able to measure 
up to this high [treatment routine] complexity and not being able to comply with the 
standard” (Interviewee 3). Taken together, “[…] under these conditions, it’s just 
easier and safer for the individual actors to draw on a pathway than to decide on 
their own” (Interviewee 8). 
In summary, while written rules may represent a comparatively inefficient coordi-
nation device for highly complex tasks, prior research has rarely considered the 
interaction between task characteristics and institutional pressure when explaining 
why routine participants adhere to specific organizational rules. High institutional 
pressure creates strong social expectations for actors to account appropriately for 
their routine performances. In such situations, written rules protect routine partici-
pants from accusations of inappropriate conduct when failing at a complex task. 
Participants who fail to live up to social expectations risk sanctions from institu-
tional stakeholders (e.g., loss of certifications) as well as disapproval by peers. In 
this configuration, written rules are likely to become enacted across routine itera-
tions, as they support routine participants in reducing their risk of failure in a situa-
tion in which failure is likely to be caused by high task complexity and linked to 
severe social sanctions resulting from high institutional pressures. Written rules 
reduce routine participants’ risk by continuously guiding present routine perfor-
mances while also providing reliable means of accounting for past routine perfor-
mances. 
Situation 2: Securing Status 
Solution 2 suggests that high institutional pressure in conjunction with high levels 
of routine participants’ professional expertise and high task frequency are sufficient 
for the enactment of care pathways, irrespective of task complexity. The expert dis-
cussions revealed that the enactment of written organizational rules in this situation 
follows from routine participant’s impetus to secure their status as knowledgeable 
and experienced professionals. Highly experienced routine participants frequently 
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“[…] not only experience this institutional pressure, but also contribute to its de-
velopment” (Interviewee 3). In this situation, routine participants are confronted 
with high institutional pressure to conform to specific written organizational rules. 
More importantly, high task frequency allows experienced peers to uncover sys-
tematic deviations from well-established standards. Thus, participants have a strong 
incentive to enact the rule. 
The findings suggest that securing status becomes particularly apparent when exe-
cuting frequent treatment routines that involve experienced professionals guiding a 
small number of junior physicians in a department through routine performances. 
Due to the high institutional pressure associated with the care pathway, senior phy-
sicians are held accountable by their peers for guiding junior physicians during rou-
tine executions. While infrequent deviations from written rules based on highly in-
stitutionalized standards may be accounted for by patient requirements, frequent 
deviations from written rules based on highly institutionalized standards will raise 
contempt by fellow senior physicians In the expert discussion, a senior physician 
provided evidence for this mechanism: “Consider this example: There are people 
[junior physicians] that are new to the […] department. Accordingly, they have 
little knowledge of the current […] literature. Due to this lack of knowledge, I think 
that they [junior physicians] do not really experience this pressure coming from 
citations. What really matters here is how the leadership team [senior physicians], 
like myself, decides on care pathways and standards, demonstrates their applica-
tion and uses them on their own” (Interviewee 6). In assuming a guiding role, sen-
ior physicians have to ensure that junior physicians are being trained and socialized 
according to established standards. Junior physicians, because they lack profession-
al expertise, are unable to take into consideration prevailing institutional pressure 
when performing treatment routines. This mediating function of senior physicians 
between the field-level and the organizational routine is illustrated by the same expe-
rienced physician: “Well, I am fully aware of this filter function – it is highly rele-
vant. […] Considering the larger context, there certainly is considerable pressure 
[to enact a highly institutionalized care pathway]. However, this does not really af-
fect the junior physicians directly. It’s more like we [senior physicians] mediate this 
[pressure], and only then will junior physicians experience it as well” (Interviewee 
6). 
Taken together, three different levels of explanatory conditions jointly foster the 
enactment of care pathways: Experienced routine participants are most susceptible 
to institutional pressures due to their exposed position as role models and task char-
acteristics allow peers to easily identify systematic deviations from a pathway. In 
this configuration, rules are likely to become enacted across routine iterations, as 
they support routine participants in securing their professional status in a situation 
in which their high professional expertise puts them under particular pressure to 
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continuously respond to the strong social expectations prescribing the enactment of 
written rules as appropriate behavior, while high task frequency increases the 
chances that deviant behavior will be detected. Written rules help to secure routine 
participants’ status by providing a means to guide routine performances, thereby 
visibly complying with the institutional pressures that weigh particularly strong on 
highly experienced routine participants who are expected to translate established 
standards for junior professionals. Further, the enactment of written rules secures 
routine participants’ status by supporting them when accounting for their routine 
performances.  
Situation 3: Surviving Stress 
Solution 3 suggests that low levels of professional expertise in conjunction with 
low institutional pressure, low task complexity, and high task frequency are suffi-
cient for the enactment of care pathways. The expert discussions revealed that in 
these situations, surviving stress is a dominant mechanism driving the enactment of 
written organizational rules. Departments employing mostly unexperienced routine 
participants can hardly provide constant close supervision by experienced routine 
participants. When reflecting on this situation one junior physician stated: “When I 
first started working here, someone plunked down a ring binder next to me, telling 
me to get going. The folder contained all basic care pathways I needed to know 
when working here; however, it still was a 5 cm folder! […] You had to work that 
thing through in order to know how to accomplish your first shift on your own” 
(Interviewee 1). Another junior physician reiterated: “[…] such a guideline is the 
best thing that can happen to you; in particular when you’re an inexperienced 
newbie, you’re in constant need of guidance. However, the problem is that you 
won’t receive constant guidance by senior physicians […]” (Interviewee 4). De-
spite their lack of expertise, junior physicians are expected to address non-complex 
but frequent tasks in a professional and efficient manner. As a junior physician 
from the expert discussions pointed out, inability to address such tasks independent-
ly commonly leads to uncomfortable situations – both by demonstrating medical 
incapacity and by delaying interdependent treatment routines: “[It’s] not necessari-
ly embarrassing, but annoying to yourself if you constantly have to ask someone: 
‘Listen, I don’t know this stuff – can you help me out one more time?’. That be-
comes really tedious after some time” (Interviewee 4). 
In this situation, routine dynamics are likely to foster rule enactment, as routine par-
ticipants with limited professional expertise can draw on written rules for guidance 
and reflection on their experiences. Low levels of professional expertise in a de-
partment imply that most routine participants have not yet developed elaborate os-
tensive aspects to guide their routine performance. A senior physician illustrated: 
“As a junior physician, you‘re extremely happy if you can draw on standard oper-
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ating procedures (e.g., care pathways, the authors) - because then you have some-
thing you can stick to. You’re not in a situation where you have to decide complete-
ly on your own. Instead, you have a standard operating procedure which tells you 
exactly what to do under which circumstances” (Interviewee 8). The low task com-
plexity in this situation places routine participants under the pressure of completing 
tasks without seeking constant guidance by senior physicians, as tasks of this kind 
are easily comprehensible and highly analyzable. While failing at low complexity 
tasks hardly threatens patient life, lacking thoroughly developed ostensive aspects 
may cause stress in departments primarily staffed with junior physicians. Without 
institutionalized standards available on the field-level, such local demands for guid-
ance are addressed by highly idiosyncratic care pathways. Such written organiza-
tional rules may represent an adequate substitute for incomplete ostensive aspects 
and lack of personal guidance by seniors. 
In summary, the findings suggest that under conditions of high task frequency, in-
experienced actors are more likely to inappropriately execute treatment routines 
and, as a consequence, must justify their routine performances more often. Having 
performed a routine in accordance with a locally developed written rule will aid 
inexperienced routine participants in accounting for the actions taken. The enact-
ment of rules will minimize sanctions for failing at relatively easy tasks, as adhering 
to written rules implies that routine participants performed a routine not only to the 
best of their knowledge but also to the best of general knowledge within the de-
partment. In this configuration, rules are likely to become enacted across routine 
iterations, as they support routine participants in surviving stress. The enactment of 
rules serves as a resource to routine participants that allows them to survive stress, 
because rules guide inexperienced routine participants with weakly developed os-
tensive aspects while at the same time supporting inexperienced actors in account-
ing for their performance whenever undesired outcomes arise in these frequent rou-
tine performances. 
A Configurational Model of Rule Enactment 
Across the three sufficient conditions of care-pathway enactment, this study finds 
that professionals enact written rules when routine participants face conditions 
where written rules serve as resources. Written rules become resources when they 
enable routine participants to perform an organizational routine. To perform an or-
ganizational routine, participants have to successfully coordinate their individual 
actions (Dionysiou & Tsoukas, 2013; Jarzabkowski, Lê, & Feldman, 2012). Fur-
thermore, routine performances must be considered legitimate by peers. To achieve 
both coordination and legitimization, routine participants can draw on written rules. 
Written rules can serve as guides to coordinate routine performances, as sources to 
account for routine performances, and as labels when referring to routine perfor-
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mances. Written rules therefore may serve as resources for routine participants 
when engaging in the processes that link the ostensive to the performative aspect of 
an organizational routine. Conversely, written rules may also serve as resources in 
linking the performative to the ostensive aspects of organizational routines. 
The findings of this study demonstrate that written rules are only invoked when 
specific situations challenge routine participants in guiding, referring to, and ac-
counting for routine performances, because of increased coordination needs or strict 
behavioral expectations reflected by the institutional environment. For example, in 
Solution 3 (“surviving stress”) routine participants are likely to quickly integrate the 
enactment of a written rule into their representation of the routine (i.e., the ostensive 
aspect), as they frequently execute a routine that addresses a treatment of little 
complexity. In this situation, the rule will most likely work as an efficient coordina-
tion device while also compensating for the routine participant’s lack of profession-
al expertise. Given this configuration of conditions, routine participants are likely to 
experience frequent and positive feedback from enacting a care pathway, a result 
that contributes to the enactment of the written rule in future performances of the 
organizational routine. Figure 6.1 depicts a configurational model of rule enact-
ment. 
 











This model shows how the interplay between the ostensive and performative aspect 
of a routine fosters rule enactment. Based on the empirical analysis, this model dis-
tinguishes between rule resourcing and rule experiencing as antecedents to rule en-
actment. Rule resourcing takes place whenever routine participants find themselves 
in a situation in which they enact a written rule, as it provides a resource in guiding, 
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accounting for, and referring to routine performances. Depending on the experienc-
es that follow from each routine performance incorporating the written rule, the 
performative aspect (which includes the enactment of a written rule) creates and 
maintains an ostensive aspect that includes rule enactment as an important element 
of routine participants’ shared representation of the routine. 
Going back to the empirical data, the interview data suggests that in Solutions 1 and 
2, routine participants find themselves in a situation in which they face social pres-
sures to conform to what is deemed appropriate conduct in the eyes of field-level 
stakeholders (e.g., professional associations or federal bodies) as well as peers, 
while at the same time are confronted with task characteristics that increase the risk 
associated with failure to do so. In Solution 3, routine participants find themselves 
under high pressure to perform routines appropriately and efficiently without exper-
tise to guide their performance. 
In all three configurations, the way in which routine participants’ ostensive aspect 
guides, accounts for, and refers to their performance needs to satisfy multilevel de-
mands encompassing institutional, organizational, and task conditions to ensure 
appropriate conduct and efficient coordination. The analysis therefore underscores 
that the dynamics of organizational routines not only depend on internal organiza-
tional contexts (Howard-Grenville, 2005) but also on external institutional contexts. 
Furthermore, the finding of three equifinal solutions supports the notion established 
by some researchers that organizational routine dynamics are subject to equifinal 
processes. Only a few single-case studies have indicated that multiple ontological 
levels influence routine dynamics (e.g., Howard-Grenville, 2005; Rerup & 
Feldman, 2011). Equifinality in routine dynamics has been mostly implied by exist-
ing research but rarely studied empirically (Pentland, Hærem, & Hillison, 2010: 
933). 
6.3.6 Limitations and Conclusion 
The enactment of written rules by professionals can be explained by their function 
as a resource linking the ostensive to the performative routine aspect and the expe-
riences derived from the routine performances incorporating the written rule. The 
present analysis substantiates but also extends the generative-systems perspective 
on organizational routines. It substantiates the generative-systems perspective in 
demonstrating that both conditions influencing rule resourcing (related to processes 
of guiding, accounting for, and referring to performative aspects) as well as condi-
tions influencing rule experience (related to creating, maintaining, and modifying 
ostensive aspects) interact in fostering the enactment of written rules. The analysis 
also extends previous research in the generative-systems tradition. It does so by 
demonstrating that the enactment of written rules is not only subject to specific per-
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formances by specific actors in specific situations, but also follows from the inter-
action of conditions incorporating the institutional, organizational, and task level. 
This finding should remind researchers theorizing about routines as generative sys-
tems to consider the different contexts in which routines are performed. Failure to 
do so might result in incomplete descriptions and interpretations of phenomena. 
This study suggests that theories of organizational routines need to be broadened to 
include multilevel dynamics in order to explain the enactment of written rules in 
organizational routines in professional organizations. Based on the empirical analy-
sis of rule enactment, this study proposes a configurational model of rule enactment 
that incorporates external and internal organizational context. Accordingly, it ex-
pands the generative-systems perspective on routines by contributing theory and 
data that explicitly address context as an oftentimes neglected influence (Parmigiani 
& Howard-Grenville, 2011). In conclusion, this study proposes a “routines-in-
situations perspective” to explain routine dynamics and rule enactment. 
This study aims to explain an empirical phenomenon – the enactment of written 
organizational rules by professionals – for which the relevance for organizational 
survival and performance has been extensively documented by research on profes-
sional organizations (cf., Heugens & Lander, 2009). However, we still lack research 
that examines the enactment of written organizational rules by professionals in or-
ganizational routines. While this inquiry addresses this research gap, the sample of 
this study includes a relatively small number of organizational routines. Although 
other qualitative studies on organizational routines incorporate a comparable or 
smaller number of routines (e.g., Feldman, 2000; Howard-Grenville, 2005), any 
generalizations drawn from the present study should consider this limitation. For 
example, it cannot be claimed that the sufficient solutions apply to every type of 
written rule enacted for every routine in every form of organization. Another poten-
tial limitation is that all organizational routines in the sample are executed within 
internal-medicine departments at German university hospitals. However, the cali-
bration procedure included in the fsQCA mitigates this shortcoming, since the set-
membership values were not defined according to the sample’s means, but rather 
according to exogenous standards (e.g., population means). This design reduces the 
necessity of employing a representative sample for generalization (Fiss, 2011). 
Therefore, this study’s findings should also apply to treatment routines in other 
hospital departments or non-university hospitals. 
Since hospitals are an extreme in terms of knowledge-intensive and competitive 
professional organizations, they offer substantial learning opportunities for compa-
rable professional organizations (cf., Adler, 2003). That said, this study’s findings 
cannot be generalized to organizational routines that are executed within non-
professional organizations – settings which provide an interesting area for further 
research. Furthermore, the present study draws on data aggregated across individual 
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routine participants. Given that organizational routines are usually performed with-
in a social context constituted by more or less experienced actors, the measure ap-
pears appropriate for the present study. Future research could expand on these find-
ings and employ ethnographic methods to study more closely the interaction of 
multiple actors and their interaction processes causing the enactment of rules in 
routines. Such research seems particularly promising when considering the impact 
of prior ethnographic work on hospitals (Kellogg, 2009) and the initial implementa-
tion of written rules in routines (Lazaric & Denis, 2005; Reynaud, 2005). 
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7 Discussion and Conclusion 
This dissertation started out with the question on professionals’ role in processes of 
institutional change and stability. If nothing else, the preceding chapters have 
shown that the different contexts in which professionals operate have to be taken 
into account to explain, when, why, and how professionals exert institutional work. 
In the course of this last chapter I will elaborate in more detail on how institutional 
research could profit from a more contextualized conceptualization of profession-
als’ institutional work that takes into account that the archetypical ‘professional’ 
simply does not exist. First, I will discuss how the conceptual idea of professionals 
as contextually embedded boundary workers is reflected in each of the empirical 
studies presented above. Further, I will elaborate on how the studies presented 
above relate to extant research and how they contribute to the study of profession-
als’ role in institutional dynamics. Second, I will discuss the limitations of this the-
sis before closing with a concise summary of its main findings and implications. 
7.1 The Context-Dependency of Professionals’ Institutional 
Work 
This dissertation contributes to research on professionals’ role in institutional dy-
namics by suggesting a more nuanced view on professionals as contextually em-
bedded actors who are more heterogeneous than current research suggests (e.g. 
Suddaby & Viale, 2011).   
Recent institutional research has focused its attention on the professional as a spe-
cial kind of social actor that often critically influences whether and how institutions 
change (Currie et al., 2012; DiMaggio, 1991; Greenwood et al., 2002; Kitchener & 
Mertz, 2012; Leicht & Fennell, 2008; Muzio et al., 2013; Scott, 2008b; Suddaby & 
Viale, 2011). Yet, reflecting the heritage of trait-based approaches to the profes-
sions (Carr-Saunders & Wilson, 1964; Etzioni, 1969) and early neo-
institutionalists’ interest in sources of structural stability (Zucker, 1977), profes-
sionals have often been conceptualized as homogenous group of actors (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983) and powerful defenders and promoters of their professional logic 
(e.g. Ackroyd, 1996; Currie et al., 2012; Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006; Micelotta & 
Washington, 2013).  
While both sociologists and institutionalists have proposed that there may be con-
siderable differences within and between different professions with regard to their 
basis of authority and their status (Abbott, 1981; Scott, 2008b), this insight has yet 
to fully translate into the study of professionals’ institutional work. For example, 
Scott (2008a: 227-228) differentiates between creative, carrier, and clinical profes-
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sionals. According to him, creative professionals establish the institutional frame-
work along which their profession is structured and are mostly to be found in re-
search and teaching facilities (ibd.: 227). These professionals, as Scott (2008a: 227) 
points out, enjoy the highest status within a profession. Carrier professionals, in 
turn, diffuse these professional frameworks into organizations in their roles as edu-
cators (e.g. lawyers or consultants) while clinical professionals – the largest sub-
group of a profession – “apply professional principles to the solution of problems 
presented by individual clients” (ibd.: 228).  Yet, despite identifying these multiple 
sub-groups within a profession, Scott’s (2008a: 219) idea of professionals as “lords 
of the dance” and “most influential, contemporary crafters of institutions” (ibd.: 
223) leave little room for the conceptualization of professionals as heterogeneous 
groups of actors whose potential to shape institutional arrangements may differ 
considerably.   
Each empirical study of this thesis provides insights that shed a critical light on the 
concept of ‘the professionals’ as a specific, largely homogenous group of institu-
tional agents. In particular, study 1 of this thesis suggests that professionals’ institu-
tional work is strongly affected by their relative status within a field. While both 
physicians and nurses have been conceptualized as profession of some sort (Abbott 
& Meerabeau, 1998: 3), study 1 shows that they differ considerably with regard to 
their access to discursive means as important – if not most important – tools of in-
stitutional work on the field-level. In effect,  the findings of this critical discourse 
study suggest that the professional project of low-status professionals does not only 
occur at their regulatory and task boundaries with adjacent (high-status) professions 
(Abbott, 1988, 1995) but within the meaning systems provided by the high-status 
actors of a field.  For the study of professionals’ role in institutional dynamics, this 
insight is important insofar as it illustrates how professionals may add to both insti-
tutional change and stability at the same time. While nurses actively challenged the 
paradigm of medical dominance in German health care, they reinforced the medical 
professions’ right to define the objects around which the field-level discourse re-
volved. Further, study 1 underlines the need to differentiate between different kinds 
of professionals who, for example, differ in their relative field-status and hence 
their access to discursive means of agency.  
Tightly linked to this first insight that professionals are generally heterogeneous 
with regard to their inherent ability to create, maintain, and disrupt institutions is the 
second and – arguably –  major contribution of this thesis, that is, the conceptual 
and empirical advancement of our understanding of how professionals’ contextual 
embeddedness affects when, why, and how they exert agency.  
Recent conceptual work has emphasized that professionals’ embeddedness in dif-
ferent field- and organizational contexts may critically affect whether and how they 
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engage in institutional dynamics and may even bring about different “forms of pro-
fessionalism” (Muzio et al., 2013: 703). Adding to the growing number of research 
that studies professionals’ institutional work in context (Currie et al., 2012; 
McCann et al., 2013; Reay et al., 2006; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013; Smets et al., 
2012), this thesis has tried to provide a more systematic view on professionals as 
embedded institutional agents. On the conceptual level, it advances current research 
by integrating sociologists’ idea of professionals as ‘boundary workers’ (Abbott, 
1988, 1995; Chreim et al., 2013; Fournier, 2000; Gieryn, 1983; Kilpatrick et al., 
2012) with institutionalists’ conceptualization of institutional dynamics as shifts in 
logic constellations (Zilber, 2013). Specifically, I suggested that professionals’ in-
stitutional work can be described as boundary work to in- or exclude logics. This 
conceptual model of professionals’ institutional work as boundary work between 
multiple logics stands in explicit contrast to earlier research that implied that pro-
fessionals mostly engage in agency to promote and defend their professional logic. 
Accommodating the reality of many professionals, this model acknowledges that 
professionals are often exposed to several logics at the same time and that the mere 
maintenance and defense of their professional logics is often neither feasible nor 
desirable against the contextual boundary conditions of their work (Goodrick & 
Reay, 2011; Harris et al., 2014; Kitchener & Mertz, 2012; Reay & Hinings, 2009). 
Professionals may selectively in- and exclude logics while fulfilling their organiza-
tional and professional roles and while exerting their routines. This kind of institu-
tional work – while leading to the maintenance or change of logic constellations in 
routines, organizations, and eventually fields – is often driven by pragmatic consid-
erations as professionals, like most employees in organizations, are interested in 
‘getting the job done’ (see e.g. Smets & Jarzabkowksi, 2013: 1304). However, the 
inclusion of non-professional logics in their routines and roles is not always owed 
to the fact that efficiency considerations override professionals’ political interests. 
As shown by extant research, professionals may even purposefully enact non-
professional logics to advance their professional project (e.g. Greenwood et al., 
2002; Salhani & Coulter, 2009). A particularly illustrative example for this is prob-
ably the enactment of managerial logics by low-status professionals to gain influ-
ence and status through the organizational hierarchy (Kirkpatrick et al., 2011).  
While the conceptual model of professionals’ institutional work as boundary work 
suggests that whether and how professionals combine (specific elements of) differ-
ent logics is dependent on the contexts in which they are embedded, the empirical 
studies of this thesis – study 2 and 3 in particular – systematically examine how 
configurations of contextual conditions affect professionals’ institutional agency. 
These studies advance institutional research by transcending the level of individual, 
in-depth case studies on professionals’ institutional work while maintaining the 
richness of qualitative research. In doing so, they answer explicit calls to employ 
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comparative qualitative analysis to gain more insights into the antecedents and pro-
cesses of institutional agency (Battilana et al., 2009: 95). 
These two papers illustrate well why it is so important to account for professionals’ 
contextual embeddedness to explain when, why, and how they exert institutional 
work. Specifically, the studies in sections 5.3 and 6.3 provide insights on how con-
figurations of contextual conditions may add to the development of what Muzio et 
al. (2013: 703) identify as different “forms of professionalism”. Both studies show 
that professionals’ contextual embeddedness may effectively lead to a divergence 
of the highly political professional project on the field-level and the more pragmatic 
and implicit professional projects on the organization- and routine-level.  
Study 2 illustrates that even when new task-spheres and corresponding role changes 
are promoted as an important step towards nursing professionalization by field-
level actors, these changes only translate to the organizational level when specific 
boundary conditions are met. Examining when and why nursing professionals in 
German university hospitals are open to changes in institutionalized task-divisions 
between nurses and physicians, I found three different configurations of boundary 
conditions which were summarized as ‘Pragmatic Progress’ (high functional and 
low institutional pressure), ‘Authorized Professionalism’ (high institutional pres-
sure and involvement of a high-status change agent in a change project with low 
divergence), and ‘Guided Professionalization’ (low institutional pressure and in-
volvement of a high-status change agent in a change project with high divergence). 
These types of configurations all have in common that they provided nurses with 
both normative and pragmatic rationales that jointly fostered nurses’ openness to-
wards changes in their task responsibilities. While tentative, this finding implies 
that within organizations, professionals simultaneously enact elements of their pro-
fessional logic and the corporate logic of efficiency and – under specific circum-
stances – even primarily base their reaction towards change on its implications for 
process efficiency (for more detail see 6.3.4).  
I would like to specifically focus on the configurations of ‘Pragmatic Progress’ 
(high functional and low institutional pressure) and ‘Authorized Professionalism’ as 
these offer additional insights on when and why professional projects on the field-
level may be misaligned with professionals’ institutional agency within their organ-
ization. The situation that I called ‘Pragmatic Progress’ is characterized by high 
functional and low institutional pressure, leading nurses to primarily focus on how 
new task-divisions could increase process efficiency. Additionally, the lack of ad-
vanced nursing training in the respective departments made the logic of ‘nursing 
professionalism’ far less salient than on the field-level. This resulted in an interest-
ing combination of visible structural progress and conservatism in the underlying 
rationales. While nurses were open towards new task responsibilities, they provided 
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legitimization accounts that were at cross with the professional project on the field-
level as it promoted typical elements of the traditional nursing logic of “uncondi-
tional care” (Kirpal, 2004: 217). Specifically, nurses emphasized their interest in 
putting the patients’ needs first while disregarding the implications of new task re-
sponsibilities for the development of nursing as a profession. In sum, this solution 
provides insights on how professionals’ embeddedness in a specific organizational 
situation may detach them from their professional project on the field-level: It 
shows how strong functional pressures together with a local absence (or at least 
underrepresentation) of the field-level ‘professional logic’ may lead to the devel-
opment of a conservative professional project that only appears to be in line with 
the progressive professional project on the field-level but indeed follows different 
rationales.  
Solution 2 of this study, that is, ‘Authorized Professionalism’ (high institutional 
pressure and involvement of a high-status change agent in a change project with 
low divergence), in turn, illustrates that even if professionals reproduce the profes-
sional project on the field-level by viewing new task responsibilities as an adequate 
reflection of nurses’ growing professional expertise, their openness towards change 
may be fragile. Interestingly, the enactment of confident nursing professionalism 
which was strongly promoted by nursing representatives on the field-level (see also 
study 1) did not only translate into the confident assumption of new tasks but also 
in the confident demarcation of nursing from medical work that became especially 
relevant when nurses felt that physicians could benefit from new modes of task di-
vision at nurses’ expense. Accordingly, nurses’ generally open stance towards new 
task responsibilities was owed to the specific interaction of the given boundary 
conditions. The involvement of high-status change agents was important for the 
change project to become an official acknowledgement of nurses’ high qualification 
in these departments while the low divergence of the project itself implied that the 
changes in task responsibilities were small enough to not be considered much addi-
tional work strain and thus be tolerated. This solution underlines particularly well 
that scholars should not only generally account for the contexts in which profes-
sionals are embedded but also employ comparative methods that allow for a holistic 
evaluation of their institutional work in context as it may be the idiosyncratic inter-
action of conditions that critically informs when, why, and how professionals en-
gage in institutional dynamics.  
How professionals’ contextual embeddedness shapes their institutional agency in a 
way that creates an explicit contrast between field-level professional projects and 
the behavior of clinical professionals is further illustrated by study 3 of this thesis. 
Specifically, this study accounted for the multi-level embeddedness of profession-
als’ routines in fields, organizations, and immediate task environments when trying 
to answer the question of when and why medical professionals enact rules in their 
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routines. As elaborated on in chapter 6.3, German health care is characterized by 
pressures towards increased efficiency and accountability while representatives of 
the medical profession openly spoke out against the standardization of medical 
practice and the enactment of care pathways in particular. With the enactment of 
care pathways physicians integrate the “logic of efficiency and accountability” into 
their routines, thus laying the foundation to change in the medical profession from 
the bottom-up (Adler and Kwon, 2013: 954). At the same time – at least in the spe-
cific case of the German medical profession – the enactment of care pathways in 
medical routines constitutes a contradiction with the recommendations of the pro-
fessional associations on the field-level. The findings of this study suggest that phy-
sicians enact care pathways in their routines when they perceive them to be ‘re-
sources’ to support coordination and/or legitimization of their routine performanc-
es.  
Interestingly, the findings do not only support the idea that professionals’ subtle 
institutional work within their routines is driven by the practical necessities of their 
daily tasks and occurs along the way of staying on top of one’s work (see specifi-
cally Solution 3 ‘Surviving Stress’).  Instead, the findings also suggest that profes-
sionals include care pathways (and thus the logic of efficiency that these rules con-
vey) into their daily work in an attempt to secure their professional status. Solution 
2, which was named ‘Securing Status’, exhibits a mechanism behind rule enactment 
that illustrates well how institutional and functional pressures interact to detach pro-
fessionals from the political agenda of their profession on the field not in spite of 
but because of their goal to secure their status as legitimate professional.  
In the case of German health care this paradox situation could occur as the field-
level pressures on medical professionals were complex and did not prescribe a 
dominant set of behavioral expectations for clinical professionals. On the one side, 
the enactment of pathways has been publicly decried by as “cookbook medicine” 
(Sturm, 2013: 223) undermining professional autonomy and the sacred relationship 
between a physician and his patient (see section 6.1). On the other side, representa-
tives of the medical profession spoke out for the application of evidence-based 
medicine in the medical profession’s tradition of applying scientifically proven, 
state-of-the-art knowledge. Against the background that the routine participants in 
Solution 2 were physicians with high levels of expertise facing frequently occurring 
tasks, the enactment of professional autonomy was obviously less important to 
them than the demonstration of state-of-the-art medicine. As further interview evi-
dence suggested, physicians tried to secure their status as knowledgeable and expe-
rienced professionals because of their function as teachers and role models to young 
physicians. Interestingly, they saw themselves as both translators and creators of 
institutional expectations according to which young professionals should be social-
ized. Accordingly, the enactment of care pathways at the expense of fully autono-
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mous conduct was not merely a performative pattern of physicians with high levels 
of expertise who sought to consistently demonstrate their ability to keep their 
treatments in line with the latest scientific findings. Rather, as senior physicians are 
local providers of professional socialization and high-status peers to junior physi-
cians, their enactment of pathways also promoted the reliance on formal rules as an 
appropriate element of medical treatment routines. Accordingly, this situation illus-
trates well how professionals’ response to practical problems in idiosyncratic con-
texts paves the way for bottom-up institutional change (see also: Adler & Kwon, 
2013; Smets et al., 2012): The enactment of care pathways by physicians with high 
expertise stands not only in explicit contrast to the promotion of medical autonomy 
by field-level representatives but – as these professionals are perceived as legiti-
mate mediators of field-level expectations –  also leads to a socialization of junior 
physicians into professional roles that are incommensurable with these top-down 
pressures. These socialization processes by frontline practitioners can be conceptu-
alized as disruptive institutional work since they promote the normative appropri-
ateness of standardizing medical practice und thus contribute to the diffusion of 
new views on medical professionalism.  
Overall, both the conceptual and the empirical parts of this thesis have contributed 
to a more systematic understanding of how professionals’ contextual embeddedness 
in systems of meaning and tangible structures affects when, why, and how they ex-
ert institutional work. Specifically, this thesis shows that scholars should remain 
cautious when speaking of ‘professionals’ or ‘the professions’ as these are not nec-
essarily homogenous groups of social actors. The contextual embeddedness of pro-
fessionals in fields, organizations, and routines may even – as specifically illustrat-
ed in study 2 and 3 of this thesis – lead to a divergence of a profession’s profession-
al project and the institutional work of individual and collective professional agents. 
This is because their boundary work between different logics may in itself be 
bounded, either when the arenas of institutional agency are being discursively dom-
inated by other actors (study 1) or when real-life working environments make the 
unadulterated enactment of their ideal-type professional logic impossible, inappro-
priate, or inefficient (studies 2 and 3).  
These insights resonate well with Ackroyd’s (1996: 604) idea of “double closure” 
as a precondition for successful professionalization. Double closure refers to the 
combination of a profession’s regulatory closure in the labor market and profes-
sionals’ control of dominant positions within their organizations to maintain and 
reinforce a profession’s status and power (Ackroyd, 1996: 604-605). As already 
pointed out by McCann et al. (2013: 754), institutional work “on the frontline” is 
thus equally important  as professionals’ grand political strategies on the field-level. 
Accordingly, the rise and fall of professions needs to be studied as a multi-level 
phenomenon with specific attention to the different contexts in which professionals 
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operate (see also section 3.2). The insight of this thesis that professionals’ embed-
dedness in ideological and structural contexts may explain the (mis)alignment of 
field-level professional projects and the local enactment of professional logics may 
advance our understanding on why some professions successfully shape their insti-
tutional environment according to their preferences while other professions fail to 
do so. Additionally, scholars should take into account that the conceptualization of 
professionals as being generally interested in the consequent enactment of their pro-
fessional logic which brought about almost paradigmatic dichotomies, such as ‘pro-
fessionals versus managers’ (Dent, 2003; Raelin, 1986) and ‘professions versus the 
state and the market’ (Freidson, 2001; Relman, 2007),  is too simplistic against the 
complex contexts in which professionals are currently embedded and the multiple 
roles they hold (Bode & Maerker, 2014; Doolin, 2001; Kirkpatrick et al., 2011; 
Kuhlmann et al., 2013; Llewellyn, 2001; Thorne, 2002).  As the conceptual sections 
of this thesis suggested and the empirical studies illustrated, professionals may even 
actively promote logic constellations that lie at cross with their profession’s overall 
political goals as contextual conditions ‘activate’ clinical professionals’ own con-
cepts of appropriate behavior which are informed but not determined by their 
membership in a profession.  
In sum, this thesis contributes to institutional research by challenging both old and 
more recent conceptualizations of professions and professionals in institutional lit-
erature. Early conceptualizations of professionals have emphasized their homoge-
neity and their function as sources of structural stability in organizational fields 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Levitt & Nass, 1989; Slack & Hinings, 1994) while 
later work on the professions has added that professionals also serve as powerful 
agents who bring about institutional change as their professional projects “reverber-
ate throughout the field” (Suddaby and Viale, 2011: 426). This dissertation has pro-
vided insights on the contextual forces that promote the enactment of different con-
cepts of professionalism even within the same profession, thereby challenging early 
conceptualizations of professionals as “interchangeable” actors (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983: 152) who solely adhere to their professional norms and thus become 
sources of isomorphism in a field. The effect of contextual embeddedness on pro-
fessionals’ preferences and behavior also challenges more recent ideas of profes-
sionals as powerful agents in institutional change. Professionals are and will always 
be agents of their profession, endowed with certain privileges and deeply concerned 
about the maintenance of professionalism as societal logic from which they derive 
their special status in fields like health care and law (Child & Fulk, 1982; Currie et 
al., 2012; Micelotta & Washington, 2013; Savage & Robertson, 1999). Yet, while 
professionals are, without a doubt, influential actors in socially important fields like 
health care, both the conceptual and the empirical sections of this thesis should 
have provided a case for a cautionary view on professionals as a new kind of insti-
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tutional ‘super-agents’ who single-handedly create and shape institutional contexts. 
While professions are a constitutive pillar of the institutional pressures that charac-
terize a field, professionals as the “inhabitants” (Delbridge & Edwards, 2013; 
Everitt, 2013; Hallett & Ventresca, 2006) of professions are embedded in diverse 
institutional and practical contexts that both enable and constrain agency. Since 
professions cannot exist apart from and beyond their enactment through profession-
als, they emerge, change, and perish in dependence from the contexts in which their 
members operate. Thus, as much as professions shape contexts, contexts shape pro-
fessions.  
To account for the diversity of professionals, future research should consider dis-
tinguishing professionals according to their access to and the relevance of the con-
cept of professionalism to their work (see also: Adler & Kwon, 2013). On the field-
level, different professions may be more or less associated with the societal logic of 
professionalism as study 1 of this thesis underlines: While physicians – as members 
of one of the most traditional professions – casually depicted non-medical 
healthcare professionals as ‘non-professional’, nurses struggled to discursively link 
nursing to the status of a profession. On the organization- and the routine-level, pro-
fessionals may be partially detached from their field-level professional logic due to 
specific role expectations and practical pressures as illustrated by the studies 2 and 
3 of this thesis. Consequently, both a profession’s history and the immediate con-
textual embeddedness of professionals may affect professionals’ reaction to and 
their involvement in institutional dynamics. As elaborated on in the course of this 
thesis, the mere distinction of professionals and non-professionals as different kinds 
of institutional actors provides a very narrow view on professionals’ role in institu-
tional change and maintenance. Differentiating institutional workers according to 
how accessible and relevant professional logics are to them, would, in turn, allow 
researchers to account for professionals’ different professional backgrounds as well 
as their embeddedness in organizations and routines while not neglecting the effects 
of professionalism on institutional work.  
The insight that professions and professionals are just as much shaped by context as 
they shape their institutional contexts also holds managerial implications. Most im-
portantly, it puts the notorious ‘non-manageability’ of professionals (Raelin, 1986, 
1989) into perspective. While professionals are endowed with high degrees of au-
tonomy due to their professional regulation and normally remain in control over the 
operational core of their work (Marcus, 1985), this thesis has shown that (i) profes-
sionals’ openness to changes in their task responsibilities depends on specific con-
stellations of boundary conditions (study 2) and that (ii) the contextual conditions in 
which their routines are embedded may explain whether professionals will enact 
formal rules (study 3). While not all of the contextual conditions that shape profes-
sionals’ susceptibility to managerially motivated change and their motivation to 
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align their work with bureaucratic modes of control can be easily manipulated (e.g. 
institutional pressure from the field), managers might want to consider the specific 
situations into which they try to implement change. Increased awareness of the joint 
effect of different boundary conditions of professionals’ work may facilitate the 
choice of departments when trying to design pilot projects and may support manag-
ers in preparing adequate strategies to overcome resistance to change. This thesis 
highlights such specific boundary conditions (see specifically study 2 and 3). Con-
sequently, while the contributions of this thesis are clearly more theoretical, the 
insights gained from the empirical studies may help managers to guide their atten-
tion and raise their understanding of why professionals react to managerial inter-
ventions the way they do.  
7.2 Limitations and Conclusion 
This dissertation sought to provide a balanced perspective on professionals’ role in 
institutional dynamics that – while acknowledging professionals’ important role in 
fields like health care – examines professionals’ institutional work as embedded 
agency that is critically influenced by context. 
Limitations 
Focusing on German health care and employing qualitative research methods, the 
findings of this thesis are naturally of limited generalizability. While German health 
care is currently characterized by similar changes as most Western health care sys-
tems, that is, marketization and liberalization (see section 2.2), the hierarchical rela-
tions between the different health care professions differ when compared to other 
European countries. Specifically, the traditional dominance of the medical profes-
sion in health care is still very noticeable in Germany and reflected in the medical 
professions’ involvement in the central regulatory bodies of German health care 
(see section 2.1). Accordingly, the findings that pertain to the professional projects 
of the medical and the nursing profession (specifically study 1) may not apply to 
other health care systems.  
Due to its qualitative orientation and its selective focus on specific precursors and 
forms of professionals’ institutional agency, this thesis’ contribution to institutional 
theory must be viewed as only a small piece towards the resolution of a greater the-
oretical puzzle. Specifically, future research should focus more on comparative 
studies between different professions to provide a deeper understanding of how 
similar contextual embeddedness affects the institutional work of different profes-
sions differently. More comparative research appears particularly important since 
more and more occupations make the claim of being recognized as a profession and 
exert practical and political institutional work to promote their professionalization 
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(Cooper & Robson, 2006; Kirkpatrick et al., 2011; Kitchener & Mertz, 2012; Neal 
& Morgan, 2000). While study 1 of this thesis has already provided first insights on 
how a professions’ status within a field may affect professionals’ access to discur-
sive means as tools in institutional work, there is still much need to compare profes-
sions on other dimensions such as age or dependency on organizational contexts 
(e.g. managers, in opposite to lawyers or physicians are inherently dependent on 
their organizational embeddedness to exert their ‘craft’). A potential starting point 
for a more systematic comparison of different professions’ institutional work is 
provided by Adler and Kwon (2013: 934-941), who propose that professions can be 
differentiated according to their degree of autonomy, their distinctive field of exper-
tise, their values, their degree of shared identities, and their ties to critical roles in 
organizations.  
Another potential avenue for further research is the interaction of professionals’ 
institutional work on different levels. While I have pointed towards a potential di-
vergence between professional projects on the routine-, the organization-, and the 
field-level in the preceding discussion, more research is needed to uncover how 
professionals’ agency on these different levels of their work is mutually interde-
pendent. For example, we still know little about how the realities of professional 
practice may undermine political arguments or how practical improvisations may 
escalate to changes in professional regulation and other field-level structures (for a 
notable exception see: Smets et al., 2012).  
Conclusion 
This dissertation sought to add to institutionalists’ understanding on when, why, 
and how professionals engage in the dynamics of institutional change and stability. 
Figure 6.1 provides an overview of the main insights of this thesis, focusing on how 
the three main chapters (4, 5 and 6) complement the conceptual model on profes-
sionals’ institutional work in context (see also figure 3.2).  
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Figure 6.1: Professionals’ Institutional Work as Boundary Work in Context – Findings  
 
 
My thesis started out with an overview on German health care as the empirical set-
ting in which I studied when, why, and how professionals are involved in institu-
tional dynamics (Chapter 2). Given the recent changes in German health care and 
the central importance of professions to this field, German health care proved to be 
a suitable setting for more in-depth analyses on professionals’ institutional work. 
Before theoretically elaborating and empirically examining when, why, and how 
(health care) professionals contribute to institutional change and stability on differ-
ent levels of their work, I provided the conceptual foundation to this thesis (Chapter 
3). Specifically, I elaborated on how conceptualizations of professionals moved 
from trait-based approaches (Greenwood, 1957) to an interactionist perspective 
(Abbott, 1988; Freidson, 1988a) that laid the foundation for institutionalists’ current 
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idea of professions and professionals as institutional agents (Scott, 2008b; Suddaby 
& Viale, 2011). Given that today, most professionals are employed in large organi-
zations and exert their work as participants in organizational routines, I discussed 
how the different contexts in which professionals operate (i.e. fields, organizations, 
and routines) may enable and constrain their institutional agency. Challenging the 
idea that professionals are primarily enacting and defending their professional logic, 
I developed an integrated model that conceptualized professionals’ institutional 
work as boundary work between different logics that allowed a more nuanced view 
on professionals’ agency as embedded in different contexts which promote the en-
actment of diverse logic constellations. 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 – as the three main parts of this thesis – each provided an in-
depth analysis of professionals’ institutional agency on the different levels of their 
work in the empirical setting of German health care. All three chapters exhibit the 
same structure by first elaborating on the relevant developments of German health 
care as empirical background and then providing a literature review that identifies 
major gaps in research before presenting a qualitative empirical study that focuses 
on a selected aspect of professionals’ role in the institutional dynamics of German 
health care.   
Chapter 4 focused on professionals’ role in institutional change on the field-level. 
The main changes in the field of German health care can be described as marketiza-
tion and economic rationalization and provided an opportunity for nurses – as low-
status actors in German health care – to promote their professional project since the 
ever-increasing efficiency pressures led to a general re-evaluation of regulatory and 
task-boundaries between the different health care professions. The literature review 
in the theoretical section of this chapter uncovered that professionals engage in in-
stitutional work when they perceive opportunities or threats to their profession. 
While the existence of opportunities and threats to the status of a profession often 
stems from developments in the larger institutional environment – such as the mar-
ketization of German health care – a professions’ status can also be threatened from 
within as different subgroups promote diverging logic constellations (Dunn & 
Jones, 2010; Ramirez, 2013). The strategies and instruments through which profes-
sionals promote change or stability in a field often rely on leveraging their central 
position in fields and societies as a whole, which gives them the chance to articulate 
their opinion on institutional developments. As institutional dynamics on the field-
level are mainly driven by political processes that include negotiation, profession-
als’ institutional work on this level often occurs through the discursive (de-)legiti-
mization of new institutional arrangements. Accordingly, the empirical study in 
chapter 4.3 focused on how different professionals used discursive means to pro-
mote or prevent change in German health care. Specifically, this study raised the 
question ‘How do political actors in professional fields make use of vocabulary 
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structures to promote or inhibit institutional change?’. Its findings suggest that pro-
fessionals’ relative status within a field explains how they are enabled and con-
strained by the construction of specific vocabularies. Specifically, nurses appeared 
to be ‘caught up’ in the vocabulary structures provided by federal actors and physi-
cians. This study expands extant literature on professionals’ institutional work on 
the field-level by drawing attention to vocabulary construction as a subtle discur-
sive strategy while finding that the reproduction of high-status-actors’ vocabularies 
may lead to ‘bounded boundary work’.  
Chapter 5 provided theoretical and empirical insights on professionals’ institutional 
agency on the organization-level. German health care organizations, under pressure 
by regulatory demands for more efficiency and accountability, have recently estab-
lished new administrative roles such as quality managers which provide new oppor-
tunities for professionals to exert influence in their organization and buffer their 
work against the ever-increasing managerial control. Additionally, the strive for 
efficiency promoted the re-evaluation of task-divisions between medical and nurs-
ing professionals that translated into the proliferation of medical task delegation 
projects. The theoretical section of this chapter showed that within organizations, 
professionals are incentivized to exert institutional work when it promises to allevi-
ate the tensions that result from the integration of different cognitive schemes in 
multi-professional organizations and the ambiguities that professionals experience 
due to conflicts between their organizational roles (e.g. as managers) and their pro-
fessional roles. The strategies and instruments through which professionals foster 
institutional change and stability within their organization differ from those on the 
field-level as organizations provide a unique environment to build inter-
professional alliances since organizational hierarchies comprise an additional di-
mension along which groups can form. Further, professionals may utilize organiza-
tional structures like information systems as unobtrusive pathways to promote new 
normative and cognitive frameworks, thereby implementing institutional change 
while borrowing the legitimacy of extant structures.  As research on professionals’ 
institutional agency within their organization has been much concerned with re-
sistance and the maintenance of professional logics against managerial intervention, 
the empirical study presented in section 5.3 focused on the conditions under which 
professionals are open to changes in institutionalized task-divisions that affect their 
professional roles. Specifically, this study examined the question of when and why 
nursing professionals react openly towards changes in their task responsibilities. 
The findings suggest that boundary conditions of change need to provide nursing 
professionals with both pragmatic and normative legitimization accounts. It added 
to institutional research on the professions by showing that boundary conditions of 
institutional change critically influence how professionals rationalize these changes. 
Specifically, this study illustrated that due to their embeddedness in idiosyncratic 
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constellations of boundary conditions, including both institutional and functional 
pressures, members of the same profession who work in similar organizations and 
express similar reactions to similar changes may, in fact, be guided by different ra-
tionales that imply different role identities.  
Chapter 6 dealt with the most micro-level of professionals’ institutional work, inte-
grating institutional and routine-theoretical perspectives to provide theoretical and 
empirical insights on when, why, and how professionals’ work towards the repro-
duction or disruption of logic constellations within their daily routines. 
This chapter started out with an overview of how German health care professionals’ 
routines have recently been pushed towards standardization, pointing towards a 
conflict between care pathways as an instrument to secure treatment quality and 
efficiency and care pathways as ‘cookbook medicine’ that undermines medical au-
tonomy. The theoretical section of this chapter showed that professionals’ institu-
tional work on the routine-level may be induced by both the mundane feedback 
they draw from their daily routine performances and external interventions that may 
disrupt extant routines. In stark contrast to their political work on the field-level and 
their less dramatic but still noticeable institutional work on the organization-level, 
professionals exert institutional agency on the routine-level along the way of simply 
‘doing their job’ – selectively enacting and rejecting logics in their routine perfor-
mances. Given that bureaucratic means of coordination such as formal rules and 
professional conduct are generally perceived as incommensurable, yet one can in-
creasingly observe the enactment of formal rules in professionals’ routines, the em-
pirical study of this chapter raised the question ‘When and why do professionals 
participating in organizational routines enact written rules?’. Specifically, this study 
explored which configurations of a routines’ boundary conditions (participants’ 
expertise, addressed tasks, and institutional context) cause physicians in university 
hospitals to enact care pathways in their treatment routines. The findings suggest 
that boundary conditions must interact in a way that makes the written rule become 
resource for routine participants. Rules may become a resource for professionals 
when they enable them to demonstrate the social appropriateness of their actions 
and/or to raise coordinative efficiency against the specific work situations in which 
they find themselves.  
In the discussion in the preceding section of this thesis, I argued that despite the 
different foci of each study of this thesis, they are united in their conclusion that 
professionals’ institutional agency needs to be studied in context to fully understand 
when, why, and how professionals engage in institutional dynamics. The considera-
tion of not only the social but also the practical boundary conditions of profession-
als’ institutional work may help to foster a more nuanced view on professionals 
who – while being powerful institutional agents in such important fields as health 
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care – are not a new kind of ‘institutional super-hero’. Specifically, scholars should 
remain cautious to acknowledge that different professional groups may differ con-
siderably with regard to their ability to shape their institutional environment. Even 
professionals within the same profession may enact diverging logic constellations 
since their professional membership, while strongly affecting their identity, does 
not – unlike early (neo-)institutionalists suggested – make them interchangeable 
actors. Against their multiple embeddedness in fields, organizations, and routines, 
actors within the same profession are often neither interested in promoting the same 
institutional structures and practices nor are they equally able to exert agency. Con-
sequently, while this thesis could provide first insights on when, why, and how pro-
fessionals engage in institutional change and stability, it would be presumptuous to 
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